Donald Trump’s latest moves on Russia and Ukraine have alarmed Kyiv and European capitals alike. But rather than scrambling to contain the fallout, EU leaders are keeping their cool. Zoya Sheftalovich and Nick Vinocur explore Europe’s strategy for weathering Trump’s midterm storm — and what it means for Ukraine.

Then, France reels from a weekend of violent protests, with more than 1,800 arrests and widespread destruction. As political leaders trade accusations, we look at how the unrest is shaping the battle ahead of the 2027 presidential election from Paris.

Plus, hackers turn supermarket fridges into heaters, exposing some surprisingly basic cybersecurity vulnerabilities.

If you have a question or comment, don’t hesitate! Message us on our WhatsApp here or at +32 491 05 06 29.

Ein mögliches rot-grün-rotes Bündnis in Berlin schlägt bundespolitisch hohe Wellen. Während z.B. Grünen-Chef Felix Banaszak vor radikalen Kräften warnt und die Tür zur CDU taktisch offen halten will, ist Friedrich Merz wiederum hart und unerbittlich im Ton gegenüber Grünen und der SPD, wenn es um die Gespräche mit radikalen linken Kräften geht. Rasmus Buchsteiner ordnet ein, wie nun auch in der SPD der Widerstand wächst und Parteichef Lars Klingbeil sich derweil zurückhält.

Die Junge Union fordert derweil drastische Konsequenzen: Eine künftige Berliner Landesregierung soll z.B. von Geheimdienstinformationen des Bundes abgeschnitten werden. Im 200-Sekunden-Interview erklärt der CDU-Abgeordnete Johannes Volkmann, warum er Teile der Berliner Linken als Sicherheitsrisiko sieht und eine politische Ächtung der Partei verlangt.

Auf internationaler Bühne sorgt die Kehrtwende der USA für Entsetzen, nachdem Donald Trump die Sanktionen gegen Russlands Schattenflotte auf Eis gelegt hat. Hans von der Burchard analysiert, wie dieser Schritt Europa sicherheitspolitisch erneut herausfordert und welche Folgen der Wegfall amerikanischer Unterstützung für die Ukraine im nahenden Winter haben könnte.

Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es jeden Morgen ab 5 Uhr. Rixa Fürsen, Maximilian Stascheit und das POLITICO-Team liefern Politik zum Hören – kompakt, international, hintergründig.

Für alle Hauptstadt-Profis: Der Berlin Playbook-Newsletter bietet jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und Einordnungen. Jetzt kostenlos abonnieren.

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Jamie Dettmer is associate editor and a foreign affairs columnist for POLITICO.

Cast your mind back to last year, when European leaders scrambled back and forth across the Atlantic, seeking to patch up tattered relations between U.S. President Donald Trump and Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

After the Oval Office brawl where a scolded Zelenskyy pushed back against Trump and his vice president before being ejected from the White House, then-U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron led the effort to engineer a call between the pair, during which the Ukrainian president expressed regret about the meeting — but fell short of apologizing.

Likewise, after Trump’s August summit in Alaska with Russia’s Vladimir Putin, Starmer and his top security adviser Jonathan Powell worked feverishly alongside other European leaders to rescue the broken relationship between Kyiv and Washington. They even came up with a ceasefire plan and got U.S. buy-in. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte also did some heavy lifting.

But this time, after Trump unveiled a controversial diesel deal with Russia and called — once again — for Zelenskyy to step down, the European reaction has been less febrile. Of course, they have offered Kyiv strong rhetorical support and unveiled more Russia sanctions, but there has been no frantic, panicky outreach effort to Trump to mediate a speedy repair.

Why not?

Because the Trump shock factor is wearing off, hazards Ukraine’s former Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba. “The primary answer is that they have got used to him,” he told POLITICO. “They have all had an immunity shot, and they don’t feel as scared as they did last year.”

“Another reason is they’re drowning in their own problems,” he added. “And I think that first they feel they have to try to figure out how what Trump is doing will impact them — how big their bill will become as a result.”

European leaders are not scrambling like they did last year because Trump is “losing his leverage,” said Lia Quartapelle, an Italian lawmaker from the opposition Democratic Party who is vice chair of the parliament’s Foreign and European Affairs Committee. “We realize he cannot be trusted and we are on our own,” so there’s little point lobbying him.

