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“What this means I do not know”: Loss and Rumors of Loss (Prophetic Maharaja Book Event)

By: APS
6 May 2025 at 07:49
Jack Whitten, Atlantis Rising

In his introduction to this book event, SherAli makes reference to a formulation of Talal Asad that I have found to be haunting as a regulative ideal: “Life is essentially itself.” The truth of this is what makes friendship appear across the symbolic register, but also requires attention to the ways that each term—life, being, essence, itself—may be captured within the colonial frame and betray friendship that remains impossible. For me, this brings to mind a guilty pleasure of mine, romantic comedies. Specifically, romantic comedies that take interracial relationships as their focus. In those films there is often a scene where the two protagonists come face to face with the reality of trying to love each other in a world where their racial identity matters and structures how they might live. For example, in the (admittedly middling) 2023 film You People, Ezra (Jonah Hill) and Amira (Lauren London) fall in love and are able to inhabit that space together joyfully and erotically. That is until they make their relationship known to their respective Jewish and Black communities. Once they make their love visible within the community—casting their love as subject to what the community is able see—they confront the reality that who they “really” are is not unmoored from how they inhabit the world within the symbolic register. That they love each other in a way immanent only to themselves is no less true than the reality that they must face being racialized within the world that imposes distance and transcendence to their experience. 

Reference to such a middle-brow film might seem strange in the context of engagement with such a rich text as Rajbir Singh Judge’s Prophetic Maharaja, but what is common despite the low and high-quality of the two is a kind of yearning for the impossible while having to contend with the reality of loss, and rumors of even greater losses. The abyss between a shared life that is only immanent to itself and life that can only be communicated through the symbolic might be another way to describe loss. Attention to this gap might be another name for mourning and melancholia. Rajbir’s book—which flows between the historical and deeply theoretical, all while deftly dealing with the imposing demands of a historico-disciplinary institutional machine—offers no simple nostalgia for a lost sovereignty, nor a kind of defense of a future sovereignty to-come. In a line that is undeniable in its understated desire, and draws me in for that reason, Rajbir writes, “I am ambivalent about loss, affirming and denying it, resisting it and acknowledging it, working through it and against it, and interrogating its nature, its ground or presuppositions, its form and its failures. […] the book does not provide a theorization of loss but dwells in the various rhythms of loss (13, emphasis mine).” 

Part of what has been lost, I take Rajbir to be teaching us, is even the ability to see what has been lost clearly. What is the rhythm that emerges when the Sikh community is drawn toward the possibility of a lost sovereignty when the language of that loss is irreparably changed by the presupposition of “a Christian paradigm (8)”? Might we even say the language is “infected” or is this too much? Does that notion of infection not itself presuppose a Christian paradigm of biopolitics? Instead, maybe we can say the rhythm is now inflected, but still the rhythms that were are now no longer. They are new, which is perhaps something to mourn, but can the loss even be related to when this new beat, this new notion, remains stuck in our head? Ambivalence becomes a powerful stance here.

This relation to loss is what I think allows Rajbir something unique and rare in academic work today, especially academic work in the so-called Western academy that often relegates work like this to “area studies” or even to the discipline of history itself, sold as it is amongst a million different cultures where stories can be heard and understood. The nefarious nature of Christian-secular hegemony also creates spaces within the Western academy where borders are policed in the name of fighting for some form of recovery, where seemingly “provincial” concepts get recast into and for Western academia. Rajbir’s book moves with a kind of beloved ambivalence between concepts of European origin and those of Sikh tradition. He passes across these borders seemingly without anxiety, precisely because this ambiguous relationship to loss undermines claims that some final or complete knowledge of Duleep Singh will be found anywhere. What the Punjab and Europe share in common is not an understanding of sovereignty, but that they “appear to have ‘failed’ (13)”. Failure is common across the divide, across the traditions, across lives lived essentially as themselves. 

I find that there’s something enjoyable, even if is not reparative, in knowing that even if the colonists think they’ve won, my god, how they have failed! How much they have lost! I realize that Rajbir’s book is not about the colonizers, but given my own relationship to colonialism, I did find myself thinking of them. I don’t know if this is failure and I can accept it if it is. But I was drawn in particular to the concept of “rumor” in the book, a form of knowledge that is totally lost on the colonizers. I think rumor identifies another resource that works on loss (like mourning and melancholia) and is truly a philosophical concept. I was drawn at first to the way that rumor is described by Rajbir as exceeding what the colonizers’ can understand, what they can know. For example, in the chapter following “Rumor,” we find the British consular agent in Pondicherry reporting on the rumored increase in supporters of Sindhanwalia (who was working to restore the Maharajah to the throne) with the admission, “what this means I do not know (156).”  

Rumor is a kind of knowledge, but without clear or secure meaning. Rajbir connects such an understanding of rumor to gossip, “Rumor and gossip contest the tightknit relationships between public and private, outer and inner, world and home, central to both colonial rule and nationalist thought (117).” Agamben turns to gossip as a philosophical idea in his book on St. Paul, The Time That Remains. He doesn’t fully flesh out the idea, but I find his description as fascinating as it is dense: 

This does not mean that gossip cannot be interesting; on the contrary, to the extent that it entertains a nontrivial relation to truth that eludes the problem of verification and falsification and claims to be closer to truth than factual adequation, gossip is certainly a form of art. The peculiarity of its epistemological status lies in the fact that in itself it accounts for the possibility of an error that does not entirely undermine the definition of truth. Intelligent gossip therefore interests us independently of its verifiable character. That said, to treat gossip as though it were information is truly an unforgivable apaideusia [lack of refinement] (Agamben, p. 8).

Gossip does not have to be accurate in order for it to be closer to truth than fact is. Yet, the truth gossip is close to is still far from being information. When Agamben tells us that it is inelegant to treat gossip in this way, we can extend the argument logically to see that treating information as if it were truth is equally as ignoble. This confusion of truth and information, even a fear of gossip and rumor, is at play when the colonial occupiers work to categorize and track individuals as information amongst the Sikh community. 

Is rumor, as Rajbir describes and traces it, distinct from Agamben’s philosophical gossip? If gossip in Agamben’s text brings to mind catty scholars leaning in over drinks to share what they heard, rumor has a distinctly more insurgent character. Rajbir builds upon Ranajit Guha’s argument that, “As a spoken utterance, rumor, […] was central in creating rebellion in the colonial era, since rumor spread more urgently and dynamically than the written word (118).” Fanon, who appears elsewhere in this text, might also be instructive here, writing in the “On Violence” chapter of The Wretched of the Earth

Colonized peoples are not alone. Despite the efforts of colonialism, their frontiers remain permeable to news and rumors. They discover that violence is atmospheric, it breaks out sporadically, and here and there sweeps away the colonial regime. The success of this violence plays not only an informative role but also an operative one (Fanon, p. 30).

Rumor is insurgent because its relation to law in the political realm shares something with gossip’s relation to truth in the metaphysical realm. Colonial violence is presented as law which hides its identity as violence through the myth of meaning. Colonialism’s conception of the law is mythic in structure because law presents itself as the meaning of violence. The way that rumors can spread, both anonymously and without the requirement that the speaker or the hearer believe in the rumor, reveals the underlying disjuncture of law and truth. The distinction that Walter Benjamin finds in his “Critique of Violence” is that between law, taken to be universal, and justice, which is always particular. 

Rajbir’s conception of rumor again returns us to the question of the community and tradition that runs throughout his book and is both a place of dwelling with loss and what is lost. In the discussion of rumor we see Rajbir repeating a structure that flows out of the his stated relationship to loss. On the one side, the community and tradition are real and operative, “Though open to improvisation, rumor remains grounded in local credibility, within the parameters of tradition” (119). Rumor is not universal, and when the British attempt to turn it into information, they will necessarily miss what it has said, may say, and is saying. The particularity of the community is what allows rumor to remain rumor, to let it speak truth without turning it into a dead letter of information or law.

On the other side, though, rumor “is not simply about local credibility or precoded political thinking, but about disjuncture and displacement, which both creates and restricts possibility for political struggle (ibid, emphasis mine).” Rumor, and the insurgent violence that may emerge from it, is not a simple matter of the community’s moral affirmation or condemnation. The truth that this tradition—any tradition—is itself not secure, complete, or finished, is understood in rumor. Rumors tell us that this tradition is no more sovereign than the colonizer is or the rule that was lost was. What is particular is also displaced, particularity requires displacement or else it is simply captured and circumscribed by law. 

I suspect some readers of Rajbir may find his ideas of loss too melancholy, even rumor lacks something of the healthy mind real strivers have. Too melancholy too those concepts that flow out of his dwelling in that loss, both within failed European traditions and in the failure of Duleep Singh. Of course, heart to heart, I do not find them too much. For those who listen and can move to it, there is something beautiful in the rhythms of loss that Rajbir plays out for us. A reminder that the colonial borders repeated in the university between academic disciplines are not real, even if they are deadly (sometimes for our bodies, sometimes for our spirits). Yet, the rhythms of loss allow for movement anyway. A little ambiguity about any of the claims that, once lost, we can be found, allows for a wild theoretical freedom still controlled like a dancer pushing the boundaries of the body while the rhythm keeps that body in time. 

When scholars and intellectuals refuse loss, what is it that they are so scared of? When reading Rajbir on rumor, I was surprised to find myself quoting Matthew 24:6, “And you will hear of wars and rumors of wars; see that you are not alarmed, for this must take place, but the end is not yet.” So much loss, and yet I still cannot fully get rid of this tradition, which I suppose I could claim, however tenuously, even if it does not claim me. What are they so scared to lose, when the reason the loss hurts so much is that it is never fully lost, there’s no certainty in the loss to remain lost? Are you scared that when you get what you want you’ll still be lost? Rajbir says of the colonizers, “They refused to consider the possibility of rumor outside of the certainty of their law (137).” I have heard a rumor that two people fell in love, that friendships were formed, despite the world they live in, and rumor says that they’re totally fucked, but they might just make it. Though, I do not know what this means. 

FreshRSS 1.26.2

3 May 2025 at 22:27

This is a security-focussed release for FreshRSS 1.26.x, addressing several CVEs (thanks @Inverle) 🛡

A few highlights ✨:

  • Implement JSON string concatenation with & operator
  • Support multiple JSON fragments in HTML+XPath+JSON mode (e.g. JSON-LD)
  • Multiple security fixes with CVEs
  • Bug fixes

Notes ℹ:

  • Favicons will be reconstructed automatically when feeds gets refreshed. After that, you may need to refresh your Web browser as well.

This release has been made by @Alkarex, @Frenzie, @hkcomori, @loviuz, @math-GH
and newcomers @dezponia, @glyn, @Inverle, @Machou, @mikropsoft

Full changelog:

Black Internationalism, the Black Prince, and the Pressures of History (Prophetic Maharaja Book Event)

25 April 2025 at 17:58

The resonances between my own work and Rajbir’s felt obvious on the surface. We both work with 19th century figures and materials that are routinely routed toward historicist and redemptionist ends. The sense of an impossibility of recuperating what has been lost and refusing to simply repeat a narrative of fulfillment drives both of our analyses. While working with different histories of loss and narratives of redemption, the resemblance between the Western forms of statecraft and social order that have produced discourses of racial classification and their juristic and imperial enforcement means Rajbir’s work has significant implications for thinking and rethinking something like 19th century black internationalism.

When I first began reading Prophetic Maharaja and about Duleep Singh, sometimes called the black prince, I immediately thought of W.E.B. Du Bois’ novel Dark Princess. Written in the years of Du Bois’ waning influence in America, the novel follows the African American protagonist Matthew Towns, who, exiled in Berlin, finds himself introduced into an international movement for the darker peoples of the world against European imperialism. Through his relationship and repeated rescue by the Princess Kautilya, the Maharanee of Bwodpur and Sindrabad who is his love object, Towns staves off a crisis of faith in the radical democratic vision of a global socialist movement animated by solidarity amongst people of color and Europe’s internal revolutionary forces. The novel ends with Towns and Princess Kautilya welcoming their son, fulfilling the need to provide a ruler to Bwodpur and Sindrabad and staving off England’s rule. Instead, they renew Indian autonomy against the ever encroaching forces of the white Western world and empower those once enslaved with a singular and global historical contribution to the revolution against empire. Crowning him the Maharaja of Bwodpur, “Messenger and Messiah to all the Darker Worlds,” Princess Kautilya and Towns’ child represents, not only the hope and possibility of an Indian nationalist vision, but also an internationalist sign of the future overthrow of the forces that have captured African Americans and all other darker peoples and workers of the world, condenses the messianic and the message in the figure of the child ruler.

Rajbir’s Prophetic Maharaja takes up the kinds of messianic messages generated in Du Bois’ novel by considering the impossible figure of Duleep Singh, a former child ruler, as the hopes for a restored Khalsa Raj circulate around his unstable form. The weight of possibility placed on Duleep Singh can often lead to anxieties that drive a quest for the fulfillment of dreams more than staying with the texture and effects of the dreams themselves. Reading Rajbir’s work at this point in my own writing of a book manuscript was also, at turns anxiety producing, deeply challenging, compelling, and always tinged with the excitement of uncertainty. This uncertainty, I take as an effect of Rajbir’s approach to narrating the figure of Duleep Singh in terms that depart from the strictures and reassurances of the salvation that so often and uncritically underwrites thickly descriptive histories. Rather than the engorgement of an alternative and recuperative history, Rajbir’s book takes knowledge’s inadequacy to its object as a point of departure for a different question: “How do we drive at the impossible Duleep Singh–a Duleep Singh we can never arrive at?” (183)

Rather than attempting to arrive at a settled and known sense of Singh, this uncertain terrain, too, becomes an unexpected means of revelation through Rajbir’s examination of loss, not as a known and accomplished fact, but as dynamic effect of the work that constitutes a living community. If the messiah is also the messenger and his figure circulates as the message and in the messages generated around his body, what is it that he communicates? What is it that he stimulates even as what is communicated exceeds his sovereignty and self? I was very struck by Rajbir’s examination of the prophetic’s effects on the fashioning of publicity and the press, for instance. He shows how loss, sovereignty, dreams, and history converge and deform colonial logics as “aspects of the community that had been presumed lost, such as the Khalsa Raj and Duleep Singh, continually erupted into public discourse”(66).

What Rajbir brings to the fore, here, is how the unexpected reappearance of what was presumed lost staves off the success of a recuperative act, fulfilling a salvific quest for fulfillment through the recovery of what was. Instead, what is revealed in the secret that the impossible Duleep Singh makes visible is that “there is no secret to be revealed” (87). Rajbir contrasts this lack of a secret revelation with readings of what the instability of meaning circulating around Duleep Singh reveals. In part, the revelation generated by his instability is the work by which “Colonial administrators regulated the public by creating a typology of racial difference” producing the possibility for the revelation of the secret that is “essential because it functions as a presupposition that sustains the entire order of things” (58). But, a distinct difference to the secret’s function in colonial societies lies in its establishment of the public as lacking in the judgement that would set up an exchange of trust and legitimation to circulate between the public and imperial rule. Instead, the distrust that structures the colonial relation depends on the denial of knowledge to the colonized public. Rajbir’s deft insights here expose the production of concealment and revelation as an effect of the colonial state’s censure of publicity in order to manage the threat of disorderly knowledge.

