LONDON — The U.K. government is removing import tariffs on more than 100 products, including food, drink and fuel, to ease the cost of living.

In a pre-budget announcement on Monday night, the Treasury said it would suspend tariffs on a number of popular food items, including baked beans, chocolate and gherkins, as well as fertilizer and kerosene heating oil.

The announcement, which follows a consultation earlier this year, comes after the government said last week that it would suspend import tariffs on over 250 goods that were due to expire on Dec. 31 until Dec. 2028.

Collectively, the government said the tariff suspensions would reduce consumer costs by around £245 million to £595 million a year.

“Today’s everyday fixes are just a small part of what we are doing to give families a bit of breathing space,” Chancellor John Healey said.

“Conflict in the Middle East and Europe is hitting families here at home through higher everyday costs. We can’t control global events, but we can act where we can make a difference.”

BRUSSELS — Quebec’s new separatist government is treating this week’s EU-Canada summit in Montreal as the start of a wider diplomatic push to get the province in the room whenever Ottawa and Brussels strike deals that concern its powers.

The separatist Parti Québécois returned to power this month at the head of a minority government in the province, promising to assert greater control over Quebec’s affairs and eventually hold another referendum on independence. 

“Quebec has to be at the table, and Canada understands that very well,” Hélène Drainville, the province’s delegate general to the Benelux and the EU institutions, said in an interview in Brussels.

Prime Minister Mark Carney hosts Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa on Thursday and Friday for a summit the two sides have billed as a step change in relations, driven by Donald Trump’s tariffs and a shared need for new partners. Von der Leyen has even proposed to make Canada an “associate member” of the EU — an offer that goes too far even for some of the bloc’s member countries. 

Early drafts of a joint summit declaration include a digital trade deal, a pact to let the European Investment Bank finance Canadian critical minerals projects, and a consignment of Canadian water bombers for Europe’s emergency services.

While Canada is responsible for negotiating the text, much of it lands in areas where its 10 provinces have extensive powers, such as over natural resources, education and health. Quebec is the second-largest province by population after Ontario and has a territory more than twice the size of France — with which three-quarters of its people share French as their mother tongue.

“Canada negotiates the umbrella agreement, and where we come in is when what’s negotiated touches our areas of jurisdiction,” said Drainville, who has been in post for a year. Natural resources are a provincial matter, she added, noting that Quebec has deposits of 22 of the 34 minerals on the EU’s critical list.

The province is already talking to the European Investment Bank and DG GROW, the European Commission’s industry department, about the bank’s entry into Canada, she noted. 

Asked whether Quebec’s interests line up with those of Ottawa, Drainville said federal and provincial officials have already set up joint working groups to implement the summit’s outcomes. “Right now, all the signals are green,” she said.

New arrival

The cooperation comes at an unusual moment. Quebec’s new premier, Paul St-Pierre Plamondon, won power on Oct. 5 while promising a third referendum on sovereignty, though not as long as Trump is in the White House. His cabinet includes the new position of minister for “accession to independence.”

However, support for independence in the province is the lowest it has been for three decades, around 29% in a poll from earlier this year — hardly a popular mandate for the project.

The Parti Québécois has nevertheless pledged to double Quebec’s 34 offices abroad. A party blueprint published last year would raise the number of countries with a Quebec office from 19 to 38 and, if the referendum delivers a “yes” to sovereignty, would turn those delegations into embassies and consulates.

“Quebec is going to start to exist and shine everywhere in the world,” St-Pierre Plamondon said last year, describing the representative network as a prerequisite for independence.

Drainville said the new government, which has been in office for three weeks, has not yet set its line on Europe. 

“Our political leaders haven’t taken a position yet, which is normal,” she said. “But if they decide to double [the network], it’s because they believe in this partnership.” As for the associate-member label, she declined to engage: “We’re not really into semantics. That’s Canada.”

What Quebec does want from the EU, she said, is “win-win partnerships,” noting that the province and Ottawa complement each other and are stronger together when it comes to relations with Europe.

It hasn’t always been so amicable. 

Quebec’s diplomatic ambitions date back to the 1960s, when the provincial government asserted the right to pursue international relations in areas under its constitutional jurisdiction.

Its international aspirations became politically contentious when French President Charles de Gaulle publicly embraced Quebec’s independence movement in 1967 — ending a speech in Montreal by proclaiming: Vive le Québec libre! (“Long live free Quebec!”) 

The Brussels office opened in 1972, and the province now counts 10 posts in Europe, which Drainville called the most of any Canadian province.

Quebec never consented to the constitutional changes Canada enacted in 1982, and its 1995 independence referendum failed by the narrowest of margins (49.4% to 50.6%). A decade ago, Quebec lobbied Europe for a seat at the table in negotiations on the CETA EU-Canada trade deal.

Mark Carney’s pursuit of a global alliance of middle powers has a Europe problem.

Canada’s prime minister wants to help build a new world order that can counterbalance the power of the United States and China. But his vision depends on a new relationship with a Europe that doesn’t see itself as a middle power at all. 

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has a different vision: a Brussels-centered bloc that extends the EU’s economic and geopolitical influence, starting with Canada. The idea, according to senior European lawmaker Siegfried Mureșan, is to create an opportunity for the EU to become the “global center of gravity for liberal democracies.” 

The competing visions will be tested this week when Carney and von der Leyen meet in Montreal for a summit intended to chart a new course for transatlantic relations. Both want to demonstrate they can prosper in a world upended by U.S. President Donald Trump. But they have different ideas about their curious new alliance — and face political resistance that could limit how far the partnership can go. 

Von der Leyen’s offer of “associate membership” in the EU surprised officials on both sides of the Atlantic. Four diplomats told POLITICO they were not consulted before she floated the idea in the State of the Union. The officials added that they don’t understand the label, which has yet to be defined. Germany has since led pushback on the plan.

“We’ve definitely put the cart before the horse,” one of the diplomats said. “We’re announcing something and then figuring out how to flesh it out.”

Trump called the membership idea “laughable,” but also threatened “very serious tariffs” should it come to be — a reminder that leaders in pursuit of Washington workarounds must avoid provoking the White House. 

