The United States cannot credibly defend freedom around the world while treating the survival of a democracy under attack as a bargaining chip.

Russia’s war against Ukraine is not simply a territorial dispute. It is a test of whether democratic nations will defend the principles that sustain their freedom — or allow an authoritarian aggressor to destroy these principles through military force, terror and economic coercion.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine was unlawful. Its conduct has included attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, and in March 2023, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova over alleged war crimes involving the unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children. All grave allegations that demand accountability.

As Ukraine continues to fight for its survival, current U.S. policy raises a fundamental question: Does Washington understand what is at stake?

If Moscow succeeds in subjugating Ukraine, other authoritarian leaders will also ask whether military conquest can succeed. Can U.S. commitments be trusted? Will democratic nations stand together when the price becomes politically inconvenient?

Ukraine’s defense is not charity. It is a strategic investment in American and European security, Washington’s credibility and the deterrence of future conflicts.

The U.S. emerged from World War II understanding that an international order based on sovereignty, freedom and rule of law serves its interests. And successive Republican and Democratic administrations recognized that unchecked authoritarian expansion threatens both American security and the independence of its allies.

That understanding must guide U.S. policy toward Russia today.

Diplomacy is essential. Negotiations to end the war should be pursued seriously. But peace cannot mean rewarding aggression, compelling Ukraine to surrender its sovereignty or giving Moscow time to rearm for another invasion.

Appeasement does not necessarily prevent conflict. It can encourage aggression by convincing dictators the free world lacks the will to resist them. And a ceasefire without effective safeguards could become merely a pause before the next assault. A settlement that leaves Ukraine defenseless would postpone the conflict, not resolve it.

Peace should be measured not by the speed with which an agreement is signed, but by whether it protects Ukraine’s independence and makes another war less likely. And economic pressure is among the most important nonmilitary instruments available to the U.S. in this process, as Russia’s ability to wage war depends substantially on energy revenues, access to international markets and networks that facilitate sanctions evasion.

On Sept.18, U.S. President Donald Trump signed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 into law. Then, on Oct. 16, he issued an executive order waiving specified sanctions, restrictions and duties authorized under the legislation, citing the national interest. This order raises a legitimate question about how Washington intends to use the economic leverage Congress provided.

The measurable objectives these waivers are intended to achieve, why they serve American national security and what conditions would trigger their reconsideration need to be explained.

The U.S. needs to enforce restrictions consistently, close avenues for evasion and impose consequences when countries or companies knowingly provide material assistance to Russia’s war effort in violation of applicable law.

This does not require abandoning diplomacy. It requires a coherent policy in which economic relief advances clearly defined security objectives.

If Washington weakens its own pressure without obtaining meaningful concessions, it risks surrendering leverage while leaving Russia’s aggression unresolved. Every source of revenue helping Moscow sustain its military campaign has consequences for Ukrainian civilians, who bear them in destroyed homes, shattered families and lost lives.

U.S. policy should not make it easier for Russia to finance a war Washington says it wants to end.

American history has a bipartisan tradition of leadership that combines the defense of freedom with strategic judgment.

Harry Truman understood U.S. security depended on resisting authoritarian expansion. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, John F. Kennedy demonstrated that strength and diplomacy are not opposites. Ronald Reagan understood freedom must be defended against those who seek to suppress it. And George H. W. Bush knew sovereignty and alliances are essential to an international order where nations cannot redraw borders by force.

Though from different eras, the leadership of these presidents reflected a common principle: American security is strengthened when the U.S. combines military strength, alliances, diplomacy and a commitment to the independence of free nations.

A policy that pressures Ukraine more than Russia, offers Moscow economic relief without substantial concessions or asks Ukrainians to accept an insecure future is not a strategy for lasting peace. It risks rewarding aggression and inviting further conflict.

And above all, Ukraine’s future should not be decided over the heads of Ukrainians.

Democratic institutions can be attacked and dismantled far faster than they can be rebuilt. Ukraine’s struggle is therefore about more than one war. It is about whether the democratic world will remain a community of nations bound by common principles or become a collection of states left to negotiate individually with authoritarian regimes.

History will not judge U.S. policy solely by the immediate cost of weapons, energy or sanctions. It will judge whether America stood by a nation fighting for survival, upheld the principles it asks others to respect and helped prevent future wars by demonstrating that aggression does not pay.