The irruptive, disruptive, ordering, and disordering circulation of the impossible figure of Duleep Singh also extends to his name. The press’s threat resided in its ability to “[expose] excitable forms of belief to the danger of an impossible unity through the name Duleep Singh” (70). The contestations of colonial racial classification that Duleep Singh’s name makes possible depend on an eroticism that exceeds imperial orderings of race and belonging to go about the work of fashioning a dynamic and uncertain mode of oneness. Sikh’s gathering around, under, and against the name of Duleep Singh generate possibilities that, even in their not coming to fruition, refuse the anticipatory assumptions of knowing on which colonial logics depend. In this way, “the public emerges as a knot unable to be adjudicated into historical form” (87).


That historical form so often serves as a way of resolving the knots that undermine colonial logics is reflected in the pressures of history that attempt to measure the “success” of an idea, a movement, a cultural product, in terms of its historical accuracy or faithfulness to a historical form. In recounting the reception of Du Bois’ Dark Princess, for instance, Claudia Tate highlights the mixture of defense, criticism, embarrassment, and incomprehension that Du Bois’ romance—which is routinely identified as a “historical novel”—engendered:

The reviewer for Hampton Institute’s The Southern Workman defends Dark Princess against claims that it is unrealistic by identifying its problem as the search for “the plan of emancipation.” The reviewer adds, the problem “is not, however, solved; but is discussed from many angles” (336). Allison Davis’s review in The Crisis argues that Du Bois “has raised the dead weight of our stolid depression by propaganda at once eloquent and sane.” He further adds that Dark Princess “must be evaluated” for its “spiritual influence in Negro life,” for its “propagandic purpose” (339). Despite the efforts of these sympathetic critics to efface the novel’s eroticism and to recast the work in the more favorable light of racial propaganda, privately, they seem to have regarded Dark Princess as a dirty old man’s fantasy that should never have been published.

Reviews of Du Bois’ novel routinely set the spiritual against the material, the idealism of propaganda against historical fact, the eroticism of fantasy against the sober chastity of reality, and the stability of policy against the quest for a “plan of emancipation.” Rajbir’s challenge to the historicist presumptions that underwrite distinctions between the political and religious would teach us well, here, and have implications for all of us interested in the study of race, religion, and politics.

I first read Dark Princess when I was maybe 18 or 19, having had it recommended to me by my sometimes conspiracy theorizing oldest brother who had stumbled across it in the public library. I was totally taken by the book, pushing through even the many moments I did not understand because something about its eroticism and mythic sensibility, its internationalism and religiosity, stirred up a drive in me to see the novel through. Upon the novel’s end, I remember feeling in a haze. I could not put into words what the novel was “about,” nor what I was “taking” from it. I could probably recount some plot points and significant events, describe the key players and the protagonist and his love object. But the thing I’ve carried with me most from this book, over the nearly 2 decades since I first read it was the impression of a vision, almost a fever dream, and a sense of possibility that could never be foreseen in advance or fully articulated and encapsulated in words. The novel was certainly historical, and Du Bois’ place in black history gave gravity to it, but what the novel actually does, by refusing to be a realistic historical representation of black internationalism actually offers a more powerful counter to the strictures of a imperialist binaries.

I felt, upon reaching the novel’s last page, that I had been shown something about the possibility of an internationalist sense of black life, culture, and literature that exceeded the standard narration of black possibility, built on redemptive logics of reproductive futurity, that I had inherited. Having been exposed to this unstable and open sense of possibility, I was relieved of some of the pressure of following the redemptive Americanist narrative of our great overcomings from slavery to freedom. If Du Bois, one of the most prominent black leaders of the late 19th-20th century, could produce an at times irrational and affecting, didactic and poetic, political romance predicated on the mythic work that makes an international solidarity of darker peoples of the world possible, then perhaps what I thought I knew about black culture, black history, black romance, needed to be upended. Yes, this was a romance. Yes, it was an ostensibly historical novel. Still, what it amounted to with its inadequacies and incoherences held a salvific satisfaction at bay.

Upon reaching the final pages of Rajbir’s book, I felt that his treatment of Duleep Singh reminded me of the feeling of a fever dream that Du Bois’ novel stirred up in me. The lack of a salvific satisfaction, which is not identical to the lack of eroticism. Rajbir highlight’s prophecy’s ability to reroute our staid senses of sovereignty into a much more critical but also creative and curious direction. Rather than treat the dreams and myths and prophecies stirred up by the figure of Duleep Singh as irrational forms in conflict with political forms, Rajbir makes clear what Cedric Robinson, in his Terms of Order shows, which is the fundamentally mixed-paradigms that serve as the basis of human fashionings of order and authority. Indeed, these mixed-paradigms are central to the ongoing work of learning that undermines colonial certainty. As Rajbir notes, this also can have the effect of taking the pressure off those of us attempting to write in the wake of these stories of loss and stories of history. Approaching the messianic and the messenger as sites of learning, we may find that

[i]n our learning there might be no need to conclude, which means that there is no need to convince, to produce a final conviction about our loss in the carceral operation of history that arrests a community, a tradition, and the very questioning of sovereignty. (185)

Repeating the announcement of a knowledge that exceeds our words, Rajbir’s reminder of our freedom from the need to conclude, convince, or produce a final conviction, offers a lesson in learning to stay with the uncertainty as a way of staying with the singularity and totality of what is at once a tradition and a dynamic and open-ended effect of communities in, across, and against time.

The Physics of Perfect Pour-Over Coffee

23 April 2025 at 21:47
estimated reading time: 1 min

Scientists used fluid dynamics to learn how to get the most flavor from pour-over coffee.

More than a billion cups of coffee are consumed daily: French-press, espresso, cold brew, whatever it takes.

Arnold Mathijssen, a physicist at the University of Pennsylvania, is partial to pour-over coffee, which involves manually pouring hot water over ground beans and filtering it into a pot or mug below. Surely, he figured, applying the principles of fluid dynamics to the process could make it even better.

With two students of similar mind, Dr. Mathijssen began studying how to optimize the pour in a pour over. Their science-backed advice: Pour high, slow and with a steady stream of water. This ensures the greatest extraction from minimal grounds, enhancing the coffee’s flavor without added beans or cost.

The findings, published this month in the journal Physics of Fluids, highlight how processes that unfold in the kitchen — from making foie gras to whipping up a plate of cacio e pepe — can inspire new scientific directions. In turn, science can enhance the art of cuisine.

“Kitchen science starts off with a relatively low entry barrier,” Dr. Mathijssen said. “But it’s more than just cute. Sometimes fundamental things can come out of it.”

Dr. Mathijssen primarily studies the physics of biological flows, such as the way bacteria swim upstream in blood vessels. But when he lost access to his lab during the Covid-19 shutdown, he started playing with his food — literally. He shook up bottles of whiskey, tested the stickiness of pasta and slid coins down slopes made of whipped cream and honey. The interest culminated in a 77-page review, structured like a menu, of the physics involved in making a meal.

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My semesterly reading

22 April 2025 at 18:23

For many years, I have been using my Amazon Wish List as a vast “to-read” list — including recommendations, books of which I’ve read interesting reviews, books I want to remember for my research, etc., etc. (I very rarely actually buy the book from Amazon; instead, I’m free-riding on their easily accessible database of virtually every book ever published.). Over time, the list became so unwieldy as to be useless, and this year I resolved to attack the problem from two directions. First, I would go through the list and be honest with myself about whether I would actually read certain titles (or groups of titles on topics I have lost interest in). Second, and more interestingly, since I am between research projects, I wanted to use my ample commute time to actually read a good chunk of them by fully leveraging my access to interlibrary loan.

The result has been an enjoyable semester of miscellaneous reading that is often pegged to certain times of my life or certain friends. It was so nice to get off the treadmill of work-oriented reading that I even resisted writing up a blog post, because it would potentially make it “feel like work.” But as an aid to my own memory, I present the list here:

  • Susan Stewart, The Ruins Lesson: Meaning and Material in Western Culture — this was a good way to consolidate memories of my trip to Rome, overlaying what I had seen with its broader historical significance.
  • Shabbir Akhtar, The New Testament in Muslim Eyes: Paul’s Letter to the Galatians — this is related to a long-planned article on Paul and the Qur’an; I found it to be extremely strange and borderline unreadable, to be honest.
  • Robert O. McDonald, Works Like a Charm: Incentive Rhetoric and the Economization of Everyday Life — I already blogged about this one.
  • Jiwei Ci, Dialectic of the Chinese Revolution: From Utopianism to Hedonism — I’ve read a lot on Soviet Communism but comparatively little on China, and a review article on Ci’s work in NLR made this seem like a good starting point. It was pretty bracing, presenting Mao’s career as marked by magical thinking and a weird secular eschatology.
  • John Rieder, Science Fiction and the Mass Cultural Genre System — an effortlessly authoritative overview of science fiction studies, through the lens of the ways that commercial culture transforms the meaning and function of “genre” compared to classical models.
  • Seth Benardete, Achilles and Hector: The Homeric Hero — this was recommended to me way back when I was first prepping Shimer’s senior capstone sequence. I probably should have read it back then!
  • Seth Benardete, The Bow and the Lyre: A Platonic Reading of the Odyssey — This wasn’t a “recommendation,” but I figured I enjoyed Achilles and Homer so much I would check this one out. It gave me a lot to think about for particular details of the Odyssey, but I’m not sure I understand the overarching argument about how Homer is somehow Platonic in approach (such as it is discernible in his almost Gillian Rose-like severe style).
  • Zdravko Planinc, Plato through Homer: Poetry and Philosophy in the Cosmological Dialogues — This was a recommendation from my summer seminar on Plato and Homer; it similarly gave me a lot of insights for future teaching.
  • Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners — my friend Bruce Rosenstock, who passed away in 2023, recommended this to me way back when I was working on Awkwardness. Since I didn’t have reliable library access at the time and wasn’t planning on making it a scholarly book, I left the recommendation aside — but picking it up semi-at-random now, I enjoyed the morbidly fascinating tidbits of medieval manners, as well as the introduction in which he uses his own sociological method to account for why the sociology of his time sucked.
  • Erving Goffman, Stigma: The Management of Spoiled Identity — another Bruce recommendation from the Awkwardness days. This is remarkable for the author’s matter-of-factness about the negative valence of certain traits in the context of mandatory “normality.” I was also struck by how his discussion of affinity groups, complete with publications, for most stigmatized identities anticipates the explosion of similar groups in online settings.

For the summer, I’m going to need to shift gears back toward class prep and research for most of my reading, so this is where I leave this particular project. I think I’m going to make an effort to do something similar every few years, though. Undirected reading is really important for keeping one’s mind fresh and nimble.

Claustrophobic Archive (Prophetic Maharaja Book Event)

22 April 2025 at 11:59

This post is by LL Hodges, a writer, historian and professor based in Los Angeles. They focus on queer history and questions of memory, loss and time.

It was the Monday in November after the daylight saving time ended. Riding my bike home in the City of Quartz after work suddenly meant navigating a setting sun. I was unprepared. So, I rode on the concrete sidewalk portion of the bridge over the Los Angeles River instead of on the road. That’s when the sign came into view. From the corner of my eye, I saw bright red and yellow and stopped pedaling. Cars sped behind me as I turned to look. Had this always been there? And so it was that during the reminder of time’s construction, rolled back an hour and plunged into darkness, I saw— perched on a rooftop and written in neon—Concrete is Fluid.

I’d had the pleasure of reading the introduction to Rajbir Singh Judge’s book Prophetic Maharaja by then. Ideas of loss, mourning, and grasping perseverated. Not to mention the claim: “One could say that mourning is the project for historians (Judge 15).” Full disclosure: I am a historian. This means many things. For starters, I should believe in determinate negations and aufheben (truthfully, I shouldn’t even know what that is since I was trained in the U.S. and not supposed to learn theory). I’m supposed to take out my thread and needle to repair our current/past loss, progressing society forward with each suture. I build narratives across space. Doesn’t concrete do the same? Isn’t it an example of how “success is grasped through a frozen hold on time” (Judge, 16). 

As a kid I used to dial a number on our house telephone and, at the tone, hear what the time would be. But on that evening of all evenings, just after the state exercised its power over time, my mind was left malleable. Concrete. Space. Time. As a trained historian, I want to eschew the prickliness that disrupts teleology promise (Arondekar, For the Record, 17). Yet the time-change lingered in unfixed aches that day as it worked itself through my unadjusted body. I could not ignore it. I started to lose my grasp on history. Queerness has a way of ungrasping.

Concrete is not solid. This became clear, freeing even. Thus, the idea conjured queerness. It brought the orbits of Jean Genet and Gerry Bibby together with Gayatri Spivak and Anjali Arondekar and Rajbir Singh Judge. These orbits aligned or even crashed in the space of my brain. Is this a fair collision? It is in this post. And not to worry, the event did not signify an end or a conclusion. I am still floating in that space.

In the writer Jean Genet’s only film, Un Chant d’Amour, the queer desires of men in prison exceed their concrete walls of confinement. The film revels in its homoeroticism, but that isn’t my concern here. Instead, I pull out two themes that recall the discourses of Duleep Singh’s public and hidden transcripts (Judge 30). Publicly, there is a swinging of flowers. Privately, there is a blowing of cigarette smoke. 

The film opens as a guard walking to work sees two arms hanging outside of the barred prison windows. From one window an arm swings a string with a bouquet of flowers tied at the end. The waiting hand of the next window over tries to grasp the bouquet. He misses. Again, the bouquet pendulum swings, again a miss. Loss becomes continuous. This opening, like the opening to Prophetic Maharaja, asks the viewer to sit with Spivak’s idea of “simultaneously grasping and ungrasping,” as Rajbir reconceptualizes it (25). We are not asked to grasp and hold on. In this book Rajbir asks of us to keep grasping. I cannot think of a more intellectually caring call to arms. Be wary of redemption, keep letting go.

What might this mean for an archive? Rajbir turns to Arondekar for “an archival approach that articulates against the guarantee of recovery” (Judge 60). I turn back to Genet’s afterlives. In 2010 and then again in 2023, the artist Gerry Bibby performed an ode to Genet. Once called Un Chant. Grotto Giganta: stalactite/stalagmite (2010) and later Un Chant/A Shoe/Achoo. We’re gonna have a Good Time: For BP (2023)Bibby’s performance centered on the swinging bouquet. Rather than swung between two hands, a bouquet swung back and forth above a photocopy machine. Bibby tried continuously to capture a photocopy of the bouquet, all while reading the technical manual to the copy machine out loud. These fleeting moments of desired intimacy evaded capture, despite the drone of technical, administrative operation. 