The leaders are under pressure to leave Montreal with more than a liberal democratic photo-op. For starters, they need to decide what “associate membership” means — and disarm resistance in the EU capitals blindsided by von der Leyen’s plan.

Canada’s Ambassador to the EU Jonathan Wilkinson told POLITICO last month that people got too hung up on a label that was revealed prematurely. Carney called the Canada-EU relationship an “alliance for the future” when he addressed European lawmakers in Strasbourg.

Wilkinson said the Canada-EU project will show other democratic nations how to deepen partnerships. “It ties into very much what [Carney] talked about at Davos — and after Davos.”

Carney, von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa have two days to chart what’s next while American foreign policy continues to stress test geopolitical relationships in midterm campaigns that will shape Trump’s last two years in office.

The economic divide 

Ottawa considers the EU an obvious partner in its push to diversify trade away from the U.S. There’s already a free-trade agreement that both sides view as being underutilized. 

Leaders gathering in Montreal this week will celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Canadian-EU trade agreement, nicknamed CETA. But nine EU member countries have yet to ratify the deal, underscoring the challenge of turning rhetoric into reality. 

“We have shared challenges and many more shared opportunities,” Canadian International Trade Minister Maninder Sidhu told reporters last week in Dublin, where he was invited to participate in an informal meeting of EU trade ministers, a preview of what a more integrated Canada could look like. “Canada wants to be Europe’s most reliable partner.”

Sidhu said CETA utilization rates in EU member countries range from 60% to 80%, making a point about room for improvement and perennial challenges. “We know there’s room to grow.”

Von der Leyen’s associate membership plan “has been coldly received by member states,” a senior EU official said. “It [the summit] is more about what we do, how we can use the real potential of the CETA agreement.” CETA has been provisionally in force since 2017.

Trade talks between Canada and the bloc read like a lengthy transatlantic grievance list.

At a meeting between Brussels and Ottawa last October, the EU complained about Canadian taxes it says disproportionately hit European carmakers, opaque cheese-import quotas, cumbersome rules on cosmetics and what it considers discriminatory provincial taxes and markups on European wines and spirits.

Canada, meanwhile, warned that the EU’s deforestation rules could burden its exporters, questioned the impact of Brussels’ carbon border tax and pressed for greater recognition of Canadian standards in areas including AI.

The senior EU official described the relationship as constrained by “irritants and unfulfilled promises” that must be resolved if the two sides are to make progress.

There are hurdles ahead. Even as Canada and the EU imagine a deeper economic and security partnership, both are pursuing industrial policies that could shut the other’s companies out of lucrative public contracts — death by compounded trade barriers.

Brussels has concerns about Ottawa’s “Buy Canadian” initiatives and their compatibility with the EU-Canada free trade agreement. “Some member states didn’t like the ‘Buy Canada’ thing from Carney,” the official added.

Canada is likewise uncertain whether its companies will qualify for the EU’s proposed “Made in Europe” preferences foreseen in a major industry bill that would seek to channel public procurement spending to European companies. The EU is divided over whether to extend those preferences to trusted trading partners, a topic that is expected to come up in Montreal.

Canadian business leaders recognize the domestic appeal of “Buy Canadian” in the face of Trump’s threats, but warn there will need to be concessions.

“It’s something that will have to be resolved in order to move the relationship deeper, particularly with respect to industrial cooperation or collaboration,” Mark Camilleri, president of the Canada EU Trade and Investment Association, told POLITICO.

Camilleri likened the 10-year-old CETA deal to a garden overgrown with weeds. “It pains me to see market access being eroded through Canadian and European preferences,” he said.

Pressure is on

European and Canadian leaders are under pressure to deliver wins this week that demonstrate that “non-hegemons” — a descriptor Carney used in his Davos speech — can survive and thrive in an age of great-power rivalry.

Canadians currently support closer ties with Europe. But the EU faces political headwinds of its own, from fraught budget negotiations within the bloc to right-wing populist movements that are picking up momentum in some of its biggest economies.

One likely deliverable is a new digital trade agreement. Talks launched in March and were still underway last week. But the agreement lacks substantive text on artificial intelligence, leaving the two sides to find other places to cooperate, potentially through the EU’s proposed Cloud and AI Development Act. That proposal seeks to reduce reliance on U.S. tech giants, raising the risk of a new row with Washington. 

The European Commission is also pushing for Canada to join Erasmus+, the bloc’s student exchange program, according to one EU official. Carney has already publicly expressed interest. 

But Brussels has bigger ambitions for the partnership. The EU is pressing Canada to increase its funding for Ukraine, a test of Canada’s willingness to take on more of the security burden. 

For von der Leyen, securing that commitment would be a win. So would leaving the summit with a pledge from Carney to explore her offer of an “associate membership” — or whatever they end up calling it.

Zi-Ann Lum reported from Toronto, Sebastian Starcevic from Brussels and Camille Gijs from Dublin.

DUBLIN — EU and Chinese officials are already discussing the next sectors for trade talks as Brussels prepares to review implementation of their latest understanding in January, EU trade chief Maroš Šefčovič told POLITICO on Friday.

“In January we can assess how it worked and if it delivered all parts of our agreement,” Šefčovič said, referring to an Oct. 9 pact by which China will voluntarily reduce exports of hybrid vehicles to the EU by almost half to 350,000 units in 2027.

That deal also lowers tariffs on European goods such as auto parts and footwear, and smooths exports of rare earth elements to the EU. 

After a scheduled January videoconference with his counterpart Wang Wentao, Šefčovič said he hopes the two can deliver results in March 2027 at their next round of in-person talks in Brussels. 

“I would like to see that we both have an understanding of what sectors we are going to focus on next,” he said.

The intense engagement with China comes as the bloc seeks to rebalance mutual economic ties, which EU officials say have been distorted by Chinese subsidies, market barriers and a surge in imports. Šefčovič stressed the urgency of the task, given that the EU’s trade deficit with China “reached almost €197 billion in the first half of this year. At this rate, we could break the 2022 record” of €397.3 billion.

