The Trump administration’s snub of South Korea has America’s allies in Asia rethinking how much they can depend on the U.S. for defense — and looking to each other to reduce their reliance on Washington.

President Donald Trump said this week he is cutting back joint military exercises with South Korea, and announced Wednesday that he will meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un later this year. That is pushing countries in the region to accelerate their defense spending and forge alternate partnerships, according to Asian diplomats and others familiar with discussions among regional governments.

“Expect a refocus on self-reliance,” said one Asian diplomat. The diplomat, and others, were granted anonymity due to the sensitivity of their comments.

“U.S. defense tech is still the best, and it’s not economical or logical for countries already locked in on it to pivot or diversify due to interoperability and maintenance issues,” the diplomat said. “But I reckon there’ll be more investment by those that can in self-defense to reduce reliance on the U.S. umbrella in the long term.”

That’s especially true because the move against South Korea was a pressure tactic related to a completely different conflict: the Iran war.

Trump’s move “resonates not just in Korea but across the entire Indo-Pacific because everyone’s wondering whether or not their relationship with the United States is as unstable as the Koreans’,” said Ian Brzezinski, who served as deputy assistant secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy under President George W. Bush. Brzezinski is still in regular contact with Asian officials.

As recently as December, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth declared South Korea a “model ally” worthy of a “special favor.” The apparent reevaluation of that relationship is the latest sign that Trump can quickly flip on longtime partners in the region. In May, Trump delayed a $14 billion arms sale to Taiwan as a “bargaining chip” with Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

The U.S. has long worked to buttress alliances in Asia as a counterweight to Beijing’s growing military dominance. Over recent months, however, the Trump administration has appeared to see that as less essential, and Asian countries have already been investing in their own capacities.

The South Korea decision could speed that transition. South Korea is making it clear that it sees the Trump administration’s action and its approach as an insult.

South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun told lawmakers in Seoul on Wednesday that the government was “not notified in advance” of Trump’s decision to cut the duration of the exercises by a week. President Lee Jae Myung — who presented Trump with a gold crown in October — is trying to get U.S. military ties back on track through joint discussions with administration officials, Cho added.

And the talks “are getting messy,” said a person familiar with those discussions. “The War Department and U.S. Forces Korea are just surprised and don’t have any specific plans right now.”

Lee is already seeking other partnerships. “He’s talking to African countries, to the Gulf and Japan” to expand those links, said Jung Pak, a former U.S. senior official who worked on North Korea and the region in the Biden administration. “This dispute is just going to reinforce that the Republic of Korea has to continue to do that.”

Trump’s push to renew high-profile conversations with the North Korean leader, whom he met three times in his first term, comes as the nuclear-armed authoritarian state accelerates its tempo of ballistic missile tests and threats against neighboring Japan.

The departure of the only Asia-based U.S. aircraft carrier to the Middle East this week also has allies questioning how committed the U.S. is to preventing such acts of aggression.

“Recent signals look more like U.S. disengagement, even though cooperation is clearly still ongoing,” said a second Asian diplomat. “The key issue is increasingly not U.S. intent, but U.S. capacity to sustain the level of presence it has promised.”

The Department of Defense declined to comment.

Asian countries do have some options to insulate their defense capabilities — including military hardware supplies — from the risk of becoming bargaining chips in future policy disputes with Washington.

That could include investments in air and missile defense systems, the hardening of military facilities to protect them from attack and greater cooperation with Australian and European forces, said a third Asian diplomat.

China and North Korea’s growing arsenal of conventional long-range ballistic and hypersonic missiles has increased the vulnerability of Asian nations’ military infrastructure previously considered safe from attack — making such investments high on many countries’ priority lists. Taiwan is building a network of hardened fighter aircraft shelters designed to withstand a Chinese missile barrage.

Longer term, South Korea and Japan could develop their own nuclear arsenals for fear that they may not be able to rely on the U.S. as a deterrent.

Indo-Pacific countries are already forging alternate defense partnerships. Japan and the Philippines sealed an agreement in June that creates a secure supply chain for joint military training exercises, while India and Vietnam launched a weapons co-production initiative in May.

“Tokyo keeps repeating that the U.S.-Japan alliance is a cornerstone of its defense policy, but that’s dwindled down to lip service at this point,” said Yuki Tatsumi, former special assistant for political affairs at the Japanese Embassy in Washington, who is in regular contact with both Japanese diplomats and government officials in Tokyo. “Japan increasingly sees itself as leading a coalition of U.S. allies with deep anxiety about U.S. long-term commitment in the region.”

Asian governments feel a growing sense of urgency to take such measures due to the strains that the ongoing war in Iran has placed on the U.S. military and the depletion of key munitions essential in any possible future conflict with China, the third diplomat said.