Then, like Rajbir, I, too, turn to Arondekar, imagining the copy machine spewing attempt after attempt. “What if the recuperative gesture returns us to a space of absence? How then does one restore absence itself? Put simply, can an empty archive also be full?” (Arondekar, For the Record, 1). Subverted, the question echoes: Can a full archive also be empty? Yes. “The colonial archive is thus most empty precisely when it is most full” (Arondekar, For the Record, 12). This is Bibby’s archive of photocopies gathering in the machine’s receptacle. A full archive moves towards what Rajbir explains as the colonial politics of “securing the world” (2), one that creates a “carceral register” (20). 

A pile of paper can easily become an archive. “The carceral operation of history” (185), however, is not without its difficulties. The frustrations of the colonial apparatus, of mechanical administration and bureaucratic systems is the site of queerness constituted against capture or redemption. The machine does capture something, but only the right-before-vanishing.

Here, Dhurm Singh transitions us, in a slippery way, from the outside of concrete to the inside. A man with good intentions and lucky timing. As Rajbir writes, he was “both meager and many, lacking and copious, absent and present, Dhurm Singh had arrived at his destination and disappeared” (85). Could a poesis be at play here? This suspension, to be empirically determined but lost, to live on the edge of the limits of the state, slips through time. Like the failed photocopy of the bouquet, Dhurm Singh appears as a sort of blur. In this blur he avoids becoming objectified and overdetermined as an archival subject. In these current times of heightened surveillance, there is a way of being here that I find inviting. With AI object recognition technologies trying to “secure the world,” how might we endeavor to live in blur.

Now within the prison walls, there is another kind of grasping at play. In Genet’s film, two men in neighboring cells share cigarette smoke through a hole in the concrete wall between them. The act arouses them, frustrates them.

We should not be surprised by such little holes. Prophetic Maharaja reveals the tears and the holes of the carceral operation, to show, for example, how everyday practices like taking amrit render the colonial order “a sieve” (105). Like a sieve, the concrete wall allows for movement. The smoke moves like rumor, dissident and uncapturable, as irreducible as air. Sometimes the man ignores it, sometimes he inhales it. Desire itself becomes unfixed and free within concrete.

Genet’s film ends with the hand firmly grasping of the bouquet. Maybe affection is allowed to be secured. But Bibby’s performance, ends without a clear photocopy, leaving a lingering suspension, exceeding placement. This feels more apt to Rajbir’s work.

Prophetic Maharaja rejects a neat conclusion into the future, instead asking for the present act of learning. Specifically, it asks of us “to learn without closure” (185). But its opening challenge moves further, “to learn…without end, without satisfaction, and open to the possibility of failure” (26). What might it mean to have a failed history? Not a history of failure, not a failed historian, but a history that reneges on The Promise?

Recall that mourning is the project of historians. In our desire to secure the present through interpretations of the past, we are tied to the future. The secure past works to secure the future. They are inseparable for many. I might go as far as to say that to the extent that we spend our time in the past, we are stuck in the future. Perhaps this is why, after discussing research on the past, a historian is liable to face the question: “So, what do you think will happen?” The common historian answers, “Well, I study the past, so I can’t see into the future. But…” and continues. Orthopedics, indeed. 

Yet Prophetic Maharaja asks us to avoid satisfaction. What, then, if there is something satisfying in the lack of satisfaction? 

By now the sky was dark purple and reaching for black. The city’s skyscrapers glowed in the distance as the Los Angeles River trickled down its concrete banks below. The neon sign continues its challenge: Concrete is Fluid. I looked this up later and found it part of the artist Lauren Bon’s greater project to hack the LA River’s infrastructure. It seems possible. But of course, concrete is also solid. It builds and it traps.

In Los Angeles, the weight of concrete has its own character. According to Mike Davis, who spoke with a piece of concrete in his hand at the 1998 Critical Resistance conference , the substance used to hold promise, but now seems sinister. Now it holds “the stink” of, among nefarious things, claustrophobia. I think back to the pile of photocopies growing during Un Chant, of the historian wading through piles of documents. Davis opened by saying the Romans invented concrete, thus evoking empire. If one could trace the development of concrete, would they find it paired with the development of the archive?

I looked down at my watch and realized the time. My watch is powered with help of a quartz, a component of concrete. This moment both could not have happened on any other day and continuously happens ever since. I turned and rode my bike home. 

Dwelling in Loss: An Introduction (Prophetic Maharaja Book Event)

19 April 2025 at 22:02

This is a guest post by SherAli Tareen, Professor of Religious Studies at Franklin and Marshall College.

At its core Rajbir Singh Judge’s dazzling monograph Prophetic Maharaja presents an argument for “dwelling in loss” rather than seeking the enticing yet entrapping desires for restoration, recovery, and healing. By writing a “historical narrative that refuses to historicize,” Judge pushes his readers to examine notions of sovereignty and history that the practice of dwelling might make available. Conceptually, through the example of Duleep Singh (d. 1893) and the politics his life and memory make possible, the book seeks to interrupt dominant scholarly notions of historicism and colonial logics of religion and sovereignty, that reappear in varied apparitions in contemporary scholarship as well. It is very rare for a monograph, and even rarer for a first monograph, to offer an example of close and patient reading that rattles deeply held and deeply prized normative assumptions of one’s field of intervention. Judge achieves precisely that. And he does so in multiple ways and registers.

In Panjab Studies, there is a pervasive trend of excavating a redemptive narrative of a Panjabi cosmopolitan ethos that might offer the fantasy of traversing and transcending the alleged juggernaut of religious convictions that according to this view stifle such “cosmopolitan” pasts and futures. The Sikh tradition, under the calculus of this desire for “Panjabiyyat” or “Panjabiness” can either work as a quintessentially hybrid religion that naturally inheres pluralism or as a model for a colonial infested discursive machine that can only be repaired through the prophylactic of secular baptism. Judge entertains none such fantasy. In fact, Prophetic Maharaja conducts a devastating indictment of the politico-conceptual coherence as well as the desirability of the secular quest for Panjabiyyat by presenting a reading of Duleep Singh’s quest for sovereignty that does not seek to resolve, recover, overcome, or redeem any restorative project of liberal redemption and goodness.

Through an analysis both painstakingly layered and theoretically vivacious, Judge masterfully walks his reader through a terrain of political theology populated by visions of sovereignty neither liberal nor secular, but rather nestled in the refusal to exercise the sovereign decision to historicize, humanize, and heal any alleged ruptures of history. Judge’s analysis of Duleep Singh’s attunement to the loss and possibility of sovereignty propels the reader to confront and wrestle with a grammar of life that is not driven by or available for secular projects of dividing that life into binaries like religion and culture, state and society, plural harmony and exclusivist bigotry. Life, Judge teaches us, taking a cue from anthropologist Talal Asad, is “essentially itself.”

One of the great lessons of this book that I found particularly striking and productive concerns its theorization of loss and its simultaneous recognition that loss escapes and exceeds any neat theorization. Judge is at his most brilliant and intellectually courageous during moments in this book when he meditates on the aporias of his own encounter with the conceptual constitution of his project. And remarkably, and again in a rare achievement, these are precisely the moments when his argument is most piercing and compelling. His discussion of loss is a great example of this. As Judge writes very early in the book (in its Introduction), signposting an analytical attitude and conviction he sustains throughout the monograph: “rather than provide a new theorization of loss-which cements a relation to loss-this book endeavors to reckon with the powerful resources that work on loss, such as mourning and melancholia, and what they have already provided.” Judge continues, in a flash of utter brilliance, “I contend with loss instead of transcending it through recovery [emphasis mine]…I do not tie a thread throughout the text that provides an adequate answer to loss because there might not be any answer to it. In this sense the book does not provide a theorization of loss but dwells in the various rhythms of loss. My goal is not to recognize loss and provide it taxonomic space but to sit with losses as they appear, disappear, and reappear throughout the text” (p. 13). This mini paragraph I have just cited represents a moment of tremendous significance in the study of South Asian History and Religion. Note, in the interest of careless readers who will rush towards the inconsiderate gesture, all too pervasive among historians of a certain ilk, to dismiss or undermine careful theoretical interventions as Judge’s here as convoluted high theory. Note particularly that dwelling, in Judge’s account, as both an analytical concept and as a mode and practice of life, is anything but passive inactivity. Exactly to the contrary, dwelling represents that aggressive commitment to a politico-conceptual ethic of refusing to repair and overcome loss through secular gestures of managing and healing the violence of history.

Dwelling in loss, instead of activating the secular instinct of historicizing, humanizing, and supposedly transcending loss makes possible a horizon of the political that comes to live with rather than attempt to overcome the aporias of life. Judge’s invitation to his readers to “sit with losses as they appear, disappear, and reappear” in the passage of a text or in the passage of history is I believe a profound call for suspending sovereign confidence in compensating for loss and treating the wound of historical contingency through the fantasy of historicist rigor, of returning life to its immanent materiality. What sort of politics and possibilities of sovereignty might become available by dwelling in loss, by sitting with rather than treating with the prophylactic of secular historicism the vertigo of historical conjunctures such as the one involving the loss, renewal, and diffusion of Duleep Singh’s aspiration for sovereignty? In asking and addressing this question, Judge successfully offers pathways for recognizing and exploring the political power and philosophical sophistication of imaginaries of sovereignty, like Duleep Singh’s, that are otherwise conveniently though perniciously catalogued as sorry tragedies of a colonized subject. Making Duleep Singh’s example speak back to and interrupt the alleged tragedy of his quest for sovereignty, Judge undertakes a critically important endeavor of decolonizing both colonial and contemporary secularist models of South Asian history populating the Western academy. This forum brings together outstanding scholars, conducting theoretically cutting edge critiques of secular power from multiple disciplinary perspectives, to engage, wrestle with, and celebrate a book with major ramifications and consequences in the study of religion, history, philosophy, and South Asia. The Prophetic Maharaja is in many ways a model and master seminar in bringing together invasive attention to the particularity of an archive and theoretical reflection that paves as well as shifts the terrain of multiple fields of knowledge simultaneously.

SherAli Tareen is Professor of Religious Studies at Franklin and Marshall College and currently a Patricia Crone member in the School of Historical Studies at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton NJ for the academic year 2024-25. His book Defending Muhammad in Modernity (University of Notre Dame Press, 2020) received the American Institute of Pakistan Studies 2020 Book Prize and was selected as a finalist for the 2021 American Academy of Religion Book Award in the Analytical-Descriptive Studies category. His second book is Perilous Intimacies: Debating Hindu-Muslim Friendship after Empire (Columbia University Press, 2023) which was selected as a finalist for the 2024 American Academy of Religion Book Award in the Textual Studies category.

Rajbir Singh Judge is Assistant Professor in History at California State University, Long Beach. Prophetic Maharaja: Loss, Sovereignty and the Sikh Tradition in Colonial South Asia was published in 2024, and over the next few weeks we have a series of contributors who’ll be offering their reflections, followed by a response from Rajbir. I’ll update this post with links to the other posts as they’re published:

Introduction by SherAli Tareen

LL Hodges, ‘Claustrophobic Archive

Amaryah Armstrong, ‘Black Internationalism, the Black Prince, and the Pressures of History

APS, ‘”What this means I do not know”: Loss and Rumours of Loss

Samaah Jaffer, ‘The Contention of Mourning

Marika Rose, ‘A Matter of Fantasy

Satbir Singh, ‘Dandy (de)livery

Basit Iqbal, ‘Non-redemptive Narration

Response by Rajbir 

Trump as the American Gorbachev

12 April 2025 at 17:16

There’s something about Trump that draws comparisons with Communism. The one I’ve heard most is the Cultural Revolution, where Chairman Mao incited a rebellion against the state he ostensibly led, with the Great Leap Forward (rapid economic transformation through absurd magical thinking) as a close second. Mao does not exhaust the field, however. There is a rich vein of ironic parallels to be found in the career of Mikhail Gorbachev. Here I am drawing on Vladislav M. Zubok’s Collapse: The Fall of the Soviet Union, which I discussed at greater length here.

There are any number of parallels that immediately leap to mind — such as their strange trust in their country’s historical enemies (Reagan for Gorbachev, Putin for Trump), their tendency to indulge in personal projects instead of governing (writing Marxist theory for Gorbachev, golfing for Trump) or even the fact that both have a bizarre visual feature on their head (the birthmark and the combover, respectively).

More informative, though, are the parallel dynamics of their careers. The first is that both shocked the political establishment with their radicalism. In both cases, establishment figures assumed they would be a fresh outsider face (Trump as a political novice, Gorbachev as the first Soviet leader born after the Russian Revolution) who could be controlled. In fact, in the case of Gorbachev it was likely that the need to control him didn’t even occur to most of the relevant power brokers, since he had previously been such a “go along to get along” kind of guy. But both Gorbachev and Trump 2.0 moved much faster and made much bigger changes than anyone was anticipating. In Gorbachev’s case, the establishment was too blindsided to do much of anything prior to the abortive coup attempt (famous for the Soviet TV station’s decision to play Swan Lake on repeat for the duration rather than report on events), and this time around it doesn’t seem like much of anyone with institutional power is making serious plans to counter Trump.

The nature of those rapid changes also bears comparison. Perhaps most notably, Gorbachev’s decision to simply leave the Eastern Bloc countries to their own devices was as shocking to Soviet insiders as Trump’s omni-trade war has been to their American counterparts. This decision is representative of a broader trend — their rapid changes tended to be strangely self-undermining. Gorbachev seems to have believed he would gain some moral authority and shed an economic burden by abandoning the Warsaw Pact, just as Trump claims to be righting a major wrong in the world trade system by fighting back against our allies’ supposed parasitism. In practice, though, both moves seriously undercut the sources of the respective superpower’s sway on global events.

The same was true domestically. Gorbachev styled himself as a new Lenin, instituting a renewed revolution to fully actualize socialism in its ideal form — including an eventual transition to democracy. Ironically, though, he ruled more purely dictatorially than most post-Stalin Soviet leaders, even as he continually undercut the sources of his own power. Key to his plan to democratize the Soviet Union was the ambition of reenvigorating the individual republics and their local “soviets” — moves that wound up stoking nationalistic fervor that had mostly lain dormant, which (shockingly!) proved to be counter to Gorbachev’s socialist goals. And though this analogy is admittedly a bit strained, both also made changes to the “official” history of their countries that hurt their legitimacy — Gorbachev by belatedly admitting the truth that the Baltic states had been annexed by force (morally good, tactically stupid) and Trump by hamfistedly imposing a white supremacist narrative to counter the scourge of “woke” (morally evil, also tactically stupid).

Similarly, the attempted reform of the Soviet economy took on a DOGE-like “move fast and break things” tone, as the few people who still had some idea how the planning system worked were sidelined and the functioning systems were gummed up. The attempt to make the constituent republics “real” again also had the effect of severely disrupting supply chains, similar to Trump’s antics. Contrary to the hagiography by which Gorbachev wisely oversaw the inevitable dissolution of the Soviet Union, the events of his rule were chaotic and unpredictable to almost everyone involved, due to the unique combination of naivety and recklessness he brought to the table.

In summary, both were aspiring revolutionary dictators, aiming to revive an idealized heroic national past, and both relentlessly destroyed the state capacity necessary to carry out their stated goals. Both responded to economic discontent by heedlessly making things even worse. Both abandoned allies and cozied up to long-time enemies who did not actually have their nation’s interests at heart.