“A part of our team is working on implementing all what we agreed, and [another] part of the team is talking to our Chinese counterparts on what should be the next sectors, next areas on what we want to focus the work on. Hopefully with another [Trade and Investment Consultation] in Brussels we can actually deliver the results,” he added. 

“The primary objective for us … is to rebalance the trade.”

At a press conference on Friday, the trade chief said the European Commission was looking to shield more sectors from Chinese overcapacity, with plastics the leading candidate for safeguard measures — a mix of quotas and tariffs.

“We are currently analyzing what would be the best candidates and sectors to be addressed” through safeguard measures, he said. “Currently, what I think is the closest, is the plastic sector.”

Brussels is also juggling requests from the EU’s 27 member countries, which all seek to protect the industries that are key to their economies.

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen told EU leaders last week that Brussels wants to shield the chemical and machinery sectors next, POLITICO reported.

Šefčovič added that the European Commission was looking at proposing new trade tools to nudge EU companies to diversify their suppliers, expected in early December.

“We would respect what we have heard from every single business: Keep it simple, no additional reporting,” he said. 

The EU executive is also looking to incorporate a proposal by France and Germany for a new tool that would allow Brussels within days to restrict — or even close — access to Europe for countries that severely distort the bloc’s single market. 

“It’s better to present a new instrument,” Šefčovič told POLITICO. “We could initiate it very quickly and … act very quickly.”

THE HAGUE — The European Commission should act “as soon as possible” to give clear guidance on U.S. sanctions against the International Criminal Court, its top administrative official told POLITICO in an interview.

Osvaldo Zavala Giler, who oversees the day-to-day functioning of the Hague-based court as the institution’s registrar, said his job became “preparing for sanctions” as the White House imposed an escalating regime of restrictions against it.

The Trump administration targeted prosecutors and judges from the court first in February 2025 before announcing blanket sanctions on Oct. 9 this year. The EU has repeatedly backed the Court against Washington, but it has resisted calls to activate a mechanism that would forbid firms from complying with U.S. laws.

That has agonized senior figures in The Hague. Zavala Giler said the Commission’s “lack of clarity” left private companies and NGOs in the dark over whether they should comply with sanctions decided by Washington — and what risks they face if they don’t.

Zavala Giler’s call to the Commission adds to pressure from EU lawmakers for a swift response after the Oct. 9 announcement. Kallas told the European Parliament on Tuesday that Brussels would use the next few months “to open dialogue” on the issue. The new sanctions are set to take effect in April next year.

“What I would hope is that the space for dialogue is not interpreted as a space for waiting to protect the court,” Zavala Giler said, who spoke from his glass office on the eve of a visit to the Court’s headquarters by the EU’s top diplomat, Kaja Kallas.

Damocles sword

Anticipating sweeping sanctions, the Court spent six months abandoning U.S. tech providers and moving to an open-source software environment, and 20 months to make its financial transactions dollar-proof. That move has been a huge undertaking for Zavala Giler’s team, he said.

The Court initially deepened its reliance on U.S. technology after it was hit by a massive cyber attack in 2023, but what seemed a solution at that time became a problem in the face of sanctions. Even though the current regime includes a carveout for telecommunications, there is no guarantee it will remain the case.

“It becomes a sort of Damocles sword on top of our head that could be revoked at any time,” Zavala Giler said. “I cannot count on U.S. tech companies anymore.”

U.S. platforms operate as entire ecosystems, offering all-encompassing solutions under a single contract. To do without them, “you need to start creating your own architecture and systems that need to speak to each other,” the registrar said.

Financial autonomy was equally hard to achieve. The Court mapped all its suppliers’ transactions to ensure there was no U.S. nexus, meaning that no U.S. person, bank or currency is involved in a payment. “We made all of our staff members have European bank accounts. It was a very detailed process that we had to do, person by person, company by company, making sure that the contracts were in euros,” the registrar said.

The Court also went from working with tens of banks to only “a few,” since only a handful of institutions are comfortable with dollar-proof payments.

Chilling effect

That situation is likely to worsen without clear guidance from EU countries and the Commission. As Zavala Giler put it, “if the International Criminal Court cannot transact in Europe, in euros within the SEPA zone with no U.S. nexus, then there is a bigger question about European financial sovereignty.”

The Court has long called the EU to use a legislative shield — known as blocking statute — that would forbid EU firms from complying with U.S. sanctions. The request was backed by dozens of lawmakers at the European Parliament, which incidentally awarded the court its human rights Sakharov Prize on Thursday.

The blocking statute “becomes an instrument to reassert the minimum space that should not be affected by unilateral extraterritorial sanctions … that minimum space should be, at the very least, the eurozone,” Zavala Giler said. Even without it, the court needs “the reassurances that, at least within the eurozone, [it] can continue to operate,” he added.

So far, however, the Commission has taken a cautious approach, choosing dialogue with the U.S. as a way of “buying time,” as a EU diplomat put it to POLITICO.

In a balancing act, EU heads of state and government backed Brussels’ diplomatic effort at their summit last week, while also committing to do whatever is needed to support the Court.

“I hope that now that the European Council has opened this door, the Commission will feel more comfortable in taking an extra step. And at the very least, providing some kind of clear guidance,” Zavala Giler said.

As an intermediate step, the registrar suggested the use of “comfort letters” reassuring firms that they should not comply with the U.S. measures.

Zavala Giler stressed that sanctions were not only a matter to address for banks and tech operators, as the current uncertainty has already affected NGOs working with the Court. NGOs play a critical role in supporting the work of the Court, for instance “to provide reparations for victims in Uganda” or “to assist the work of the court in providing assistance to victims in Ukraine.”

“This has created an enormous chilling effect,” he said. “They don’t know if they have the legal protections or not, to continue supporting the work of the court.”

The registrar’s office overlooks the moat circling the court’s six towers across the compound’s 46,000 square meters. In one of these buildings, the trial of former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte over alleged crimes against humanity is due to begin next month. Reporters who will cover the proceeds won’t be allowed to use their phones — only paper and pen.

