The United States cannot credibly defend freedom around the world while treating the survival of a democracy under attack as a bargaining chip.

Russia’s war against Ukraine is not simply a territorial dispute. It is a test of whether democratic nations will defend the principles that sustain their freedom — or allow an authoritarian aggressor to destroy these principles through military force, terror and economic coercion.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine was unlawful. Its conduct has included attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, and in March 2023, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova over alleged war crimes involving the unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children. All grave allegations that demand accountability.

As Ukraine continues to fight for its survival, current U.S. policy raises a fundamental question: Does Washington understand what is at stake?

If Moscow succeeds in subjugating Ukraine, other authoritarian leaders will also ask whether military conquest can succeed. Can U.S. commitments be trusted? Will democratic nations stand together when the price becomes politically inconvenient?

Ukraine’s defense is not charity. It is a strategic investment in American and European security, Washington’s credibility and the deterrence of future conflicts.

The U.S. emerged from World War II understanding that an international order based on sovereignty, freedom and rule of law serves its interests. And successive Republican and Democratic administrations recognized that unchecked authoritarian expansion threatens both American security and the independence of its allies.

That understanding must guide U.S. policy toward Russia today.

Diplomacy is essential. Negotiations to end the war should be pursued seriously. But peace cannot mean rewarding aggression, compelling Ukraine to surrender its sovereignty or giving Moscow time to rearm for another invasion.

Appeasement does not necessarily prevent conflict. It can encourage aggression by convincing dictators the free world lacks the will to resist them. And a ceasefire without effective safeguards could become merely a pause before the next assault. A settlement that leaves Ukraine defenseless would postpone the conflict, not resolve it.

Peace should be measured not by the speed with which an agreement is signed, but by whether it protects Ukraine’s independence and makes another war less likely. And economic pressure is among the most important nonmilitary instruments available to the U.S. in this process, as Russia’s ability to wage war depends substantially on energy revenues, access to international markets and networks that facilitate sanctions evasion.

On Sept.18, U.S. President Donald Trump signed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 into law. Then, on Oct. 16, he issued an executive order waiving specified sanctions, restrictions and duties authorized under the legislation, citing the national interest. This order raises a legitimate question about how Washington intends to use the economic leverage Congress provided.

The measurable objectives these waivers are intended to achieve, why they serve American national security and what conditions would trigger their reconsideration need to be explained.

The U.S. needs to enforce restrictions consistently, close avenues for evasion and impose consequences when countries or companies knowingly provide material assistance to Russia’s war effort in violation of applicable law.

This does not require abandoning diplomacy. It requires a coherent policy in which economic relief advances clearly defined security objectives.

If Washington weakens its own pressure without obtaining meaningful concessions, it risks surrendering leverage while leaving Russia’s aggression unresolved. Every source of revenue helping Moscow sustain its military campaign has consequences for Ukrainian civilians, who bear them in destroyed homes, shattered families and lost lives.

U.S. policy should not make it easier for Russia to finance a war Washington says it wants to end.

American history has a bipartisan tradition of leadership that combines the defense of freedom with strategic judgment.

Harry Truman understood U.S. security depended on resisting authoritarian expansion. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, John F. Kennedy demonstrated that strength and diplomacy are not opposites. Ronald Reagan understood freedom must be defended against those who seek to suppress it. And George H. W. Bush knew sovereignty and alliances are essential to an international order where nations cannot redraw borders by force.

Though from different eras, the leadership of these presidents reflected a common principle: American security is strengthened when the U.S. combines military strength, alliances, diplomacy and a commitment to the independence of free nations.

A policy that pressures Ukraine more than Russia, offers Moscow economic relief without substantial concessions or asks Ukrainians to accept an insecure future is not a strategy for lasting peace. It risks rewarding aggression and inviting further conflict.

And above all, Ukraine’s future should not be decided over the heads of Ukrainians.

Democratic institutions can be attacked and dismantled far faster than they can be rebuilt. Ukraine’s struggle is therefore about more than one war. It is about whether the democratic world will remain a community of nations bound by common principles or become a collection of states left to negotiate individually with authoritarian regimes.

History will not judge U.S. policy solely by the immediate cost of weapons, energy or sanctions. It will judge whether America stood by a nation fighting for survival, upheld the principles it asks others to respect and helped prevent future wars by demonstrating that aggression does not pay.

Adrian Zuckerman is a former U.S. ambassador to Romania (2019-2021); Mark Gitenstein is a former U.S. ambassador to Romania (2009-2012) and to the EU (2022-2025); Ron Gidwitz is a former U.S. ambassador to Belgium (2018-2021) and acting U.S. ambassador to the EU (2020-2021); Jim Gilmore is a former U.S. ambassador to the OSCE (2019-2021); Kathleen Kavalec is a former U.S. ambassador to Romania (2023-2025); Jim Rosapepe is a former U.S. ambassador to Romania (1998-2001).

POLITICO occasionally publishes opinion pieces from guest authors to offer our readers a range of perspectives on the intersection of power and politics. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of POLITICO.

Night falls in the European capital. Everything’s quiet, but the nightmares are about to begin.

Viktor Orbán’s ghost haunts the Schuman roundabout; ash from the bonfire of red tape covers the Justus Lipsius building; Ursula von der Leyen’s chief of staff, Björn Seibert, chases after staffers demanding to know what “associate membership” for Canada actually means; and MEPs tremble at the prospect of construction workers uncovering the skeletons of political intrigues past during renovations.

Scared? You should be.

Here’s our guide to who is terrified of whom in the Brussels bubble. 

Everyone is scared of Marine Le Pen

The person haunting EU diplomats, officials and lawmakers is French presidential front-runner Marine Le Pen. Will she really halve Paris’ contribution to the EU budget, as promised? Will she pull Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni away from the Brussels mainstream? And will she demand von der Leyen’s head?

The bubble had warmed (slightly) to the idea of Jordan Bardella in the Élysée Palace, after his years leading the National Rally’s European operation revealed a certain pragmatism toward Brussels — only for those hopes to be shattered when a Paris appeals court cleared Le Pen to be a candidate for the presidency.

The next ECB chief is scared of Jean-Luc Mélenchon

The European Central Bank president is the euro’s last line of defense against unorthodox national economic decisions — but that could be tested by French presidential candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon, who is on course to reach the runoff after vowing to set billions of euros of French debt “on fire.” His incendiary plan calls on the Frankfurt-based ECB to waive interest payments on a vast tranche of French bonds — an unorthodox, perhaps impossible, maneuver that critics warn could even see France kicked out of the euro.

Now that we know Christine Lagarde will step down as ECB president in February, what France’s presidential candidates want to do about its monumental debt pile will haunt the race for her successor, with Dutchman Klaas Knot and Spaniard Pablo Hernández de Cos as the two frontrunners.

Lobbyists are scared of ChatGPT

The number of amendments lawmakers have filed has exploded since generative AI arrived, with key EU laws now facing thousands of proposed text changes. Parliament officials don’t think it’s a coincidence, with some pointing to amendments written in suspiciously bot-like language, and others saying sometimes amendments cite legislation that does not even exist.

The growing pile of amendments is haunting lobbyists, parliamentary assistants and officials forced to track and sort through it all — along with the fear that AI could eventually replace them. Spare a thought, too, for the MEPs who may have to vote through the amendments one by one, with hands raised in plenary. 

Commission officials are scared of Austria’s Europe minister

Well-heeled Commission officials (and their families) are spooked by Austria’s Europe Minister Claudia Bauer, who has been leading a push to slash the Commission’s administration expenditure — which pays eurocrats’ salaries and offices — in the next seven-year budget. The campaign, backed by most EU capitals, resulted in an 8% cut to the admin budget in the latest budget proposal.

Bauer is so feared that EU officials joke they reduce their delegations’ size whenever they travel to Austria.

Jessika Roswall is scared of Stéphane Séjourné and Valdis Dombrovskis

Environment Commissioner Jessika Roswall and her department have reason to fear industry boss Stéphane Séjourné, who is taking the lead on the upcoming Circular Economy Act, despite Roswall’s official title of Commissioner “for a Competitive Circular Economy.” Making matters spookier, Roswall’s environment department now shares the Breydel building with Séjourné’s internal market and industry department, setting the stage for some chilling corridor encounters as Roswall pushes for greater environmental protection while Séjourné prioritizes industrial growth.

Roswall is also under pressure from EU simplification chief Valdis Dombrovskis to cut red tape on several environmental laws. The Latvian commissioner, who oversees the omnibus packages, wants a deal before year-end. Meanwhile, the center-right European People’s Party continues to press the Commission to reopen laws on birds, habitats, and water — the EU’s oldest nature protection laws — so they can be simplified too.

Alexander Stubb is afraid of Kaja Kallas and António Costa

Kaja Kallas has not publicly addressed the call that Finnish President Alexander Stubb made to Russia’s Vladimir Putin, but the EU’s top diplomat has made clear she dislikes such outreach. Still, if Putin offered serious talks and concessions, Kallas would be the obvious person to answer: as coordinating EU foreign and security policy is her job. “Of course I will talk if such an opportunity presents itself,” she told Estonian media in September when asked about speaking with Putin or his Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.

Also reaching for the phone: António Costa. EU diplomats note that the European Council president represents the bloc at the leaders’ level abroad. That institutional turf war may explain why Stubb stressed that he and Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Støre spoke only for their own countries — not for Europe.

Manfred Weber is scared of his own group …

What keeps the leader of the European People’s Party — Europe’s largest political family — up at night? Divisions within his own ranks. So far, Weber has kept a tight ship and wants to reunite his troops ahead of the 2029 EU election, which he is casting as a battle against the far right. But that may prove tricky as the EPP’s national delegations increasingly clash over whether to work with the far right or isolate them.

… and the group is scared of Ouarda Bensouag

Central to Weber’s strategy is Ouarda Bensouag, the group’s secretary-general and his chief of staff. One of his most trusted lieutenants, she has a reputation as a smart but ruthless operator who EPP staffers fear when crossing paths in the Parliament’s labyrinthine hallways.

No one is scared of the Parliament … but they should be

Parliament’s attempts to spook capitals over the next long-term budget have been borderline tragic so far: It keeps threatening to kill the budget, but nobody seems to care or believe it will.

They should care. When it comes time to pass the budget, 361 of 720 votes will be needed, and the margin could be razor-thin in a fragmented chamber that’s hostile to plans to pool farm and regional funds. The louder MEPs protest — and the longer the Council ignores them — the more determined they become to prove the threat is real.

By Max Griera, Gregorio Sorgi, Kathryn Carlson, Nick Vinocur, Jakob Weizman, Fiona McNally and Eliza Gkritsi

Putin said that he and Musk are in "close contact" about Rassvet, Russia's Starlink-like satellite connectivity project.

LUXEMBOURG — Europe’s energy ministers are running out of ideas to protect citizens from surging energy prices as winter approaches.

But at a summit in Luxembourg on Thursday, they were clear on one thing: Demanding voters cut back on power use is not an option.  