According to the Financial Times, EU officials plan to urge Zelenskyy to tone down his increasingly sharp remarks about Trump, fearing they are only inflaming the situation. Starmer’s successor, Andy Burnham, is positioning himself as someone who can “lay the ground” for a reconciliation, he explained to the House of Commons Wednesday. 

Nonetheless, the calmer reaction to Trump’s maneuvers stands out, acknowledges Daniel Fried, a former senior U.S. diplomat who served as assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian Affairs under U.S. President George W. Bush.

“The Europeans seem to have taken Trump’s measure,” Fried told POLITICO. “They want to avoid the worst. They want to mitigate the damage over the next two years while Trump is in office. They do work with people in the Trump administration with whom they can work. And there are such people.” 

Speaking from Warsaw, fresh from attending a recent security conference in the Polish capital, he said the Europeans understand now that much of what Trump does is performative and has a short life span — like the Russian diesel deal, which has a shelf life of two or three days, he said. “I’m not sure it’s going anywhere as it is utterly impractical and legally questionable, and it isn’t clear the Russians actually can supply the diesel,” he said. In other words, why get worked up about it?

Fried said in his conversations with European leaders and officials, he has detected increasing exasperation with the overall inconsistency of the American position: “Trump wants Europe to do more militarily, but it must buy American,” he said. “But we can’t sell to the Europeans because of our needs, so they will have to wait even though they can’t build it themselves. Nonetheless, they have to carry the load in Ukraine without us. That’s utterly inconsistent, and they are exasperated by it.” 

And they’re just tired of having Trump jerk them around, Fried added. “One thing they are trying to avoid is having Trump snap his fingers and they come flying. Because then it looks like they are at Trump’s beck and call and are his supplicants, and they don’t want to do that. Besides, if they fly out and talk him into something, how long will what he agreed to last?”  

Of course, the Europeans can also console themselves with the high chance of Trump reversing himself. “There is a pattern,” said Kuleba. “He launches a cavalry attack … and then retreats. That’s what we saw in February last year. That’s what we saw in November 2025. And that’s what we will see this time too.”

EU leaders returned Friday for their second day of marathon talks, with a discussion on migration set to descend into a showdown over whether to push for tougher controls.

Before those talks, Denmark called for new, tougher language linking migration to crime.

Earlier, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy made a direct pitch for more help amid a crisis of faith among allies over Donald Trump’s latest steps favoring Russia.

Leaders are expected to turn to the question of how to protect the bloc from Russian hybrid attacks, maritime security and the Middle East.

On Thursday, a three-hour argument over taxing car emissions derailed Antonio Costa’s carefully laid plans to tackle the biggest challenges facing the bloc: fixing its economy and sorting out its spending priorities, drawing ire from some diplomats.

As leaders piled into their motorcades around midnight after 14 hours of talks, they seemed as far away as ever on negotiations over the bloc’s next long-term budget — with the next serious round of talks slipping to November.  

As the United States looks towards Russia for diesel, European leaders are doubling down on their support for Ukraine.

On the show, hosts Zoya Sheftalovich and Ian Wishart unpack all the ways the EU plans to put its money where its mouth is and help Kyiv. Expect it to be the talk of the town at this week’s meeting of leaders at the European Council summit.

Next, exclusive polling coming out of Spain shows that 58% of Spaniards fear tensions with Morocco over Ceuta and Melilla could spiral into an armed conflict in the next 10 years. We discuss what this means for a country that’s heading into a snap election at the end of next month.

Speaking of Spain, we’re launching Madrid Playbook today! For our Spanish-speaking listeners, subscribe why don’t you?

Finally, Ursula von der Leyen may have been smiling in influencer videos filmed after her State of the Union speech, but behind closed doors, her comms teams was furious.

Questions? Comments? Let us know on our WhatsApp here or at +32 491 05 06 29.

Articles mentioned in this episode:

• “Poll: Spaniards say Ceuta crisis could spark armed conflict with Morocco.”
• “Ukraine’s FM: Russia’s war budget makes the case for using frozen assets now.”
• “EU approves biggest Russia sanctions package since invasion began.”
  

WARSAW — European leaders are preparing to demand tougher sanctions on Russia at a summit on Thursday, putting them at odds with Donald Trump just days after the U.S. president struck a deal with Vladimir Putin to ease restrictions on Russian diesel exports.