It is Zavala Giler’s job to oversee this huge institution, which relies on secure communications, cross-border funding for investigations and the contribution of many NGOs.

“This court has for victims the promise of the never again,” Zavala Giler said.

BRUSSELS — Germany, France and at least six other EU countries are pushing against “associate membership” as the name for closer EU ties with Canada, six diplomats involved in the negotiations said.

The label is one of the main sticking points in talks over a joint declaration setting areas of deeper cooperation between Brussels and Ottawa ahead of the EU-Canada summit in Montreal on Oct. 29-30, the six diplomats and two EU officials told POLITICO. They were granted anonymity to discuss the sensitive negotiations.

The diplomats said the objections center on the wording of “associate membership,” not the broader goal of closer ties.

Five weeks after European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen first proposed Canada becoming an “associate member” of the EU in her State of the Union speech — to the surprise of both Ottawa and EU capitals — and one week out from the summit itself, the disagreements show the term remains a political and messaging hurdle.

The EU “is really keen to have close cooperation with Canada,” said Bernd Lange, chair of the European Parliament’s trade committee. But, he added, he too would avoid using the term “associate membership,” as it leaves too much room for confusion with other forms of EU partnerships, such as association agreements.

Germany is pushing hardest to remove the label from the draft declaration, five of the EU diplomats said, while France, Italy and Belgium were among those expressing skepticism about the phrasing.

The central concern among the capitals that object to the term is that the EU is labeling the relationship before agreeing what it would mean. They argue the name should have been defined before negotiations with Canada began, four diplomats said, with two others adding that the objecting capitals are annoyed that von der Leyen proposed the label without first consulting national governments.

“We’ve definitely put the cart before the horse,” one diplomat said. “We’re announcing something and then figuring out how to flesh it out.”

A representative for the German Permanent Representation to the EU declined to comment.

The European Commission will engage with skeptical capitals and work on acceptable language, an EU official said, adding that they believe the countries’ doubts stem from not yet understanding what the proposal means in concrete terms.

There is no disagreement over the aim of strengthening an already close relationship, including economic and defense cooperation, international engagement and institutional links, the official stressed. “What matters is what we do, not what we call it.”

What’s in a name?

The label aims to describe the EU-Canada relationship as closer than Brussels’ partnerships with other countries, without making Canada a member of the bloc, one of the diplomats said. Canada cannot become a formal member, as the EU’s founding documents limit that status geographically to Europe.

The distinction matters because existing arrangements with European neighbors, including the U.K., Switzerland and countries in the European Economic Area, center largely on access to the EU’s internal market. Canada, on another continent, is not seeking the same model or the four freedoms of movement, the diplomat said.

The idea is to identify practical areas for cooperation first, then decide whether new treaties or formal negotiations are needed, the same diplomat said.

Work on six priority areas is expected to begin after the summit, with progress reviewed after six months and then a proper stock-take one year later at the next EU-Canada summit, which will be held in Europe.

The stock-take would consider whether Canada has moved closer to the EU by becoming a full member of Horizon Europe and Erasmus, is building undersea cables and stockpiling critical raw materials with the EU, and is exploring pension-fund investment. If Canada meets those criteria, it could become the EU’s first associate member, the diplomat said.

The diplomat described the idea as an experiment, adding that “Canada might be the only one” to ever get associate membership of the EU.

The plan reflects changing calculations on both sides. Canada has long depended heavily on trade with the United States, but tariffs and political pressure from Washington have sharpened concerns about that reliance. Prime Minister Mark Carney wants to diversify trade and modernize the country’s infrastructure, including energy links that largely run north to south.

For the EU, a closer partnership with Canada is part of a broader effort to build relationships as pressure from the United States, China and Russia grows. The summit is intended to give the partnership a more distinctive political framework.

The declaration is still being revised, with EU ambassadors due to discuss it again on Monday. One of the EU officials cautioned that several parts of the declaration still had comments outstanding.

Another controversial element concerns energy cooperation, with Austria pushing back against any mention of deepening nuclear ties, while France, Romania, Slovakia and some other countries support its inclusion.

A spokesperson from the Canadian mission to the EU did not respond to POLITICO’s request for comment.

LONDON — Nigel Farage has been careful to downplay his closeness to Donald Trump to a MAGA-loathing British public. But to U.S. conservatives, it’s a different story. 

“There are very few human beings I know with whom I agree on so much as I do with Donald Trump,” the Reform UK leader told an American podcast. “And I admire his guts and I admire his courage.”

During an interview with Trump-aligned commentator Benny Johnson on Sept 30., the veteran Brexiteer struck a markedly warmer tone toward the U.S. president than in any of his recent remarks for a British audience.

“Donald’s been a friend for many, many years. I’m a regular at Mar-a-Lago,” Farage boasted on the Benny Show. “I get on with many of his family. We have a laugh together — I mean, he’s a proper bloke.”

In Britain, Farage has publicly dampened his closeness to Trump as he tries to position himself as a contender for U.K. prime minister, particularly since the war with Iran.

“I haven’t really been in touch with Trump for many months,” Farage said in an interview with Times Radio in April, as the U.S. and Israel got bogged down in a price-spiking conflict with Tehran.

A spokesperson for Farage told POLITICO: “Nigel has never hidden his relationship with the President. However, he has been a critical friend over Canada, Greenland, Ukraine and various other issues.”

Farage, whose right-wing Reform insurgency has been a disruptive force to traditional British politics, had to correct his initial support for the war, which has been perceived negatively in U.K. from the off.

Initially Farage said that Britain should “do all we can” to support the U.S.-Israeli action in the Middle East. He’d later go on to say “let’s not get ourselves involved in another foreign war.”

Farage described Trump’s tariff threats as “wrong” and said that he’d be “having some words” with the U.S. administration; he has also been careful to question Trump’s “51st state” comments on Canada; and, at times, he has distanced himself from Trump’s views on Ukraine.

The U.S. president is deeply unpopular in the U.K., like he is across much of Europe. And Farage’s relationship with him is off-putting to many British voters.