“U.S. commitments look more contingent, transactional and vulnerable to being overtaken by events elsewhere, and that raises doubts about whether the U.S. can sustain its stated Indo-Pacific priority in a multi-theater crisis,” the person added.

The rise of those new defense groupings could boost Beijing’s longtime efforts to pry Asian countries away from established U.S.-dominated alliances. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi could make the case for a South Korean defense strategy less dependent on the U.S. during his two-day visit to Seoul, which began today.

“The Chinese leadership has long sought an opening to divide the U.S. from its two most important allies in the region: South Korea and Japan,” said Nicholas Burns, former U.S. ambassador to China in the Biden administration. “The timing of the president’s criticism of the South Korean leadership will give Wang Yi an opening to drive the wedge further between Washington and Seoul.”

The Chinese embassy declined to respond to a request for comment.

BARROW-IN-FURNESS, England — Submarines appear before the town does.

They can be seen from the road next to the factory, where the BAE Systems yard dominates the landscape and workers in high-visibility jackets are a constant presence. Police keep watch for anyone who might threaten Britain’s national security.

AUKUS — a security partnership announced in 2021 linking the U.S., U.K. and Australia seen by many as in a long-term effort to protect democracies against Chinese aggression in the Pacific — is a clear part of the town’s history, and its future.

A local memorial recalls the crews lost or captured sailing the first two submarines built in Barrow for the Royal Australian Navy during World War I, and over the next 15 years AUKUS depends on Barrow’s shipyards building the next generation of nuclear-powered submarines.

But observers, from the British parliament to former cabinet secretaries and prime ministers, say delays in Barrow are not only possible, but likely.

The SSN-AUKUS fleet will be based on a British design, incorporating technology from all three countries. The first examples will be built at BAE Systems’ Barrow yard, then later at Osborne Naval Shipyard in Adelaide, Australia, with Rolls-Royce supplying the nuclear propulsion plants.

And while Britain insists the first SSN-AUKUS class submarine will cut steel in 2027, delays would strain Britain’s national security and test the central promise of AUKUS.

A one-town dependency

Simon Case, the former U.K. Cabinet Secretary charged with regenerating the town, told POLITICO that AUKUS has become a live conversation in Barrow: “Barrow’s fortune has become synonymous with AUKUS.”

A House of Commons committee examining AUKUS went further, calling Barrow’s regeneration “too big to fail.”

That’s because Barrow must support Britain’s Dreadnought nuclear deterrent program and Astute fleet while also increasing output from one submarine a decade to one SSN-AUKUS every 18 months.

Achieving that leap in pace is more than a workforce challenge. It will take thousands of new houses, new higher education institutions, and an urban transformation.

The local college that feeds the shipyard apprentice pipeline was failed by Britain’s education standards body Ofsted in 2024.

If those facts are not daunting enough, Barrow’s regeneration challenge has a wider meaning: Get it right and this small town of 67,000 can claim to be at the center of a British power revival, in its post-Empire, post-EU era.

Get it wrong, and the central promise of AUKUS will go unmet.

The challenges will be constant over the next 15 years.

About 13,500 people work for BAE at the shipyard, roughly one-third of Barrow’s working-age population. While that’s a massive expansion from a workforce of 2,900 in 2003, the company still needs to reach 16,500 workers by the end of 2027.

Adding 3,000 jobs in a small town in 18 months is no easy feat. Adding them to achieve what Australia’s Defence Industry Minister Pat Conroy told POLITICO is “the most technically advanced thing in the world,” is even harder.

Conroy has visited Barrow twice and remains optimistic.

Trevor Taylor, director of the Defence, Industries & Society Programme at the RUSI defense think tank, also described the United Kingdom as the least risky part of the AUKUS bargain. Dreadnought and Astute class submarines appear to be emerging without drastic delays, he said.

The unresolved question is experience. “They’ve certainly got the workforce, and I think the infrastructure,” Taylor told POLITICO. “Whether they’ve got the workforce experience is another matter.”

That distinction matters in a nuclear program. Barrow can train welders and other tradespeople. The design engineers, nuclear physicists and systems architects required for SSN-AUKUS will mostly have to be brought in.

And Barrow will be competing against shortages faced in other parts of Britain’s nuclear workforce, from highly qualified specialists to vocational workers.

The town the workforce needs

The production schedule is colliding with the town’s social reality.

Case, the former head of Britain’s civil service who now leads Team Barrow, a partnership dedicated to transforming the town, said the yard’s fortunes declined after the Cold War peace dividend and the town declined with it.

The order book is now strong, with decades of work ahead. Housing, education, health and employment have yet to catch up.

“What is holding the town back is actually the previous 30 years of under investment in housing, education, health and employment,” Case said.