Adrian Zuckerman is a former U.S. ambassador to Romania (2019-2021); Mark Gitenstein is a former U.S. ambassador to Romania (2009-2012) and to the EU (2022-2025); Ron Gidwitz is a former U.S. ambassador to Belgium (2018-2021) and acting U.S. ambassador to the EU (2020-2021); Jim Gilmore is a former U.S. ambassador to the OSCE (2019-2021); Kathleen Kavalec is a former U.S. ambassador to Romania (2023-2025); Jim Rosapepe is a former U.S. ambassador to Romania (1998-2001).

POLITICO occasionally publishes opinion pieces from guest authors to offer our readers a range of perspectives on the intersection of power and politics. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of POLITICO.

Night falls in the European capital. Everything’s quiet, but the nightmares are about to begin.

Viktor Orbán’s ghost haunts the Schuman roundabout; ash from the bonfire of red tape covers the Justus Lipsius building; Ursula von der Leyen’s chief of staff, Björn Seibert, chases after staffers demanding to know what “associate membership” for Canada actually means; and MEPs tremble at the prospect of construction workers uncovering the skeletons of political intrigues past during renovations.

Scared? You should be.

Here’s our guide to who is terrified of whom in the Brussels bubble. 

Everyone is scared of Marine Le Pen

The person haunting EU diplomats, officials and lawmakers is French presidential front-runner Marine Le Pen. Will she really halve Paris’ contribution to the EU budget, as promised? Will she pull Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni away from the Brussels mainstream? And will she demand von der Leyen’s head?

The bubble had warmed (slightly) to the idea of Jordan Bardella in the Élysée Palace, after his years leading the National Rally’s European operation revealed a certain pragmatism toward Brussels — only for those hopes to be shattered when a Paris appeals court cleared Le Pen to be a candidate for the presidency.

The next ECB chief is scared of Jean-Luc Mélenchon

The European Central Bank president is the euro’s last line of defense against unorthodox national economic decisions — but that could be tested by French presidential candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon, who is on course to reach the runoff after vowing to set billions of euros of French debt “on fire.” His incendiary plan calls on the Frankfurt-based ECB to waive interest payments on a vast tranche of French bonds — an unorthodox, perhaps impossible, maneuver that critics warn could even see France kicked out of the euro.

Now that we know Christine Lagarde will step down as ECB president in February, what France’s presidential candidates want to do about its monumental debt pile will haunt the race for her successor, with Dutchman Klaas Knot and Spaniard Pablo Hernández de Cos as the two frontrunners.

Lobbyists are scared of ChatGPT

The number of amendments lawmakers have filed has exploded since generative AI arrived, with key EU laws now facing thousands of proposed text changes. Parliament officials don’t think it’s a coincidence, with some pointing to amendments written in suspiciously bot-like language, and others saying sometimes amendments cite legislation that does not even exist.

The growing pile of amendments is haunting lobbyists, parliamentary assistants and officials forced to track and sort through it all — along with the fear that AI could eventually replace them. Spare a thought, too, for the MEPs who may have to vote through the amendments one by one, with hands raised in plenary. 

Commission officials are scared of Austria’s Europe minister

Well-heeled Commission officials (and their families) are spooked by Austria’s Europe Minister Claudia Bauer, who has been leading a push to slash the Commission’s administration expenditure — which pays eurocrats’ salaries and offices — in the next seven-year budget. The campaign, backed by most EU capitals, resulted in an 8% cut to the admin budget in the latest budget proposal.

Bauer is so feared that EU officials joke they reduce their delegations’ size whenever they travel to Austria.

Jessika Roswall is scared of Stéphane Séjourné and Valdis Dombrovskis

Environment Commissioner Jessika Roswall and her department have reason to fear industry boss Stéphane Séjourné, who is taking the lead on the upcoming Circular Economy Act, despite Roswall’s official title of Commissioner “for a Competitive Circular Economy.” Making matters spookier, Roswall’s environment department now shares the Breydel building with Séjourné’s internal market and industry department, setting the stage for some chilling corridor encounters as Roswall pushes for greater environmental protection while Séjourné prioritizes industrial growth.

Roswall is also under pressure from EU simplification chief Valdis Dombrovskis to cut red tape on several environmental laws. The Latvian commissioner, who oversees the omnibus packages, wants a deal before year-end. Meanwhile, the center-right European People’s Party continues to press the Commission to reopen laws on birds, habitats, and water — the EU’s oldest nature protection laws — so they can be simplified too.