But Farage clearly sees his links with the U.S. right as deeply important, too. As he told Johnson, there have been numerous trips to D.C. and Mar-a-Lago — even if allies have also noted their relationship has cooled since 2024 and not all his Palm Beach visits have yielded meetings with Trump.

Farage noted on the show that there are things they don’t see eye-to-eye on, but was keen to stress they are “friends and allies” who “agree on quite a lot.”

he world is starting to understand that there is no way to fully and lastingly protect itself from President Donald Trump.

The man just can’t let things go — and he’ll get creative to get what he wants.

The latest blowup over Ukraine is emblematic of Trump’s wily persistence, and it suggests a challenging two years lie ahead for the international set even if Democrats gain some power in the midterm elections.

Not that long ago, Trump seemed to have patched up ties with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy as Kyiv made gains against Russia. Trump signed legislation last month that was championed by his late friend, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), to impose heavy new sanctions and tariffs to punish Russia for its war on Ukraine.

This month, the original Trump — the one who fawns over Russian leader Vladimir Putin and despises Zelenskyy — roared back. He waived many of the legislation’s penalties on Russia, moved to buy Russian diesel and signaled he’s more interested in doing business with Moscow than seeking justice for Kyiv. Ukrainians suspect the U.S. has pressured them by throttling its satellite connections and intelligence-sharing. (The Trump administration disputes much of this.)

“Russia, frankly, has been fine on Ukraine,” Trump said Monday as he welcomed the idea of an arms control summit with Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping that might include talks about Ukraine.

The lesson, foreign officials and others steeped in diplomacy tell me, is that you cannot truly change Trump’s mind or stop his overall trajectory. Even if Trump seems briefly chastened or stages a tactical retreat, he will eventually return in new, often-surprising modes to push his original views and goals. He will try to exhaust you into submission.

Imagine how startling it is to be Ukrainian these days as Trump pressures you to make concessions to Russia by blaming you for a global energy crisis he caused by launching a war on Iran. Or what it’s like for officials across European capitals trying to craft a response, knowing there’s never an end to the process.

“There is no immunity to Donald Trump. He makes a deal in order to make a better deal the next day,” one senior European official mused, having been granted anonymity because the topic involves sensitive diplomacy.

It’s hard to blame world leaders who think they’ve learned to manage Trump only to be bewildered by a sudden left hook on his part. Foreign policy is often driven by hope when you lack good options. And Trumpology is a confounding, but still a relatively new, subfield.

Besides, Trump’s messaging is inconsistent, incoherent and nonstrategic — characteristics that can obscure his single-minded pursuit of his goals. So the global actors dealing with him — whether it’s the Gulf Arab states who shower him with gifts or the Canadians furious over his trade and territorial threats — sometimes think they’ve come to terms with him only to find they’re fighting on a newly configured plane.

A Supreme Court ruling that gutted many of Trump’s tariffs earlier this year was good news in many capitals. But since then, the so-called Tariff Man has moved to impose the import taxes under pretexts not considered by the court, including turning to accusations involving forced labor.

The White House doesn’t dispute Trump’s aggressive tactics.

“There is no greater fighter for America First interests than President Trump — and he is willing to look anyone in the eye to deliver wins on behalf of the United States,” spokesperson Anna Kelly told me in a statement.

The Greenland saga shows the limits of trying to mollify Trump.

In his first term, Trump wanted to buy the frozen island. The idea was shelved amid global laughter, but authorities in Greenland and Denmark made it clear to Trump that they welcomed more U.S. investment in the Danish territory.

In his second term, Trump huffed and puffed about an all-out U.S. takeover of Greenland, only to agree in September to an expanded U.S. military footprint that he could have gotten anyway under existing, decades-old diplomatic accords without all the drama. The whole affair has led to lingering anger in Europe about what Canada’s leader called a “rupture” in the global order — but many European officials hoped that the saga had faded away.

Yet, it’s far from certain that Trump has given up on possessing Greenland. Just days ago, he touted on social media plans to start oil, gas and mineral exploration in “our new and beautiful Greenland.”

The use of “our” is more than a little suggestive.

Defying Trump, too, can get you only so far.

Brazilians effectively told Trump to take a hike when he used tariffs and sanctions to punish the country for charging its former president, Jair Bolsonaro, in a coup attempt.

A few months later, as Bolsonaro was about to start his prison sentence, Trump seemed to admit defeat in his effort to help his political ally. “That’s too bad,” he said in November 2025, with little emotion. (“Brazil Defied Trump and Won,” The New York Times declared.)

But Trump wasn’t done with Brazil. He and his team have pursued efforts to undercut the current Brazilian government while quietly backing Bolsonaro’s son, Flávio, in his efforts to win the presidency this year. The runoff election is on Sunday, and it’s tight.

World leaders are doing what they can to make their countries Trump-resistant, if not all-out Trump-proof.

That has meant everything from diversifying their sources of trade and security alliances to joining Trump on ventures that, on the surface at least, can be helpful to them. (Then there are the many countries, especially in Africa, that diplomats privately tell me are happy to be off Trump’s radar.)

My takeaway from watching all of this, though, is that it’s not enough to stay one step ahead of Trump. You have to stay several steps ahead, and you have to be wildly imaginative about the lengths to which Trump and his devoted aides are willing to go to complicate your life.

The second Trump administration is filled with people who have turned to unique, bizarre and clever interpretations of law and reality to push his agenda. It’s not always clear who is behind which move, but it’s hard to imagine Trump isn’t fine with most of what’s happening.

It’s why a teenager is being held in immigration detention for the actions of his grandmother decades ago. It’s why Congress can scream and shout about its spending orders yet Trump ignores it.

Sen. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) said other nations should not hope that the Republican Party will shed Trump’s worldview, including his disdain for allies, once Trump’s out of power.

“I would love for our allies to know that we have consistent common adversaries that we’re going to work together to fight. I just don’t know that you can make that guarantee,” Murphy, a frequent Trump critic, told me. “That’s painful to say, but given the state of the Republican Party right now, it’s true.”

