This post is by Rajbir Singh Judge.

As I wrote Prophetic Maharaja, I often recalled that libraries cull their collections. This common practice is called ‘weeding,’ which, as the American Library Association has it, “is critical to collection maintenance and involves the removal of resources from the collection. All materials are considered for weeding based on accuracy, currency, and relevancy.” The task has become more onerous as budget cuts, the promise of the digital, limited space—the need for open student study spaces—and the overall destruction of the university further extends weeding. Publish and (eventually) perish, unless one can remain accurate, current, and relevant—a laborious task—especially so since destruction “can always happen faster than any creation, production, construction” to borrow from Gil Anidjar.

And yet creation, production, construction continue even as we witness continuous destruction in Gaza. The questions academics can ask then seem obscene: How does one remain adequate to the accumulation of knowledge over time? What does it mean to introduce time, as currency, into a community? What to make of the (in)sufficiency of narration in a historical moment, as Basit asks in this forum? For academic books, journals, and articles, we have a system in place that saves one from weeding: the prestige of the publisher, the number and substance of reviews, institutional affiliation, awards and, more concretely, the number of citations, neatly measured by the h-index. It is, perhaps, a professionalism that allows for ideological reproduction; a restricted economy emerges within the promises of the dwindling library. We can then say that to keep—and now even find—its place on the shelf, a book must be generative both in and of time, but certainly not wastefully so. One must overcome the remains and rubble, which, as Samera Esmeir writes, the colonial state can only look to conquer: a “progressive conquest” (49).

The three professional requirements articulated by the ALA are quite essential to the discipline of History, which struggles to accurately—today, objectively, rather than carefully—capture the past to retain the past’s currency and ascertain its relevance. It is a question of success. As Amaryah reflects: “That historical form so often serves as a way of resolving the knots that undermine colonial logics is reflected in the pressures of history that attempt to measure the ‘success’ of an idea, a movement, a cultural product, in terms of its historical accuracy or faithfulness to a historical form.” Whether one wants it or not, History offers redemption—accuracy, currency, and relevance—in the unfolding of an elevating historical process, which can then lead to a successful book. One must bend to History; know time to periodize—elevate—effectively. The demand is clear, one Nietzsche articulated long ago: “If every success is a rational necessity, if every event is a victory of the logical or the ‘idea’ then down on your knees quickly and do reverence to the whole stepladder of ‘success’” (105)! Of course, some do not revere that particular ladder and so, to follow Basit, “the sufficiency of a narration for the rabbis, for Sikhs, and for me (each inhabiting our losses, which touch one another, not least in language) may not be redemptive for the professional historian.”

Such success also evades me, although the ladder is a tantalizing one. Yet perhaps such a failure allows the book to exist without such anxieties about accuracy, currency, and relevance. My book, Anthony says, “moves with a kind of beloved ambivalence between concepts of European origin and those of Sikh tradition. He passes across these borders seemingly without anxiety, precisely because this ambiguous relationship to loss undermines claims that some final or complete knowledge of Duleep Singh will be found anywhere.” But ‘too irreverent and undisciplined’ are the accusations of those with authority especially as they want to see the knee bend. To give one example, when I asked to enter the rotation to teach the core course in the History MA Program, “Historical Thinking and the Discipline of History,” I was told I was not “good enough.” So, I will not arrive. I lack the requisite Historical Thinking (though I am grateful for Anthony’s reminder “that the colonial borders repeated in the university between academic disciplines are not real, even if they are deadly (sometimes for our bodies, sometimes for our spirits)”).

I mention this all to say that I am grateful to the readers in this space, organized by my friend Marika, for allowing me to take their time, which has let my book do something else in the world, albeit only for a moment. They have allowed for a departure to learn with care, without end, without relevance—a more wandering, aimless, conversation that I am delighted to have.