Where the parallel begins to break down is that Gorbachev’s intentional stoking of intra-Union nationalism wound up creating independent power centers that ultimately dissolved his country out from under him. A few months into the Trump administration, we don’t seem to be very far down that road — though arbitrarily witholding federal funding to “blue” states could do for state-level identification what Trump’s abominable threats have done to Canadian nationalism. Maybe Gavin Newsom will turn out to be America’s Boris Yeltsin, withdrawing the single biggest constituent unit from a tottering federal structure (though of course California is proportionally nowhere near as dominant as the Russian “Republic” was within the USSR).

And of course, for most Western readers, the parallel rankles because Trump is bad and Gorbachev was good. Personally, I’m not so sure that dissolving a major world power, permanently racheting down the life prospects of everyone in the successor nations, and abandoning a major region of the world to what amounts to mafia rule was an unalloyed good. If the choice were between the continued existence of the USSR and the constituent republics becoming nice, normal, prosperous liberal democracies, obviously the latter outcome holds considerable appeal — but it is not remotely what happened, nor is there really any reason to imagine that option was on the table. Meanwhile, judging from the early days of Trump’s second term, the world may well regard the dissolution of the United States with relief by the time he’s done.

If that sounds impossible to you, well, the dissolution of the Soviet Union would have sounded impossible to everyone in the early 80s — from Gorbachev and Reagan all the way on down. A superpower doesn’t just destroy itself! That would be crazy! But sometimes crazy things happen. We unfortunately seem to be living through one example — hence the value of thinking through a previous case.

wallabag 2.6.12

10 April 2025 at 14:00

Here is the latest release of wallabag.

⚠️ This release follows the 2.6.11, which is a security release.

📈 To update your instance, just run make update. Don't forget to make a backup of your instance (database and files).

🤝 A little reminder that you can support our work on wallabag by sponsoring us on Liberapay or subscribe on wallabag.it. Thanks!

Human summary

We forgot to update the dependencies of the project in the last release.

What's Changed

Fixes

Technical stuff

You can read the full changelog on GitHub.

Download wallabag 2.6.12

To download, install/upgrade wallabag, please read our downloads page.


Need help?

We are on Matrix, ping us!

You can also open a new issue on GitHub.


How can you help us?

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wallabag 2.6.11

8 April 2025 at 23:00

Here is the latest release of wallabag.

⚠️ This is a security release of wallabag.

📈 To update your instance, just run make update. Don't forget to make a backup of your instance (database and files).

🤝 A little reminder that you can support our work on wallabag by sponsoring us on Liberapay or subscribe on wallabag.it. Thanks!

Human summary

Adding protection against CSRF on several endpoints.

What's Changed

Security fix ⚠️

Fixes

Technical stuff

You can read the full changelog on GitHub.

Download wallabag 2.6.11

To download, install/upgrade wallabag, please read our downloads page.


Need help?

We are on Matrix, ping us!

You can also open a new issue on GitHub.


How can you help us?

By using wallabag, by reporting bugs, by translating wallabag and its documentation, by talking about wallabag to your friends, ...

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Notes and selected translations from Éric Rohmer’s The Organization of Space in Murnau’s “Faust”

26 March 2025 at 15:53

[Editor’s note: While preparing for my frequent course “Deals With the Devil,” which centers on the Faust theme, I discovered that one of my favorite filmmakers, Éric Rohmer, wrote a doctoral dissertation on F.W. Murnau’s silent film Faust. To force myself to read it, I put it on my syllabus, hoping that it would set up an exercise where my students could build connections between the Faust theme and a major work not obviously based upon it, in this case, My Night at Maud’s. As you will see, it turned out that much of the material in the book was not directly relevant to the course, but Rohmer does have some good stray observations about Murnau’s reworking of the Faust theme and his relationship to Goethe in particular. I share the text of the handout I will be distributing to my class in case anyone might find it interesting or useful. My translated excerpts below are drawn from Éric Rohmer, L’organisation de l’espace dans le Faust de Murnau (Paris: Union Générale d’Editions, 1977). Page numbers refer to this edition.]

Éric Rohmer (1920-2010) was a French filmmaker associated with the New Wave movement pioneered by directors like Jean-Luc Godard and François Truffaut. Like Godard and Truffaut, Rohmer actually started out as a film critic and scholar, and he did his doctoral dissertation on Murnau’s silent film adaptation of Faust (1926). As a film critic and aspiring filmmaker himself, Rohmer is much less interested in the plot of the film than in Murnau’s cinematic technique. In fact, he believes that the familiarity of the plot was what allowed Murnau to be so innovative in the way he presented it—all his attention was focused on technique rather than narrative. Nevertheless, Rohmer does make some very insightful remarks about how the film functions as an adaptation of Goethe’s Faust. Here I will provide an overview of Rohmer’s work and a translation of those passages. My hope is that this will help us to make connections between the Faust theme and Rohmer’s film My Night at Maud’s (1969).

Rohmer opens the book with the claim that “Of all filmmakers, F.W. Murnau is perhaps the one who knew how to organize the space of his films in the most rigorous and inventive way” (9). He defines three different kinds of space that a film can create. The first is the pictorial space, which talks about the way that individual shots or frames are composed. The second is architectural space, which refers to the way a film creates the illusion of a “real world” that the characters are moving through. The third is filmic space, which refers to the way that the film creates a sensation of movement.

The main chapters of the book go through these versions of space one by one. In the first chapter, on pictorial space, Rohmer claims that most filmmakers of Murnau’s time were inspired by photography, but Murnau preferred to use painting as a model. Rohmer goes through many individual painters he believes inspired Murnau’s broad style, including Rembrandt, Caravaggio, and Vermeer. He also mentions several specific paintings that he sees as models for particular scenes and refers, in broader terms, to the way that illustrations of Goethe’s Faust may have influenced him as well. This chapter basically does not discuss the plot at all and hence does not include any substantial passages relevant to our class discussion.

In the second chapter, on architectural space, Rohmer does a detailed study of the layout and décor of the various spaces that appear in the film. This chapter includes some analysis that is so detailed that it may border on the insane—for instance, at one point he provides a chart listing and categorizing every single object that appears on screen (80-82). He also includes sketches where he tries to reconstruct the layout of Faust’s study (67), Gretchen’s house (71), and Martha’s house (72). More relevant to our discussion is his inventory of the scenes from Goethe that Murnau excluded or modified, which leads to an analysis of Mephistopheles as a character:

Now let us precisely determine, while examining each scene in detail, the places that are in Goethe and those that have been modified. Auerbach’s tavern disappears, but it is in a tavern that we see Mephistopheles provoke Valentine and engage in a feat of sorcery, here more terrifying than burlesque: the flame shooting out of the wine. If the character of Mephistopheles retains all the comic force of his literary model (without going beyond it, except perhaps in Martha’s house), Murnau wanted, however, to preserve the seriousness of the wonders he shows us, whereas Goethe tinged the legacy of the Volksbuch [a term for the original Faust legend] with derision. The demon is not presented to us, as in the play, in the form of a poodle; it is Faust himself who evokes him, just as in the legend; and the sinister monk who emerges, though sarcastic, cannot provoke in us the slightest chuckle. Murnau will equally avoid showing us the gallery of animals that is the witch’s kitchen (Hexenküche); it is in his study that Faust’s rejuvination is carried out. Walpurgis Night, which inspired painters and musicians, has also disappeared, but I do not see how a cinematographic translation of that satiric-philosophical interlude could be given, except in a spirit of Goya-esque masquerade, which is quite far from Murnau. (60-61)

Rohmer then takes a step back to think about Murnau’s relationship to Goethe more broadly:

If Murnau and Kyser [the writer of the screenplay] ultimately remain so faithful to Goethe, despite their apparent desire to distance themselves from him and return to the sources of the myth (“an old German legend,” as the credits say), it is perhaps also the case that the play carried the seed of its cinematographic transcription. It is true that the settings of the scenes, in this philosophical drama that was made above all to be read, even if they do not play a truly active role, assert their presence more forcefully than in many works better conceived for staging: that of Shakespeare, for example, or the Greek tragedies. The “tragedy” of Faust is indeed more cinematographic than theatrical, in its first and second parts. We never find in it a banal waiting room, an anonymous place, but always a well-defined place, which makes up an integral part of the old myth and of what Goethe himself forged, in the same way as the names of characters or the epoch when the story unfolds—which no one would dare change. (61)

Later in the chapter, after his reconstruction of the various sets and his listing of all the objects, Rohmer reflects further on the idea that everything in the film has a very defined purpose:

In Murnau, the same thing holds for clothing as for objects: it is never a means, a tool, a weapon for getting what one wants or seducing someone. We are in a world made of relationships of force, not of persuasion. Not of a lover’s courtship: the woman does not play the flirt, the man does not play the rake. In this universe of pure desire, there is room only for predator and prey: whether he uses the fascination of his looks or pure violence, it is all the same. Each being is for the other a vampire or a victim. Each knows what he is after from his counterpart, or what he fears. Deception is impossible. There is no need to strut about: one passes immediately to action, which is to say to assault or its simulation. The love scenes are conceived as battles where now the man, now the woman is attacking or attacked, pursuing or pursued. Thus, for example, the scene in Martha’s garden… (86).

This concreteness holds especially for costumes:

To a change in clothing there almost always corresponds a profound transformation of one’s being, and Faust, with its theme of rejuvenation, puts out in the open a theme that is elsewhere latent [in Murnau’s other films]. Moreover, the transition is not forcefully abrupt. It would be more fair to speak sometimes of blossoming or blooming. In the famous scene with the jewelry, reduced by the filmmaker to a simple necklace, or in the one where Valentin offers a shawl to his sister, the two faces of Gretchen are revealed, today a reserved young girl, tomorrow a woman and a lover. The fact of wearing such and such clothes is not for Murnau a social act, but a natural phenomenon of evolution, of growth or decline. (87-88)

In the third and final chapter, Murnau analyzes the idea of filmic space or the creation of motion. Here he emphasizes Murnau’s use of sudden appearances, which leads to another massive table listing and categorizing every example (96ff.). This chapter also includes a long section where he provides multiple abstract sketches of different scenes to trace the direction of the main movements (125ff.). He discusses the overall pattern of motion in the film as a kind of strategy, which is sometimes apparently violated by the actors. In this context, he talks about individual performances, particularly those of Emil Jannings (Mephistopheles), Yvette Guilbert (Martha), and Camilla Horn (Gretchen):

Certainly one can say that Emil Jannings and Yvette Guilbert “go too far.” It is certain that the gestures of these two actors, especially in the scene where they meet, appear indifferent to the general dynamic of the film’s strategy. They are gestures that bear a significance without reference to the global conception of the mise en scène. Their direction owes nothing to their inscription in the space of the film… But one must not confuse the direction of the film and what is proper to each filmed element…. This mode of expression is the responsibility of the characters…. It is not Yvette Guilbert, nor Jannings who “goes too far,” but Martha and Mephistopheles…. This comic verve, though due in part to the personal rapport of the actors and though apparently foreign to the general spirit of the mise en scène, is ultimately integrated successfully into the film’s modelling and its motor scheme….

By opposite means, Murnau obtains with an unknown, Camilla Horn, in the role of Gretchen, the same result…. Did he lead his actress to find some of these poses and gestures herself, or did he suggest them right from the start? It is of little importance whether he uses one or the other method. The fact is that he succeeded there as well in perfectly marrying what came from him and what he owed to the actress, giving us the impression of cutting her to the quick, of forging a new being who would be, from birth, “Murnauian”… This second nature which she is granted renders her always absolutely “natural.” (108-110)

In the footnotes to this chapter, Rohmer also returns to the notion that the Faust legend is more intrinsically cinematic than theatrical. Here he quotes Goethe’s version of the wager, where Faust defies Mephistopheles to give him happiness so great that he will declare, “Beautiful moment, please do not pass away”:

It is an idea more cinematographic than theatrical, because tragic theater, whether Greek or Shakespearean, puts the accent on the impossibility of innocence, not of happiness, having in view action rather than contemplation. The feeling of the incompleteness of the moment, associated with that of is fullness, we find in a vague way in almost all films, in the guise, most often, of a “sentimental” optimism, in search of one of those “suspensions”… that the screen is well suited to achieve by its magic and that of the soundtrack. In this sense, the “happy ending” of Murnau’s Faust appears to be more in line with the typical mythology of the cinema than with the ambiguous conclusions of the first and second parts of Goethe’s Faust. (123)

 

How the Bullies Stole the UFC | GQ

25 March 2025 at 20:00
estimated reading time: 1 min
Conor McGregor is running for president of Ireland on an anti-immigrant platform, Ultimate Fighting Championship head Dana White has personally welcomed the Tate brothers to events, and both are closely aligned with Donald Trump. How, asks writer and longtime UFC fan Vince Mancini, did a sport for the “weird little guy” not only become politicized, but positively toxic?
Image may contain Donald Trump Conor McGregor Accessories Formal Wear Tie Adult Person Blazer Clothing and Coat
Getty Images; Kelsey Niziolek

There was a time when the UFC was strenuously apolitical. There were fighters who seemed like assholes and others who didn’t, of course, but that was part of the fun. When Matt Serra famously disparaged his welterweight rival Matt Hughes as “a jock asshole” in season 6 of The Ultimate Fighter, it could be hard for an outsider to know what to make of it. One professional athlete calling another a jock? Aren’t they all jocks? It only made sense within the peculiar logic of MMA broadly and the UFC at the time, which was somehow both a sport and not a sport, “as real as it gets,” but also transparently entertainment. To its fans, it was somehow both the only pure sport and the anti-sport sport. MMA writer Ben Fowlkes once described it as “sports without the metaphor.”

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The Book That Really Predicted Trump

23 March 2025 at 17:01

There are a number of candidates for “the book that predicted Trump,” from Octavia Butler’s eerily prescient near-future dystopia that purported to “Make America Great Again” to Corey Robin’s The Reactionary Mind. I have occasionally quipped that Creepiness is the book that truly deserves the title. There is a moment of truth there — I do argue that the creepiness trend was in large part about the breakdown of white masculinity — but it was mostly just a joke about the almost overwhelming creepiness of Trump himself. More recently, though, it has dawned on me that another book in the series may deserve some prophetic credit, namely Why We Love Sociopaths. Or rather, it seems to have initially dawned on Aaron Bady, who tweeted about it a few times, and that prompted me to realize that Trump fits my cultural diagnosis in that book in a way that is, dare I say it, almost creepy.

My argument in Why We Love Sociopaths is that the remarkable prevelance of sociopathic characters in 2000s television was a symptom of a broken cultural contract. With the decline of the Fordist order and the rise of neoliberalism, one long-standing narrative about social mobility and merit had been discarded without being replaced by a plausible alternative. This situation gave rise to a growing sense that the only reliable means to get ahead in the system is to cheat. Certainly we can read Trump 2.0, and especially the seeming public indifference to his flagrant violation of laws and constitutional structures, as an extreme outgrowth of that basic tendency.