European gas prices soared above €100 per megawatt-hour on Wednesday for the first time since 2022, as last-minute panic-buying to fill European gas reserves added to supply pressures linked to the war in the Middle East.  

But at the Thursday summit, EU energy ministers broadly acknowledged that both Brussels and national capitals had run out of ideas to contain price pressures.

“We’ve exhausted most of our short-term options,” said one senior European energy official, granted anonymity to offer a candid perspective. “What’s left is really crisis management.”

For the past year, government attempts to cushion price rises with renewables schemes, windfall taxes and costly fuel subsidies have ultimately failed to contain anxieties that have since boiled over into widespread protests across the continent.

“The EU and member states don’t have a magic wand to make the price increases go away,” Irish Energy Minister Darragh O’Brien, whose government holds the EU’s six-month rotating presidency, told reporters. “There’s a lot of measures that have been taken already in the short term. What today is about is actually seeing how we can move to more sustainable measures.”

But even crisis management is proving politically difficult. Despite calls by EU energy chief Dan Jørgensen earlier this year to encourage consumers and businesses to cut energy use, European ministers are reluctant to make such a move official policy.

“I don’t want to see that we will limit people,” said Mika Nykänen, the state secretary to Finland’s energy ministry. Instead, he called for policy designed to “change behavior” and reduce energy consumption less painfully. “Industry does it naturally. Normal households, normal families — they sometimes need encouragement,” he said. “For instance, subsidies to invest in the energy efficiency of houses, windows.”

Demand reduction “has an impact on industry, it has an impact on business, and in a difficult situation, it could be the way to do that. But it does not … solve the long-term,” Polish Secretary of State for Energy Wojciech Wrochna told reporters.

High prices “will regulate demand by itself,” Swedish Energy Minister Ebba Busch told reporters.

Fossil fuel subsidies

Such was the opposition to demand reduction measures on Thursday, Jørgensen — who was at the summit warning of a “difficult” winter of soaring fuel prices ahead — gave up even proposing it, focusing instead on subsidies. He reluctantly accepted that such subsidies could include fossil fuels as well as clean alternatives, but urged that they be “targeted and temporary.”

Since the war started, governments have paid €18 billion for tax relief on fossil fuel products, including a controversial move by Rome earlier this month to reduce the impact of gas prices on electricity costs.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen warned national leaders against this tendency, urging them at a summit this month to keep policies temporary and targeted to avoid inadvertently increasing fossil fuel demand and distorting the EU single market, according to two EU diplomats familiar with her comments.

That remains a point of contention among EU leaders, with some, including Greece, calling for greater fiscal space to increase energy subsidies while others warn of the dangers of subsidizing fossil fuels.

“Our concern is to make sure that we don’t create conditions where different member states go very far in different national decision-making,” said Lithuanian Energy Minister Lukas Savickas in a separate interview.

Jørgensen did not respond to POLITICO’s question at a subsequent press conference when asked whether new fiscal flexibilities were being considered.

Other ideas have gone by the wayside. Von der Leyen rejected calls by countries to establish an EU-wide tax on windfall profits of oil and gas companies at this month’s summit, the diplomats cited above said even as European oil companies like Shell, TotalEnergies and Repsol rake in their biggest profits since 2022.

Member countries also questioned the value of a Commission proposal to coordinate the purchase of energy supplies. Such a scheme would work in theory but be hard to implement for “big players” with established supply chains, Wrochna said.

Neither has the EU’s commitment to hastening the release of strategic crude oil and diesel reserves earlier this month — in response to what EU officials described as U.S. “blackmail” — done much to ease fuel costs.

Even so, the EU’s commitment will now include over 40 million barrels on top of the 10 million pledged by Paris, France’s economy minister Roland Lescure told reporters on Thursday.

A parallel push to delay methane monitoring requirements — a plank of the EU’s 2024 Green Deal that industry argued was poorly designed and would disrupt supplies — also had no impact on prices.

Slow pay-off

To be sure, measures designed to lower electricity prices and encourage consumers to switch away from imported fossil fuels are starting to work, with soaring sales of heat pumps and electric vehicles in Europe this year. “There’s no silver bullet, but when you add all of these things up, it can actually matter,” said Jørgensen.

But even longer-term efforts to encourage the switch to cleaner energy are facing backlash as countries resist ceding power to Brussels.

One example is a Commission proposal to make electricity bills more affordable and speed up electrification, including by ensuring electricity is not taxed more heavily than natural gas. Member countries pushed back against the proposal’s taxation provisions on Thursday, arguing that Brussels is overstepping EU treaties requiring that tax changes be approved unanimously, risking higher costs for households and industry.

Busch, the Swedish energy minister, said the proposal’s taxation provisions went too far, warning it would face “a lot of pushback” from countries concerned about EU interference in national tax policy.

Germany and Poland also raised concerns about the proposal’s potential impact on industry and national tax systems, while Italy warned that changing tax rates could make energy more expensive rather than encourage electrification.

KYIV – Russia struck a railway platform in the central Ukrainian city of Dnipro on Thursday, killing at least 14 people in what Mayor Borys Filatov described as an act “of genocidal war.”

“In Dnipro, the Russian forces directed a drone straight at the railway station platform, where many people were waiting for a train. As of this moment, 14 people have been killed, and at least 14 others have been wounded,” State Emergency Service of Ukraine said in a statement.

Russia also killed civilians in residential districts of Kremenchuk in сentral Ukraine and in the center of Chernihiv in the north of the country, emergency services said. Three people were killed in Kremenchuk and another 15 were injured, while two children died in the strikes on Chernihiv, where 23 people were injured, including a 10-month-old baby girl. Houses, shops, and cars were also damaged, the statement says.

“Just how many terrorist strikes has Russia carried out against our people since sanctions were lifted on certain Russian oligarchs and the Russian energy sector, rather than de-escalating?” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in a Facebook post after the strikes.

“This is precisely why Ukraine has always said that just and decisive action by America and Europe is needed in response to Russian escalation … It is time for new, stronger sanctions steps by the EU, the United States, and the G7,” Zelenskyy added.

Czech President Petr Pavel condemned the attack as “inexcusable,” while French President Emmanuel Macron said the incident underlined the need to “redouble our efforts for a just and lasting peace and bring Russia to the negotiating table.”

Russia’s defense ministry said Moscow carried out strikes in places where Ukraine was producing drones and on logistical routes used to transport weapons.

Russia downed most of the 613 Ukrainian drones heading towards Moscow overnight on Thursday, the capital city’s mayor Sergey Sobyanin said. He did not give details on the extent of the damage.

We live in an era where wars are fought not just on battlefields, but also on our screens, in our minds and through the narratives we are led to believe. Narratives are influencing perception while missiles destroy infrastructure. What happens when the war for truth becomes more dangerous than the actual battle itself? Who’s controlling the narrative?

When wars end, the fighting over what they meant begins: who won, who was to blame and who can be trusted to keep the peace. These questions are settled less on the battlefield than on screens, in feeds and in group chats. For a Middle East emerging from the war that began on February 28, that contest may decide whether any new security order holds.

The region is now asking what comes after deterrence. That question brought policymakers, military leaders and researchers from the United States, Europe, Asia and the Gulf to the TRENDS 6^th Annual Conference, held in Abu Dhabi and organized by TRENDS Global, in collaboration with its global offices. The answer cannot be measured only in missiles and alliances. Information resilience should be treated as security infrastructure, planned and funded like air defense, not managed as public relations.

What happens when the war for truth becomes more dangerous than the actual battle itself?

The struggle over perception can now matter as much as events on the ground. That is no longer hyperbole. In any crisis today, governments, media outlets, political movements and non-state groups compete in real time to define what is happening. Disinformation, coordinated propaganda and now content generated by artificial intelligence (AI) mean a false account can reach millions before an official one is drafted.

As former BBC correspondent Karen Allen put it at the conference, “Now in an instant, I’m able to influence millions of people,” and algorithm manipulation is what we are increasingly seeing.

This year’s war showed how real that is. Within days of the first U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran, an AI-generated video of Dubai’s Burj Khalifa on fire, with crowds fleeing, was viewed tens of millions of times, according to BBC Verify. Fabricated images of damaged U.S. facilities in the Gulf spread just as fast, some posted by Iranian state-linked outlets. UAE Minister of State Noura Al Kaabi later described the attacks on the country as coming “from the sky and behind our screens.” Her government’s answer was to treat “fake news and misinformation as a security threat.”

A more damaging false story was not a single video. It was the idea that the Gulf was a party to the war. The UAE did not want this war and said so. On March 3, Minister of State Reem Al Hashimy said the UAE did not “seek to expand the circle of confrontation,” that it had “repeatedly confirmed” its territory could not be used for any military operation against Iran, and that “returning to the negotiating table is the only rational way forward.” The attacks continued anyway. Reuters reported, citing UAE defense figures, that 186 ballistic missiles and 812 drones were fired at the country in the first days of the conflict.

Information resilience should be treated as security infrastructure, planned and funded like air defense, not managed as public relations.

Tehran sought to blur that record, framing strikes on Gulf cities as retaliation against American aggression. Its foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, told NBC News that Iran had “not attacked our neighbors,” only “American bases,” and called the hotels hit in Dubai “collateral damage.” Countering that narrative does not require propaganda of our own. It requires putting the record in front of the world quickly and repeatedly: the UAE’s public calls for restraint before the war, its refusal to let its territory be used against Iran, and the hundreds of missiles and drones fired at it, most of which it shot down. Facts published fast, through verified channels, in Arabic, English and Farsi, are harder to bury than corrections issued too late.

Even after a war ends, the threats do not disappear; they simply take different forms. Ceasefires and reconstruction depend on public trust. If populations come to believe that the peace is a betrayal, or that a neighbor cannot be trusted, no deterrence framework or security pact will survive contact with domestic politics. Spoilers understand this. Their cheapest weapon is a story.

Seen from the Gulf, the lesson of recent years is that speed and credibility beat silence. Crisis communication is not a side function of security. When official channels inform the public quickly, consistently and honestly, rumors have less room to grow. When they hesitate, someone else fills the gap.

None of this is simple. Governments everywhere are still working out where countering disinformation ends and controlling speech begins, and that debate should stay open. But the common ground is wider than it looks: a society cannot be secure if it cannot tell what is true.

The harder test comes now. After a war, influence campaigns shift from shock to slow erosion: relitigating who was to blame, questioning whether Gulf governments can protect their people, and setting neighbors and communities against each other. Young connected audiences are the main target. They are also the best defense.

Protecting our societies from that influence does not mean closing them. It means official channels fast and credible enough that people turn to them first. It means platforms held to clear rules on labeling AI-generated conflict content, as X began to do in March. And it means a generation of young Emiratis and Gulf citizens equipped to verify what they see and able to tell the region’s story themselves rather than leaving it to others.

The harder test comes now. After a war, influence campaigns shift from shock to slow erosion.

This is not only a Gulf problem. The campaigns aimed at audiences in the Gulf also shape how Washington and Brussels understand the region. The UAE and its partners already work closely on defense and intelligence. Detecting and exposing cross-border influence operations belongs on that shared agenda as a joint effort between governments, platforms and researchers.