Alexander Stubb is afraid of Kaja Kallas and António Costa

Kaja Kallas has not publicly addressed the call that Finnish President Alexander Stubb made to Russia’s Vladimir Putin, but the EU’s top diplomat has made clear she dislikes such outreach. Still, if Putin offered serious talks and concessions, Kallas would be the obvious person to answer: as coordinating EU foreign and security policy is her job. “Of course I will talk if such an opportunity presents itself,” she told Estonian media in September when asked about speaking with Putin or his Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.

Also reaching for the phone: António Costa. EU diplomats note that the European Council president represents the bloc at the leaders’ level abroad. That institutional turf war may explain why Stubb stressed that he and Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Støre spoke only for their own countries — not for Europe.

Manfred Weber is scared of his own group …

What keeps the leader of the European People’s Party — Europe’s largest political family — up at night? Divisions within his own ranks. So far, Weber has kept a tight ship and wants to reunite his troops ahead of the 2029 EU election, which he is casting as a battle against the far right. But that may prove tricky as the EPP’s national delegations increasingly clash over whether to work with the far right or isolate them.

… and the group is scared of Ouarda Bensouag

Central to Weber’s strategy is Ouarda Bensouag, the group’s secretary-general and his chief of staff. One of his most trusted lieutenants, she has a reputation as a smart but ruthless operator who EPP staffers fear when crossing paths in the Parliament’s labyrinthine hallways.

No one is scared of the Parliament … but they should be

Parliament’s attempts to spook capitals over the next long-term budget have been borderline tragic so far: It keeps threatening to kill the budget, but nobody seems to care or believe it will.

They should care. When it comes time to pass the budget, 361 of 720 votes will be needed, and the margin could be razor-thin in a fragmented chamber that’s hostile to plans to pool farm and regional funds. The louder MEPs protest — and the longer the Council ignores them — the more determined they become to prove the threat is real.

By Max Griera, Gregorio Sorgi, Kathryn Carlson, Nick Vinocur, Jakob Weizman, Fiona McNally and Eliza Gkritsi

KYIV — With another bitter winter of fighting in the Russia-Ukraine war ahead, diplomatic activity is ramping back up in a fresh attempt to close in on a ceasefire and eventually a final peace accord.

Under renewed pressure from U.S. President Donald Trump, Kyiv and Moscow are preparing to send negotiating teams to Abu Dhabi for a three-way meeting with American officials to explore the potential for agreement. The meeting is penciled in for Nov. 10. 

But many questions about the process remain, including whether Europe will have a seat at the table when key decisions are taken — and who should fill it. Based on remarks from key leaders, and conversations with European officials granted anonymity because the talks are sensitive, POLITICO breaks down what’s under discussion for an agreement and what could get in the way.

What will they discuss? 

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy says the agenda for Abu Dhabi should first include initial steps toward de-escalation, such as prisoner swaps and ceasefires on energy infrastructure and for the Black Sea. There should also be a discussion among the technical negotiating teams of what format a future three-way meeting between leaders — Trump, Zelenskyy and Russia’s Vladimir Putin — should take, he told reporters this week.

When it comes to a final deal, one overriding question for Ukraine is what form of security guarantees it will get from Europe and the U.S., or potentially NATO. Zelenskyy won’t want to accept anything he believes could leave Ukraine vulnerable to a future attack from Russia. 

Putin is also likely to raise the need for security guarantees — for Russia — including limiting or potentially reversing NATO’s presence in the neighborhood. 

Then there’s the question of territory. Zelenskyy’s view is that marking out any boundaries, temporarily or permanently, is something that can only be discussed at leader level. “No one else has the authority to do so,” he said Tuesday. 

Zelenskyy said during previous sets of negotiations over the past year, “as a compromise,” that Ukraine had been prepared to discuss the idea of a demilitarized “buffer zone” on both sides of the contact line in the Donbas region.

Similar ideas were proposed for other parts of Ukraine. Zelenskyy said his negotiators discussed these questions again with the Americans in recent weeks. “We are ready to discuss the issue of territories because the Russians keep wanting to discuss it and make it part of the agenda,” he said. But this would need to be at a leader-level meeting. 

Europe has a role 

European leaders are adamant that they must be included in final negotiations, not least because it is they who are are now providing the vast bulk of financial and military support to Ukraine. Trump ended American aid in 2025.

Zelenskyy and U.S. officials accept that European governments will likely need to be involved in discussions about security guarantees — mainly because any peacekeeping forces deployed to Ukraine would be dominated by European troops.