But it is not so easy to reject direction and redemption, especially for those who feel lost. As Robert Meister has queried: “And what about those victims who feel lost? Such victims might recover by being found or saved.” This is possible if the past sufferings are “valorized and made meaningful.” Or, to heed Elizabeth Povinelli’s lesson: “suffering and dying can always be referred to a horizon of time where they are transformed into thriving and birthing” (184-5). Yet, as Basit declares in this forum, loss “does not make you special or confer some kind of election.” So, we are left with another question, one that Meister continues to go on to ask: “But is it redemption that lost victims always want?” (216). For Saidiya Hartman, the answer is ‘no’ especially in the “time of slavery,” which “negates the common-sense intuition of time as continuity or progression, then and now coexist; we are coeval with the dead” (759). So then one can be, should be, ungrateful toward one’s redeemers; it might be a mistake “to take everything objectively, to grow angry at nothing, to love nothing, to understand everything” as Nietzsche diagnosed in his untimely meditations (105). But if one is ungrateful, one can be called childish, especially if one stubbornly stays in the same spot, refusing to proceed, and remaining “coeval with the dead.”

Satbir Singh rightly focuses on loss and the child in his rich and astute analysis of the book to question the status of the child as an original or prototype for a community in time. We learn from Singh that the famous portrait of Duleep Singh, painted by Franz Winterhalter, and narrated by a mother, Queen Victoria, in her journal entry, can become a maternal phallus and offer an imaginary completion that relieves castration anxiety (although it cannot overcome it); recall, it is the obsessive that refuses to accept the mother’s castration, which leads to a masturbatory jouissance that represents “the crushing of desire” (433). Sikhs are often enough presented as obsessive by academics in their need for control: too worried about “who owns religion?” as Laurie Patton examines. As the underlying structure of the argument goes, Sikhs have been smothered and deny lack because of the anxiety the Other’s desire elicits. Therefore, they can only present their history as fully formed, fixed, their own, without lack. Satbir presses upon this point and asks about the Real: “Does he (for the Sikh at least) not evoke the lost, absent mother, to whom his gaze poses the Freudian dilemma, ‘father, don’t you see I am burning?’” In presenting us this dream-scene with the famous question, Singh offers another view in which Duleep Singh is linked with jouissance, an encounter with the Lacanian Real that fantasy—reality—then makes bearable (Žižek, Sublime Object, 44-45). For such a gaze is not “clear or penetrating,” but presents a dilemma: it does not realize a possibility, but “it is rather an impossibility that is crucial to the constitution of the subject–the impossibility, precisely, of any ultimate confirmation from the Other” (Copjec, Read My Desire, 36). Desire then is without content as it drives after an impossibility—essential to my own reading practice in Prophetic Maharaja.  

Duleep Singh himself did not remain under the thrall of Queen Victoria as we see in the expansion of the maternal function as Satbir Singh theorizes it in relation to Thakur Singh Sindhanwalia. The maternal function, Elissa Marder demonstrates, can also emerge as “an uncanny, ambiguous vessel that contains uncontainable events, ideas, temporalities, and that paradoxically creates a space for the birth of futures that may have otherwise remained unimaginable” (8). It is what Amaryah, too, reads in Du Bois’ novel: “this unstable and open sense of possibility.” But the expansion of the maternal function, the refusal of Queen Victoria, as well as reading beyond standard narrations became a sign of “adolescent storm and stress” to British colonial officials. As Sara Pursley demonstrates, in her magnificent Familiar Futures, anticolonial insurgencies were indeed “read as symptoms of the emotional adolescent stage of development and of the psychological pathology of precocity.” What then to make of “development along native lines”? Perhaps such a development that looks to teach the native how to mourn properly must be rethought; we must, to use Satbir’s words, “conceive beyond major notions of successful mourning or melancholic entrapment, to ways of becoming and belonging that exceed the psychoanalytic canon’s parameters.”