Diplomacy, investment, and deterrence will rebuild the region’s security. Whether that security holds will depend on something harder to measure: what people across the region believe about each other, and about who protects them. For the UAE, winning that argument with facts is not public relations. It is part of keeping the country safe.

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Najla Al Midfa is an Emirati researcher at TRENDS Research & Advisory, a company under TRENDS Group. Her research focuses on geopolitics, international relations, economic diplomacy and regional security, with a particular interest in the UAE’s foreign policy and strategic partnerships. She holds a master’s degree in Global Affairs and Diplomatic Leadership from the Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy, where her thesis examined the UAE’s economic diplomacy through its Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement strategy.

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Sources

• Sixth Annual TRENDS Conference 2026 kicks off on October 12 — WAM (Emirates News Agency), September 2026
• TRENDS 6th Annual Conference 2026 — Sustainable Security: programme and speakers — TRENDS Research & Advisory
• AI-generated Iran war videos surge as creators use new tech to cash in — BBC Verify, March 7, 2026
• Factbox: Iranian missiles and drones fired at Gulf countries — Reuters (republished by Al-Monitor), March 3, 2026
• X suspends revenue sharing for undisclosed AI war videos — AFP, March 3, 2026
• UAE urges the US, Israel and Iran to return to the negotiating table — Euronews, March 4, 2026
• Fake news treated as security threat during Iran war, says UAE minister — The National, September 15, 2026
• NBC News, “Iran’s foreign minister denies seeking war with neighbors,” March 2026. https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/irans-foreign-minister-denies-seeking-war-neighbors-rcna261954

KYIV — With another bitter winter of fighting in the Russia-Ukraine war ahead, diplomatic activity is ramping back up in a fresh attempt to close in on a ceasefire and eventually a final peace accord.

Under renewed pressure from U.S. President Donald Trump, Kyiv and Moscow are preparing to send negotiating teams to Abu Dhabi for a three-way meeting with American officials to explore the potential for agreement. The meeting is penciled in for Nov. 10. 

But many questions about the process remain, including whether Europe will have a seat at the table when key decisions are taken — and who should fill it. Based on remarks from key leaders, and conversations with European officials granted anonymity because the talks are sensitive, POLITICO breaks down what’s under discussion for an agreement and what could get in the way.

What will they discuss? 

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy says the agenda for Abu Dhabi should first include initial steps toward de-escalation, such as prisoner swaps and ceasefires on energy infrastructure and for the Black Sea. There should also be a discussion among the technical negotiating teams of what format a future three-way meeting between leaders — Trump, Zelenskyy and Russia’s Vladimir Putin — should take, he told reporters this week.

When it comes to a final deal, one overriding question for Ukraine is what form of security guarantees it will get from Europe and the U.S., or potentially NATO. Zelenskyy won’t want to accept anything he believes could leave Ukraine vulnerable to a future attack from Russia. 

Putin is also likely to raise the need for security guarantees — for Russia — including limiting or potentially reversing NATO’s presence in the neighborhood. 

Then there’s the question of territory. Zelenskyy’s view is that marking out any boundaries, temporarily or permanently, is something that can only be discussed at leader level. “No one else has the authority to do so,” he said Tuesday. 

Zelenskyy said during previous sets of negotiations over the past year, “as a compromise,” that Ukraine had been prepared to discuss the idea of a demilitarized “buffer zone” on both sides of the contact line in the Donbas region.

Similar ideas were proposed for other parts of Ukraine. Zelenskyy said his negotiators discussed these questions again with the Americans in recent weeks. “We are ready to discuss the issue of territories because the Russians keep wanting to discuss it and make it part of the agenda,” he said. But this would need to be at a leader-level meeting. 

Europe has a role 

European leaders are adamant that they must be included in final negotiations, not least because it is they who are are now providing the vast bulk of financial and military support to Ukraine. Trump ended American aid in 2025.

Zelenskyy and U.S. officials accept that European governments will likely need to be involved in discussions about security guarantees — mainly because any peacekeeping forces deployed to Ukraine would be dominated by European troops.

The Coalition of the Willing, a loose alliance of more than 30 countries led by France, the U.K. and Germany, put together detailed proposals in coordination with the U.S. almost a year ago. Ukraine is also interested in exploring bilateral security guarantees with the U.S., a discussion that would not need to involve European officials.

Plans for rebuilding Ukraine and nurturing its economic revival would also have to involve Europe, Zelenskyy said. “We cannot envision such a, so to speak, ‘Marshall Plan’ without Europe.”

But Europe doesn’t know who should speak for it 

Trump’s renewed interest in Ukraine also resurfaced some sore questions for European governments: Who should represent them when it comes to decision time? And should they even be talking to Putin at all? 

With no clarity emerging from Brussels, some leaders have taken matters into their own hands. On Tuesday, Finland’s President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre held a 90-minute call with Putin, urging him to end the war. It went down badly with several European governments, including Denmark, Italy, Sweden and Lithuania. One frustrated diplomat said: “There are too many middle-aged men who want to end up in the history books having solved this war.”

Russia has said the Stubb-Støre call achieved nothing of substance and the war will likely “escalate.” By some accounts, Putin used much of the time on the phone lecturing the Nordic leaders on regional history. 

One problem in identifying a lead negotiator is that the European countries with a stake in the talks are not only in the EU — the U.K. and Norway, for example, are both outside the bloc. Without clarity of leadership, European interests risk being sidelined when the talking gets serious. 

It all comes down to Trump 

One critical unknown factor in the mix is how long Trump’s attention will stay on Ukraine.

After the U.S. and Israel launched a war with Iran in the spring, progress on Ukraine stalled for months, only to return this fall as Trump sought to mitigate the impact of the Middle East conflict. A new escalation in the Iran war risks sidelining the negotiations all over again. 

The U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff held talks with Zelenskyy, Stubb and Støre in Oslo on Oct. 20. Witkoff then went to St. Petersburg to meet Putin the next day. There was supposed to be a follow-up meeting in Brussels this week in preparation for negotiations in Abu Dhabi — but the Americans postponed the talks, apparently due to developments in the Middle East. 

“The meeting in Abu Dhabi now depends on the American side,” Zelenskyy said Tuesday. At a press conference Wednesday, he added: “We very much hope that the escalatory processes in the Middle East — which are currently the subject of so much discussion — will not interfere.”

Putin can wait 

After their Kremlin call, Stubb and Støre apparently told Zelenskyy they felt Putin was serious about the Abu Dhabi opportunity. But in public and private, diplomats and political leaders in Europe are deeply skeptical that Putin is at all serious about an imminent path to peace.

Despite the Kremlin insisting he is on board, European diplomats believe the Russian leader is just playing for time in the hope that Ukraine weakens over a winter of attacks on its energy system, and Europe — perhaps with the far-right Marine Le Pen in charge of France — gets tired of paying for the war and gives up next year. 

That’s why EU officials know they cannot pin their hopes on peace and need to redouble their financial support and military aid for Ukraine, while tightening sanctions on Russia. EU leaders will discuss the issue of securing funds for Ukraine’s war effort at their summit in Brussels scheduled for November 26.

Nicholas Vinocur in Brussels contributed to this report.

LONDON — Andy Burnham became Britain’s prime minister 100 days ago on a pledge to end 40 years of neoliberalism. His first budget announced he wouldn’t do that on the front page.

Wednesday’s 150-page red book was titled “breathing space for today, fresh hope for the future”, a confession, with true British modesty, that it was a stepping stone to bigger pledges downstream.

Burnham’s top finance minister, Chancellor John Healey, unveiled 98 changes, including help for most households’ energy bills, which are due to spike this winter because of Donald Trump’s war with Iran, and a £10 billion defense package to support Ukraine.

Many of the tax tweaks were limited and technical, including an 8% cut to tariffs on soy milk. Healey’s ambition was reined in by surging global oil prices and a political choice by his boss not to blow the doors off yet.

Burnham has reviews on the creaking welfare system, devolving power to the regions and a “10-year plan” all coming before Christmas. Only then can he grind out the numbers for next year’s spending review.

The Labour MP Darren Jones, who served in the Treasury until Burnham arrived in July, called it a “steady-as-she-goes budget” that was to be expected. Many Labour MPs were happy, cheering measures for their area and pointing toward a bigger bang later on. Industry lobby groups could grasp onto something in their area of expertise.

But with U.K. growth struggling, others were less generous. Joe Shalam of the center-right Centre for Social Justice think tank called it the “fudge-it budget.” Tory leader Kemi Badenoch asked: “Is that it?”

Perhaps the trickiest response for Burnham was from Mainstream, the left-wing campaign group that helped propel him to the Labour leadership this year. “Ending 40 years of neoliberalism can only be delivered by radical action,” read a statement by the group’s interim council.

POLITICO looks at five other takeaways from Wednesday’s budget.

1) We’re in the holding pen

The chancellor’s big bazooka was to slap a much-anticipated tax rise on banks — but he surprised many by saying it will last only 15 months. It will raise less than £1 billion in its peak year.

It wasn’t the only temporary measure Healey unveiled on Wednesday. He extended existing cuts to fuel duty, a tax cut on household energy bills and a £2 cap on bus fares, but only until 2027. They will all need to be reviewed again before his next annual budget.

Likewise, some of Healey’s spending plans thin out after a few years, which suggests they may need topping up later. This applies even to the areas closest to Burnham’s heart. Budget documents suggest support to end rough sleeping will total £1.1 billion in the two years from April 2027 but only £270 million in the three years after that.

There were plenty of changes, of course, such as to writing-down allowances, property income taxes and tax on savings. Whitehall will have to find more administration cuts while tax inspectors hunt down another £3.2 billion a year. But the Institute for Fiscal Studies, a non-partisan economic think tank, called it all a “hodgepodge” of “fiddly measures” that would do little to affect growth.

Many of the more fundamental decisions were kicked down the road. Healey has committed to spending 3.5% of GDP on defense by 2035, but will only spell out how to fund it in a spending review at some point in 2027. Major reforms to the welfare system — spending on which is still rocketing — will only be decided after two reports by the Labour grandees Stephen Timms and Alan Milburn are published in November.

Healey published a “fiscal devolution roadmap” that spelled out a path to handing regional mayors full control of the business rates raised in their areas by the end of the decade, but this has an element of wait-and-see too.

Healey had a narrative for his cautious approach. “I decided on an early budget to give the country a bit of breathing space and to provide stability and direction in the face of speculation,” he told MPs Wednesday. “We’ll continue to map out that direction for Britain through the prime minister’s 10-year plan and the spending review.”

This is not the Burnham who complained Britain was “in hock to the bond markets” last year.

2) Everything is terrible, so blame the White House.

Burnham and Healey can blame Trump — up to a point.

The chancellor said the headwinds that once faced Britain are now “global economic storms,” fueled above all by the U.S. conflict with Iran. “We did not want this war,” Healey told MPs.

Journalists spent Wednesday trawling through the usual gloomy parade of numbers about the U.K. economy produced by the independent Office for Budget Responsibility. Britain’s projected growth in 2027 was cut from 1.6% to 1% (though Treasury officials insisted GDP per person will rise overall by the end of the decade).