The leaders plan to call for further sanctions and measures targeting Moscow’s oil revenues at the European Council, according to a recent draft joint statement obtained by POLITICO, as EU governments reject Trump’s claim to have secured an energy ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine.

The disagreement exposes a widening divide over how to bring Moscow to the negotiating table. While Trump is seeking to bring down U.S. fuel prices by allowing more Russian diesel onto global markets, European leaders argue that restricting the Kremlin’s energy revenues remains essential to forcing Putin to end the war.

“Russia is not interested in deescalation, ceasing fire or peace,” Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk told a security conference in Warsaw on Monday. “That is why I will go to Brussels to ask my partners to consider seriously increasing sanctions against Russia.”

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz also called for further restrictions, pointing to Moscow’s continued attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure despite Trump’s announcement of a ceasefire.

“Russia will only negotiate in good faith under pressure,” Merz said Monday. “Following Moscow’s reckless attacks on Ukraine’s civilian energy supply, we must even tighten [sanctions] further.”

The push comes after EU foreign ministers on Monday approved the bloc’s largest-ever addition to its Russia sanctions list, targeting more than 1,600 individuals and entities. The European Commission is also preparing a 23rd package of sectoral sanctions, which Kyiv expects to be circulated to EU governments by the end of the year, according to a senior Ukrainian official who was, like others in this article, granted anonymity to speak frankly on the sensitive negotiations.

Other European countries are taking a similar position. Britain and Norway have also pledged to increase pressure on Moscow.

“It’s important to sanction Russia not to finance the war,” Norwegian Defense Minister Tore O. Sandvik told POLITICO, calling for loopholes in existing restrictions to be closed.

Trump’s election calculation

Behind closed doors, many European diplomats see Trump’s abrupt shift toward easing restrictions on Russian energy as driven primarily by domestic political concerns ahead of next month’s U.S. midterm elections.

That is the “broadly held view” among EU officials, according to one senior official.

The president is under mounting pressure over fuel prices, which have surged since the outbreak of the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran. Having promised during his 2024 campaign to bring gasoline prices below $2 a gallon, Trump now faces an electorate paying more than twice that amount, with Republicans at risk of losing control of Congress.

His agreement with Putin is intended to release an additional 4.8 million tons of Russian diesel onto global markets over the coming months, easing pressure on fuel supplies and prices.

But European and Ukrainian officials question whether the additional supply will make a meaningful difference, saying that the total volume promised amounts to only around 10 days of U.S. demand. They feel the deal risks undermining efforts to deprive Moscow of the revenues funding its invasion.

“The reality” is that the additional fuel will have a “minimal” impact on U.S. prices, the senior EU official said.

“This is about the midterms,” a second EU official said. “He said he would bring down prices, but then he decided to go to war with Iran.”

The officials also question whether Putin intends to honor Trump’s purported energy ceasefire. Russia has continued striking Ukrainian energy infrastructure since the announcement, while Kyiv says it was not consulted on the arrangement.

For now, most European officials are reluctant to criticize Trump publicly, despite any doubts about the agreement. The EU and Ukraine should maintain their position over the coming weeks, when the administration’s longer-term intentions toward Kyiv may become clearer, one diplomat said, adding that Trump might even change course again if Putin fails to deliver the promised diesel.

Pressure on Washington

The dispute has also revived European calls for Washington to enforce its own sanctions against Moscow.

Tusk urged Europe and the United States to act together to show Russia they were prepared to impose tougher measures, while EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas called on Washington to align its approach with Brussels.

Kallas pointed to sweeping Russia sanctions legislation championed by the late Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, which Trump signed into law last month but has yet to fully implement.

The legislation gives Washington additional tools to target Russia’s energy trade and those helping sustain its war effort. European officials want the administration to use them rather than loosen restrictions on Russian exports.

Some Republicans are also calling for tougher action.

“I think we need to be implementing the Russia sanctions bill,” Republican Representative Dan Crenshaw told the Warsaw conference.

The disagreement is raising wider questions in Europe about its dependence on Washington, particularly amid reports that U.S. officials have threatened to restrict Ukraine’s access to American weapons unless Kyiv stops attacking Russian oil refineries.