I organized my account around three types of sociopaths, all of which seem in retrospect to capture the Trump phenomenon in some way. The first category was the Schemer, which I mainly associated with cartoon shows where the characters are attempting to get away with mischief for its own sake. My key example was Eric Cartman from South Park, the strangely charismatic and resourceful child who periodically comes close to taking over the United States and even the world. Though Trump obviously lacks Cartman’s discipline and focus, there is something of the childish schemer in Trump — though that element is less prevalent in the embittered end-state we are now witnessing.

The second was the Climber, who stops at nothing to climb the social ladder. My key examples here was Don Draper from Mad Men. Here the connection to Trump is admittedly more distant, since my analysis was focused on meritocrats of the Obama type, who I argue should not be counted on to challenge the basic terms of the system that enabled their rise. Yet I do start out with an analysis of reality television, which I present as a “dumbed-down” version of the same basic worldview we see in prestige dramas like Mad Men and The Wire, and so I want to claim partial credit due to Trump’s association with reality TV.

The final sociopathic archetype was the Enforcer, the lawman who breaks the law in order to save it. My key example here was Jack Bauer of 24, who murders and tortures his way to stopping terrorist attacks that only see seems to have the insight to predict. Trump himself has identified unambiguously with this category, in his infamous quote (attributed to Napoleon) claiming that it is impossible to violate the law in service of your country. Clearly he is counting on his fellow citizens to decide that it doesn’t matter if he follows the legal niceties as long as he gets things done — nor is there any way to deny that the system as constituted on January 19, 2024, was basically incapable of delivering any meaningful results in a way that would be legible to the public.

Not only does Trump fit, in some way, into all of these categories, but his appeal depends on his ability to pivot among them. His status as a Cartman-esque provocateur gives people license to dismiss his scarier or more nonsensical declarations as mere bluster; his reputation as a (sort of) self-made businessman is key to his appeal; and his promise to “get things done” by any means necessary both emboldens his supporters and cows his enemies into submission. You can’t hold all three of these images together simultaneously, but they often combine in a kind of one-two punch. Cartman Trump seems most useful for such strategies. For instance, the existence of Climber Trump allows people to use the Cartman Trump to dismiss his destructive economic plans as bluster, while the frightening ambitions of Jack Bauer Trump can be rendered more palatable by reference to Cartman Trump. But on the less jovial side, it is precisely the Climber Trump that renders him plausible to many as a Jack Bauer figure who won’t be beholden to political restraints.

While in my conclusion I do offer up the feeble hope that, in a broken system, we might all benefit from being more sociopathic — a counterintuitive soundbite that was for a time picked up by Slavoj Žižek in his public lectures — my overall assessment of this trend is negative. It does offer a diagnostic of our broken system, sometimes even (in the case of The Wire in particular) a remarkably insightful one, and I admit up front that I enjoyed many of these shows (including South Park and some reality TV).

But its dominance of the entertainment field was, I believed, socially corrosive, and I think events have proven me correct. Trump 2.0 is not just politics as entertainment, which is bad enough, but it’s politics as 2000s entertainment, it’s politics as designed by people who watched way too much South Park, 24, and reality TV. I’m not making this up. Literal Republicans say as much, about themselves. Ross Douthat wrote a famous column on the rise of “South Park Republicans,” motivated primarily by a brash anti-PC attitude rather than any positive ideology. Supreme Court Justice Scalia — supposedly “the smart one” — literally cited 24 in an opinion, and the current conservative supermajority are all intellectual heirs of Scalia. As for the influence of reality TV, Trump’s trajectory speaks for itself, and clearly neither J.D. Vance nor any of Trump 2.0’s luminaries are “here to make friends.”

Obviously sociopath TV is not the only cause of Trump — nor am I saying as much. I’m saying the trend itself arose as a symptom of social breakdown, which it then helped to exacerbate. The one thing my diagnosis excludes is social media, for which I can perhaps be forgiven since I was writing in 2012 (and the book was after all about TV). But I think that many of the attitudes inculcated by South Park, reality TV, and 24 — the reflexive anti-PC “provocativeness,” the endless zero-sum competition for “clout,” and the ambient menace of violent fantasies — have shaped the social media field as well.

I’m not sure how much credit I really deserve for this prediction, since the fact of having written the book didn’t help me to predict either Trump’s success in the primaries nor his Electoral College technicality. But then, like most sane people, I had not up till that point given Donald Trump — who was little more than a vapid media phenomenon — much thought. If I had, perhaps I would have seen how well the cultural trends I diagnosed in Sociopaths converged in him. The cost, though, is that I would have squandered some of those precious remaining years and months before I was forced to spend so much of my time and energy thinking about one of the most worthless human beings ever to live. I stand behind that trade-off, even if I had no way of knowing I was making it. And if it turns out that my little book about TV trends, properly contextualized, could have prevented Trump’s rise — all I can do is apologize.

Upcoming book event: Prophetic Maharaja

20 March 2025 at 17:01

From mid-April to early May we’ll be hosting the next AUFS book event on Rajbir Singh Judge’s recent book Prophetic Maharaja: Loss, Sovereignty and the Sikh Tradition in Colonial South Asia. Rajbir is Assistant Professor in History at California State University, Long Beach, and the book explores loss and the limits of history by considering Maharaja Duleep Singh and his struggle during the 1880s to reestablish Sikh rule, the lost Khalsa Raj, in Punjab. Do get your own copy of the book and join us to talk about it. The event is currently scheduled to run as follows:

15th April: Introduction by SherAli Tareen

17th April: Marika Rose

21st April: LL Hodges

23rd April: Amaryah Armstrong

25th April: Basit Iqbal

28th April: APS

30th April: Samaah Jaffer

2nd May: Satbir Singh

5th May:  Response by Rajbir 

My Gen Z kids had a surprising reaction to 'Dead Poets Society' - Upworthy

17 March 2025 at 13:56
estimated reading time: 4 min

As a Gen X parent of Gen Z teens and young adults, I'm used to cringing at things from 80s and 90s movies that haven't aged well. However, a beloved movie from my youth that I didn't expect to be problematic, "Dead Poets Society," sparked some unexpected negative responses in my kids, shining a spotlight on generational differences I didn't even know existed.

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I probably watched "Dead Poets Society" a dozen or more times as a teen and young adult, always finding it aesthetically beautiful, tragically sad, and profoundly inspiring. That film was one of the reasons I decided to become an English teacher, inspired as I was by Robin Williams' portrayal of the passionately unconventional English teacher, John Keating.

The way Mr. Keating shared his love of beauty and poetry with a class of high school boys at a stuffy prep school, encouraging them to "seize the day" and "suck all the marrow out of life," hit me right in my idealistic youthful heart. And when those boys stood up on their desks for him at the end of the film, defying the headmaster who held their futures in his hands? What a moving moment of triumph and support.

My Gen Z kids, however, saw the ending differently. They loved the feel of the film, which I expected with its warm, cozy, comforting vibe (at least up until the last 20 minutes or so). They loved Mr. Keating, because how can you not? But when the movie ended, I was taken aback hearing "That was terrible!" and "Why would you traumatize me like that?" before they admitted, "But it was so gooood!"

- YouTubewww.youtube.com

The traumatize part I get—that film gets very heavy all of a sudden. But in discussing it further, I uncovered three main generational differences that impacted their "Dead Poets Society" viewing experience and what they took away from it.

1) Gen Z sees inspiring change through a systemic lens, not an individual one

The first thing my 20-year-old said when the credits rolled was, "What? That's terrible! Nothing changed! He got fired and the school is still run by a bunch of stodgy old white men forcing everyone to conform!" My immediate response was, "Yeah, but he changed those boys' individual lives, didn't he? He helped broaden their minds and see the world differently."

I realized that Gen X youth valued individuals going against the old, outdated system and doing their own thing, whereas Gen Z values the dismantling of the system itself. For Gen X, Mr. Keating and the boys taking a stand was inspiring, but the fact that it didn't actually change anything outside of their own individual experiences stuck like a needle in my Gen Z kids' craw.

2) Gen Z isn't accustomed to being blindsided by tragic storylines with no warning

To be fair, I did tell them there was "a sad part" before the movie started. But I'd forgotten how deeply devastating the last part of the movie was, so my daughter's "Why would you do that to me?!" was somewhat warranted. "I thought maybe a dog would die or something!" she said. No one really expected one of the main characters to die by suicide and the beloved teacher protagonist to be blamed for it, but I'd somehow minimized the tragedy of it all in my memory.

But also to be fair, Gen X never got any such warnings—we were just blindsided by tragic plot twists all the time. As kids, we cheered on Atreyu trying to save his horse from the swamp in "The Neverending Story" only to watch him drown. Adults showed us "Watership Down" thinking it would be a cute little animated film about bunnies. We were slapped in the face by the tragic child death in "My Girl," which was marketed as a sweet coming of age movie.

Gen Z was raised in the era of trigger warnings and trauma-informed practices, while Gen X kids watched a teacher die on live TV in our classrooms with zero follow-up on how we were processing it. Those differences became apparent real quick at the end of this movie.

3) Gen Z fixates on boundary-crossing behavior that Gen X overlooked

The other reaction I wasn't expecting was the utter disdain my girls showed for Knox Overstreet, the sweet-but-over-eager character who fell for the football player's cheerleader girlfriend. His boundary-crossing attempts to woo her were always cringe, but for Gen X, cringe behavior in the name of love was generally either overlooked, tolerated, or sometimes even celebrated. (Standing on a girl's lawn in the middle of the night holding a full-volume stereo over your head was peak romance for Gen X, remember.) For Gen Z, the only thing worse than cringe is predatory behavior, which Knox's obsessiveness and pushiness could be seen as. My young Gen X lens saw him and said, "That's a bit much, dude. Take it down a notch or three." My Gen Z daughters' lens said, "That guy's a creepo. She needs to run far the other way."

On one hand, I was proud of them for recognizing red flag behaviors. On the other hand, I saw how little room there is for nuance in their perceptions, which was…interesting.

My Gen Z kids' reactions aren't wrong; they're just different than mine were at their age. We're usually on the same page, so seeing them have a drastically different reaction to something I loved at their age was really something. Now I'm wondering what other favorite movies from my youth I should show them to see if they view those differently as well—hopefully without them feeling traumatized by the experience.

This article originally appeared in January

From Your Site Articles

FreshRSS 1.26.1

13 March 2025 at 22:34

This is a bugfix release for 1.26.0, addressing some regressions 🐛

A few highlights ✨:

  • Fix regression with cURL HTTP headers breaking conditional HTTP requests
  • Fix regression with saving states of user queries
  • Fix regression with dynamic OPML

This release has been made by @Alkarex, @FromTheMoon85, @marienfressinaud, @math-GH
and newcomers @abackstrom, @BryanButlerGit, @culbrethj, @EricDiao, @Karvel, @ViPeR5000

Full changelog:

  • Features
    • Add cURL version to page about system information #7409
  • Bug fixing
    • Fix regression with cURL HTTP headers breaking conditional HTTP requests #7403, FreshRSS/simplepie#33
    • Fix regression with saving states of user queries #7400
    • Fix regression with dynamic OPML #7394
    • Fix update of the user’s last activity on login action #7406
    • Fix setting category option Maximum number of articles to keep per feed #7416
    • Fix priority field when processing a new feed from an extension #7354
  • Deployment
    • Fix regression with 64-bit timestamps on 32-bit platforms #7375
    • Fix back-compatibility with cURL 7.51 (we require cURL 7.52+ for CURLPROXY_HTTPS) #7409
  • UI
    • Use case-insensitive sort for categories #7402
    • Improve dark mode of Origine theme #7413
    • Added API password indicator #7340
  • I18n
    • Fix (es, fa, sk): do not translate XPath code #7404
    • Fix date bug in Finish #7423
    • Add Portuguese from Portugal #7329
    • Improve Hungarian #7391
  • Misc.

American Umami

12 March 2025 at 22:00
estimated reading time: 15 min

Maybe there's no such thing as a "basic" taste after all

Homage to the Futoccho Burger, Lucky Pierrot, Hakodate (photo by Laura Edwards, from Hokkaido). You didn’t think I was done talking about burgers, did you?

I recently had the privilege to appear as a talking head on Dr. Anna Sulan Masing and Lucy Dearlove’s podcast series “To Be Delicious: A Cultural Context of MSG in the UK.” Across five episodes, Masing and Dearlove examine MSG and umami from multiple angles, investigating how they can be understood through both science and culture, and how it connects to larger concepts like nostalgia, racism, language, and a sense of place. The podcast clearly differentiates between MSG and umami (it bears repeating: they are not the same thing), while also explaining their inseparability and universality. MSG and umami feature in all cuisines. Literally all of them. But their specific forms, the way they are used, and the way they are understood all vary widely from culture to culture.

I went back through my old blog posts and college essays (embarrassing) to see if I could pinpoint when I first learned about umami.1 In November 2004 I wrote a paper called “Adaptation of the Chinese Noodle in Pre-Modern Japan” that explains umami and key umami ingredients, such as katsuobushi and soy sauce.2 By December 2006, I was mentioning umami casually in recipes for chowder on my blog. Back then, umami was novel to me, but also relatively unremarkable. It wasn’t the gastronomic buzzword or international phenomenon it is now. I remember noticing it on a lot of Japanese food packaging in banal contexts: as an ingredient (うま味調味料 umami chōmiryō (umami seasoning)), or in marketing copy and descriptors, such as this “rich taste” (深い旨み fukai umami, literally “deep umami”) nattō sold by Lawson.

In both instances, you could translate umami as “savory,” and it would make sense, and adequately describe the flavor or ingredient in question. But! Note that “umami” is written differently in each instance: うま味 for the umami seasoning, and 旨み for the “rich taste” nattō. This is a difference I only recently came to understand. The former refers specifically to umami the basic taste – you can think of “umami chōmiryō” as analogous to the word “sweetener” on English food labels (though of course that applies to sweet compounds rather than umami ones). The latter is more vague – just like the other umami, it derives from “umai,” which means “tasty,” but in this sense it implies a satisfying, balanced flavor. The Umami Information Center’s Japanese site has an explainer about this, which doesn’t appear on their English site. They take for granted that in English, umami is understood only as savoriness.

Except… it kind of isn’t! There’s still a lot of confusion about what exactly umami is, and some of this confusion comes from how umami as a concept is communicated by the Japanese outwardly, to a global audience. On the podcast, I said that my understanding of umami is really “umami in translation.” But it might be more accurate to say that my understanding of umami is actually limited to the relatively straightforward English definition of umami, which avoids the Japanese issue of homophonic ambiguity. Even so, some of the fuzziness derived from that ambiguity persists in English; the secondary Japanese definition of umami as “deliciousness” isn’t so much lost in translation as warped in translation.3

Back in 2015, The New Yorker published an article by Hannah Goldfield provocatively titled “You Think You Know Umami.” At the time, I felt it badly misrepresented what umami is, while also overcomplicating it, leaning hard into stereotypical characterizations of Japanese cuisine (and Japanese culture generally) as mysterious and inscrutable. (It’s annoyingly common for people writing about Japan to take the position that if they don’t know something, then it must be unknowable.)