The Coalition of the Willing, a loose alliance of more than 30 countries led by France, the U.K. and Germany, put together detailed proposals in coordination with the U.S. almost a year ago. Ukraine is also interested in exploring bilateral security guarantees with the U.S., a discussion that would not need to involve European officials.

Plans for rebuilding Ukraine and nurturing its economic revival would also have to involve Europe, Zelenskyy said. “We cannot envision such a, so to speak, ‘Marshall Plan’ without Europe.”

But Europe doesn’t know who should speak for it 

Trump’s renewed interest in Ukraine also resurfaced some sore questions for European governments: Who should represent them when it comes to decision time? And should they even be talking to Putin at all? 

With no clarity emerging from Brussels, some leaders have taken matters into their own hands. On Tuesday, Finland’s President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre held a 90-minute call with Putin, urging him to end the war. It went down badly with several European governments, including Denmark, Italy, Sweden and Lithuania. One frustrated diplomat said: “There are too many middle-aged men who want to end up in the history books having solved this war.”

Russia has said the Stubb-Støre call achieved nothing of substance and the war will likely “escalate.” By some accounts, Putin used much of the time on the phone lecturing the Nordic leaders on regional history. 

One problem in identifying a lead negotiator is that the European countries with a stake in the talks are not only in the EU — the U.K. and Norway, for example, are both outside the bloc. Without clarity of leadership, European interests risk being sidelined when the talking gets serious. 

It all comes down to Trump 

One critical unknown factor in the mix is how long Trump’s attention will stay on Ukraine.

After the U.S. and Israel launched a war with Iran in the spring, progress on Ukraine stalled for months, only to return this fall as Trump sought to mitigate the impact of the Middle East conflict. A new escalation in the Iran war risks sidelining the negotiations all over again. 

The U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff held talks with Zelenskyy, Stubb and Støre in Oslo on Oct. 20. Witkoff then went to St. Petersburg to meet Putin the next day. There was supposed to be a follow-up meeting in Brussels this week in preparation for negotiations in Abu Dhabi — but the Americans postponed the talks, apparently due to developments in the Middle East. 

“The meeting in Abu Dhabi now depends on the American side,” Zelenskyy said Tuesday. At a press conference Wednesday, he added: “We very much hope that the escalatory processes in the Middle East — which are currently the subject of so much discussion — will not interfere.”

Putin can wait 

After their Kremlin call, Stubb and Støre apparently told Zelenskyy they felt Putin was serious about the Abu Dhabi opportunity. But in public and private, diplomats and political leaders in Europe are deeply skeptical that Putin is at all serious about an imminent path to peace.

Despite the Kremlin insisting he is on board, European diplomats believe the Russian leader is just playing for time in the hope that Ukraine weakens over a winter of attacks on its energy system, and Europe — perhaps with the far-right Marine Le Pen in charge of France — gets tired of paying for the war and gives up next year. 

That’s why EU officials know they cannot pin their hopes on peace and need to redouble their financial support and military aid for Ukraine, while tightening sanctions on Russia. EU leaders will discuss the issue of securing funds for Ukraine’s war effort at their summit in Brussels scheduled for November 26.

Nicholas Vinocur in Brussels contributed to this report.

Europe’s united front on Ukraine is showing cracks. Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre have opened a direct line to Vladimir Putin, drawing criticism from some fellow European leaders — even as Ukraine backs their efforts. Nicholas Vinocur and Paul Dallison examine the fallout and the growing scramble over who gets to speak for Europe in peace talks.

Also on the pod: Brussels unveils a sweeping overhaul of Frontex, giving the EU border agency a much bigger role in deportations, new powers to monitor social media and plans for a major expansion.

And after a summer of devastating heatwaves and wildfires, the European Commission wants governments to prepare for a world that’s three degrees hotter than preindustrial levels.

Finally, you can see the ghostly turnip that freaked Nick out here. And if you have someone spooky in mind for Paul’s story on the figures haunting the EU bubble, please write in! Find us on WhatsApp here or at +32 491 05 06 29.

Articles mentioned in this episode:

• Leaders of Finland and Norway hold direct talks with Putin.
• EU prepares for a grim future with new climate-proofing law.
• Frontex gets power to track migration talk on social media.
• ⁠Frontex set for new powers to deport beyond EU borders in latest overhaul.⁠
• This summer’s heat was Europe’s deadliest on record, scientists say.

BERLIN — Friedrich Merz has tried to move on from his conservatives’ historic defeats to the far right in eastern Germany, but his biggest test as chancellor — and of his grip over his own party — may still lie ahead.