Despite Barrow being situated near England’s Lake District — a major countryside tourist hub and holiday destination — the town itself is not seen as an attractive place to live.

Barrow’s town center has the familiar marks of Britain’s former industrial heartlands. The Commons report records 18.3 percent of working-age people as not in employment, 71.3 percent of adults as overweight or obese and drug and alcohol misuse above national rates. Government statisticians report Barrow residents as having the lowest life satisfaction in the U.K.

BAE provides high-paying work, but deprivation remains interwoven with that prosperity.

John Woodcock, a former Labour MP for Barrow who now sits on the House of Lords crossbench, said the town must become a magnet for engineering, nuclear physics and other high-technology graduates.

Barrow’s relative remoteness makes that harder. The town is more than five hours’ drive from London.

Young graduates often want a major city, and visible deprivation can become a barrier to recruitment, Woodcock said, even when the jobs are among the most advanced in the world.

Housing is the immediate constraint.

BAE has said a stable workforce cannot be transient. A family moving to Barrow needs a home, a school, health services and a reason to stay, making regeneration critical to ongoing defense production.

With 89 percent of the BAE workforce living locally, up to 2,700 new households may be needed by the end of 2027. The district builds about 750 homes a year.

Marina Village, a planned 1,350-home development supported by £24.8 million from Homes England, has yet to deliver a home.

What sets Barrow apart from many industrial communities across England’s North, which have seen deprivation creep in after the closure of the mills and mines that provided jobs in the 20th century, is that Barrow’s industrial future still exists and is set to exist for decades to come.

Barrow’s technical education foundation is improving.

Around 11 percent of the population, about 6,000 people, have been in the apprentice system, the highest proportion in England. BAE received another 6,000 applications in 2025. The young adult population is growing, and a new University Technical College is due to open soon.

No additional funding, no nuclear submarines

The U.K. government has committed £200 million over 10 years through the Barrow Transformation Fund. Case, who leads the public-private partnership established to revive the town, puts the real requirement at £1 billion and says government health and transport departments are yet to make funding commitments. “Some of the most deprived wards in the entire country are here in Barrow, despite the fact we spend billions of pounds a year,” Case told the Commons defense committee.

His conclusion is blunt: “If Barrow does not get it, we do not get our nuclear submarines, which are the cornerstone of this nation’s security. It is that simple really.”

The Ministry of Defence rejects the £1 billion investment figure. It says the £200 million fund was designed to catalyze investment from other departments and the private sector, and points to a £6 billion dedicated submarine investment.

On July 29, Prime Minister Andy Burnham announced £8.4 billion for Dreadnought, including £5.9 billion for BAE and £2.5 billion for the wider supply chain and apprenticeships.

Burnham’s appointment of John Healey — the former defense secretary — as the chancellor, has cheered Australian officials. “That shows to me that they’re putting defense and national security at the heart of their economic agenda as well as their defense agenda,” said James Paterson, the shadow defense minister, who is at the heart of debates about AUKUS accountability.

The military clock

Barrow’s local problems translate into military risk through the gaps in Australia’s submarine capability.

Paterson has identified two potential gaps in Australia’s submarine capability that need planning.

The first comes between the Collins-class submarines and Virginia-class submarines in the early 2030s. The second comes between the Virginias and SSN-AUKUS in the early 2040s.

Australia’s interim options include rotating British Astute-class submarines through waters around Australia and acquiring second-hand U.S. Virginia-class submarines in the early 2030s.

The Commons report says the Royal Navy’s Astute fleet is the smallest the U.K. has had in decades: In the first half of 2024, none of the five Astute-class boats completed an operational deployment, according to the report.

Sidharth Kaushal, a senior research fellow specializing in sea power at Royal United Services Institute, told POLITICO a deployment to Australia would stretch it to the limits of its capacity.

“What I don’t want to see is fatalism,” Paterson said. “These are solvable problems. We’ve got time to get this right, as long as we are honest and realistic about it now.”

A shared industrial gamble

The U.K. is designing and building its own SSN-AUKUS boats before Australia builds its fleet.

That front-loads risk onto Britain and gives the U.K. a powerful incentive to get the program right for its own national security.

Burnham says British money should be spent on British workers, firms and skills in places written off for 40 years. Conroy supports this effort, seeing a stronger British yard as part of northern Britain’s economic rejuvenation, which will ultimately benefit Australia.

BAE says its £25 million Submarines Academy for Skills and Knowledge in Barrow and a Skills and a related Training Academy Campus in Adelaide will support thousands of future submarine builders. The Adelaide campus is scheduled to open in 2028 for up to 1,000 learners a year.

Woodcock argues that more of the early boats should be built in Barrow, creating a faster route to transfer capability and to build Australia’s sovereign capacity.