The article made me so angry that I ranted about it on my blog, and later adapted that rant into an explainer of umami in Vegan JapanEasy. Here’s one particular snippet from the article that triggered me:

When I asked him to describe what umami tastes like, he grew philosophical. “It’s something that’s kind to the body,” he said. “It’s mild, and, after eating, it’s not heavy on your stomach. It helps you wake up better in the morning. That’s what deliciousness is about. It’s about feeling good after eating.” The most balanced meals, he said, have the same level of saltiness as exists naturally in our bodies, and umami in other countries can be too heavy on the stomach. “In Japan, we talk about it tasting good, sleeping well, and clean bowel movements.”

These statements were made by Kazu Katō, a representative of JRO, the Organization to Promote Japanese Restaurants Abroad. Though JRO’s stated purpose is to promote restaurants, what they really promote are Japanese exports, via the businesses that sell them. They operate mainly at expos and trade events, but also run occasional public campaigns like last year’s Japanese curry stamp rally in London. Umami itself is one of their most prominent marketing assets. But JRO was initially conceived as an organization that would not only promote Japanese food, but also regulate and certify it. Ted Bestor explains the background in an article in Devouring Japan:

In the mid-2000s, Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Matsuoka Toshikatsu complained about “inauthentic” Japanese restaurants after visiting a Colorado emporium that featured both sushi and Korean barbecue on its menu. In response, he advocated a system of certification to be applied to restaurants outside of Japan that represent themselves as serving genuine Japanese cuisine.

The proposal was ridiculed in the Japanese press, as well as in government circles; the project came to naught. Nonetheless, the notion of “sushi police” was picked up by the Japanese media and has remained in popular consciousness, perhaps as a shorthand for referring to officious gatekeeping of what is and what isn’t actually Japanese cuisine. Indicative of such popular derision is a 2016 Japanese television anime series entitled Sushi Police… [which] portrays bumbling Japanese officials, accompanied by a robot powered by soy sauce, pursuing inauthentic sushi in the United States… and elsewhere.4

Although Matsuoka’s specific proposal never materialized, it morphed into JRO, which tacitly certified restaurants by including them in campaigns, or by endorsing them in designated restaurant guides. Furthermore, the MAFF scheme turned out to be a hydra: its head may have been cut off, but two more grew in its place: JETRO’s “Japanese Food Supporter” designation, and the completely opaque Nintei Nihon Restaurant accreditation program (apparently initiated by a Japanese restaurant owner in London, with no connection to any other governing body).

This is all to say that umami has been used by Japanese government ministries and trade organizations like JRO as a political and economic tool to support a narrow, generally conservative image of Japanese food, and Katō’s comments should be understood in that context. Elsewhere in Devouring Japan, Yoshimi Osawa investigates the idea of umami as Japanese cultural property in her article “We Can Taste but Others Cannot”:

[Some] Japanese now commonly assert that umami is a taste recognized only by Japanese or that the Japanese understand umami better than foreigners… There are at least three technical reasons why these claims exist: (1) all three umami substances (MSG, IMP, and GMP) were discovered by Japanese scientists, (2) Japanese is one of only a few languages to have a word to describe the umami type of taste, and (3) the existence of umami as a fifth taste was not believed outside of Japan until the discovery of the umami receptor in 2000.5

Osawa’s research included interviews with a number of Japanese chefs in both Japan and the UK, some of whom were absolutely damning in their appraisal of non-Japanese palates as inferior and unable to perceive or understand umami.6 And is it any wonder, when official explanations of umami, such as Katō’s, can be so esoteric and abstract that they invoke sleep quality and bowel movements? Mythologizing umami like this creates a feedback loop between Japan and the West that supports an Orientalist/exceptionalist view of Japan while making umami out to be something more difficult to grasp than it actually is.

The New Yorker article also features commentary from Adam Fleischman,7 founder of the now mostly-defunct Umami Burger. The whole idea of an “umami burger” is irksome to me, because burgers are already inherently umami, especially if they contain accoutrements that bring their own umami compounds to the party: common toppings such as cheese, tomatoes, ketchup, or pickles. Even at their most basic, burgers express an extraordinary level of umami intelligence. That’s why most of the world’s best burgers are not that different from ones that would have been made one hundred years ago. Adding high-concept condiments such as Fleischman’s “Umami Master Sauce” or “Umami Dust” is… fine, I guess, and probably quite tasty. But it’s also unnecessary. I get the impression that in the case of Umami Burger, umami was deployed primarily to generate marketing buzz, and only secondarily in the service of making a better burger.

The Japanese, [Fleischman] told me, define umami as “an over-all harmonious state of perfection where the ingredients come together, a really rounded and harmonious dish. They have a sort of zen way of looking at it.”

The invocation of Zen says it all: umami is meant to be something mystical, rarefied, profound. But one of Osawa’s interviewees, a Japanese food TV presenter, offers a counterpoint: “To be honest, umami is a convenient expression. If I cannot find an appropriate expression to describe the taste of food, I sometimes use umami instead of just saying oishii (tasty).”8

Imagine, if you will, a parallel universe in which the chemical compounds responsible for the subtle but distinctive taste of savory food were isolated by an Italian scientist, who named this taste “gustosità” or something. I wonder what the discourse surrounding gustosità would look like. Would the Italian government use it to promote anchovies and cheese and tinned tomatoes, and to support the idea that Italians have superior palates? (Lol I can’t even keep a straight face writing that – of course they would.) Would non-Italians be producing podcasts and writing lengthy think pieces about it, like this one?

Or would we all just shrug and say, “Oh yeah, gustosità – I get it, savoriness. American food is savory, too. Burgers are totes savory.”

Clearly, I am very dismissive of the notion that umami is anything more than just a universal basic taste – too dismissive, in fact. Masing and Dearlove’s podcast – which compellingly connects umami to feelings of comfort, satisfaction, nostalgia, and self-care – has made me rethink my hardline, just-the-facts position on umami. Because taste is not just a matter of, you know, taste. How we perceive food and understand our relationship to it, and its relationship to the wider world, has a lot to do with how we contextualize it and talk about it.

Katō’s musings about how umami is “kind to the body” and helps you poop sound pretty woo-woo, but a more open-minded and perhaps less arrogant interpretation would be that he’s expressing an aesthetic sensibility related to umami, rather than trying to define the term in a purely academic way. And certainly, that approach has merit, especially because when it comes to describing sensations, words often fail us miserably.

A perennial favorite Calvin and Hobbes (Bill Watterson, 1995).

In a way, it’s no wonder we’ve all latched on to umami so excitedly. We don’t have a lot of words to describe tastes, so when a new one comes along, it’s like finding a key to a door that’s been locked our whole life. Now we can name it; now we can talk about it, explain it, move in and make it our own.

Discussing the sensory characteristics of food often involves metaphors. We describe tastes in terms of other things, and vice versa: a bittersweet memory, a sour expression, salty language. But savory…? That’s a bit trickier. We can savor a moment, or meet an unsavory character, but the actual word “savory” doesn’t appear in any English figures of speech that I can think of. Perhaps this indicates that we don’t have strong, definitive associations with the word. It may be worth noting, as Osawa does, that Japanese dictionaries also define umami as “a skillful thing to relish, especially techniques in art” and “profit that is easily gained in business.”9 As a more familiar, more lived-in word (and again, a homophone), umami naturally has other connotations in Japanese.

How on earth would you describe a savory taste to someone else? How would you describe any taste? It’s actually kind of impossible, which is why using metaphors, using narratives, and expanding on the emotions we associate with a taste can be useful – as Masing and Dearlove and their interview subjects have done, and indeed, as Katō does in his explanations. The language Katō uses to explain umami is delicate and calm: “kind,” “mild,” “feeling good,” “sleeping well.” They’re the same sort of words you might hear in a meditation app. Now, compare this to Adam Fleischman’s cookbook:

To quote Clive Badger from Fantastic Mr. Fox: Explosions! Flames! Burning things! The back cover copy boasts that this book will teach you how to “detonate flavor”! Kaboom! Could this take on umami be more American?10 Of course it’s to be expected that in a country where there are more guns than people, even umami is weaponized. Goldfield points out that “Fleischman’s approach — Where do I find the umami, and how can I get as much as possible? — is distinctly American.” She also reports that in 2013 David Chang set out to create something he called “the New York umami.” What does this even mean? If you want New York umami, eat a slice of pizza. If you want American umami, just eat any normal cheeseburger. In his cookbook, Fleischman acknowledges the inherent umami of pizza and burgers – but it’s not enough for him. And maybe that’s the American approach to umami, as Goldfield suggests: to ramp up, maximize, exaggerate, explode.

Umami is a basic taste – and I still think that’s the best and simplest way to understand it. But perhaps basic tastes just aren’t so basic after all. Sweet, sour, bitter, salty, and umami: we associate all of them with particular things outside the realm of food, and it is in those associations that they take on new, more complex meanings, which will inevitably vary between different cultures and languages. Tastes are like colors: we all see the same red, blue, and green, but how we interpret them as symbols depends completely on our cultural vantage point. We are what we eat – that’s a given. But we are also the way we talk about what we eat.

24 Hour Pancake People is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

Thanks for reading! If you enjoyed this post, you may like some of the articles I’ve written for Pellicle, which also explore how symbolism and sense-memories connect to taste and flavor.

1

I remember my MSG “aha!” moment clearly. When I was living in Japan, at some point I clocked that the salt shaker on the table at my go-to yakitori joint wasn’t just salt. It was aji-shio, or “flavor salt,” a mixture of salt and MSG. So that’s why it makes everything taste so good, I thought. This came after growing up in America and seeing “no MSG” labels on food packaging for years and years, and hearing about MSG primarily in the context of widespread, casually racist demonization of Chinese food. I never really knew why people thought MSG was bad, and it didn’t take much Googling for me to realize that it wasn’t.I’ve been all in for Team MSG ever since.

2

The paper also refers to synergistic umami, although only in a misspelled citation that took me a while to figure out: “sojo-kaka,” which should have been “sōjō kōka” (相乗効果). To be honest, re-reading this paper made me feel like I’ve been spinning my wheels for 20 years when it comes to communicating about umami!

3

This is a pretty common occurrence in popular writing about Japanese culture. So many Japanese words have undergone a similar treatment, like ikigai – I really enjoyed this article explaining how it’s been misrepresented in the West. And it’s worth pointing out that we already have cultural concepts analogous to ikigai: raison d’être, or simply one’s life purpose – just like we already have the concept of savoriness. Do we even need “umami”?

4

Bestor, Theodore. “Washoku, Far and Near: UNESCO, Gastrodiplomacy, and the Cultural Politics of Traditional Japanese Cuisine.” Devouring Japan, edited by Nancy K. Stalker, 109-110. Oxford University Press, 2018.

5

Osawa, Yoshimi. “We Can Taste but Others Cannot: Umami as an Exclusively Japanese Concept.” Devouring Japan, edited by Nancy K. Stalker, 127. Oxford University Press, 2018.

6

Osawa 126.

7

“Butcher” in German; literally “meat man.” Is that nominative determinism or what?

8

Osawa 121.

9

Osawa 121.

10

Out of curiosity, I Googled うま味爆弾 umami bakudan (umami bomb in Japanese), and there are actually quite a lot of results. (The first and most interesting one is for 3D-printed canapés!). So maybe this idea of a violent, explosive umami isn’t so all-American or un-Japanese after all.

Here's what dopamine, the 'happy hormone,' actually does

10 March 2025 at 07:19
estimated reading time: 7 min
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Dopamine rushes, withdrawals, and detoxes are trending among wellness gurus online. But experts say the science behind the trendy phrases doesn’t hold up.

A magnified view of dopaminergic neurons, appearing as a web of interconnected round bodies with multiple tails connecting to neighboring bodies.

The nerve cells pictured here are responsible for producing dopamine, a neurotransmitter that has become an obsession among online wellness gurus. But experts say the popular understanding of dopamine is often wrong—and the chemical actually plays a critical role in learning, movement, memory, attention, mood, and motivation.

Micrograph by Dr. Nick Gatford, Research Fellow/Kavli Institute of Nanoscience Discovery/University of Oxford

ByKatie Camero

February 4, 2025

Dopamine is widely known as a “feel-good” hormone, a major reason why we may feel happy after a shopping spree or eating pizza.

Thousands of TikTok videos reveal how interested people have become in boosting or lowering their daily doses of dopamine—whether through dopamine “rushes” and “withdrawals,” or dopamine “fasts” and “resets.”

But now that the chemical has become an obsession among wellness gurus, scientists who study it want to make it clear: Dopamine can do a lot of things, but making us “feel good” isn’t one of them.

Dopamine doesn’t work like that, and it’s certainly not a “catch-all term for happiness,” says Daniel Dombeck, a neurobiology professor at Northwestern University who studies the molecule.

(Why dopamine drives you to do hard things—even without a reward.)

Dopamine is a sophisticated neurotransmitter that also acts like a hormone and plays critical roles in learning, movement, memory, attention, mood, and motivation. While dopamine contributes to our feelings of pleasure, it doesn’t directly cause them—and it definitely doesn’t act alone.

“There's a lot of ignorance about what dopamine does and how the brain functions,” says Anne-Noël Samaha, an associate professor of pharmacology and physiology at the University of Montreal who studies the science of rewards and motivation. But in a nutshell, “it’s one of the molecules that allows us to stay alive.” 

How dopamine works in the body 

Dopamine acts as a chemical messenger, allowing neurons in different parts of your brain to communicate with each other. How it affects you depends on where it’s acting in your brain, Samaha says.    

“In some regions [of the brain], an increase in dopamine can help people focus,” Samaha says. “In others, it could make people more impulsive.”

A lack of dopamine in certain areas of the brain can also negatively impact functions like concentration and movement, and is associated with conditions like attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, Parkinson’s disease, and addiction.

Thousands of brightly colored, interconnected strands, transitioning from yellow in the lower left corner, to pink, purple, blue, turquoise, and eventually green in the upper right corner.
This prismatic photo captures a network of dopaminergic neurons—nerve cells that produce and release dopamine—generated from human stem cells. Scientific studies have shown that dopamine doesn't actually make you feel good as some people claim—it makes you want the things that make you feel good.Micrograph by Dr. Nick Gatford, Research Fellow/Kavli Institute of Nanoscience Discovery/University of Oxford
An illustrated view of the space between a neuron and its target receptor, into which the neuron is releasing vesicles of neurotransmitters.
An illustrated view of a synaptic cleft, the space between a neuron and the cell where the neuron releases neurotransmitters such as dopamine. A "dopamine rush" is a misnomer, experts say; when you engage in an enjoyable activity you actually experience a rise in levels of several types of neurotransmitters.Illustration by Science Picture Co/Science Photo Library

So why is dopamine mostly known for its part in our pleasure and reward system? Dombeck says that’s because it was the subject of early research in the 1980s that found our brains release the molecule when we receive food or another reward. As a result, experts generally accepted that dopamine mediates pleasure.