I understand why Ukraine and the European Union are trying to diversify their sources of intelligence and military industrial bases as Trump keeps chasing love from Russia.

Despite Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s claims, the reality is that the United States can no longer be trusted for such security assistance.

But it’s not enough to find new intelligence partners or weapons manufacturers. You have to ask bigger questions, like, “What are the untapped streams of intelligence that no one knows are out there? What’s a potential weapon no one has considered? How can I acquire what I need before Trump stops me?”

Governments need to have plans — now — for scenarios that seem completely crazy. Better to be wrong than unprepared.

Still, even if you do all of that … “I don’t think it’s possible to stay two or three steps ahead of Trump,” said Charles Kupchan, a former senior national security official during the Obama administration who apparently enjoys raining on parades.

“He acts on impulse,” argued Kupchan, who has a new book out on the crumbling world order. “We need to try to limit the damage he’s causing and ride him out.”

A Democratic win in November’s midterms — one or both chambers of Congress — is unlikely to do much to rein in Trump’s actions abroad during his final years, current and former U.S. and foreign officials tell me.

He still has the veto and has been willing to ignore congressional demands. There’s also the fact that presidents have significantly more power to act in unilateral ways overseas than they do domestically.

Ukraine, the European Union, the world — all will be dealing with a politically wounded Trump who’s likely to double down on what he feels he must have.

“He’s going to be angrier,” Murphy predicted.

Alice Weidel, co-leader of the far-right Alternative for Germany party, told European lawmakers on Wednesday that Russia and Ukraine need to negotiate a peace deal, while insisting that German businesses require access to cheap Russian energy to remain competitive.

“It isn’t about capitulating to Russia, far from it, absolutely not, but we want people to sit down around the table. It’s high time they did, and went into it with a sensible diplomatic approach, making sure we pay due regard to the interests of both Ukraine and Russia,” she told a press conference.

Four and a half years since Russia launched its war on Ukraine, President Donald Trump is pressing Kyiv to negotiate with Moscow, while Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed on Wednesday to resume trilateral talks with Ukraine.

Weidel made the comments during a visit to the European Parliament in Strasbourg, where she unveiled her opposition AfD party’s EU program at an event organized by the far-right Europe of Sovereign Nations group.

The party aims to shrink the Commission, turn the European Parliament into an assembly of delegates appointed by national parliaments, and seek an opt-out for Germany from EU policies it can’t reform to its liking — potentially including an exit from the Schengen border-free travel area, she told reporters.

During an event following the press conference, Polish MEP Tobiasz Bocheński, from the right-wing European Conservatives and Reformists group, asked what she thought of Poland’s fears regarding Russia. Weidel said her party “puts German interests first,” insisting that “now we are in a critical phase that our industry is dying without Russian gas and oil.”

Germany needs “a sustainable, reliable and cheap energy resource that has been guaranteed by Russia for the last four decades,” she added, claiming that sanctions on Russia have “destroyed” Germany’s “business model.”

German industry is shedding jobs amid high energy costs, Chinese competition and U.S. tariffs, while Chancellor Friedrich Merz continues to push for reforms to revive a stagnant economy.

Weidel said that Russia, the U.S. and China are the only ones steering talks on Ukraine while European leaders aren’t even invited to sit at the table. The EU should have pushed for peace since the start, she added, as “four years down the road, it’s in a much worse position going into negotiations with Russia.”

EU countries are discussing who should represent them at the negotiating table. European leaders have repeatedly said that any decision on a peace deal must involve Ukraine and must include security guarantees.

Asked whether she was in contact with France’s far-right National Rally to repair ties, Weidel said the AfD was “pragmatic.” The French party broke with the AfD in 2024 and later helped shut it out of the far-right Patriots group amid concerns about its extremism and stance on Russia.

“We need to work together on a European unique level, and therefore we need to be in talks and discussions,” Weidel said, adding: “And we are.”

LONDON — Beijing has threatened to retaliate if the U.K. raises tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, aligning with the European Union.

Responding to POLITICO’s story that Britain was looking to act in “lockstep” with the bloc to counter China’s market dominance in electric cars, a spokesperson from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce said: “If the U.K. insists on imposing restrictions on Chinese electric vehicles, China will resolutely retaliate and safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese industries.”

The U.K. is currently working with its European partners to avoid a 10% electric vehicle tariff from the beginning of next year, when stricter rules of origin under the Brexit trade deal kick in. 

The British government is also lobbying to be included in the EU’s Made in Europe policies, which give Brussels-made products preferential treatment in certain procurement projects. 

U.K. Trade Minister Anas Sarwar told POLITICO on the sidelines of the German-British Business Summit at Mansion House last week that “the more that the U.K. and the EU work together and act in lockstep, the better it is for both the U.K. and the European Union.” 

“The automotive sector and partnership remain strong, but do we have to grapple with the challenge that comes from rapid expansion in China? Of course we do,” he added. 

China urged Britain to follow World Trade Organization rules and warned it against copying Brussels’ approach, arguing that tariffs on Chinese EVs would be discriminatory. 

“China urges the U.K. to abide by WTO rules, think carefully, and not follow the European Union,” said the Chinese Ministry of Commerce spokesperson. “China will closely monitor the U.K.’s developments.”

There are certain sensations you don’t realize belong to an era until they’re gone: the modem’s electronic shriek as it connected to the internet, the satisfying clack of a landline receiver, the little metallic weight of an arcade token in your palm. Lately, I’ve been wondering if the basket of free chips and salsa — dropped almost ceremonially onto the table before anyone has ordered a thing — might eventually join them.

At El Nopal, a regional Mexican chain my family has frequented for years, the opening minutes of dinner follow a familiar choreography. We slide into a pleather booth beneath burnt-orange walls and televisions playing Spanish-language fútbol. Half the table orders Diet Coke, the other water with lemon; someone requests a skillet of molten white queso. Then come the chips: hot, sturdy, generously salted, piled into black woven baskets alongside ramekins of fire-engine-red mild salsa and a darker, spicier version flecked with onion and jalapeño.