There is currently “no sign” Washington is following through on those threats, a NATO official told POLITICO, arguing that restricting sales would also hurt American weapons manufacturers.

“PURL is a good deal for the Americans,” the official said, referring to the NATO initiative under which European allies finance purchases of U.S. weapons for Ukraine.

European Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius, without directly addressing the reports, said Europe needed to take “primary responsibility” for its own defense more urgently as Washington reduces its military presence on the Continent.

The immediate test, however, comes on Thursday, when EU leaders will seek to maintain pressure on Moscow even as their most powerful ally moves in the opposite direction.

Victor Jack and Sebastian Starcevic contributed reporting from Brussels, James Angelos contributed reporting from Berlin, Esther Webber contributed reporting from London.

Andrii Sybiha is Ukraine’s minister of foreign affairs

Europe can no longer remain immobilized on Russian assets. Now is the time to use them for Ukraine’s defense and recovery.

This decision, which is long overdue, would be a game changer that could shift the balance in Ukraine’s favor — particularly if taken alongside strong sanctions pressure. But to achieve this, we have to be faster and more decisive than Russia.

According to the latest reports, Russia plans to spend a record €180 billion on its military in 2027 — more than 40% above its 2026 defense allocation. And that is only part of the picture. The country’s draft federal budget allocates a combined €669 billion to defense and security for the 2027–2029 period.

These figures make clear Russia wants war. Moscow is increasing the pressure, intensifying its terror against Ukrainian civilians and raising the cost of defense for both Ukraine and Europe. But as the cost of war grows, it should grow faster for the aggressor.

The higher the price for Moscow, the sooner peace will be restored. Half-hearted pressure on Russia and half-measures in support of Ukraine will only prolong conflict and increase the overall price tag. Decisive steps can bring it to a close.

At the end of August, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain and Poland addressed the European Commission, urging renewed discussion on the full use of immobilized Russian assets. We are grateful to them. But it is now time to turn this discussion into a legal process: launch a permanent platform, engage experts and develop the decision.

Europe has taken the hardest step already. In 2022, the G7 immobilized some €300 billion in Russian central bank reserves, roughly €210 billion of them in the EU. In 2024, the G7 borrowed $50 billion for Ukraine against the future windfall profits on those reserves. And in December 2025, the bloc made the immobilization open-ended.

What remains undecided is the only step that matters: using the assets themselves.

Every argument for and against this has been heard, and the debate now revolves around its scope and how to mitigate associated risks.

The prevailing view is that the decision to use these assets must not expose any single country to disproportionate risk — above all Belgium, where most of the assets sit at Euroclear. We agree. To that end, Ukraine’s Finance Ministry proposed a clear plan to the European Commission: placing the assets under collective EU control, so that the decision to use them — and the liability for doing so — is European, not Belgian.

Belgium’s exposure is a reason to share the risk, not to do nothing.

Another common argument is that any decision must cover immobilized assets in every jurisdiction, not only those at Euroclear. Again, we agree — with one caveat: This can be done but on parallel tracks. Europe should not make its own decision contingent on protracted global coordination when its security is in peril.

Skeptics raise four objections of principle against the full use of these assets: that using them breaks the rule of law, that it undermines the euro as a reserve currency, that it gives away leverage in peace talks, and that Russia would retaliate by seizing Western assets.

Let’s take these arguments in turn.

On rule of law: Under the International Law Commission’s 2001 Articles on State Responsibility, a state that commits an internationally wrongful act owes full reparations, and injured states may take countermeasures to induce compliance. And in November 2022, the U.N. General Assembly recognized that Russia must bear the legal consequences of its aggression, including reparations.

The same articles also require countermeasures to be reversible, and Ukraine’s position honors that: The legal title stays in an EU-governed vehicle, Ukraine receives financing rather than ownership, and the arrangement unwinds the day Russia pays what it owes.

On the euro: This has already been tested. When the reserves were immobilized in February 2022, the euro’s share of global reserves did not move. Reserve holders understood then what they understand now — that this principle applies to a state waging a war of aggression in breach of the U.N. Charter, not to anyone else. Moreover, the euro’s credibility as a reserve currency rests on Europe’s ability to defend order and principles.