Healey chose to leave himself with a smaller fiscal buffer than his predecessor Rachel Reeves, telling MPs he had used it to “absorb the impact of the Iran war.” He also raised net taxes by £7 billion a year, though this was far less than the £26 billion in Reeves’ last budget.

But the situation is so volatile that these numbers, based on market energy prices in mid-August, are probably already out of date. The OBR’s “severe shock scenario” had oil prices peaking at around $115 a barrel in the first half of 2027. They already hit that level this week.

Healey insisted that Britain is doing well in the circumstances; his ministers all point to an International Monetary Fund prediction that the U.K.’s deficit will be the lowest in the G7 by 2029.

Opposition parties, however, paint a picture of a nation where everything is just getting gloomier. The tax take was already on course to rise to a record high; Healey broke that record again on Wednesday. (It is now due to reach 38.6% of GDP.) Britain’s spending on debt interest has almost tripled since 2020.

3) Defense spending is still a big, big headache

Healey resigned as defense secretary under former Prime Minister Keir Starmer in June to protest the lack of military spending — but now faces mounting unanswered questions about his own plans.

Healey did two big new things on defense spending on Wednesday. First, he confirmed an open secret in Westminster: he plans to reach 3% of GDP by 2030 — on a path to NATO’s 3.5% by 2035 — but repeated that the details of how he’ll pay for it will only be spelled out in next year’s spending review.

Secondly and more significantly, he outlined his plan to plug a ​​£1.8 billion-a-year gap in Starmer’s defense investment plan — but provided only scant details. 

The Treasury said it will be paid for by shaving 1% off each Whitehall department’s capital budget in the coming years. However, those departments have not yet worked out what they will cut; that is a problem for another day. These questions will dog Healey for the next year.

At least one person was delighted: Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The Ukrainian president said the chancellor “made my day” with a £10 billion package of economic and military support to Kyiv. Part of the package needed special sign-off by ministers because civil servants warned they could not guarantee it would provide value for money.

4) There was something to make Labour MPs happy

Much of what Healey did unveil appeared to be aimed at preserving the “Burnham bounce” in the polls and with his own MPs. 

The chancellor called it a “budget for the working people of Britain” and Treasury analysis says it was redistributive, handing the biggest boost to the poorest households (albeit only raising their incomes by 0.6%).

Central to this was Healey’s closest thing to a “rabbit out of the hat” — a £100-per-household cash payment to people living in homes below a certain value this winter. One Labour MP enthused that the criteria for the payment (which Treasury officials say will capture 88% of the poorest households) was “absolutely brilliant” because it will capture working households and those on benefits at the same time.

There was another £1.5 billion for social and affordable housing, a “covenant” to govern new AI data centers and changes to mileage rates for self-employed workers. Burnham has prided himself on being a grassroots politician; it was a grassroots package.

How much voters will notice is another question. The IFS warned the package of “breathing space” measures was still “relatively small.” It could be swallowed by a rise in annual energy bills in January — predictions of which have recently ranged from £276 to £469.

The OBR warned there has been “virtually no growth” in real household disposable income per person over the last decade or so, and predicted “no real earnings growth in 2027” despite Burnham and Healey’s efforts to help.

5) MPs won’t stop chattering about an election

Burnham only has to call an election by mid-2029 and keeps trying to snuff out talk of going earlier — but every prime minister does this until they don’t.

His MPs were studying the budget Wednesday to work out if it makes an early general election more or less likely. It’s fair to say they couldn’t agree.

On the one hand, this cautious budget of temporary measures might suggest Burnham — who needs his own mandate for more radical changes to the electoral system or Britain’s relationship with the EU — is holding out for the country’s backing.

Others would say a cautious stepping-stone budget is hardly the eye-catching approach you would take if you were about to sell yourself to voters. Growth is set to be slow next year; Burnham needs time to turn the economy round and show he can change things.

Burnham told journalists on Wednesday: “I don’t know how many times I’ve done this now, but yes, I can rule out calling a general election in the next 12 months.” The speculation will continue anyway.

Esther Webber, Emilio Casalicchio, Sam Blewett and Charlie Cooper contributed reporting.

CORRECTION: This article was updated on Oct. 29 to better reflect the Centre for Social Justice’s ideological stance.

At some point, maybe around the time Joe Biden declared on the debate stage that he “finally beat Medicare,” Washington got the idea that defeating an old man in an election was easy.

Not always.

Just days before an American election viewed by many voters as an opportunity to neuter an unpopular 80-year-old president, voters in Brazil and Israel delivered a vivid reminder that an old man in his country’s highest office usually didn’t get there by accident.

In Brazil, a decisive majority of voters on Sunday returned left-wing President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva for a fourth term, defying expectations that Brazilians were ready to discard the fiery trade unionist as yesterday’s man. In Israel’s Tuesday election, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — the longest-serving premier in his country’s history — lost his parliamentary majority but may have thwarted his opponents from electing a viable governing coalition.

Lula, 81, and Netanyahu, 77, have almost nothing in common except their age and political resilience. They have towered over their countries for more than a generation, outfoxed prosecutors and humiliated electoral rivals, enraged and entranced Washington. They have done it with the loyal support of voters on the left and right who view each man in heroic terms, as a tireless champion of their interests and a shield against the most fearsome enemies.

President Donald Trump has, at times, shared those political traits. If he has one more escape act left in him, it would look more like what we’ve just seen in Israel and Brazil than anything in Trump’s second term so far.

Since returning to office in 2025, Trump has failed to deliver policy victories that most voters can feel in their own lives, while shedding some of the most important parts of the political identity that forged his populist base. He ran for president in 2024 pledging to whip inflation and railing against needless foreign wars. Trump’s signature acts this term — passing the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, waging a global trade war, attempting regime change in Iran — have made health care, consumer goods and energy more expensive.

What is his closing message in the midterm election? Trump makes one argument consistently: that Democrats are crazy. But you’d be hard-pressed to find a convincing through line in a series of campaign-trail monologues boasting about the economy, trashing individual Democratic candidates as weirdos and subversives, musing about renaming oceans, defending the Cheesecake Factory and admiring Jon Husted’s rock-hard bod.

Compare this to what voters heard in Brazil and Israel: relentless, ruthless, shameless appeals to the political coalitions that Lula and Netanyahu forged over decades.

In Brazil, Lula tapped into the regional and class-based divisions that have defined his electoral career, while offering a buffet of new economic promises to voters in his base. He hiked welfare payments, promised voters free public transit on weekends and endorsed a shorter workweek. His 45-year-old opponent, Flavio Bolsonaro, stumbled in the final days with a dismissive comment alluding to an accident Lula suffered as a young metalworker — a remark apparently taken by many voters as a gratuitous sneer at the working class.

In Netanyahu’s fight for political survival, the Israeli leader delivered an apocalyptic message aimed at polarizing the electorate to his advantage. He posted an AI-generated image of a nuclear strike on Tel Aviv, branded his challengers as soft on Iran and derided Arab political parties as an enemy within. Israeli and American news outlets have reported that Netanyahu pushed the military for a new wave of attacks on Iran before the election, an escalation that might have reshaped the campaign’s final days.

If Trump had approached the midterms with Lula- or Netanyahu-like focus and vigor, he would probably still be a very unpopular president. But he might be a very unpopular president with a firm grip on the red states that control the Senate, instead of scrambling in October to defend Kansas and Mississippi.

Trump’s populist campaign tactics have been comparatively slapdash and unresponsive to voters’ real needs. He floated giving away $5,000 checks to Americans if Republicans keep control of Congress, only to see lawmakers from his own party pan the idea as a budget buster. He has handed out locally tailored goodies — new funding pledges for a pipeline in Alaska, tariff exemptions as a gift to Maine — that might make a difference on the margins but can’t substitute for a national message on the cost of living.

And Trump has not made a concerted effort to heal the breach within the MAGA base over the war in Iran. He has toggled between Bibi-like warnings about nuclear attacks on Southern California and assurances that the war will end after the November election, all while fuel prices stay painfully high for the people who put him in office.

It may add up to the least effective campaign ever for the man who has overwhelmed American politics for 11 and a half years.

And yet, the midterms are not the end of the story.

Even a broad defeat for Republicans next week would leave Trump with half a term to work with. Two more years to recover his footing, return to political basics, reconnect with his base and fight, fight, fight for relevance and recovery. There is a bag of tricks available to him, if he were to get serious about salvaging his presidency.

For Trump’s opponents, the warning from abroad remains: Beware the old man in a hurry.

Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has defended the leaders of Finland and Norway for reaching out to Russian leader Vladimir Putin as part of efforts to reach a peace deal. 

In a 90-minute call on Tuesday, Finland’s President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre urged Putin to end his war on Ukraine.

But some European leaders felt the call was a mistake, criticizing Stubb and Støre for undermining Europe’s unity in dealing with Russia’s president, who has been largely frozen out after launching his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Speaking to reporters Tuesday, Zelenskyy praised the two Nordic leaders for their help, saying he had a “positive” view of them. “We really have very good relations with these countries. They truly help,” Zelenskyy said. 

The Ukrainian leader said Putin had been taken out of diplomatic isolation last year when U.S. President Donald Trump met him in Alaska. “Since Alaska, Europeans have also been in contact with Russia,” Zelenskyy said. “They just haven’t done so as openly as the leaders of Norway and Finland.”

Everyone understands that there have been contacts “at the national security adviser level and between intelligence agencies,” as well as talks that only emerged after they had happened, he said. 

“Here, though, everything is completely out in the open: discussions in advance, a full briefing, and transparent objectives. Finland and Norway are showing that they want to open another channel of communication, so that Europe can receive information not only through the United States and Russia can hear certain things directly,” Zelenskyy added.

The question of whether — and how — Europe should talk to Putin is a sore subject for officials and diplomats among Ukraine’s allies in the EU and beyond. 

On Tuesday, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said she was “very skeptical” about the Finnish-Norwegian joint call and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson said peace must come through “strength” rather than “appeasement” of Russia.

One official from a national capital, granted anonymity like others to speak candidly about sensitive issues, said formats like the E3 (Germany, France and the U.K.) worked well. Fracturing the unified European voice by letting each country start its own talks with Moscow would be a bad thing, the official added.

The Italian government was irked by Stubb and Støre’s call with Putin, with officials saying it exposed Europe’s failure to agree who should represent the region in peace talks.

A government official from Rome warned that separate national initiatives and constantly shifting diplomatic formats risk further eroding influence, saying Europe “cannot continue to act randomly and in formats that change from week to week.” Rome wants the urgent appointment of representatives with a shared European mandate to defend the continent’s interests and security. “The negotiations will not wait,” the official said.

The reaction from the Brussels institutions to the Norway-Finland initiative has been muted so far, while hinting at the sensitivity of the subject.

“We take note of the call, which took place solely on a bilateral basis,” said Paula Pinho, spokesperson for the European Commission. “These negotiations are happening in different formats, different places and different levels involving heads of states and government, ministers, senior diplomats and officials. The EU is involved.”