The future of AUKUS runs through a town where the shipyard has recovered faster than the place around it.

ROME — In the barns where the milk for Italy’s most famous cheese is produced, the fans have barely stopped whirring for two months. As temperatures across northern Italy push close to 40 degrees Celsius, cows stand almost motionless, tongues lolling, while automated sprinklers soak their backs.

Italy is now enduring its fourth major heat wave of an exceptionally brutal summer. The prolonged heat is piling costs on the €4 billion industry behind Parmigiano Reggiano, forcing farmers to spend heavily on cooling their animals while drought and dwindling water supplies make it harder and more expensive to grow the forage needed to feed them.

Farmers have received support from regional authorities, the EU and a producers’ consortium to help them adapt to the heat, but they say the funding falls short of the investment increasingly required.

For producers of the protected cheese, there is no possibility of escaping somewhere cooler. Under the strict rules governing Parmigiano Reggiano’s EU Protected Designation of Origin — that secures its added value on the market — the cows, their milk and the cheese must remain tied to a defined area of northern Italy. At least 75 percent of their forage must also be grown locally.

Dairy cows can begin suffering from heat stress at around 25C, depending on humidity, according to Giovanni Buonaiuto, a vet with the Parmigiano Reggiano Consortium, which defends producers’ interests. Their digestive system generates considerable heat as they break down food, while cows have relatively few sweat glands with which to disperse it. “It’s as if the cow has a radiator inside her,” Buonaiuto told POLITICO.

As temperatures rise, cows eat less and stand for longer to expose themselves to moving air. They rest and ruminate less, milk production falls and prolonged heat can also affect fertility.

Buonaiuto said milk production has fallen by about 10 percent on average during the summer, although the impact varies sharply between farms depending on their cooling systems.

Overheating herds

Federica Dall’Aglio, who raises 400 cattle on the plains near the city of Parma, said each cow was producing five to six kilograms less milk a day, a fall of roughly 20 percent, despite fans and water sprays installed to protect her herd.

The cows now spend much of their time beneath the fans and water sprays, she added, as they’re reluctant to move away from the cooling systems.

Outside the barns, farmers are reorganizing their working days around the heat too. Some now cut and collect hay at 3 a.m. or 4 a.m., Buonaiuto said, before the morning heat causes the hay to crumble. By 8 a.m. or 9 a.m., it can already be too hot.

Keeping the cows cool comes at a high cost.

Luca Cotti, a sixth-generation dairy farmer and president of farmers’ association Coldiretti in the northern Emilia-Romagna region, said electricity consumption in barns can double or even triple during extreme heat as cooling systems run almost continuously.

He recalled worrying about winter 20 years ago, with the weather freezing drinking water and other systems in the barn. Now investment is directed toward surviving summer.

The new normal

Extreme summer heat was once exceptional and might last a week before temperatures eased, Cotti said. Now, he said, “it’s normal.” This year, “since June, it has never let up.”

For some smaller producers with older facilities, the question is whether the investment is still worthwhile.

Dall’Aglio’s family has been investing in cooling systems for around 15 years, recently adding solar panels to help offset their growing electricity needs.

Across the Parmigiano Reggiano supply chain, such technology is becoming commonplace. Around half of its dairy farms, responsible for 70 percent of its milk, have invested in advanced cooling systems, including fans, motion-sensitive water sprays and automated temperature monitoring, according to the consortium president, Nicola Bertinelli.

The remaining 30 percent of milk comes largely from farms in the cooler hills and mountains, he said.

With persistently high temperatures, insufficient rainfall and water levels in major Alpine lakes approaching historic lows, authorities in the Po River basin, which supports agriculture across northern Italy through a network of tributaries and canals, have declared a high level of drought severity.

Alfalfa, an important source of forage for the cows, is relatively resistant to drought because of its deep roots. But Dall’Aglio said her family had already been irrigating heavily to ensure a good hay crop this year.

When rivers run too low for irrigation, some farmers have to pump groundwater instead, which can make irrigation around five times more expensive because of the energy required to extract it, according to Lorenzo Catellani of farmers’ association CIA Agricoltori Emilia-Romagna.

Coldiretti is calling on politicians to treat water storage as infrastructure rather than emergency relief.

Cotti said regional and national authorities need to invest in reservoirs and other water-storage infrastructure, arguing that individual farms cannot solve the growing problem of water scarcity alone.

Paradoxically, Parmesan producers normally worry about producing too much, not too little — and had sought to curb output this year. “We always have the brake on,” Cotti said, adding that high prices mean farmers have little difficulty increasing production when needed.

Despite the strain, producers insist there is no danger of Italy running short of Parmesan.

The cheese’s strong global market gives farmers greater scope to invest than producers in more fragile agricultural sectors.