            In his beautifully written essay, Anthony gestures toward such a reading by turning to ‘rumor’ and ‘gossip’ in Agamben’s The Time That Remains. As Anthony recounts, “Gossip does not have to be accurate in order for it to be closer to truth than fact is. Yet, the truth gossip is close to is still far from being information.” Exceeding the economy of accuracy, currency, and relevance, gossip reveals an unrestrained expenditure (recall Freud’s close connection between melancholia and mania in relation to the question of economy). But perhaps here we can simply say that gossip is a “subaltern borrowing”—then and now—which reveals a complicity and connection that does not allow for a singular and known transaction in its anonymity. Therefore, rumors have, Mladen Dolar proclaims, “the capacity to inform the community by spreading not information, but the elusive substance of jouissance” (71). Dolar’s conclusion follows from his understanding that the shadow, symptom, of the big Other—“the epistemological foundation of proper knowledge” (logos)—is rumors, hearsay, and slander; the big Other is Janus-faced (11). It is an ambiguous constellation in which the beneficial slides into the detrimental as logos is complicit with its shadows (83). Dolar offers a similar conclusion as Anthony, who observes, “ambivalence becomes a powerful stance here.” Ambivalence is full of tensions, the difficulty of maintaining one’s movements in rhythm because we are overclose to the world. We can trip. And then we can get embarrassed and angry. Ambivalence, that is, is also about discord, which is itself a question of the heart. “When I say ‘I love you,’ it means that I want to be near the feeling of ambivalence our relation induces and hope that what’s negative, aggressive or just hard about it doesn’t defeat what’s great about it really—or in my fantasies of it, anyway,” is the way Lauren Berlant framed it. It is to return to Anthony’s question: what indeed does it mean to make it?

            Marika, in her fantastic close reading of the text, asks a series of important and daunting—what she terms ‘vulgarly Marxist’—questions about gender and sexuality, property relations, and communication technologies. For example, how did gender order the distinction between public and private? What is the role of sugar in pahul ceremony, especially considering the role of sugar in imperial expansion and capitalism? How do we see this interplay between community, exchange, and the household especially with changes of property and production? And, finally, what to make of the communicative technologies at play? My response here will be inadequate, and I will only answer a few of them, since these questions themselves evoke a vast historiography to which I respond in the book.

Consider the question of the public/private divide, which Partha Chatterjee has famously investigated. He argues that a nationalist Indian public was premised on a constitutive split between outer and inner realms in contrast to Europe. Within Europe, although distinguished from each other, the public and private were still unified and consistent in a single political domain. In colonial society, however, “the political domain was under alien control and the colonized excluded from its decisive zones by a rule of colonial difference”(75). Therefore, as Chatterjee writes, “a neat separation between a private sphere of diverse individuals residing in bourgeois patriarchal families and a public sphere inhabited by homogeneous citizens was not available to Indian nationalism” (147). This exclusion meant that the private, spiritual, and inner domain became the place where nationalism fashioned its authority through cultural difference and resisting the sway of colonial institutions. As Chatterjee posits, “the home was the principal site for expressing the spiritual quality of national culture, and women must take the main responsibility of protecting and nurturing this quality.” Chatterjee contends the home—the site of particularity and difference—then, is where “the hegemonic project of nationalism was launched” (147). And so, Chatterjee concludes that there existed two political domains in tense relation to each other: civil society and community—the latter that provided opportunity to resist the universalizing tendencies of modern disciplinary power and capitalist rule (237-238). It is space in which “(primarily male) nationalist elites undertook to establish their own spheres of sovereignty and originality and sought to reject a colonially scripted secondariness”, if we work with Parama Roy’s formulation (3). In the struggle for the Khalsa Raj at the end of the nineteenth century, we also do see the desire for a masculine sovereign in the figure of Duleep Singh for many.