The Alternative for Germany is pushing to deliver its biggest blow yet to the chancellor’s weakened coalition government by installing the country’s first far-right state premier since World War II in the eastern state of Saxony-Anhalt when lawmakers vote on the post in December.

Merz’s fellow Christian Democrats in Berlin fear regional members of their own party will help the AfD do this, creating a nightmare scenario for the chancellor. That concern stems from accusations that a group of Saxony-Anhalt conservatives already broke ranks by voting in a secret ballot for the AfD’s candidate for state speaker earlier this month, outraging national conservative leaders.

“The behavior of the CDU parliamentary group in Saxony-Anhalt with regard to past and upcoming elections is completely unacceptable,” Thomas Röwekamp, a CDU lawmaker who chairs the Bundestag’s defense committee, said. The AfD “wants to annihilate the CDU in Germany” by “forcing us into a debate about how to deal with it in order to divide the party,” he added. “We must not allow that to happen.”

Under pressure from conservatives in Berlin, Saxony-Anhalt CDU leader Sven Schulze announced a plan last week to have his party’s lawmakers leave the chamber during the initial two rounds of secret voting in December, ensuring none can vote for the far-right candidate — or be suspected of doing so. It’s unclear what the party would do in a potential third round, when the AfD would only need a majority of votes cast.

AfD leaders have openly said they are seeking defections from conservative ranks, a strategy designed as much to sow division among conservatives as to win the premiership. That approach seems to be working, at least partly.

State conservatives have faced intense criticism for appearing so divided and vulnerable to aiding the AfD that their leaders apparently have no choice but to avoid the vote altogether. “It’s about taking a stand and assuming responsibility, rather than shirking a decision,” Röwekamp said.

Local CDU lawmakers, however, say their approach is tactically necessary.  “We have always drawn a clear line between ourselves and the AfD,” CDU state lawmaker Chris Schulenburg said. “We adhere to the principle of distinguishing ourselves on the basis of substance, but not excluding them [the AfD], because, after all, the party is not currently banned, and its parliamentarians were also democratically elected.”

AfD leaders, meanwhile, have rejoiced in the CDU’s disarray.

“This is nothing less than the CDU’s capitulation,” AfD national co-leader Tino Chrupalla said after the state conservatives announced their plan to leave the chamber. “They’re afraid of elections.”

Centrists flirting with radicals

For Merz, whose approval ratings are at historic lows, his party’s conduct in Saxony-Anhalt — and the prospect of a politically explosive AfD victory in December — are complicating efforts to move past last month’s humiliating election losses in eastern Germany and project renewed control as he attempts to focus on core priorities: backing Ukraine and reviving the economy.

Already, center-left lawmakers have attacked parts of Merz’s party as having failed to learn the lessons of Germany’s history, drawing parallels with the Nazis’ rise to power with conservative help.

After local conservative lawmakers appeared to back the AfD’s candidate for the Saxony-Anhalt speaker earlier this month, Social Democratic Party (SPD) lawmakers in Berlin marched in protest past the Brandenburg Gate to a square where the Nazis carried out book burnings. SPD Defense Minister Boris Pistorius sang the national anthem and called the episode the breaking of a taboo that “we haven’t seen in this form for more than 90 years.”

Conservative lawmakers have retorted in recent weeks by attacking the SPD and Greens for letting their Berlin branches enter coalition talks with the Left — a far-left party rooted in the East German communist party— which won first in the city in last month’s election.

But for Merz and his coalition government, the stakes of the December vote in Saxony-Anhalt are far greater.

How the December vote will unfold remains highly unpredictable. Ultimately, the AfD’s candidate for the premiership, Ulrich Siegmund, could win the post with support from Alliance Sahra Wagenknecht, a small, populist-left party that has expressed openness to working with the AfD and shares its Kremlin-friendly views.

Merz is clearly alarmed by the prospect of CDU lawmakers covertly assisting the AfD — an outcome that could trigger his chancellorship’s greatest political crisis yet.

“People who do things like that — members of parliament who extend a hand — there is no place in the CDU for such a choice, and that will not change,” Merz said earlier this month. “The CDU will never elect extremists to public office or government positions anywhere in Germany.”

BRUSSELS — There is a growing realization among European governments that they may soon need to nominate someone to face Russian leader Vladimir Putin in direct talks on a peace deal for Ukraine. 

The main problem is deciding who should take on such a hazardous task.

The question gained urgency this week after U.S. presidential envoy Steve Witkoff traveled to Russia to offer Putin a three-way summit with Donald Trump and Ukraine’s leader Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in an effort to press for a ceasefire. 