For now, those investments are keeping Parmigiano production stable, although smaller farmers with aging barns may eventually choose to close rather than spend the money needed to adapt. For now, there is little to do but wait for the temperatures to fall. “We keep going like this,” Cotti said. “We hope it ends as soon as possible.”

The U.S. on Friday threatened action against the EU unless Brussels reins in its environmental and human rights rules, which Washington says unfairly burden American companies.

Acknowledging Brussels had made “some positive reforms,” Washington said the EU had “failed to fully address U.S. concerns,” and that it “will take any actions necessary to address unreasonable burdens on U.S. commerce.”

U.S. Ambassador to the EU Andrew Puzder piled on the pressure Friday, writing on X that “now it’s time for the EU to deliver.” He pointed to commitments made under last year’s Turnberry trade deal to ensure U.S. businesses do not face “undue restrictions” on transatlantic trade due to Brussels’ green regulations.

The dispute centers on two pillars of the EU’s corporate sustainability rulebook: the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, which requires large companies to address human rights and environmental harms linked to their operations and supply chains, and the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive, which requires companies to disclose sustainability-related information.

Brussels has scaled back both laws in its drive to cut red tape, but has stopped short of Washington’s demand to shield U.S. companies from their reach.

Last week, Puzder similarly attacked the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism as a tariff on U.S. exporters. On Thursday, the White House also accused the EU and more than 40 countries of enabling Chinese goods to skirt U.S. tariffs by rerouting them through their markets.

A European Commission spokesperson told POLITICO that Brussels had made “considerable efforts” to explain its rules and highlight “its willingness to cooperate with the US to increase trade where possible,” but drew a line at changing its regulatory regime in response to U.S. pressure.

“We have been very clear and consistent on the fact that neither our rules framework nor our regulatory autonomy are up for negotiation,” said the spokesperson.

This story has been updated.

Koen Verhelst contributed reporting.

BERLIN — Europe’s reserves of natural gas are running dangerously low, risking fresh energy woes if the Iran war rages on and cold spells drive up heating demand over winter.

But the continent’s top energy user doesn’t seem too bothered.

Germany is the EU’s biggest vulnerability because its sheer size means gas shortfalls there could be felt in neighboring countries, driving up prices across the bloc if it fails to restore its reserves.

That’s prompted growing calls for Berlin to do the unthinkable: intervene outright to direct its state-controlled energy giants to buy gas at any price, abandoning years of free-market doctrine on energy policy.

So far, the government has refused to budge, even as it falls short of EU targets and faces the risk of physical supply shortages as early as November. It’s a gamble that the markets will figure everything out, even as war and hot weather distort traditional incentives and upend global supply chains.

“Storage levels are not only exceptionally low for this time of year, but historically low,” said Sebastian Heinermann, the managing director of Germany’s top gas storage association, INES.

But Germany, he warned, is still relying on an outdated, market-oriented approach to refill its reserves, even when there are “hardly any market-economic incentives left.”

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, EU countries have been required to hit gas storage targets of 90 percent of national capacity by winter to prevent serious supply shortfalls. The EU lowered that target to 80 percent following the outbreak of the Iran war to prevent panic buying.

Typically, refilling is the responsibility of traders and utilities, which buy gas cheap in the summer to store and then sell in the winter for a profit. But buyers say higher summer prices as a result of the Iran war and climate change have upended that dynamic, leaving gas reserves across the bloc at around 58 percent of national capacity, 16 percentage points below the five-year historical average and the lowest level since 2011. 

The low reserves have already added to the increased pressure on gas prices linked to renewed tensions around the Strait of Hormuz, with the European natural gas benchmark now consistently higher than it was for the first four months of the Iran war.

The European Commission, the EU’s executive arm, has said the bloc faces no winter supply risks. But a report by energy analytics firm Rapidan projects that reserves will rise to only 65 percent of total storage capacity by November, arguing that hitting the EU’s target by winter won’t be possible without “materially higher prices.” 

That risk has been exacerbated, analysts say, by the bloc’s move in recent years to replace its long-term supply deals with Russia with short-term purchases of globally traded liquefied natural gas. These seaborne cargoes are highly mobile and go to the highest bidder — leaving buyers more exposed to volatility on international markets, especially in the wake of the loss of key supplies from Qatar and rising demand in Asia.

Germany, the bloc’s largest gas consumer, has seen its reserves fill up even more slowly than others, in part thanks to its more hands-off, market-led approach to restocking than many of its neighbors. As a result, reserves stood at only 47 percent of national capacity in August, according to the latest data — the lowest fill level since records began. That’s especially worrying as the country’s reserves are important for the bloc as a whole, representing over 20 percent of the EU’s storage capacity. 