            We can consider communication technologies similarly. The argument about communication technologies and Punjab is made by Harjot Oberoi. Oberoi states that “The transformation in communication made possible a new phase in the Sikh Panth: as old divisions slackened, new ties were effected through innovations like the printing press” (45). The rise of new elites, rather than colonial rule, thus leads to the conclusion that the Sikhs had become modern: a new cohesion emerged for Sikhs as a Sikh intelligentsia reconstructed the Sikh tradition into a Protestant form, a uniform identity, which led to the loss of a previous form, an enchanted universe (141). For Oberoi, then, the revolt around Duleep Singh is simply farce, the last gasp of “a rapidly dissolving” world (375). We can then make perhaps an easy diagnosis, turning to Marx. “Historical tradition produced the French [Punjabi] peasants’ belief that a miracle would occur, that a man called Napoleon [Deep Singh] would restore all their glory.” Oberoi says as much since he reduces the narrative of Duleep Singh to a question of transition and the fight for a “lost cause” by conservative peasants (even though re-readings of the 18^th Brumaire by Spivak call into question such a rote analysis by instead highlighting the emergence of a constative and performative subaltern and suggesting a translation that offers “a condition of being elsewhere within oneself” as Michael Allan formulates it).

Needless to say, the critiques and revisions of such works are numerous in the colony and metropole—the complexity of gender, family, and nationalism in imperial societies especially in relation to time, for example. Still, Marika’s questions are so important because I think the typical response to them have left us with the promise of historical difference: the promise of a better, more inclusive, Indian nation or culture in its opposition to the forces that come to constitute European modernity. In South Asian Studies, such a promise often facilitates the discovery of alternative historical forms that can provide an antidote to a politics of community in the present—the Hindu Right. As SherAli mentions in the Introduction to this forum, the problem is particularly pronounced in Punjab Studies as recovery and repair have taken root. In contrast to this more typical move, I asked: what if this division, between public and private, also fails without recourse to an alternative behind it? Are communication technologies—the entry into modernity—constituted by a closure? What do we make of the tendency to periodize—which is a sovereign decision, let’s say, covering the absent foundation of sovereignty itself? In pondering these questions, it is important to remember that ideological critique is a two-part process as Slavoj Žižek maintains. So, yes, we need to “discern in an apparently universal, unchangeable limitation the ideological ‘reification’ and absolutization of a certain contingent historical constellation,” but we also need to consider the very failure of this absolutization: that there remains something that “cannot be interpreted away as the outcome of ideological manipulation, of the ‘false consciousness’ due to the social situation of the subject.”

            Such a shift is what Joan Copjec has recently termed the “art of subtraction,” in which the task is double: “It must not only put an end to the obscurantist agenda of covering up the unconscious, of a recalcitrant wanting to know nothing about it, while avoiding the foolish error of trying to expose it.” This art of subtraction might be the work of the drive—a lesson I learned from Marika herself, who has written: “Linear, teleological desire, aiming consciously at the reintegration of the lost object and unconsciously at its endless deferral, is associated with time and with historical progress; circular, repetitious drive, which simply circles around the hole at the center of being is associated with eternity” (65). This is a reading practice that Amaryah too highlights, one in which there is “the impression of a vision, almost a fever dream, and a sense of possibility that could never be foreseen in advance or fully articulated and encapsulated in words.” And, indeed, LL Hodges brilliantly conjures this art of subtraction in their reading of the book. As they evocatively write, “From one window an arm swings a string with a bouquet of flowers tied at the end. The waiting hand of the next window over tries to grasp the bouquet. He misses. Again, the bouquet pendulum swings, again a miss. Loss becomes continuous.” It is this practice, this fever dream, this art of subtraction, I attempted to embody in my own book against the typical narratives that simply look to expose or reintegrate lost objects. It was to ask the question that Marika ends with: “what do we want?”

For Copjec, Stefania Pandolfo, and Omnia El Shakry the art of subtraction is also a question of the Divine. Consider theorizations of barzakh, which Samaah also draws upon in her important and necessary essay on historicity, destruction, and Palestine. For Copjec, “Triebe, drive is like barzakh, both a limit and a zone of linkage” (44). This liminal space between life and death is, El Shakry writes, “a place the living may travel to, if only they would allow themselves the necromantic reverie” (19). Such a place is foreclosed by Christianity: God’s incarnation as Christ, which congealed the One, as Copjec and others have written about (19). Perhaps then the search for a historical Jesus—which was also a search for a historical Israel and a historical India—is a bit different in that the solution came to reside in historicity itself, in the promise of what Amos Funkenstein calls “contextual reasoning.” In contrast to Incarnation and the closure of context, a maintenance of the gap allows for travels that provide a different relation to history-writing, El Shakry argues, as it reorients the mode of communication with the past from discovery and knowledge to the dream and Al-ghayb, the unseen (18). In my own book, drawing on the Sikh tradition, I centered hukam, which is an inscrutable order within this world, invisible command, that is not a congealed or restricted form central to historicity today. Such is oneness in the Sikh tradition: a non-totalizing force. Indeed, hukam troubles the very distinctions between inner/outer, transcendence/immanence, mind/body, relevance/irrelevance that we traffic in.