Spain and Slovenia are still undecided about whether to compete in next year’s Eurovision Song Contest, after they boycotted this year’s edition over Israel’s participation.

The European Broadcasting Union, which organizes Eurovision, announced Wednesday that national broadcasters from 36 countries would take part in next May’s contest, which will take place in Burgas in eastern Bulgaria.

Five countries staged an unprecedented boycott of the 2026 contest due to Israel’s war in Gaza — sparked by the Oct. 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel — and the resulting humanitarian crisis it triggered.

Ireland, the Netherlands and Iceland are again boycotting the 2027 competition but Spain and Slovenia “have not yet decided” whether they will compete, the EBU said. The Union has given both broadcasters until December to confirm their participation “in recognition of the complexity of the matter.”

The song contest has been embroiled in controversy in recent years over Israel’s participation. The EBU changed its rules earlier this year to block countries involved in armed conflict or any other “sensitive geopolitical situation” from hosting the annual competition, after Israel almost won in 2025 and 2026. The winning country typically hosts the following year’s event.

Canada is a new addition to the contest for 2027, while North Macedonia will return after a four-year absence. Czechia will not take part in next year’s contest for financial reasons.

LONDON — John Healey wants to keep his debut budget low-key — but he’s also got to show the British public his boss really does feel their pain.

The chancellor delivers the first financial statement of the Andy Burnham era Wednesday. The pitch? “Breathing space for today” mixed with some “fresh hope for the future.”

But with war in Iran driving up costs worldwide, government borrowing at its highest level in a year, and businesses warning they’re taxed to the max, Healey is up against it.

Here’s how POLITICO’s team of reporters will be poring over the big fiscal moment, unveiled at 12.30 p.m. U.K. time Wednesday.

U.K. Political Editor Dan Bloom

I’ll flip straight to the big table two-thirds of the way through the ‘red book,’ where Treasury officials list the total tax rises and spending cuts, and then the “headroom” against Healey’s fiscal rules in the executive summary.

The briefing suggests these numbers will be smaller than the £26 billion in tax rises and £23.6 billion in headroom former Chancellor Rachel Reeves notched up in March this year.

The Treasury has turned this into its comms strategy, pointing to “everyday fixes” and non-tax measures like scrapping business red tape. But these numbers will also show how Donald Trump’s war in Iran has reined in Burnham’s ambitions.

And they are indicative of something else — the budget just isn’t the main event this time. In the next seven weeks or so we’re expecting [former minister] Alan Milburn’s review of the benefit system, a U.K.-EU summit, a “10-year plan” and a white paper on “rewiring the state.”

Then next year is the spending review. That’s when the really hard choices will come — and the budget will give us a sign of how hard, since it will map out a path for departmental spending over the next few years.

U.K. Political Correspondent Sam Blewett

Andy Burnham’s team has been speaking a lot about “everyday fixes” — cheapo policies that can rectify real-life niggles. 

Headphone dodgers? You’re fined. Being ripped off by parking fines? We’ve got your backs. Balking at the cost of the supermarket shop? Gone are the tariffs on your gherkins.

That will buy the government a fair amount of goodwill, building a sense that the government isn’t entirely a useless beast being buffeted by global horror shows. But it’ll only go so far.

Healey is under pressure to show bold action on what really matters too — actual interventions that bring down the cost of living. We know already there will be support for household energy bills, a fuel duty freeze, support for pensioners and a hike to the minimum wage. All eyes will be on whether Healey has any more surprises on this front.

As costly as any support is for the exchequer, will it all pale in comparison to the effects of the Strait of Hormuz-sealing war with Iran? This is a self-declared “cost of living government” after all.

First, I’ll scour watchdog the Office for Budget Responsibility’s forecasts to see where the semi-official number crunchers reckon real household disposable income is headed. Then the analysts at the Institute for Fiscal Studies and the Resolution Foundation will provide more insight.

After that, the voices that really matter will be those sitting down to ever-costlier dinner, nursing pricy pints and rolling their eyes at the petrol pumps. Will this budget give Brits enough reason to believe Burnham’s new government is a force for good, trying to ease the pain? Or will they deem the new-look administration just the same old ineffective bureaucrats who need sweeping away in favor of a more radical response?

Senior Foreign Correspondent Esther Webber and U.K. Defense Reporter Mason Boycott-Owen

The number one thing we’ll be looking out for in today’s budget is how exactly Healey — who quit as defense secretary in the dying days of Keir Starmer’s government over exactly this issue — tries to demonstrate he is raising defense spending against a tough backdrop.

The chancellor has tried to manage expectations for the Ministry of Defence at the budget pretty closely, initially stating that he would only seek to cover a £4.7 billion pound shortfall in its already-unveiled Defence Investment Plan.

In recent weeks, however, the Treasury has suggested he could do more to show the U.K. is moving towards spending 3% of GDP on defense, something Healey sees as an important marker on the way to meeting the NATO target of 3.5%.

Media reports leading up to Wednesday suggest an increase will come from money funneled into the British Business Bank and National Wealth Fund.

But could he have something else in his back pocket? Healey is well aware of the potential for awkward questions about his commitment to follow through on the promises he made just four months ago that he said were crucial to U.K. security, now that he’s in charge of the money.

Financial Services Reporter Eleanor Myers

A hike in bank taxes is all but inevitable in today’s budget – but the City of London will be nervously watching how high the increase goes. Along with the lenders, I’ll be looking out for how much taxes are raised, whether any changes are temporary, and whether the City — Britain’s financial powerhouse — gets anything in return.

The easiest move for Healey is to increase the surcharge banks pay on top of corporation tax. That currently stands at 3%, after Conservative Chancellor Jeremy Hunt reduced it from 8% in 2023 to account for higher corporation taxes. Healey could simply reverse the surcharge to 8%, which would be unpopular with the banks and might not even go far enough for campaigners: the Trades Union Congress has called for an increase to 16%.

I’ll also be closely watching for how the bond markets react to the first budget under Burnham. Despite the prime minister describing Britain as “in hock” to the bond markets before he took office, odds are on for a “boring” budget, without any huge spending commitments that might spike borrowing costs.

But any cautious policy changes designed to placate the bond market will have to be tempered alongside demands from the Labour Party. It’s a tricky balance, and Labour MPs showed under Keir Starmer that they were willing to rebel when it mattered.

Senior U.K. Energy Correspondent Charlie Cooper

A sharp, painful spike in energy bills is coming for Britain; at this budget we’ll find out how much power Healey and Burnham have to help.

The latest energy price cap forecasts are brutal. Energy firms expect average, annual household bills to rise by more than £450 in January. They could go even higher in April. Why? Mainly because of gas. The fallout from the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran has sent wholesale prices soaring to levels not seen since December 2022.

Healey knows how bleak things look, but he may not have the fiscal firepower to offer much help. Burnham has hinted at removing gas standing charges from bills, which could save an average household a modest £27, according to one estimate. Meanwhile, payments to around 6 million low-income households — the Warm Homes Discount — are likely to get a top-up of between £100 and £150.

Businesses, meanwhile, could get details of a 10-year plan to bring their energy costs into line with European competitors, according to two people familiar with budget preparations.

But with the cost of living and cost of doing business set to rise so high, will that be it?

There’s “strong awareness” inside government “of how bad it will get,” said one senior government official. Unfortunately, they added, there are “not the pockets deep enough to do all the things we might like to do.”

Elsewhere, we’ll be watching closely to see whether net zero schemes — like the rollout of electric heat pumps — could face cuts to cover shortfalls in defense spending. 

Technology Reporter Joseph Bambridge

Healey put AI and innovation at the heart of his growth plan in a pre-budget speech back in September.

In that vein, the government has trailed a £600 million spending package to protect the U.K. from AI risks while growing its own share of the sector, calling it a “distinctively British” approach to mitigating risks from the technology while capturing the benefits.

The question now is whether more measures to support the U.K.’s tech and AI sector will come on Wednesday, with trade groups calling for bold moves to lower energy costs, tackle energy and planning delays, and help firms invest in AI and upskill workers.

Startups are also hoping for tax relief and further reforms to regulation and procurement rules. A relief for founders who re-invest their earnings in the U.K. has been a particular demand from the startup community, which has already bagged a win after Healey ruled out raising capital gains tax.

AI is also likely to play a significant role in the government’s plans to make Whitehall more efficient, as it did under Reeves.

The sector is also closely watching how the chancellor plans to meet his defense spending targets, in the hopes that drone makers and military tech firms might benefit from the uplift.

Trade Reporter Caroline Hug

I’m looking out for the chancellor’s VAT crackdown on foreign sellers, who register as U.K. based companies to avoid paying the tax. Healey is expected to make online marketplaces like Amazon, eBay and Temu responsible for collecting tax owed by all retailers.

We’re also waiting to see whether the government has more information on its de minimis crackdown, including whether it will introduce a handling fee for small packages below £135. The EU already has one in place.

Finally, we’ll be looking out for any more detail on the government’s suspension of tariffs on more than 100 food, drink, fuel and fertilizer products.

The U.S. and Canada are flirting again.

Washington and Ottawa have increased the tempo of their trade talks over the past week, after President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Mark Carney spoke by phone on Oct. 21.

Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, who helped torpedo a previous round of negotiations over the summer, and Canadian Trade Minister Dominic LeBlanc have been speaking regularly since then, according to two people with knowledge of the talks, granted anonymity because they were not authorized to speak publicly. They have primarily discussed Trump’s tariffs on sectors like autos and steel that have been a sticking point for Canada all along.

A senior Canadian government official told POLITICO that talks remain informal as of Tuesday.

The uptick in engagement — what Carney called “un petit intensification” speaking in French to reporters in Ottawa Monday — has triggered a flurry of headlines on both sides of the border as well as White House boasts that a deal is near. The North American trade spat will be “settled pretty soon,” Trump predicted at a rally Sunday in Michigan.

But unlike Trump, Carney has little political incentive to make concessions at the moment — or bail out Trump right before congressional elections heavily focused on affordability, including tariffs’ impact on prices. The Canadian prime minister is riding high in domestic polls after standing up to the American president and walking away from trade negotiations in August. And he is days away from welcoming European Union leaders to Montreal for a landmark summit aimed at deepening their alliance — and building an implicit counterweight to the U.S.

Neither side, moreover, has dropped its original demands, according to half a dozen current and former government officials, industry representatives and others with knowledge of the talks. Those outstanding sticking points include Carney’s ask for lower auto tariffs and Trump’s push for increased access to the Canadian alcohol and dairy markets.

The lack of new concessions or tangible breakthroughs is a sign that the recent flurry of outreach may be more of a White House effort to soothe Republicans’ midterm worries — particularly in border states whose economies are tightly connected to Canada’s — than to secure an immediate deal. The people say any denouement between the two countries is likely weeks if not months off, even as they expect the two North American neighbors to ultimately hammer out an agreement to lower tariffs and stabilize one of the world’s largest trading relationships.