Nevertheless, Berlin is staying the course. While its energy ministry has acknowledged the country’s historically low reserves, it has refused to intervene to direct its main state-controlled gas buyers, SEFE and Uniper, to buy gas at current prices to ensure its targets are met, instead of waiting for market conditions to improve.

“It is the responsibility of companies and traders to fill the storage facilities for the winter,” a spokesperson for the German energy ministry told POLITICO. “Government-led filling of the storage facilities would further constrain the gas market and drive prices even higher. The supply situation over the coming months would actually deteriorate.”

Whether this is the right approach will become clearer by winter, said Laurent Ruseckas, a senior gas analyst at S&P Global. If temperatures are unseasonably low, traders may be forced to buy additional supplies at late notice, driving up prices, especially if the Strait of Hormuz remains closed. On the other hand, intervening could raise prices prematurely if winter turns out to be mild.

“If you start buying now to get storage to some politically predetermined level you’re making prices higher now to get insurance that you won’t get higher prices in the winter when it’s cold,” said Ruseckas.

Germany’s reluctance to move quickly also highlights the difficulty the EU’s fragmented energy sector has in competing with more centralized Asian economies that have acted more quickly to secure supplies, consistently outbidding European countries even as their reserves run low.

Others warn that physical supply strains are also possible. Heinermann, of INES, warned that even filling the country’s reserves to 76 percent of capacity — which SEFE says is achievable — would not necessarily meet its supply needs if winter is “exceptionally cold.” That could ripple out to neighboring countries to which Germany is treaty-bound to provide emergency gas assistance, including Austria, Switzerland, Italy and Denmark.

Heinermann called on the German government to encourage faster restocking by lowering network charges at storage facilities or abolishing the conversion levy, fees imposed for the conversion of gas on national grids. Berlin has already unveiled plans for a new emergency gas stockpile, but that will only cover 10 percent of the country’s gas capacity and kick off officially next summer.

It’s no surprise that other major gas consumers have already waded into the private sector. The Netherlands, another free-market champion suffering from low gas reserves, earlier this summer allocated €1.2 billion for its state energy company, EBN, to more swiftly top up its reserves. 

But Berlin’s energy giants are sticking to their guns — for now.

A spokesperson for SEFE told POLITICO that even though “international conflicts” could weigh on European storage levels, the 70 percent target “remains achievable” without intervention. He pointed out that 78 percent of German storage capacity has already been booked, though acknowledged that doesn’t necessarily translate to actual volumes of gas stored. 

Regulatory measures could be useful if “necessary” but could distort markets and increase costs, he added, without specifying what.

A Uniper spokesperson was less confident, warning it would be “increasingly challenging to reach the target storage levels before the winter season starts” at the current rate of filling. But she too stopped short of calling for intervention, arguing instead for better incentives for refilling — mirroring growing calls from gas lobbyists in Brussels to scrap the rules outright.

President Donald Trump on Thursday announced tariffs on polysilicon and its related products, in his administration’s latest attempt to eliminate China’s choke points in the global supply chain for solar panels and semiconductors.

But Trump’s directive won’t take effect until Dec. 4 — well after November’s midterm elections and a planned September summit between Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping — as the administration grapples with voters complaining of high prices and fragile trade negotiations with China.

“This will bring the supply chain here,” Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick said of the order on Thursday alongside Trump at the White House. “We’ve got the industry here, it’s too small, and it’s going to explode.”

Because polysilicon is used in semiconductors and solar panels, it’s essential for military hardware and everyday electronics like cell phones and laptops, in addition to the world’s fastest-growing energy source.

The order imposes a 15 percent tariff on imported polysilicon and its derivatives, as well as minimum prices for imports of polysilicon, polysilicon ingots and wafers, solar cells and solar modules.

It also includes a clause intended to prevent companies from stockpiling those materials between now and December, authorizing Customs and Border Protection to restrict imports if it suspects an importer is attempting to dodge the higher duties.

Trump’s order is the result of a Commerce Department investigation launched last July into national security risks in the polysilicon supply chain, as part of a broader effort to shift supply chains away from China for multiple industries including wind turbines and robotics.

China has a near-monopoly on the production of polysilicon, according to S&P Global. But recent U.S. efforts to limit key areas of trade with China have already drawn a backlash from Beijing, which earlier this week implemented new controls on drone exports to the U.S.

The White House emphasized the order’s impact on domestic semiconductor production, a key focus as the U.S. looks to build out infrastructure related to artificial intelligence. Trump said the U.S. will “have a big percentage of the chip business by the time I leave office.”

But Thursday’s order may have a big impact on the solar industry, according to Jon Toomey, president of the pro-tariff Coalition for a Prosperous America organization.