But in the 90s and early 2000s, mounting evidence challenged that idea. Turns out that when you shut down an animal’s dopamine system, they enjoy their rewards just as much but lose all motivation to seek more.

In other words, dopamine doesn’t make you like something, it makes you want it.

“It's not the molecule of pleasure,” Samaha says. “It's the molecule of the pursuit of pleasure.”

This is why you may want to stop doomscrolling before bed—or using drugs or drinking alcohol—but can’t bring yourself to quit even when it makes you feel terrible. Every time you swipe past funny, shocking, or otherwise engaging content, your brain releases dopamine and records the details about the moment in an attempt to boost the likelihood you repeat it whenever you’re exposed to cues like the ping of a notification on your phone, Dombeck says.

(Here’s what happens to your brain when you take a break from social media.)

This was an evolutionary advantage for humanity.Today, most things we want and need are incredibly accessible for people in wealthy countries. But our ancestors needed dopamine to make them want to walk several miles for a meal or spend months building shelter with their hands. 

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“We evolved in environments where we had to mobilize our energy and attention to seek out things that were necessary for our survival,” Samaha says, including safety, shelter, and social connection—and dopamine helps us do that.

Dopamine ‘rushes’ are more than just dopamine

Yes, dopamine levels do rise when you engage in enjoyable activities like listening to your favorite song. But to call that surge in positive feelings a “dopamine rush” is “more than an oversimplification,” Samaha says, “it’s just plain wrong.” 

Those activities also elicit a rise in levels of other neurotransmitters that affect mood like serotonin and oxytocin, as well as endorphins, Dombeck says. How and where these molecules interact with each other determines how you feel. 

“At the time of a positive outcome, there’s a rush of activity throughout the brain,” Dombeck says. “To call the whole thing a dopamine rush is underselling what’s actually happening.”

(How to get high on your own hormones—naturally.)

These peaks in dopamine aren’t inherently good or bad, Samaha says—what matters most is that they aren’t extreme. Too much dopamine is associated with conditions like mania, while too little is linked to depression. In most scenarios, though, “dopamine is just neutral,” Samaha says, and is around to “keep us alive.”

Dopamine withdrawals are complicated too

Just because you feel temporarily irritated or anxious after losing access to something that brings you joy, it doesn’t mean you’re experiencing a dopamine withdrawal, Samaha says.

“Anytime people have to change their habits, there's always an adjustment period that’s accompanied by some level of anxiety and stress,” Samaha says. “That doesn't mean dopamine levels have greatly decreased and they're now dangerously low.

There is a real condition called dopamine agonist withdrawal syndrome, but that only happens to some people who take medications that mimic dopamine to treat conditions such as Parkinson’s disease and restless leg syndrome. If they suddenly reduce their dose or stop taking their meds, they may experience symptoms similar to drug withdrawal such as agitation, excessive sweating, nausea, and pain.

But a post-vacation gloomy mood, for example, might just be a sign that you’ve gotten used to the high of that stress-free life—not a full-blown dopamine deficit. “It'll take time for your dopamine system to kind of recalibrate and come back down to a normal threshold where other parts of your daily life could activate it,” Dombeck says.

The ‘dopamine fasting’ trend isn’t literal

“Dopamine fasting” is another buzzword that, according to the psychologist who coined the term in 2019, is meant to be an “antidote” to our highly stimulating society: Easy access to activities that give us quick dopamine hits are, as the theory goes, numbing us to the pleasures of slower activities like reading or creating art.

Now that we can do most things with a tap on a touchscreen, we’re bombarding our dopamine systems with “very potent rewards that require almost no upfront work,” says Anna Lembke, professor of psychiatry and addiction medicine at the Stanford University School of Medicine and author of Dopamine Nation. As a result, the things we like don’t satisfy us as much, but we still crave them in an “attempt to bring baseline dopamine levels back up to normal, healthy firing.”

Some people, however, have taken the concept of dopamine fasting too literally. Rather than asking you to stop doing everything that might stimulate dopamine in your brain, dopamine fasting is about limiting or completely refraining from impulsive and problematic behaviors.

Besides, there’s no way to actually drain yourself of dopamine, Samaha says. “It's not like Dry January where you decide for a whole month that you won't drink alcohol because it's good. You can't have a dry dopamine day, it’s not possible,” Samaha says. “Dopamine is an ancient molecule…that has been conserved across evolution. It certainly has not evolved to be influenced by social media or people's phone habits.” 

Furthermore, although habits like checking social media or gambling can be addictive, there’s no direct evidence that they can dramatically rewire your brain like drug abuse can, Lembke says. 

The bottom line? Avoiding harmful habits are bound to benefit you, but you don’t have to avoid the things that make you happy.

“Trust that your dopamine is going to do what it does,” Samaha says, “and just leave it alone.”

The Story That “Hillbilly Elegy” Doesn’t Tell

8 March 2025 at 10:13
estimated reading time: 10 minLike many memoirs, J. D. Vance’s book misses a few details, some of which complicate the story upon which he has based much of his politics.Republican Vice Presidential candidate Sen. JD Vance  speaks at a campaign rally at VFW Post 92 on August 15 2024 in New...

Last month, after I published an article about the Republican Vice-Presidential candidate J. D. Vance and his fixation on the traditional nuclear family, I received an e-mail from Donna Morel, an attorney in San Diego. Morel is a fact-checking hobbyist—notably, she exposed major fabrications in best-selling books by the late celebrity biographer C. David Heymann. After Donald Trump named Vance as his running mate, Morel had begun looking closely at “Hillbilly Elegy,” the 2016 memoir that brought Vance to national prominence and provided the springboard for his foray into politics. Morel suspected that the book was “a little too made for Hollywood,” she told me—in 2020, it was adapted into a movie starring Glenn Close and Amy Adams—and she wanted to see if her hunch was correct.

Vance, it must be stressed, is no C. David Heymann. Judging by what Morel has unearthed from the archives, Vance has blurred some details, perhaps unintentionally, in a manner that likely comports with most memoirs, especially those that rely heavily on family lore. Vance is careful to acknowledge spots in “Elegy” where he may not have all the facts in place; in the introduction, he writes, “I am sure this story is as fallible as any human memory.” Still, Morel has identified discrepancies and omissions that complicate the family narrative upon which Vance has based so much of his conservative politics and ideology. Some of what was left out of “Elegy” undermines Vance’s larger political project, in which matrimony and the nuclear family are the foundation of a civil society that stigmatizes divorce, single parenthood, same-sex marriage, and, of course, “childless cat ladies.”

“Two generations ago, my grandparents were dirt-poor and in love,” Vance writes toward the start of “Hillbilly Elegy.” “They got married and moved north in the hope of escaping the dreadful poverty around them.” Bonnie and Jim Vance, who are immortalized in “Elegy” as Mamaw and Papaw, left their Appalachian home town in Kentucky in their teens, eventually settling in Middletown, Ohio, where Jim got a union job at the Armco steel mill; tragically, their first child died in infancy. (“Without the baby, would she have ever left Jackson?” Vance asks in “Elegy.” His grandmother’s “entire life—and the trajectory of our family—may have changed for a baby who lived only six days.”) Vance describes Bonnie and Jim as “alone in their new city” and “isolated” from the family they felt closest to. He allows that Jim’s mother, Goldie, was “nearby,” but that Bonnie disliked her, and that she was “mostly a stranger to her own son.”

Morel dug up census records and other documents that add nuance to this tale. “Hillbilly Elegy” doesn’t name Jim’s stepfather, Julius Blackmon, who had worked at Armco for years before Jim was hired there. (“Applicants with a family member working at Armco would move to the top of the employment list,” Vance notes in his memoir, without making the connection.) Despite any disdain that Bonnie may have felt toward her mother-in-law, Bonnie and Jim lived with Jim’s mother and stepfather at two different residences following their move to Middletown, according to the census records. Uncle Jimmy’s birth announcement, in 1951, also shows the young couple living in the Blackmon home. When Bonnie and Jim did get their own place, it was less than a mile away. And, when Julius Blackmon died, Jim was named the executor of his estate—yet another data point that contradicts the picture of estrangement that Vance sketches in “Elegy.”

None of these findings destroys the portrait of two teen-agers leaving their lives behind in Appalachia and striking out to create a better life for themselves in the industrializing Midwest. But the surprising elisions work to exaggerate Bonnie and Jim’s circumstances, putting dents in Vance’s version of their plucky, up-by-the-bootstraps story.

Bonnie and Jim’s marriage was, at times, deeply troubled—in Vance’s telling, both of his grandparents were violent, and Jim was a vicious drunk. But Vance praises them in his memoir and elsewhere for sticking it out. Later in the marriage, Vance writes in “Elegy,” they “separated and then reconciled, and although they continued to live in separate houses, they spent nearly every waking hour together.” (The relationship seems to have improved immensely, Vance observes, after Jim Vance quit drinking, in 1983.) During a 2021 talk in which Vance discussed how divorce harms children, he suggested that, following the sexual revolution of the nineteen-sixties, too many couples in flawed marriages began falling back on divorce as an easy way out, and he offered up Mamaw and Papaw as an aspirational counterexample. His grandparents, he said, “had an incredibly chaotic marriage in a lot of ways, but they never got divorced, right? They were together to the end, ’til death do us part. That was a really important thing to my grandmother and my grandfather.” By the nineteen-seventies and eighties, Vance told his audience, couples were more likely to see marriage as a “basic contract,” one that could be entered into and exited with ease, even caprice:

But that recognition that marriage was sacred, I think, was a really powerful thing that held a lot of families together, and when it disappeared, unfortunately, a lot of kids suffered. And this is one of the great tricks that I think the sexual revolution pulled on the American populace, which is this idea that, like, well, O.K., these marriages were fundamentally—you know, they were maybe even violent, but certainly they were unhappy, and so getting rid of them and making it easier for people to shift spouses like they change their underwear—that’s going to make people happier in the long term.

According to records sourced by Morel, Bonnie and Jim—Vance’s flawed but heroic avatars of traditional marriage—entered divorce proceedings twice. In the first instance, according to court documents and also an announcement in the March 22, 1955, edition of the Middletown Recorder, Bonnie, then twenty-one, filed for divorce from Jim on grounds of “extreme cruelty” and “gross neglect of duty.” Joseph Nigh, a family-law attorney in Columbus, Ohio, told me that “ ‘extreme cruelty’ is a broad spectrum,” and can encompass physical assault, verbal abuse, or “demeaning conduct.” “Gross neglect of duty” is even more of a catchall term, Nigh said, intended to be left to a court’s broad discretion. (Nigh spoke with me about Ohio family law as a general matter, and did not address the Vance case specifically.)

The timing of Bonnie’s divorce petition is out of step with “Elegy,” in which Vance’s Uncle Jimmy compares the early years of his parents’ marriage to “Leave It to Beaver,” and says that, while their bond was always volatile, before the nineteen-sixties, “they were united, they were getting along with each other.” In the divorce petition, Bonnie asked the court for a restraining order against Jim as well as alimony, child support, and custody of three-year-old Jimmy. In August, 1957, the divorce filing was dismissed “without record,” leaving no documented clue as to why. Bonnie and Jim went on to have two more children.

Taylor Van Kirk, a spokeswoman for Vance, said, in an e-mailed statement, “JD’s grandparents lived difficult lives amid struggles with poverty, miscarriages, and alcoholism. But in their later years, they became overwhelmingly positive forces in the lives of their children. The decision for a married couple to divorce is deeply personal and individual—JD respects those decisions.” A representative for Vance also cited recent comments that the candidate made on Fox News in which he stressed that he has never “supported women staying in violent marriages.”

It’s entirely possible that Bonnie and Jim Vance reconciled because of their commitment to the sanctity of marriage. But it’s also useful to place Mamaw and Papaw’s first aborted divorce—which goes unmentioned in “Hillbilly Elegy”—in some historical context. Before the state of Ohio introduced no-fault divorce, in 1974, anyone unilaterally seeking a divorce needed to prove that her spouse had committed a misdeed that was enumerated in Ohio’s divorce code; in addition to “extreme cruelty” and “gross neglect of duty,” these faults included adultery, bigamy, impotence, and “habitual drunkenness.” Prosecuting such a case against one’s spouse required money and resources. In seeking divorce, “the problem that so many women had was that they weren’t financially independent from their husbands,” Elaine Tyler May, a professor emerita of history and American studies at the University of Minnesota, said. “It’s not a coincidence that divorce rates went up as an increasing number of women began working outside the home and were able to support themselves.” (Bonnie Vance, it might be noted, was not employed, did not complete middle school, and did not seem to have any family in Ohio.)

Vance is correct that the nationwide advent of no-fault divorce in the nineteen-seventies did make marriage more akin to a “basic contract.” But a range of statistics drawn from subsequent decades is highly suggestive of the kinds of contracts that some women wanted to break. Research by the economists Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers has shown that, as no-fault divorce became the norm in state after state, domestic-violence rates dropped by some thirty per cent, suicides among women dropped by as much as sixteen per cent, and the number of women murdered by their partners dropped by ten per cent.

In 2020, Vance, who had recently been baptized and confirmed as a Catholic, published an essay in the Catholic journal The Lamp about how his grandmother influenced his decision to convert. “I felt desperate for a worldview that understood our bad behavior as simultaneously social and individual, structural and moral,” he wrote. The philosophy he craved, Vance went on, “could speak against rising rates of divorce and addiction, not as sanitized conclusions about their negative social externalities, but with moral outrage. And I realized, eventually, that I had already been exposed to that worldview: it was my Mamaw’s Christianity.”

Divorce rates have not been rising for some time—they peaked in the U.S. at the turn of the eighties, before Vance was born. Still, it is his prerogative to imagine that his grandmother might have felt a sense of moral outrage about the evolution of divorce law. And Vance’s reader is free to feel a sense of moral outrage on behalf of any young mother of the nineteen-fifties who might have sought to escape a marriage that was characterized by “extreme cruelty.”

A quarter century after Bonnie Vance’s first divorce petition was dismissed, her marriage appears to have reached another breaking point. According to a decree that Morel procured from a court in Butler County, Ohio, Jim filed for divorce from Bonnie; Bonnie filed a counterclaim, and, in 1981—incidentally, around the time that the rate of divorce in the U.S. reached its historical apex—the court found Jim “guilty of gross neglect of duty.” Still, the couple did not divorce. Instead, they legally separated. Nigh, the Ohio family-law attorney, said that a couple might pursue a legal separation instead of a divorce if one or both spouses had religious objections to divorce, for example, or if there was a question of one spouse forfeiting health-insurance coverage. Yet, despite these considerations, “it’s very rarely used,” Nigh said. “In nineteen-plus years of practicing, I’ve only done one or two legal separations.”

The decree ordered that the “parties to said contract shall live separate and apart,” and Jim was required to pay Bonnie seven hundred dollars a month in alimony. He also had to “relinquish all claim” to “the family residence,” cede property he co-owned with Bonnie’s brother to their mother, and hand over the title of the 1980 Buick to Bonnie, even as he continued to make the monthly payments on it. Yet the “marriage contract” between them, the decree states, “shall continue in full force and effect.” Mamaw and Papaw may have looked and sounded divorced. But, technically, they never did give up their claim to “ ’til death do us part.” ♦

Stabat Alma Mater

7 March 2025 at 12:42

This is the text of an address I (Marika) gave recently as part of the KU Leuven annual Thomas Feast on the theme of theology, art, and decolonisation.