“I think that we’re going to make a deal with Canada. I mean, first of all, we made a deal with Canada. They reneged on the deal,” Sen. Bernie Moreno (R-Ohio) said in an interview. Asked if the deal will come before the election, Moreno said, “I don’t know.”

Canada has also been cautious about promising that a deal is near. Carney said last week Ottawa doesn’t care about “the timing” of an agreement to roll back tariffs on each other’s imports. And both Mark Wiseman, the Canadian Ambassador to the U.S., and Pete Hoekstra, the U.S. Ambassador to Canada, suggested at an event in Ottawa Monday that there will be a deal, even if it takes time.

“We have to take a longer timeline into account. And at the end of the day, we have to remember neither of us is moving out of the neighborhood, and we’re going to make it work,” Wiseman said. “The state of the relationship is pretty damn good.”

Trump, however, has been lobbing attacks on Ottawa since he returned to the White House, calling Canada the 51st state and threatening tariffs since shortly after his reelection win. Canada, along with Mexico and China, was one of the first countries he targeted with new duties in 2025 — despite an existing North American free trade deal and deeply entwined economies, particularly in the auto industry.

The tensions hit a crescendo this summer, when Trump announced a preliminary deal with Carney to lower U.S. duties, among other measures, before talks collapsed at the 11th hour. Washington and Ottawa then traded 50% duties on about $20 billion worth of goods, with Trump imposing a ban on certain products, like alcohol, and threatening even more punitive duties come January if their differences have not been resolved.

The forces that caused the deal to unravel in August are still in place. Canada has continued to seek lower tariff rates for key sectors, including autos, trucks, steel and aluminum — policies that are under Lutnick’s purview at the Commerce Department. The previous talks hit a snag over whether the U.S. would lower tariffs on heavy duty trucks, some of which are built in Ontario.

“Any potential Canada deal is going to have the same issue,” said an industry official granted anonymity to discuss private conversations. “And that is Lutnick’s strong reluctance to negotiate on the [sector-specific tariffs], particularly now that he is much heavier involved.”

Lutnick “has signed off on auto [tariff] reductions,” in previous trade agreements the White House reached with partners like the European Union and Japan, “but those often come with promises of large investment.”

A White House official confirmed Lutnick and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer have held discussions with their Canadian counterparts in recent days.

“USTR and the Commerce Department continue to work together on the cross-cutting issues involving trade with Canada,” added the official, who was granted anonymity to share details about the negotiations.

The Commerce Department and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative did not respond to requests for comment.

Industry groups that are in favor of keeping the existing duties on Canadian steel, aluminum and autos insist that Lutnick remains in their corner, even as talks intensify. Representatives for domestic manufacturing met with senior officials at the Commerce Department and USTR over the past week to lobby in favor of sticking with the status quo, according to two people granted anonymity to describe the private discussions.

“”The programs are effective as they are, and they should stay as they are,” said Century Aluminum President and CEO Jesse Gary, adding that Lutnick shows a “clear understanding of what makes these types of industries work.”

The Canada tariffs are unpopular among U.S. voters, however, and have been a headache for Republican candidates running in U.S. border states. Sen. Susan Collins of Maine, GOP Senate candidate Mike Rogers of Michigan and Republican Senate hopeful John Sununu of New Hampshire have all come out against the deal. The topic has even trickled into competitive races in Texas and Kansas.

Adam Hamilton, the Democrat challenging Sen. Roger Marshall in Kansas, is making tariffs part of his closing argument in a state where the agriculture industry has been pummeled by the trade war.

Trump and his National Economic Council Director Kevin Hassett have sought to play down Republicans’ concerns about the duties by suggesting a deal is close.

Speaking to Fox News on Sunday, Hassett said that the two sides are “very close” to a deal and emphasized Lutnick’s involvement in talks.

“I expect this is supposed to send some sort of signal to … Iowa and Kansas and other states,” said a person close to the administration who was granted anonymity to share details of private conversations with officials. But “no one expects a deal,” the person said.

“Carney would have to have some reason to want to get a deal before the midterms,” the person added. “But I can’t imagine why he would at this point.”

Megan Messerly, Sue Allan, Zi-Ann Lum and Nick Taylor-Vaisey contributed reporting.

Barely noticed among all the talk in the election campaign about great asses, shithouse countries and commie jihadists running for the Senate was a report from The New York Times warning of “heightened levels of tension and risk” surrounding Israel’s parliamentary elections, slated for today, and America’s Nov. 3 midterms due to the countries’ war with Iran, which has “entered a new phase.” They also offered this bracing observation: “This is how countries can escalate into full-scale war, several diplomats and outside experts noted.”

How’s that for a wake-up call?

In fairness, Donald Trump has mentioned in passing that he plans to “finish the job” after the midterm elections, with CNN reporting that the president “appears to be leaning toward major action.” On Oct. 15, the outlet revealed that the U.S. is considering using the “mother of all bombs” on Iranian energy infrastructure and nuclear facilities. (They admit that such a strike would be “performative,” since it would not actually accomplish anything, but would supposedly allow Trump to declare victory.) 

If anyone had the idea that a midterm election campaign would be the place where serious people of goodwill debate the major issues of the day, they were mistaken. For the most part, the war with Iran has hardly come up, and to the extent that it has, it’s been in the context of high gas prices, not the possibility of the conflict turning into a major conflagration from which the United States will not be able to walk away after putting on a fireworks show. We may be at a turning point, and nobody’s paying attention.

The U.S. has received credible intelligence, according to the Times report, that Iran has “advanced” plans to attack Americans at home and abroad. According to Reuters, the State Department has ordered non-emergency government employees and their family members to leave ‌U.S. diplomatic ⁠missions in Saudi Arabia and has reduced staff in Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Jordan. NBC News revealed that “the U.S. military has been quietly scaling back its troop presence at bases across the Middle East as well.” It certainly sounds as if something is afoot, which the Times characterized in fairly alarming terms:

The fact that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel and President Trump are facing critical elections that could dramatically affect the balance of power in their countries feeds into the complex set of calculations that all sides are making. Even if he is defeated on Tuesday, Mr. Netanyahu could decide to launch one last strike that he may believe his successor would hesitate to execute. Similarly, Mr. Trump, who knows how unpopular the war is even among his strongest supporters, may want to show that at least when it comes to his powers as commander in chief, his authority is undiminished.

Trump has claimed dozens of times that we have already won the war. This is not out of character; his habit is to prematurely declare victory in everything, apparently assuming that the force of his declaration makes it a reality. In the lead-up to the U.S. and Israel’s Feb. 28 attacks on Iran, Trump was apparently so pumped up by his historic political comeback and success at cruel mass deportation, murder on the high seas and the conquest of Venezuela, an oil-rich country, that he assumed he could succeed at what every former president knew was a fool’s errand: take over Iran, seize its oil and dominate the world’s oil supply. And, as Haberman and Swan reported in their book “Regime Change,” Trump had been convinced by whom he called a presidential historian (actually a caddie for Gary Player) that he was “the most powerful man who’s ever existed on the planet by far” — more powerful than Mao, Alexander the Great, Stalin, Hitler, all of them.

What Trump has succeeded in doing is making Iran a global power, capable of re-ordering the world through control of one of the most important waterways on the planet. In the process, he has exposed the U.S. as a second-rate military power, at least compared to the country’s previous reputation, by insisting on fighting an unnecessary war of choice without a strategy while being low on munitions and proving that it lacks the capability of fighting on more than one front. Having let down our Middle Eastern partners who assumed that by allowing bases in their countries they could count on America to defend them — not to mention the administration’s destructive tariffs and abandonment of Ukraine — the world knows that the U.S. is unreliable, and they are looking elsewhere for alliances and economic partnerships.

All this brings to mind historian Barbara Tuchman’s “The March of Folly.” Published in 1984, the book examines tragic wars of choice that needn’t have been fought but, because of hubris and ignorance, were waged anyway, despite being against the best interests of the countries that started them. As Tuchman put it:

To qualify as folly for this inquiry, the policy adopted must meet three criteria: it must have been perceived as counter-productive in its own time, not merely by hindsight . . . Secondly a feasible alternative course of action must have been available . . . third . . . the policy in question should be that of a group, not an individual leader.

The war with Iran ticks all those boxes. 

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Among the conflicts Tuchman chronicled in the book are the errors of the Catholic Church that led to the Reformation, as well as King George III’s epic misunderstanding of the dynamics driving the colonists (and England’s other enemies) to rebel against the British Crown. She also turned her keen historical eye to the big kahuna of her era, Vietnam, in which the U.S. squandered its power and moral authority on a war that began as an ideological experiment, escalated for political reasons, and ended in failure and embarrassment only 51 years ago. You’d think that lesson would still be fresh enough that we wouldn’t indulge in such a folly again.

But, of course, we have. While Afghanistan had at least the fig leaf of justification after 9/11, Iraq and now Iran have both demonstrated that the U.S. has learned nothing from its own recent history. Eight months in, Trump’s misadventure in the Islamic Republic has proven even more irrational than the others. As with all the follies, Trump indulged his fantasies, failed to understand the adversary and ended up working against his country’s own interests.

A delusional, psychologically unfit president started a war based on shifting rationales, finally landing on the idea that Iran was pursuing a nuclear weapon. This was the same country that had been complying with an agreement not to pursue a nuclear weapon, but which this president tore up simply because it had been negotiated by the man he succeeded in office. 

We don’t yet know whether these latest threats will lead to an escalation by either party. But either way, the deed is done. The world has been fundamentally changed by Trump’s daft decision to start this war, and there is no going back. That’s how all these follies end, and it’s very rarely a happy ending for the countries that started it.

The post Trump’s Iran war could escalate. Is anyone paying attention? appeared first on Salon.com.

Finland’s President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre held a joint call with Russian leader Vladimir Putin on Tuesday as part of international efforts to secure an end to the war in Ukraine.

“The discussion was frank and substantive,” said Stubb in a statement after the call. “We are neighboring countries to Russia. The outcome of this war will have a direct impact on our and the broader European security. Ending the war requires direct discussions.”

The conversation was held in consultation with Kyiv and the two leaders — who are firm allies of Ukraine — were not speaking as official representatives of Europe as a whole.

But the call comes at a delicate moment in the four-year-long war as European officials bid for a place at the negotiating table, with U.S. President Donald Trump pushing for a peace deal. Two EU officials said the President of the European Council, António Costa, had been told of the planned call in advance.

Talks between the U.S., Russia and Ukraine are planned to take place in Abu Dhabi next month.

Støre said the two European leaders stressed the importance of de-escalation in the call with Putin. “The war comes with enormous human and material costs. The suffering and destruction will impact generations,” he added.

Stubb’s office described the call as a follow-up to talks in Oslo on Oct. 20, in which the two European leaders were joined by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff, who then traveled to meet Putin in Russia the following day.

The Kremlin issued a dry statement simply confirming that “the sides exchanged views on the resolution of the Ukrainian crisis,” and that settling the conflict was the main topic of Tuesday’s call. The statement added that the outcome of Putin’s talks with Witkoff was also taken into account, according to Russia’s state-owned TASS news agency.