“This proclamation delivers the most significant global trade protection action for the American polysilicon and solar industry in the modern era,” Toomey said in a statement. “For the first time, the United States is protecting the entire solar supply chain with a single action — and rewarding the manufacturers that build here — while taking a significant step to bolster the domestic semiconductor supply chain.”

At this month’s NATO summit in Ankara, allies announced billions of dollars in new arms deals and reaffirmed their commitment to spend more on defense. European governments have made the pledge, and the money is real: European defense spending has doubled since 2019, and by 2030, European NATO member countries are projected to spend in excess of €800 billion a year, up €300 billion from 2025, with equipment spending alone nearly doubling.

But committing money is the easy part. The harder question is whether Europe’s defense industry can turn it into equipment fast enough to matter. Europe’s largest defense manufacturers’ order books now average more than five years for production, and some are closer to nine. Money is flowing in faster than industry can turn it into equipment. But a purchase order is not equipment that can be deployed on the ground and the air.

European countries have long duplicated capabilities rather than pooling them.

The bottleneck sits in the defense industrial system. Deterrence relies on the chain from funding to contracts, then through production, deployment into services, then rapid innovation in the field. Europe’s next goal comes after the spending promise. The continent fields six times as many weapons platforms as the United States, because countries have long duplicated capabilities rather than pooling them. Production ends up split across many small runs that never reach an efficient scale. Ukraine, under pressure, has shown how fast a defense system can move, adapting tactics in weeks and building drone detection networks from consumer electronics. Europe needs to catch up and then accelerate.

Four moves would help Europe accelerate.

The first is multi-speed procurement. Software-led systems such as drones and targeting improve in rapid cycles throughout their deployment and need procurement that can keep up. Israel’s Iron Dome started out as far less capable than it is today and improved continuously in service. European defense ministries have already set up high-speed procurement units with dedicated teams and greater risk tolerance. These need to become mainstream, rather than the exception.

Collaboration in procurement, maintenance and training brings costs down and delivery forward.

The second is military collaboration to reduce fragmentation. Collaboration in procurement, maintenance and training brings costs down and delivery forward. The Tempest project, where the U.K., Italy and Japan are jointly building a next-generation fighter, demonstrates the model: shared development costs that no single country could carry alone. Recent bilateral maritime agreements, and Romania’s use of EU funding to buy European while expanding production at home, show the same logic spreading.

The third is industrial consolidation, which is already underway and needs to move faster. Companies are driving it themselves. Airbus, Leonardo and Thales have agreed to merge their space divisions into a single joint venture with roughly €6.5 billion in revenue and 25,000 employees, and European defense mergers and acquisitions rose 35 percent year over year in the first half of 2025. McKinsey analysis finds that consolidation across key supply chain segments could unlock around €9 billion in annual synergies, more than the current equipment budgets of 24 of Europe’s 30 NATO members. The deepest opportunity sits below the big primes, among the thousands of tier two, three and four suppliers that still duplicate one another’s work. Europe can speed this up by harmonizing requirements, reducing national carve-outs and letting industry do the combining. Consolidation is only half the task. Europe also needs to build sheer capacity — more shipyards, more assembly lines, more of the physical plants that turn orders into hardware — and the capital to fund it. In several categories, Europe simply lacks enough places to build.

Real deterrence means difficult choices, and a public that understands the importance and the cost of security.

The fourth is regulatory unlocking. Full scale-up demands skilled workers retrained, accredited and security cleared from other industries; production sites with preapproved permitting; and alignment of export controls across European allies. These regulatory unlocks now need the same energy and focus as the funding commitment debate. 

Real deterrence means difficult choices, and a public that understands the importance and the cost of security. That conversation is only beginning in much of Europe. It must include the potential for “gray zone” cyber strikes on hospitals, arson at industrial sites, drones disrupting ports, undersea data cables cut — these have all occurred, but many citizens do not yet recognize this as having malicious intent.

The opportunity in getting it right is significant. McKinsey and GLOBSEC estimates indicate that every euro of spending on European-manufactured equipment generates two euros of revenue across the European supply chain, and an additional €165 billion a year in equipment spending could create up to 1.2 million jobs. The coming years will reveal how effectively Europe is able to scale up to protect its territory and citizens, and how much of the promised investment becomes lasting deterrence and European jobs. Getting there depends on the whole ecosystem — governments, industry and investors — moving together. Increased spending is important. Spending it effectively matters more.

Jonathan Dimson is a senior partner in McKinsey’s London office. Mikael Robertson is a senior partner in the Stockholm office.

Leading artificial intelligence models from Anthropic and OpenAI created fake online personas and tried to deceive human coders into abetting a cyberattack during a recent safety evaluation, the U.K.’s AI Safety and Security Institute disclosed Tuesday.

It marks the latest case in which a powerful AI system has attempted a digital attack on an unwitting third party without direct prompting during such an evaluation — heightening concerns the powerful technology is advancing too fast for responsible oversight.