Samaah, too, takes us to a tradition—Karbala—in which “historicity is not the point.” She draws on the work of Talal Asad and his interlocutors, as did I in my book, to “consider the possibilities of relating to, learning with, and caring for those unjustly buried in the past—inconclusively and without closure.” Part of the difficulty is, as Samaah notes, a certain kind of questioning that is inevitable when writing about a tradition: what is the precise meaning of Karbala, for instance? Yet such questioning is quite stale as Muneeza Rizvi has told us and, in turn, she has asked: what other forms of reasoning and moral criticism are there to consider a different type of enquiring (498)? This might be a question of genre—a question that my book sidesteps by conceding tragedy to the authors who equated it with failure. Yet genre, especially tragedy, is not so simple as we know. Just consider what the numerous readings of Antigone teach us. And yet tragedy might be inadequate to think about discursive tradition. Basit has rigorously paid attention to this point and shown that the anthropology of secularism is not informed by tragedy, but by Trauerspiel. This conclusion leads Basit to Asad’s antihistoricism, one which “allows the anthropologist to perceive the temporal work of modern reconfigurations without requiring the sovereign cut of periodization (secular/religious, modernity/tradition—and whether narrated as tragedy or comedy)” (89). It was this notion of tradition that I sought to highlight in my book.

But, as Samaah and Basit both query: are we also in the midst of a withdrawal of a tradition? What happens when a tradition is possibly rendered counterfeit, as Basit asks, following Aaron Eldridge’s forthcoming translation of Spiro Jabbour? Perhaps, it is the case that we are then traitors (the etymology of tradition has been discussed enough). Gil Anidjar has suggested that the only responsible assertion for the revolutionary actor is “we are traitors,” but, then, as he continues, “that assertion, spoken or not (for silence might remain golden) does not help, justify, or guarantee anything…’We are traitors,’ then, because we do not decide, nor can we know, the meaning of our actions, the nature or worth of our fame, nor can we ask, therefore, for an unambiguous, or risk-less, recognition, for instantaneous and righteous (?) fame” especially so since most traitors “are locked away somewhere dark and damp or worse” (102).

In Palestine, this question of tradition—of traitors—too is locked and perhaps encounters withdrawal in, what Abdaljawad Omar calls, a “temporal chasm, wherein the durée—essential to the rites of mourning—is systematically arrogated and denied.” Mourning, a recuperation of cathectic investments in an object for a future to come, is no longer possible; there is no retreat—a detachment from the world—possible in Palestine to make gains for a future. In contrast, our Christian world always promises more time: the day of judgment is deferred; one can supersede the losses that accumulate today. The unequal and unjust starting points themselves, it is assumed, can also be overcome by time especially since we live in a time “after evil,” but before justice as Meister describes it. It is thus a world without risk and loss—one, instead, of unlimited growth and accumulation—because its end is deferred, a temporal chasm of its own.