Stubb and Støre are close friends and speak frequently, and they were together in Helsinki for the conversation with Putin. According to a statement from the Finnish president’s office, the two leaders wanted to tell the Russian leader directly that they would continue supporting Ukraine and that peace negotiations must resume, looking ahead to the planned meetings in Abu Dhabi.

They also told the Russian leader that they had a shared interest in the stability of the Baltic Sea region and the High North.

Stubb and Støre briefed Zelenskyy after the call. “I am grateful for the detailed briefing and for their active support for our diplomacy and the peace efforts we are pursuing together with all our partners,” the Ukrainian president said in a post on X. “Alex and Jonas made it clear to the Russian leader that real de-escalatory steps are needed regarding our energy and infrastructure.”

“We discussed preparations for the trilateral meeting planned for November at the team level — Ukrainian, American, and Russian,” Zelenskyy said. “Finland and Norway, as countries that border Russia, have a particular interest in sound and reliable security arrangements. We also discussed various formats for our engagement with partners in Europe that could be useful in further supporting diplomacy, our defense, and our shared security.”

Not everyone was impressed with Stubb and Støre’s move. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said she was “very skeptical” about the initiative. European countries had not been involved in coordinating the call, she said, adding: “I believe we should keep Europe united rather than going it alone.”

Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson said peace must come through “strength” rather than “appeasement” of Russia, and if the talks lead to this then they will be welcome. But previous attempts to talk to Putin have not delivered progress and there are no signs he wants a truce, Kristersson added.

Paula Pinho, spokesperson for the European Commission, said: “We take note of the call, which took place solely on a bilateral basis, and is a follow-up of the meeting in Oslo.” The EU side is “united in our commitment not only to put an end to this horrific war but to achieve peace that will be just and sustainable,” she said.

“That is our aim and that is the stance we are defending in the ongoing talks. These negotiations are happening in different formats, different places and different levels involving heads of states and government, ministers, senior diplomats and officials. The EU is involved.”

The last staunch European supporter of Ukraine to speak to Putin at leader level is believed to have been French President Emmanuel Macron in July 2025. Some EU leaders like Slovakia’s Prime Minister Robert Fico and former Hungarian premier Viktor Orban have maintained semi-regular contact with the Russian president in recent years, despite the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

EU diplomats and officials have been considering how to ensure Ukraine’s allies in Europe can play a meaningful part in negotiations on a ceasefire and longer term peace agreement. Stubb’s name emerged as one of the potential leaders who could take on the job of representing Europe and bolstering Ukraine in face-to-face talks with Trump and Putin.

He is one of the few EU leaders and Ukraine backers who has maintained a healthy relationship with Trump at a time of strained relations across the Atlantic. Finland also shares a 1,300 kilometer border with Russia, meaning Stubb and his officials already have valuable experience of dealing with a threatening and unpredictable neighbor.

Sebastian Starcevic contributed reporting. This article has been updated.

Europe is living through an “era of darkness” as multiple wars and competition between the U.S. and China trample the rules-based global order, Finnish President Alexander Stubb said Monday. 

Speaking at the College of Europe in Bruges, Stubb said the post-Cold War age has ended and the world now faces a pivotal moment, like those at the end of World War II in 1945 and the fall of communism in 1989. 

While he tends towards optimism, there are now “unfortunately, plenty of reasons to be pessimistic,” he told an audience of students at the institution, which Stubb himself attended in the 1990s. 

“In a sense, I began my studies during an era of light and you begin your studies in an era of darkness,” he said. “We used to be able to say that the three biggest killers of mankind, disease, famine and wars, have been defeated. That is not true anymore. The light has given way to darkness.”

Stubb, who has studied and written extensively on geopolitical upheaval, has been intimately involved in European efforts to navigate U.S. President Donald Trump’s second term — particularly when it comes to the question of a peace deal for Ukraine. 

He told his audience they would graduate into “a dog-eat-dog world” in which there are, by some estimates, 65 conflicts or wars playing out — “more than at any time after the Second World War.” 

Global security will “depend on what the big powers — namely the U.S. and China — end up doing. Will they choose co-operation or confrontation?” he said.

“The key question for all of us is to create a European security structure which makes sure that Russia does not attack its neighbors again,” he said. NATO will remain a vital security alliance but new processes should also be developed, he said, including “confidence building” measures between Russia and Europe to build “trust.”

Stubb urged the audience of future diplomats, politicians and officials not to be pessimistic, but to be ambitious for a new “era of light,” despite the challenges. He said that in 30 years’ time, the European Union could grow to 40 member countries from the current 27 — including the U.K. rejoining the bloc alongside Norway, Moldova and Ukraine.

Donald Trump on Sunday night said Norway “sucks,” as he fulminated about being repeatedly overlooked for the Nobel Peace Prize.

Despite starting a war with Iran and toppling the leader of Venezuela, Trump has vigorously touted his peacemaking credentials, claiming to have settled at least eight conflicts during his second term in office.  

But he was passed over twice by the Oslo-based Nobel committee: in 2025 for María Corina Machado, the Venezuelan opposition figurehead; and in 2026 for South African jurist Navi Pillay, for her efforts to promote peace and international law.

“What about me? Do they do two of them? So I’m not in love with Norway. Frankly, Norway sucks. Norway has become a shithouse country, actually,” the U.S. president mused during a campaign rally speech in Port Huron, Michigan.

Trump was railing about immigration to the U.S. when he segued into the criticism of Norway.

“We work with Denmark, good country, good nice country. Anybody that would like to come into our country from Denmark, I’m all for it. But I must tell you, from Somalia … I’ve had it with them. I’ve had it with them. I much prefer Denmark. Denmark, we’ll take them. Sweden, Norway … I don’t think so because I didn’t get the Nobel Prize even though I ended it. So I don’t want anybody from Norway. I don’t want anything to do with Norway,” Trump said.

Espen Barth Eide, Norway’s foreign minister, responded to Trump’s remarks by reiterating the Nobel committee’s independence. “He knows very well that the Nobel committee is independent. We have reminded him of that, in case anyone is wondering, and that is still the case,” Eide told Norwegian news outlet NRK Monday.

While Trump didn’t get the 2025 prize, the Venezuelan winner did present him with her medal during a meeting at the White House in January this year.

“And the person who got it, Maria, was very nice,” the president said during his rally speech. “She said, ‘I can’t believe I got it. This should go to President Trump,’ and she gave me her Nobel Peace Prize, that was so nice. It was very nice. I won’t forget that. It was very nice.”

On the first day of its war against Iran, the United States killed 123 children when it targeted and struck an elementary school. 

The strikes, ultimately approved by humans, were facilitated by the US’s Maven Smart System, an AI-enabled software platform developed by Palantir Technologies that allows the military to aggregate, organize, and process battlefield data. Operators fed Maven intelligence classifying the elementary school as an Iranian military facility, and the system, in turn, marked it as one of the priority targets for day one of the war. Though the site was formerly part of a naval military base, it had been converted into an elementary school in 2017 and had remained one since. The intel handed to Maven did not reflect this.  

This mistake resulted in what some reporters have called “one of the single worst massacres committed by the US government since the Vietnam War.”

Such scenarios may become more common as militaries continue to deploy a once-theoretical technology — AI-assisted or autonomous weapons, capable of making both targeting and launch decisions on their own — on real battlefields around the globe. And they raise a troubling, unresolved question: When human beings and machines collaborate in violating international law, who is to blame? 

In this case, the government and private sector are pointing the finger at each other. Some US Central Command personnel, according to Pentagon officials who spoke to Bloomberg, expected Maven to flag stale information or inconsistencies in the underlying intelligence assembled for potential targets. Meanwhile, a Palantir spokesperson told Bloomberg that the company “is not responsible for the underlying data nor identifying intelligence deficiencies,” while also denying that the evidence indicated that its software was at fault in the strike. 

This debate underscores the fact that AI and autonomous weapons are raising a new host of unresolved issues within the law, even as they’re actively assuming positions on the battlefield. In institutions where the line between human and machine decision-making continues to blur, how do we assign responsibility for war crimes? And, are the laws in place suited for the job?

In institutions where the line between human and machine decision-making continues to blur, how do we assign responsibility for war crimes?

To unpack some of these issues, I spoke with international law expert Allen Weiner, a senior lecturer at Stanford Law School, where he teaches courses on the law of armed conflict. Before teaching at Stanford, Weiner practiced international law in the US Department of State for more than a decade. We discussed the difficulties in attributing criminal responsibility, achieving justice for those harmed by lethal autonomous weapons, and much more. The conversation below has been lightly edited for length and clarity.

How do autonomous weapons challenge traditional understandings of responsibility when it comes to the law of armed conflict?

For most of the 20 years I’ve been teaching at Stanford, there’s been a real fascination and fixation on the problem of autonomous weapons. But the truth is that up until pretty recently, nobody really had any [of them]. It was more of an idea than a problem. It’s only in recent years that we have begun to see the deployment of tools that seem to have the capability [to make decisions themselves], so this does raise the question about compliance with illegal orders and where in the chain responsibility lies.

There are different theories about this. Some people say that if we’re engaged in an illegal attack, that has to be because of the programming or the code, so the manufacturers are somehow responsible for committing war crimes. 

Other people would say no, that’s not the case, especially if the military has said the tool is not allowed to make very substantial autonomous judgments, or can’t say no. Then it’s basically the commander, at the point they decide to deploy this weapon, who might be responsible for the illegal acts, even without knowing in advance what they’re going to be.

So to finish where I began, this does present a big challenge to our traditional understanding of responsibility for targeting decisions and of what it would mean if there were an obligation [for autonomous weapons] to say no. 

The real issue is not the obligation to say no, but this: If you train a tool and it wages war in a manner that’s unlawful, where does responsibility for that lie?

If a commander gives a clearly illegal order, such as, “blow up this school,” it seems clear that responsibility falls on the commander. But I could imagine a scenario where a commander is using an AI-assisted or autonomous weapon, isn’t giving it any illegal orders, is trusting that it will operate within the law, and the weapon breaks the law “on its own.” Where does responsibility fall in those cases?

I can imagine two different scenarios. One is that you say, “We’re going to carry out an attack against our enemy, and we want to hit them really, really hard.” Your tool has been trained to say, “We’re not allowed to hit civilian objects,” so it might say, “I’m not going to hit a school.” But if the military has said, “Don’t refuse any targets,” then it might override the way it’s been trained. 

We’re seeing this already, with the stories coming out about breaches where AI tools, Claude and ChatGPT in particular, interpret their instructions in a way that causes them to do something the person who gave the instruction would not have wanted. When Anthropic gave Claude a challenge to figure out if it could do something, the tool figured out, well, maybe we should break into Hugging Face as a way of solving this problem, and the people who gave the AI tool the challenge never intended that.

So if you said, “We want to launch a really punishing campaign,” what happens if the tool on its own says, “Nothing’s going to hurt them more than seeing their kids killed, so let’s attack the school?” That’s one risk, and it’s a real challenge.

So [as for who’s responsible], it’s not the commander who said “hit them hard,” because when he said that, he didn’t mean “attack schools.” It’s not really the companies, because the companies didn’t want them to hit schools either. 