The disclosure is likely to ignite fresh calls in Washington and Silicon Valley for more rigorous regulation of the AI industry, particularly over frontier models with advanced capabilities to detect and launch cyberattacks. It comes just days after similar testing mishaps involving some of the same models from OpenAI and Anthropic sparked urgent calls for new AI safety regulation and a push within Silicon Valley to slow the rapid pace of AI development.

Like its U.S. counterpart, AISI routinely conducts security evaluations to better understand what dangers both new and soon-to-be-released AI models pose to public health and safety. But even the digital security body said the actions it uncovered by Anthropic’s Claude Mythos 5 and ChatGPT 5.6 — the latest publicly released model from either AI lab — were unlike anything it had seen before.

“This is the first time AISI has seen deception of this severity that was targeted at a real person, unprompted, in the real world,” AISI said in a 35-page technical report accompanying a blog post Tuesday.

AISI said the malicious activity began on July 25. The AI safety evaluator detected it and launched an investigation on July 28, when it spotted “unusual data transfers” stemming from a cyber evaluation it was conducting on Mythos 5 and ChatGPT 5.6.

Overall, AISI determined that Mythos 5 and ChatGPT 5.6 took “autonomous, unsanctioned action on the live internet, targeting real people and organizations” during 10 of the 122 evaluations the research body conducted and isolated for review. The majority of those actions, it said, involved Mythos 5 and arose during a “single, sustained line of activity.”

In the most alarming incident it uncovered, Mythos 5 attempted a supply chain attack — a sophisticated technique often deployed by North Korean and Russian cyber operatives, in which hackers bury malware inside legitimate code.

To do so, Anthropic’s model created “multiple fake identities” on developer platform GitHub and used them to send messages “pressuring” an open-source software engineer to unwittingly introduce a bugged update into code widely available on the popular site, AISI said. When that effort failed, the AI “edited its earlier activity to appear harmless” and “considered adopting a fresh identity to continue,” AISI added, a sign the model was intent on repeating the ruse.

As part of the same effort, Mythos 5 also sent direct messages over GitHub to software engineers that contained malware.

In another sign of deceitful behavior AISI uncovered in its investigation, multiple AI agents it was testing appeared to communicate with one another about how to convince real engineers using GitHub to trust them. “One agent left public messages on GitHub offering collaboration with other agents working on the same challenge,” AISI wrote.

AISI’s blog and technical assessment make no mention of whether the models also attempted to exploit previously unknown software bugs — called zero-days — during the evaluation.

Last month, OpenAI disclosed that GPT 5.6 and another of its models escaped onto the open internet during what was supposed to be a controlled test, and then hacked another company in a first-of-its-kind, autonomous breach.

In response, Anthropic launched an investigation into whether any of its models took illicit action during recent testing and discovered Mythos 5 and two other models had hacked three organizations during tests dating back to April.

In a statement, an Anthropic spokesperson said they are “grateful” to AISI for their leadership and that this review underscores the need for “a broader conversation about how to safely evaluate increasingly capable AI agents.”

The spokesperson added: “As we shared after disclosing our own incident last week, the field needs stronger, shared standards for how evaluation environments are built and secured. We look forward to partnering with the UK AISI to learn more about this incident as we conduct our own investigation.”

An OpenAI spokesperson referred POLITICO to a blog post about the incident that went up Tuesday evening. “We are committed to working across the industry to strengthen shared practices for conducting high-risk evaluations safely, including convening stakeholders such as national AI institutes, independent evaluators, other AI labs, and other groups in the coming weeks,” the blog read.

AISI stressed in its blog that the malicious activity it disclosed Tuesday took place under “deliberately permissive conditions” so they could assess the safety risks posed by the two models. This included granting the models access to the internet, unlike the earlier incidents detailed by Anthropic and OpenAI.

AISI also noted the models were intentionally stripped of internal guardrails that block malicious behavior. AISI was only able to disable those controls because of its role testing Mythos 5 and ChatGPT 5.6.

Still, AISI said the incidents highlighted the need for greater monitoring of model behavior during testing, and tighter controls over their access to the internet.

The Trump administration is finalizing a voluntary framework under which AI labs would submit powerful models they want to release to the public for federal safety testing. But it has not yet made the framework public, and it includes no provisions for models AI labs are developing internally.

The incidents last month from OpenAI and Anthropic both involved models not intended for public release.

Some cyber experts say recent incidents highlight deeper questions around AI development, such as who is liable when AI systems break federal hacking laws.

“If any of these were human-originated, they would lead to clear and vigorous prosecution. I think it’s time for a serious discussion about updates to existing computer security law,” said Marc Rogers, a hacker and prominent cybersecurity expert.