For our family of six, there are always two baskets, dividing the table into loose territories. Those seated in the middle are expected to choose a side; reaching from both feels vaguely lawless. Everyone has a salsa ritual. Mine is two-thirds spicy, one-third mild. My sister mixes the mild with queso until it turns a muted pink. One of my brothers splashes vinegary house hot sauce into the spicy. Soon the menus are stacked, the pebbled Coke cups are sweating rings onto the table and somebody is pointing with a chip while saying, “No, no, tell her the part about —”

The Trump administration has made that little ritual more expensive to maintain.

In July 2025, the administration withdrew from a long-standing agreement governing fresh tomatoes imported from Mexico and imposed a 17.09% antidumping duty on most of them. The Commerce Department said the move was intended to counter Mexican tomatoes being sold in the United States at unfair prices and protect domestic growers.

Then the weather got bad.

Poor conditions in Mexico and Florida further reduced supplies, and tomato prices climbed to their highest level in roughly two decades. Dante Galeazzi, president of the Texas International Produce Association, told Houston Public Media that at one point the fresh tomato market had jumped to about $80 a box. Grocery stores began backing away from tomatoes earlier in the year; restaurants, he said, held on longer.

There is only so much a restaurant can absorb.

“The challenge is for our Texas restaurants, they operate on very narrow profit margins in what I would call good economic times,” Kelsey Erickson Streufert, chief public affairs officer for the Texas Restaurant Association, told the publication.

These are not, she continued, particularly good economic times for running a restaurant. Food is more expensive, but so are labor, utilities, insurance and credit card swipe fees — virtually everything required to keep the doors open. Eventually, the arithmetic gets down to the ramekin.

“You have restaurants that are simply saying, ‘Look, I can’t afford to put salsa on the tables anymore,’” Galeazzi said. “What are consumers going to do? Where are consumers going to find this relief?”

The tragedy of a $4 basket of chips is obviously not the $4. It is the moment someone at the table inevitably says, “Eh, do we need these today?” Sometimes the answer will be yes. Some days undoubtedly call for acid, salt and crunch. On other days, maybe you skip them. You wait patiently for the entrées. The stories still get told. Someone finds a plastic straw to point with instead.

It’s fine.

But the texture of the wait is different.

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That small decision — chips or no chips — moves the diner almost imperceptibly from guest to customer. The thing that once arrived as part of the welcome now joins the same mental ledger as everything else: Drinks? An appetizer? Queso? Dessert? Do we need it? Is it worth it? Should we just save the money?

People sometimes joke online about whether you grew up in an “appetizers and drinks” family or an “entrées and water” family. It is a joke, mostly, about the invisible financial rules children learn at restaurants: what counts as normal, what counts as a treat and what you know better than to ask for.

Part of the appeal of the neighborhood Americanized Mexican restaurant has long been that it offers a particularly accessible kind of abundance. You can order an inexpensive combination plate and a soda, or water with a squeeze of lime, eat something hot and filling and deeply flavorful, and be out the door in 45 minutes without anybody making you feel strange about any of it.

And while you wait, you get the same chips as the table ordering margaritas.

Free chips briefly flatten the distinction between the appetizers-and-drinks family and the entrées-and-water family. Everybody gets to start with something.

Of course, restaurants cannot run on symbolism.

The “free” things on the table have never actually been free to them. Somebody bought the tomatoes. Somebody fried the chips. Somebody washed the ramekins and refilled the baskets. Hospitality has always had scaffolding beneath it; ideally, the guest simply doesn’t spend much time looking at it.

Lately, that scaffolding has become harder for restaurants to hide.

One of my favorite Chicago breakfast spots recently changed the way it serves Texas toast. Two slices had been the default for years. Now the waiter asks: Do you actually want two, or would one be enough? They were happy to bring two, he explained. But a lot of second slices were coming back uneaten, and they simply couldn’t afford to keep throwing them away. It is difficult to begrudge a restaurant that calculation. In fact, the question struck me as a rather thoughtful solution: Have as much toast as you want. Just tell us you want it first.

But it also made visible, for a moment, the financial scaffolding behind the plate.

That is what interests me about the chips and salsa, too. Not that restaurant owners are becoming less generous, but that the economic forces pressing on them increasingly require them to show their work.

Trade policy tends to arrive in public dressed in abstraction: percentages, agreements, investigations, duties, markets. Then someone opens an invoice. A tomato costs more. A batch of salsa costs more. The complimentary appetizer that was once cheap enough to disappear into the cost of doing business becomes expensive enough to notice. Eventually, somebody has to decide whether hospitality can continue to absorb it.

And then, one night, a server has to ask if you would like to add chips.

This is a mundane outcome of economic policy — almost comically so. No one’s dinner is destroyed. No one sits staring mournfully at the bare lacquered table. There is simply a small patch of negative space where something automatic used to happen.

But small gestures are often where hospitality lives.

The loss of free chips and salsa isn’t really about chips and salsa. It is about what happens when policy decisions force restaurants to make the scaffolding of their hospitality more visible — when a gesture designed to make guests forget about the transaction becomes part of the transaction itself. At El Nopal, when the baskets arrive, nobody asks who is paying for this round. Nobody pauses to determine whether everyone wants enough chips to justify them. Nobody calculates how hungry they are with their entrée still twenty minutes away.

Someone tells a story. Someone interrupts to improve the punchline. Someone else points across the table with a tortilla chip. And everyone reaches into the basket without asking.

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Certain obvious questions arise from Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Washington this past week, a spectacle that one observer has described as “diplotainment” rather than actual diplomacy. Exactly how much did Donald Trump abase himself in service to a temporary and transactional friendship with the dictatorial leader of a nation that is, at least by conventional standards, America’s principal strategic enemy? 

No one knows; I am tempted to surmise that Trump doesn’t know himself. The man who in sunnier times for his regime enjoyed calling himself “your favorite president” does not seem to be his own favorite president these days. Trump almost visibly glowed with delight when Xi praised the quality of service and attention to detail of his White House visit. “Everything is done to the highest order of perfection, and there is thought in every little detail,” the Chinese president said through a translator. “And it’s greatly appreciated.”