But the tools are out there, reading everything on the internet, and it came across something that said the way you win a war is by attacking the things your adversary holds most dear, and they hold nothing more dear than their children. So it makes this kind of judgment on its own. And it’s not as if you can go back and say who ordered it to hit a school, which is the thing that is clearly illegal. So I do think there’s a risk of diffusion of responsibility here.

You could say the commander knew the tool might work this way, or the person who decided to contract with Palantir or with Claude, whoever it is, to build this tool. But if we’re really thinking about criminal responsibility, the level of responsibility you would need to convict someone requires a culpable mental state. You would need the person to intend, or at least know, that they were authorizing an attack against the school. And I can easily see a commander saying, “I had no idea.”

The decision to authorize this tool, or to give an instruction like “hit them very hard,” could be a basis for some other kind of accountability — administrative discipline within the military, a reprimand, your rank is lowered. But if we’re talking about criminal responsibility, which is what we often think about when we talk about war crimes, I think this diffusion of responsibility is going to make it very hard to identify any single individual who has the required mental state to give rise to accountability.

The second scenario is where the tool just makes a mistake based on the information available to it. We saw that with the attack on the girls’ school in Iran, where it was pretty clear the tool was looking at old data. Now, who’s responsible for that? 

Is it the people who said “give me targets based on this data set,” when they should have made sure the data and the maps were current? All of this strikes me as negligence or recklessness, and it does seem challenging to imagine a situation in which we would say yes, somebody here has committed a war crime. 

“There can well be war crimes, but identifying who the war criminal is might be a big challenge.”

A war crime has been committed, but is there a war criminal? That’s the situation we’re seeing. There can well be war crimes, but identifying who the war criminal is might be a big challenge.

There’s a professor of law, Rebecca Crootof, who proposes the idea of “war torts.” Instead of thinking about war crimes involving autonomous weapons solely through a criminal responsibility lens, maybe tort law — which allows victims to sue wrongdoers for negligent, reckless, or intentional harm — could address the diffusion of responsibility you mentioned. What do you think about that idea?

I think the idea is interesting. We have to separate out the obligations that countries have under international humanitarian law. In a situation like the one I just described, where there’s a war crime but no war criminal, that doesn’t mean the country is not responsible. There may not be an individual who’s criminally accountable, but if a country targets civilians in a circumstance that’s unreasonable, that’s a violation of international humanitarian law, and that could be a basis for claims between the two countries. 

Tribunals were established between Ethiopia and Eritrea, for instance, after the Eritrean War of Independence, that dealt with claims between the two countries for money damages, and some of them involved allegations of violations of the law of armed conflict. Iraq paid reparations after the first Gulf War for harms it had caused to people in Kuwait, under something called the UN Compensation Commission. So the idea that the state is responsible is well established, and one of the ways states would discharge that responsibility would be by paying money damages. That’s the domestic-law equivalent of torts.

Whether there would be a mechanism for [civilians] doing this in domestic law is an interesting idea. We would probably need legislatures, either state legislatures or the federal government, to create a private cause of action allowing people who have been injured to bring claims against, say, the manufacturers of these tools. But this gets procedurally very complicated, because there’s a whole body of law on federal sovereign immunity. 

Could you sue the Defense Department? Probably not. Could you sue an individual soldier? Probably not. Could you sue Anthropic or Palantir? Maybe. But it would probably require Congress to enact a new cause of action, because in general it’s very hard to bring private lawsuits in US courts for violations of international law.

The basic idea of what we would think of as tort or civil responsibility is really the whole essence of international law. On the substance, states do owe responsibility to one another, and they can engage in violations of international humanitarian law that would invoke their responsibility. But then the whole separate question is whether you have a forum within which to adjudicate that and get compensation.

Does that look different in cases where violations of international law were committed by a human soldier versus a machine?

Well, we don’t know, because there have been no cases in the latter category. All of the international humanitarian law violations that have been the subject of international law claims were ordered by humans. 

Now, if an American machine launches an attack against a girls’ school in Iran, and there were a court with jurisdiction, the US would be responsible. In some ways it wouldn’t matter whether it was an individual or a machine, because we don’t have to go down to the level of the individual actor, company, AI tool, or commander. The responsibility is the responsibility of the country. In some ways, that makes it easier.

If we pursued compensation through state-to-state claims, you’d be able to do that without getting into the details of who within the state that committed the war crime was responsible. The state whose school was attacked would say, “I don’t care. You committed a war crime, you’re liable to me, you’re responsible for the damages, and you can figure it out internally.”

But if we were doing something like a war crimes prosecution, where we’re trying to hold an individual criminally responsible, that would make quite a difference. We would have to deal with all of these difficult questions about responsibility and mental state that you and I are struggling with right now.

So, in most cases, the state would have to take responsibility regardless.

Right, and there are lots of [International Court of Justice] cases involving different aspects of the use of force. The principle that you can bring state-to-state claims for violation of these rules is quite well established. 

But with international law, states have to consent to the jurisdiction of a court. They can do that in advance by saying “I’ve signed up to the jurisdiction of a court and I accept any claims that might be brought against me in this court,” or they do it on a case-by-case basis. And it may not surprise you to know that some of the most powerful countries in the world, the ones most likely to use force outside their borders, have tended to be reluctant to accept the jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals.

Russia, the United States, Israel, and China have not accepted the so-called optional clause jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. So there’s the substance, about the responsibility of states, and then there are the procedural aspects of whether these cases could be brought in court.

And Trump recently said everyone on the International Criminal Court should “resign immediately.”

Yeah, exactly. 

And what about the role of these military tech companies, like Palantir?

“At what point does Palantir become a good target under international law? Or at what point does Anthropic become a good target under international law, if its AI tools are being used to promote the war effort?”

Another issue [I’ve been thinking on] because of the questions we’re talking about is when the companies themselves become combatants.

We know that a private company that manufactures airplanes, an airplane factory, is a good target under international law. At what point does Palantir become a good target under international law? Or at what point does Anthropic become a good target under international law, if its AI tools are being used to promote the war effort? I think that question is about when the connection of these private companies to the war effort, in a way we’ve never really seen before, meets the standards under international law.

A civilian loses their immunity when they directly participate in hostilities, or if they assume what is known as a “continuous combatant function.” Are there arguments to be made that some of these private companies are participating in hostilities by virtue of supplying the tools the military is using to wage war? I think that’s a really interesting question.

Before his 1945 novella Animal Farm made him famous, George Orwell fought in the Spanish Civil War of the 1930s. The 1984 author’s stint didn’t last long, however, as he was seriously injured near Huesca after just 10 days on the front lines. At 5 a.m. on the morning of May 20, 1937, Orwell was struck by a sniper’s bullet mid-sentence while speaking with some other soldiers. “This was always a dangerous time, because we had the dawn at our backs, and if you stuck your head above the parapet it was clearly outlined against the sky,” he explained in his memoir Homage to Catalonia.

In that moment, Orwell recalled feeling as though he’d been at the center of an explosion. “There seemed to be a loud bang and a blinding flash of light all round me, and I felt a tremendous shock—no pain, only a violent shock, such as you get from an electrical terminal,” he wrote of the incident. While Orwell was conscious of being hurt and knew he’d gotten hit somewhere in the front of his body, it was only when he managed to faintly squeak out an inquiry that he found out how bad things were. “As they lifted me up a lot of blood poured out of my mouth, and I heard a Spaniard behind me say that the bullet had gone clean through my neck,” the novelist revealed.

Before Writing ‘1984,’ George Orwell Nearly Died FROM a Sniper ATTACK

Harry Milton, who assisted Orwell following the attack, attributed the shooting to Orwell’s height—he was 6’2”—and his reckless habit of poking his head out in view of enemy soldiers. “I heard the crisp sound of a high-velocity shot and Orwell [toppled] over. He landed on his back,” Milton remembered. From there, Milton administered first aid as Orwell waited to be transported to a local hospital. It wouldn’t be until eight or nine days later that his wound was finally examined by a doctor.

What the doctor discovered was that the 7mm copper-plated bullet had passed through Orwell’s neck between the trachea and the carotid artery, paralyzing one of his vocal chords in the process. He was then “cheerfully” informed that he’d never get his voice back. That didn’t end up being the case, though, as Orwell reported that he could speak almost normally again by the end of that July. “No one I met at this time—doctors, nurses, practicantes, or fellow-patients—failed to assure me that a man who is hit through the neck and survives is the luckiest creature alive,” he recounted.

The post George Orwell Was Once Shot Through the Throat by a Sniper and Somehow Survived appeared first on VICE.

DUBLIN — EU and Chinese officials are already discussing the next sectors for trade talks as Brussels prepares to review implementation of their latest understanding in January, EU trade chief Maroš Šefčovič told POLITICO on Friday.

“In January we can assess how it worked and if it delivered all parts of our agreement,” Šefčovič said, referring to an Oct. 9 pact by which China will voluntarily reduce exports of hybrid vehicles to the EU by almost half to 350,000 units in 2027.

That deal also lowers tariffs on European goods such as auto parts and footwear, and smooths exports of rare earth elements to the EU. 

After a scheduled January videoconference with his counterpart Wang Wentao, Šefčovič said he hopes the two can deliver results in March 2027 at their next round of in-person talks in Brussels. 

“I would like to see that we both have an understanding of what sectors we are going to focus on next,” he said.

The intense engagement with China comes as the bloc seeks to rebalance mutual economic ties, which EU officials say have been distorted by Chinese subsidies, market barriers and a surge in imports. Šefčovič stressed the urgency of the task, given that the EU’s trade deficit with China “reached almost €197 billion in the first half of this year. At this rate, we could break the 2022 record” of €397.3 billion.

“A part of our team is working on implementing all what we agreed, and [another] part of the team is talking to our Chinese counterparts on what should be the next sectors, next areas on what we want to focus the work on. Hopefully with another [Trade and Investment Consultation] in Brussels we can actually deliver the results,” he added. 

“The primary objective for us … is to rebalance the trade.”

At a press conference on Friday, the trade chief said the European Commission was looking to shield more sectors from Chinese overcapacity, with plastics the leading candidate for safeguard measures — a mix of quotas and tariffs.

“We are currently analyzing what would be the best candidates and sectors to be addressed” through safeguard measures, he said. “Currently, what I think is the closest, is the plastic sector.”

Brussels is also juggling requests from the EU’s 27 member countries, which all seek to protect the industries that are key to their economies.

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen told EU leaders last week that Brussels wants to shield the chemical and machinery sectors next, POLITICO reported.

Šefčovič added that the European Commission was looking at proposing new trade tools to nudge EU companies to diversify their suppliers, expected in early December.

“We would respect what we have heard from every single business: Keep it simple, no additional reporting,” he said. 

The EU executive is also looking to incorporate a proposal by France and Germany for a new tool that would allow Brussels within days to restrict — or even close — access to Europe for countries that severely distort the bloc’s single market. 

“It’s better to present a new instrument,” Šefčovič told POLITICO. “We could initiate it very quickly and … act very quickly.”