On leverage: These assets have been immobilized for more than four years and have not moved Moscow any closer to peace. A country budgeting €669 billion for a war of aggression is not bargaining for its reserves. What deters Russia is Ukraine’s capacity to keep fighting — and that is precisely what a European solution on these assets would fund. The leverage is not in holding the money, it is in spending it.

Finally, on seizing Western assets in Russia: Putin has been doing this since 2022. This September alone, Moscow took control of the Russian businesses of Nestlé, Auchan, Leroy Merlin, FM Logistic and Metro, following Danone and Carlsberg. That is why, as early as March 2022, we urged companies to leave. The confiscation of European property has already happened — and keeping the assets immobilized did not deter this.

Let us be clear about what we are not proposing. We are not proposing outright confiscation — the legal title will not transfer. We are not proposing a Belgian decision — the risk will be shared at the EU level. And we are not proposing a precedent for anyone else. The conditions — a war of aggression condemned by the U.N. General Assembly — are met by only one state.

Russia must be the one to pay for the damage it has caused and continues to cause, not European taxpayers.

We should be sending the right signal to Moscow: That it will not outlast our resolve.

We should be sending the right signal to skeptical audiences across Europe ahead of a major election year: That the rising cost of Ukraine’s defense will be covered at the expense of Russia.

Last but not least, we should be sending the right signal to the Ukrainian people: that they are not alone in confronting the aggressor.

The full use of Russian assets would bring tangible and immediate results, strengthening Ukraine on the frontline and bringing peace closer. After four years, Europe should no longer be immobilized on major decisions. It needs political will, collective commitment and a solid legal formula.

We urge EU leaders to make this vital decision without delay. And we look forward to the European bravery in taking this critical step.

POLITICO occasionally publishes opinion pieces from guest authors to offer our readers a range of perspectives on the intersection of power and politics. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of POLITICO.

Donald Trump verkündet eine „Energie-Waffenruhe“ zwischen der Ukraine und Russland an. Fraglich allerdings ist, was die beiden Länder davon wirklich wissen. Um den heimischen Druck durch steigende Ölpreise abzufedern, lockert Trump zuvor die Sanktionen gegen Russland. Weil er dafür von Wolodymyr Selenskyj kritisiert wird, fordert er, die Ukraine brauche einen neuen Präsidenten. Währenddessen ringen die EU-Außenminister in Luxemburg um ein neues Sanktionspaket gegen Russland. Hans von der Burchard ordnet zusammen mit Rixa Fürsen ein, wie Europa die russische Schattenflotte stoppen will und welche Konsequenzen der Drohnenangriff von Leipzig wirklich hat.

Im Konrad-Adenauer-Haus herrscht derweil Krisenstimmung bei herbstlichem Wetter. Angesichts verheerender Umfragewerte sucht die CDU-Spitze nach einem Ausweg aus dem Tief. Rasmus Buchsteiner analysiert die Strategie des CDU-Präsidiums, das sich in Klausur befindet, und wie Parteichef Friedrich Merz in seiner Position stabilisiert werden soll.

Im 200-Sekunden-Interview warnt Dennis Radtke, Vorsitzender der Christlich-Demokratischen Arbeitnehmerschaft (CDA), vor einer inhaltlichen Schieflage seiner Partei. Er fordert echte Strukturreformen bei Rente und Gesundheit statt reiner Sparprogramme und erklärt, warum die Union dringend Antworten auf die alltäglichen Sorgen der Menschen finden muss.

Das Berlin Playbook als Podcast gibt es jeden Morgen ab 5 Uhr. Rixa Fürsen, Maximilian Stascheit und das POLITICO-Team liefern Politik zum Hören – kompakt, international, hintergründig.

Für alle Hauptstadt-Profis: Der Berlin Playbook-Newsletter bietet jeden Morgen die wichtigsten Themen und Einordnungen. Jetzt kostenlos abonnieren.

POLITICO Deutschland – ein Angebot der Axel Springer Deutschland GmbH
Axel-Springer-Straße 65, 10888 Berlin
Tel: +49 (30) 2591 0
information@axelspringer.de
Sitz: Amtsgericht Berlin-Charlottenburg, HRB 196159 B
USt-IdNr: DE 214 852 390
Geschäftsführer: Christoph Eck-Schmidt, Carolin Hulshoff Pol, Mathias Sanchez Luna