“President Putin disregards the European Union as an authority,” Czech President Petr Pavel said Tuesday in an interview with the Axel Springer Global Reporters’ Network, of which POLITICO is a part. “He doesn’t want to talk to Ursula von der Leyen, he doesn’t talk to Kaja Kallas. He stopped talking to other European leaders, including Emmanuel Macron.”

He added that the EU should “identify a person or a group of people who would speak for Europe. Not necessarily representatives of the EU or NATO, but simply leaders who would be given a mandate by the others to negotiate.”

In recent days, Trump has dismayed Ukraine and its European allies by talking over their heads with Putin and appearing increasingly willing to take Russia’s side in the almost five-year war. 

That has reignited debate in Brussels and beyond about the need for Europe to have its own direct line to the Kremlin to safeguard the region’s interests and bolster Ukraine’s ability to resist a lopsided deal. 

“Much as it sticks in the craw, I do think a channel of some kind to Putin would be a good thing to have,” said David Lidington, a distinguished fellow at the Royal United Services Institute in London. “I am not optimistic that it would achieve anything much in the short term, but to have a channel which can then be used as and when an opportunity arises is not a bad thing.”

Diplomats and officials disagree on who would be the best person to represent Europe.

Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission president, has negotiated directly with Trump on trade, while the president of the European Council, António Costa, has previously opened a line of communication with the Kremlin through his office. EU High Representative Kaja Kallas is another potential player who speaks for European interests as a whole. 

But the Brussels bubble needs to accept that a deal with Putin and Trump won’t be dictated by EU protocols, in the view of a diplomat from a European Union country who, like others in this article, was granted anonymity to discuss sensitive matters.

“We cannot show up with two or three people all speaking on behalf of the EU,” the diplomat said. “The choice of who ends up representing the EU will be based on what would provide the most value, not personal power struggles or narcissistic preferences.”

Will Stubb step up?

One name outside the EU’s machinery that is gaining attention is Alexander Stubb, the president of Finland. Two key factors count in his favor: He has arguably the best relationship with Trump among EU leaders, and Finland has long experience of dealing with Russia — the two countries share a 1,300 kilometer border and have been at war in the past.

“Stubb is of interest because of Finnish knowledge of and traditional dialogue with Russia,” the diplomat said. “They know more than anyone on our side [about] what it takes to feel secure in such a situation.”

A second EU diplomat noted that Stubb was “the only person who has come forward so far” to show high-level political leadership, and could serve as a European envoy at a future peace summit. Stubb was in Norway with Zelenskyy and Witkoff on Tuesday for negotiations ahead of the U.S. envoy’s visit to Russia to meet Putin. 

Also attending the gathering in Oslo was von der Leyen’s most senior aide, Bjoern Seibert, who has joined meetings of national security advisers as part of the Coalition of the Willing to support Ukraine.

A third European diplomat said it was vital that the EU itself be represented in the talks, instead of a small grouping of powerful countries such as Germany, France and the U.K.

That means both Seibert and Pedro Lourtie, the top aide to Costa, must have seats at the table during preparatory talks, the diplomat said, and that EU member countries must be properly updated on progress.

Calling Costa

According to a fourth EU diplomat, European leaders asked Costa at last week’s summit in Brussels whether it might be time for him to talk to Putin. “Costa said, no, he’s not going to talk to Putin now,” they said. “But Costa should start talking to Putin if we want to play a role in the negotiations. By not speaking, we are playing into the hands of our opponents.”

The fourth diplomat said Costa would be a better choice than von der Leyen or Kallas, who are both seen as too invested in the Ukrainian side to represent the EU effectively at leader level. Kallas in particular has been outspoken in her criticism of Trump. “Costa comes across as more of an honest broker,” they summarized.

The European Commission insists the EU is already present at the peace talks, flagging Seibert’s presence in Oslo on Tuesday. “The main aim [in Oslo] was to explore if the parameters are there for a possible move to trilateral or even multilateral talks with Ukraine and Russia present at the same table,” European Commission spokesperson Paula Pinho told reporters on Wednesday. 

She said the talks had focused on territory, security and post-war prosperity for Ukraine; Witkoff is expected to debrief Ukraine and the Europeans after his trip to meet Putin. “What is very important is that we are sitting at the table, that we are able to present our position, and that we can engage in what is a shared objective to put an end to this horrific war,” she added. 

Gerardo Fortuna and Paul Ronzheimer contributed to this report.