For several years now I’ve been haunted by a piece by Étienne Balibar about the relationship between politics and knowledge in the university. Balibar wrote that, ‘We realise now that our ruling class is no longer a bourgeoisie in the historical sense of the world. It does not have a project of intellectual hegemony, nor an artistic point of honour. It needs (or so it thinks) only cost-benefit analyses, ‘cognitive’ educational programs, and committees of experts. That is why, with the help of the pandemic and the internet revolution, the same ruling class is preparing the demise of the social sciences, humanities, and even the theoretical sciences. To accelerate the process, why not have the victim become the culprit (‘Islamo-leftist’, ‘activism’, ‘ideology’…)? It will make things easier.’[1]

It’s a strange time to be reflecting on the relationship between theology, art and decolonisation, as both theology and the arts are struggling for survival in a global war waged ‘on wokeness’ – which is to say, on the side of white supremacy. When things that we love – or that we depend on for our salaries, stipends, or future job prospects – are threatened, it can be tempting simply to knuckle down, to try to cling to what we still have for as long as we can. But I want to suggest that we take our cue from Cedric Robinson, who writes in Black Marxism that his goal in writing the book was not simply ‘a question of outrage or concern for Black survival’ but ‘a matter of comprehension.’[2] How can we understand the relationship between theology, art, and empire?

Two things are often missing from contemporary attempts to grapple with this question, which are frequently both too abstract and not abstract enough. Our conversations often get stuck at the level of theological and artistic content – questions of who or what is represented or talked about. What this misses is both the very particular and material question of the institutions and resources which make theological and artistic expression possible, and then the more abstract question of theological and artistic form. So I want to spend some time sketching out some thoughts on these two areas.

Both the arts and academic theology in the Western world take their shape in large part from the huge social transformations which took place within Europe over the late medieval and early modern period along with the emergence of slavery, colonialism, and racism. I’m going to focus here on the role of universities, both because that’s what I know most intimately and because that’s where we currently are, but the other institutions on which theology and the arts rely – churches, galleries, concert halls, philanthropic and government funding bodies  – were also transformed with or emerged out of these same processes. Universities were born from Christian Europe’s encounters with its others, out of the wealth of cultural, scientific, and philosophical materials which became available in the wake of the fracturing of Andalusia; out of European encounters with the Arab and Ottoman worlds through the Crusades; and from the age of European discovery, conquest, and slavery. They emerged in ways which reflected the needs of growing European nations for clerical and economic administration of emergent European nation states and empires, for legal and theological justifications for new forms of property and dispossession and, connected to all of this, for new frameworks of nation, race and history within which all of these could take place; frameworks created and sustained by theology, art, and culture.

I’ve come to think that theology, art, and the institutions in which these are done, can be best understood in terms of social reproduction. For the most part, that is, theology and the arts tend to function both to repeat and to re-inscribe the hierarchical ordering of the societies which produce them, along with the spiritual and aesthetic values which sustain these hierarchies; and also to rework these values as the societies which they organise encounter new challenges. As Sylvia Wynter suggests, we see within the Western world a gradual shift from ideas about racial hierarchy which were justified in the late medieval period on theological grounds, to a justification of racial order through reason – the predominant frame of the 16th through to the 18th centuries  – followed by a hierarchy in which evolutionary and economic success come to measure eugenic perfection from the 19th century onwards; the belief that economic success indicates not only intelligence but also racial superiority.[3]

Universities exist both to reproduce the forms of knowledge which justify and re-make interconnected distinctions of race, class, and gender and also to reproduce the people who will in turn re-make the world which relies on these distinctions. The crisis we find ourselves in, then, can be understood as the result of the ongoing shifts by which racial and colonial order remake themselves. The second part of the twentieth century can perhaps best be grasped through the framework of neo-colonialism globally and multiracialism in the imperial core: a form of racial order in which, as Denise Ferreira da Silva argues, white Westerners invite non-white people to enter into the supposedly secular sphere of universal values and human rights, both failing to recognise the particularity of our own sense of what is universally human, and relying implicitly on the figure of the inhuman, fanatical or unassimilable other: the barbaric and homophobic Hamas fighter; the misogynistic, violent, immigrant; the drug addicted and welfare-dependent black mother.

Much of what passes for decolonisation in this period, then, can be better described as diversification. The West allows for formal desegregation and decolonisation, welcoming diversity into its ranks precisely in order to maintain its imperial power. We see this reflected in the paradoxes of contemporary theological and artistic institutions: the galleries showing work by black artists with the help of funding from oil companies; universities who refuse to take down statues honouring slave-owners whilst advertising their diversity schemes, running workshops on decolonising the curriculum next door to departments partnering with arms companies; or working to widen access whilst closing off our students’ future possibilities by delivering them into debt. This conjuncture has created challenges for those of us seeking to confront the historical entanglement of theology and the arts with racism and colonial violence. The university is asking us to talk about these things, but not too much; as Fred Moten and Stefano Harney wrote twelve years ago of the subversive intellectual: ‘the university needs what she bears but cannot bear what she brings.[4]

And of course, all too often we choose not to confront our institutions but to hold back; to limit what we say and do for the sake of our jobs, our connections, or our future employment prospects. To live in the university is to be formed by its systems and structures in ways that I do not think we are very good at reckoning with, and so it is often our undergraduate students who are able to see with the clearest eyes and speak with the bravest voices. I think we’ve seen very clearly in the wake of October 7th the limits of the neoliberal university’s commitment to decolonisation. The violence with which universities have shut down even the mildest demands for disinvestment from the machinery of destruction throughout the ongoing genocide of Palestinians has been revealing. I wonder whether we will look back on these protests as a turning point: the absolute failure of liberal institutions to defend free speech, the capitulation to pressure from donors and governments perhaps the death knell for the Western commitment to the multicultural ideals of diversity, equality and inclusion; and perhaps for the university as such.

What comes next of course, looks to be worse. What does it mean to confront the possibility that, as Balibar suggests the golden age of the university is over? The destruction of the university may look like what is currently taking place in the US, where an attempt is underway to systematically dismantle both universities and the arts, or in the UK, where instead of the wrecking ball of Elon Musk’s DOGE, a purportedly left wing government is overseeing the gradual death by starvation of both the university and the arts sectors. What does it mean to recognise that these changes are happening not, whatever politicians, consultants, or vice chancellors claim, out of economic necessity, but out of a groundless insistence, a kind of pure faith in the superfluity of the arts and humanities?

Let’s talk about abstraction. Jacob Taubes suggests that the fundamental shift which takes place between the medieval and the modern world can be understood, if not explained, in terms of the shift from Ptolemaic to Copernican cosmology.[5] Medieval Europeans understood themselves as part of the great chain of being, a cosmic order reflected not just in the ranked ordering of humans and other creatures but in the very universe itself, a hierarchy both literal and figurative leading from the chthonic darkness below the earth up to the celestial spheres and the heavenly beings.[6] This cosmic and metaphysical order gave both theology and art a firm anchor in the universe.

To speak of God, to make art, was to reflect an order of goodness, truth and beauty in which what was said and done on earth corresponded in a very real sense to what was done in heaven. The Catholic Church was right, Taubes says, to see in Copernicus not just a new scientific theory but an existential threat to the metaphysics which grounded both ecclesial authority and artistic representation. After Copernicus, unable to ground spiritual or ecclesial authority in the external order of the universe, Taubes suggests, both philosophy and theology turned inwards: a shift which we see both in the Kantian turn to human categories and in the ongoing struggle of Christian theology to reconcile the now antithetical poles of God and human being.

 This turn inwards is reflected too, I want to suggest, in an inwards turn which we can see in both Catholic and Protestant piety: a new emphasis on inwardness, on intention over action, on self-examination; a proliferation of new mysticisms of internal ascent leading not from heaven to earth but up the stairways of the interior castle to the darkness of God. But art, too, is unmoored, and comes to find its bearings within the individual mind and imagination. Stephen Prickett connects this process both to the spread of literacy and the newly emergent European divide between the public and the private spheres, suggesting that this internalisation of imagination and speculation is seen first in the newly emergent art form of the novel, but appears also in the visual arts and in poetry in tendencies towards realism, idealism, and perspectivalism.[7] Along similar lines, Victoria Nelson has traced the transposition of ancient ideas about underworlds into what she calls ‘psychotopography’, the literary and visual depiction of the underworld as an image of the inner depths of the mind and imagination; an allegorical rather than analogically artistic vision which, she argues, shapes the emergence of the grotesque, the fantastical, and the science fictional in artistic representations in the West.[8]

But these transformations are also racial transformations. As Willie Jennings writes, the emergence of racial slavery and European empire is characterised by a forcible deracination of enslaved and colonised people; the destruction of their relationships with one another and with their particular places and contexts in order to place them instead within a racial scale which runs not from heaven to hell but from white to black.[9] This racial logic is also a logic of property. Enslaved people, Jennings argues, are relocated both into Christian identity and also into ‘the market’. New European notions of the interior self are themselves tied to new orders of property. Balibar finds in John Locke the first full expression of the notion of self-consciousness; a notion which, he suggests, cannot be separated from Locke’s understanding of personhood as property.[10] It’s the opening up of inner space which makes it possible for Locke to understand personhood as self-possession, and this relationship of self-possession which in turn opens up new forms of possessive relation to the external world. It is this understanding of personhood which allows Locke to claim ownership not only of the ore dug up by his own hands, but also of the grass that his horse has eaten, and the turf cut by his servant. It is this interiority, this self-possession which, Brenna Bhandar and Alberto Toscano argue, smuggles ‘a racial anthropology of the human’ into the very heart of Western ideas of personhood, the self-conscious, rational, imaginative and self-possessed person contrasted with racialised non-persons, understood to be lacking in self-consciousness, irrational, and trapped outside of history in the realm of nature.[11]

The racial frame within which this new interiority is mapped is also a historical frame, an account of progress in which the gradual abstraction and spiritualisation of all things which was once worked out along the great chain of being comes now to be mapped across a historical scale. Here theology is placed as one stage along a developmental scheme within which, in its classical form, the pagan deification of nature gives way to the outward law of Jewish monotheism, then the inward law of Christianity, and finally the spiritualisation or internalisation of theology’s claims; the realisation that it is not God but reason which drives forward history.

A similar process of interiorisation and abstraction is at work in narratives of the development of art over history. The novel is placed towards the end of a process of development which begins in myth and fable.[12] What is modernity if not Don Quixote, awakening from a dream of chivalry and romance to discover himself, the protagonist of a work of fiction? The modern art gallery removes works of art from religious, ritual or social function and places them into a blank white box. Something similar can be said of the museum, which marks its difference from the gallery precisely by placing the works it holds into context, thus marking them out from art works proper, at the same time as it insist on the relegation of these contexts to the past. Recent conflicts over the fate of the Benin bronzes, for example, looted by British soldiers from Nigeria, have included contention both over the appropriateness of displaying the bronzes as separate works, rather than within the altars for which they were originally made, and also over the practice of removing them from the daily life of the communities from which they were stolen.[13]

In Black Marxism, Cedric Robinson says that his work began from the recognition that the theories of history which he encountered in Western radicalism were insufficient; that ‘something more than objective material forces were responsible for “the nastiness”’. But this need to understand was ‘not simply a question of outrage or concern for Black survival. It was a matter of comprehension.’ We are talking, then, about a double excess; two forms of desire, of pleasure, connected to the acquisition of knowledge. One thing that has happened with the shift from formal and explicit logic of segregation and empire to the less tangible and explicit order of neoliberal multiculturalism has been a shift towards the language of culture and religion as a justification for racial violence under the banner of the threat to Europe’s Christian heritage, or the decline of Western culture.

This shift implicates both theology and the arts more deeply, at the same time as it has heightened the attacks on both insofar as they have resisted these attempts to weaponise them. I wonder whether this has to do with the ambivalent role of pleasure which is more explicit here than in the sciences, precisely because both theology and the art deal with that which is not quite graspable or containable; precisely because both open up the space to confront what cannot quite be contained within the logic of racial order, alongside the pleasures which sustain it. Both theology and art have to do both with beauty and with suffering, and with the slippage between the two. Both know how to redeem the suffering of others, how to turn it into profit. The cost of interiorization and abstraction is sometimes described as ‘disenchantment’; the reward of centuries of violence and dispossession has been, for both art and theology, a certain kind of crisis of confidence, a loss of faith in the reality or value of what we do. What certain kinds of theological or artistic diversity work have in common with the violence of reactionary politics unfolding around the world is perhaps a need to witness certain kinds of suffering in order to restore a sense of reality or urgency or pleasure to the world. What is the difference between a White House video of immigrants being deported to Guantanamo and the keffiyeh-wrapped baby Jesus in the Vatican nativity scene?[14] In Heidelberg, recently, I went to an exhibition about the history of Orientalism in German art. I found myself in a room full of people looking at racist art, wondering whether we were there to enjoy the racist art, or to enjoy feeling superior to the people who made the racist art, or to enjoy feeling bad about being part of a society that had made so much racist art. What is coming for us now, I think, is a movement of reaction which both feeds on the pleasure of racial violence and very much does not want to think about those pleasures. Perhaps that is a place for us to start.


[1] Étienne Balibar, ‘Politics and Science, One Vocation or Two?’ in boundary2, 15 March 2021 https://www.boundary2.org/2021/03/etienne-balibar-politics-and-science-one-vocation-or-two

[2] Cedric J. Robinson, Black Marxism (The University of North Carolina Press, 2000).

[3] ‘Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation – An Argument’ in CR: The New Centennial Review 3.1 (2003), 257-2337.

[4] The Undercommons: Fugutive Planning & Black Study (Minor Compositions, 2013).

[5] Jacob Taubes, ‘Dialectic and Analogy’ in The Journal of Religion 34.2 (1954), 111-119.

[6] Cecilio M. Cooper, ‘Fallen: Generation, Postlapsarian Verticality + the Black Chthonic’ in Rhizomes 38 (2022).

[7] Stephen Prickett, Secret Selves: A History of Our Inner Space (Bloomsbury, 2021).

[8] Victoria Nelson, The Secret Life of Puppets (Harvard University Press, 2001).

[9] Willie James Jennings, The Christian Imagination: Theology and the Origins of Race (Yale University Press, 2010).

[10] Étienne Balibar, Identity and Difference: John Locke and the Invention of Consciousness, translated by Warren Montag (Verso, 2013).

[11] Brenna Bhandar and Alberto Toscano, ‘Race, real estate and real abstraction’ in Radical Philosophy 194 (2015).

[12] Atesede Makonnen, ‘Romanticism and the Novel(ty) of Race in Manu Samriti Chander, The Cambridge Companion to Romanticism and Race (Cambridge University Press, 2024.

[13] Barnaby Phillips, Loot: Britain and the Benin Bronzes (Oneworld, 2021).

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