You could describe that as the meaningless courtesies of routine statecraft, but it also suggested a high-flying hotel guest offering his compliments to the concierge: The eggs this morning were entirely delicious. And the way your people turn down the sheets at night: exquisite!

If we could somehow remove ourselves from the anguish and destruction caused by Trump’s improvised policies (which resemble comic-book versions of Big Brother’s “Two Minutes Hate” from the film version of “1984”) and his aggressively stupid public persona, we might be able to perceive some pathos in his predicament. He cannot escape from a situation he believed he had created and felt he could control: He is the massively unpopular elected leader of a rapidly collapsing superpower, whose downward slide he promised to reverse but has only accelerated, perhaps to the point of terminal velocity.

Trump visibly and hungrily longs for things he cannot have: the alleged greatness of the mythological American past, rendered as white supremacist schlock inherited third hand from the more vigorous fascist movements of the last century; the enforced adulation and obligatory public spectacle of a totalitarian regime such as Xi’s China or Kim Jong-un’s North Korea; most of all, perhaps, his own youth as a brash Manhattan philanderer and unstoppable political renegade, when he didn’t fall asleep in public or stumble around awkwardly with an unexplained contraption under his clothing.

To consider such matters is not a distraction; it begins to point us toward the larger and more painful questions behind the Xi-Trump pseudo-summit. It surprised literally no one that the two leaders negotiated no new agreements on regulating A.I. (or “Super Intelligence,” in Trump’s self-parodying rebrand), the status of Taiwan, the sporadic trade war between the two nations or ending the war with Iran and restarting the global flow of Middle East oil. No mention was made of Trump’s vaporware claims last May that the Chinese had agreed to buy hundreds of Boeing aircraft and $10 billion worth of U.S. beef and soybeans, but Xi promised to send two pandas from China’s breeding facility to the Atlanta zoo. So much winning. It’s impossible to calculate.

In large part, the absolute nothingness of this summit reflects the fact that China is already winning across the board and Xi needed nothing from Trump beyond the legitimation provided by a diplotainment spectacle “to the highest order of perfection.” As China scholars Nicholas Bequelin and Yaqiu Wang write in a Foreign Policy analysis published before the summit, over the first 19 months of Trump’s second term, the geopolitical “balance of power has shifted in Beijing’s favor”:

China has weathered the trade war, narrowed the technology gap, tightened its leverage over critical supply chains, increased pressure on Taiwan, and deepened ties with Russia and much of the global south.

Contrary to more Sinophobic commentators, they argue that China’s ruthlessly pragmatic leadership is not interested in dominating the world, or at least not in the same way postwar America did. But it does have a long-term agenda, they write, which includes breaking the global dependence on U.S.-centric financial institutions, discrediting democracy and furthering a historical process Xi has described as “the rise of the East and the decline of the West.”

I don’t disagree with any of that, but the most important aspect of Bequelin and Wang’s analysis gets a little buried beneath a forest of impeccably organized policy details. Xi has no need to strike an overtly aggressive posture and can afford to cosplay friendship with Trump because “the West,” or at least its greatest military and economic power, is doing a terrific job of declining all on its own. To borrow the nostrum attributed to Napoleon, the Chinese president is smart enough not to interrupt an opponent while he’s making a mistake. 

It may take generations — if there are any future generations — to measure the scale of America’s self-inflicted damage, which goes well beyond material issues into the realm of psychology or perhaps spirit. (If it’s pretentious to use the Hegelian term Geist, it still fits.) It remains astonishing, not to mention upsetting and enraging, that in the face of a global climate crisis that has already caused millions of deaths and is obvious to nearly everyone on the planet, the U.S. has deliberately chosen to double down on fossil fuels while “China is consolidating its worldwide dominance in batteries, solar, and EVs,” as Bequelin and Wang write. 

Chinese solar panels and batteries, often offered at steeply discounted prices, are revolutionizing transit and energy issues in many poorer countries, beginning to break the expensive and damaging addiction to foreign oil. Meanwhile, the U.S. has largely abandoned or dismantled its foreign aid programs aimed at fostering economic development, public health and education, while doing its level best to destroy its own reputation as a multiracial secular republic rooted in the rule of law. Faced with America’s spectacular self-own (which didn’t start with Trump, to be clear), who can blame people in the Global South for beginning to suspect that the tradeoff between “democracy” and “authoritarianism” was never as straightforward as they were led to believe?

Despite the widespread anger and disillusionment of Trump’s second term — an encouraging trend, to be clear — it’s still too easy for Americans to duck the biggest and most glaring question of all: To paraphrase one of the greatest works of postmodern angst, how did we get here? It no longer feels remotely adequate (if it ever did) to suggest that angry, vicious people accidentally elected an angry, vicious president who is pursuing a self-destructive and nihilistic agenda, and that at some future date our national sanity and our “indispensable” role in world affairs will be reasserted. 

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We tried that, remember? It didn’t work. Perhaps, from some great historical remove, Joe Biden’s presidency will appear noble and tragic. But it was also doomed, trapped in a vision of the past every bit as delusional as the MAGA fantasy, and nearly as damaging. The Biden regime’s self-appointed mission of enforcing a “rules-based order” involved pretending that the world had not changed, that America was still widely beloved and admired, that our so-called republic had not bred and nurtured Donald Trump and that he did not embody its bottomless greed, its gleeful ignorance, its wounded and flatulent national pride.

And so we arrive at the final conundrum of the Trump-Xi summit, and our president’s stopped-clock tendency to stumble upon hard truths. In his inimitable ass-backward fashion, Trump has discerned that the “free world” has become a meaningless abstraction and liberal democracy is in a state of systemic failure. He is correct about that, at least to a point. But he can provide no answer beyond prostrating himself before dictators and building monuments to himself in imitation of their grandiosity. If China’s repressive techno-state makes a distinctly unappealing candidate to lead the world into the future, America can only offer competing versions of an imaginary past. Hey, at least we got those pandas. 

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