Freud, on the other hand, understood that there was risk inherent in investments–a question of desire and object-cathexis (Betsetzung, occupation), which is why there is a thin line between mourning, melancholia, and mania (and also introjection and incorporation). It is as Hartman has said: “the work of mourning is not without its perils, chief among these are the slippage between responsibility and assimilation and witnessing and incorporation” (771). It is for such reasons that Christopher Bracken ends his article on the graves of 215 children found in Kamloops Indian Residential School with a series of questions: “What feeling goes with losing your family’s history? Is it mourning? Melancholy? Mania?” (300)

So, there is a risk, that Freud centers, that comes with object-cathexis because losses can produce, in one’s investment and occupation, narcissistic identifications, self-abjection, internalized aggression, and more, all of which are a question of economics. But a libidinal economy is neither liberatory nor damning—a point I aimed to make in my book. Ambivalence, as Anthony alludes to, comes out in the open as investments are called into question by loss. There is much to be said about Freud’s speculations—the risk of losing all value—as Derrida has done. But I wanted to simply say that today, many, including our institutions (the university, to give one prominent example), do not want to take the risk that comes with their investment, their occupation, for their trade in volatility.

Theirs is a world governed by a destruction of loss, for Palestinians but also for themselves. To return to an earlier discussion, it is an obsessional neurosis—which, in all forms, is bound to destruction—that refuses loss and, therefore, risk. Consider the Zionist fantasy: an occupation without the risk entailed in desire; recall desire is bound to a lost object that arises with separation, which creates the enigmatic desire of the Other. In contrast, obsessives cannot accept loss and, instead, take the place of the Other. Cleverly, “the obsessive takes the object for himself and refuses to recognize the Other’s existence, much less the Other’s desire,” writes Bruce Fink (119). It is a position that is masturbatory—a self-generating desire (in a  genealogical science, we can say)—as the Other is annihilated and annulled, reduced to an object (Fink, 128). Israel, Esmeir reminds us, is “obsessed…with colonizing [the land’s] surface and granting it new historic meaning” (41). This is, moreover, a position that is both imperious yet marked with remarkable weakness—one speaks constantly about one’s doubts, fears, impediments—as the obsessive refuses risk, the possibility of his own disappearance; one need only explore, here, the language of anti-anti-Semitism (Lacan, Formations of the Unconscious, 389).

The obsessive has frenzied activity and compulsive rituals—compulsive murder, too—governed by the ultimatum: “’If I don’t do this (the compulsive ritual), some unspeakably horrible X will take place;’” desire covered by demand (Žižek, Looking Awry, 25, Lacan, Anxiety, 293). Lacan discusses this minimization of risk by the obsessive in Formations of the Unconscious and elsewhere, particularly in the way the obsessional becomes bound to the need to obtain permission from the big Other: a question of the superego (395).  Yet, as Lacan claims, “ultimately, this other with whom he is playing is only ever an other who is he himself and who, already, will in any case leave him with the laurels, from whichever side he approaches things;” there is “no kind of essential risk” (396). It is not then possible to be a traitor, to be in a tradition, to learn in such a subject position because there is no risk. There are numerous nuances and movements bound to the obsessional. But the question I want to ask from this analysis is simple enough: How do we make them—Zionists and the institutions that support the Zionist project—own the risk that comes with their investments, their occupations, (even if these investments are not a matter of choice)?

            I end with this long tangent on obsession because my book wanted to foreground loss and desire—castration and drive are two sides of the same coin—to offer space for risk and, therefore, failure—a failure to be accurate, current, and relevant. How to allow for such failure within the production of knowledge today without offering oneself up for weeding? How to interrupt such decisions especially when “there are those who do not learn, ‘those who refuse to hear’”? We might need a certain kind of patience to hear an interruption—a question central to Subaltern Studies. “It is the subaltern, the fisher and the grass-roots peasant, who produces a constant interruption for the full telos of Reason and capitalism, for those who have the patience to learn,” as Spivak insists. But this is also a lesson that Talal Asad has repeatedly taught: “a living discursive tradition aims at mutual interrogation and continuous learning” (411). It is what Amaryah too ends with as well by stating my book “offers a lesson in learning to stay with the uncertainty as a way of staying with the singularity and totality of what is at once a tradition and a dynamic and open-ended effect of communities in, across, and against time.” I am grateful to have learned from these readings hosted in An und für sich and I hope I have responded adequately here, especially because of all the time I have taken from my friends who have read and written about my book. But perhaps one need not give back what had been originally given since it is in that gap that learning within a community, always a risky endeavor, can take place.