YEREVAN, Armenia — Scorching wildfires, disastrous floods and the looming mass extinction of species weren’t enough to convince wealthy nations to unlock crucial funds needed to halt biodiversity loss at a global nature summit this week.  

As countries around the world race against the clock to protect what’s left of the Earth’s collapsing ecosystems, global talks aimed at speeding up nature protection efforts yielded underwhelming results.  

The United Nations COP17 on biodiversity ended on Saturday with a renewed promise from countries to speed up global efforts to protect nature and restore depleted ecosystems by 2030.   

But behind that grand gesture, governments are still struggling to unlock the hundreds of billions needed to meet global biodiversity protection targets. The reason? A profound and unresolved disagreement over where that money should come from. 

“If we’re mutually unhappy that’s probably the closest we can get to on these very delicate compromises,” said a member of the Swiss delegation just before the text was adopted.

After two weeks of negotiations over how to speed up efforts to protect ecosystems, nearly 200 countries secured a hard-fought agreement to “accelerate the implementation” of the global biodiversity framework  “including by increased ambition in addressing the gaps, challenges and barriers related to implementation,” according to a draft of the text, the final version of which was not immediately available.

Armenian Environment Minister Hambardzum Matevosyan, who presided over the summit, said negotiators had “achieved more than we could have expected.”

But in the end, governments could not agree on how to increase the number of countries currently contributing to biodiversity finance, instead only stating the obvious: that more funds would be better.

The summit exposed a growing chasm between nations over who should be held financially responsible for funding conservation measures worldwide: historically wealthy countries whose economies have caused immense damage to the environment, or newly rich states whose economies have grown exponentially in the last three decades. 

“This COP was always going to be difficult,” said Steven Guilbeault, former environment minister for Canada, adding that “COP17’s real legacy will be decided far beyond these walls, when words need to translate to action.”

Negotiators are leaving Yerevan with many issues left to resolve between now and the next COP in 2028 in Ecuador, including on how to attract more companies that benefit from nature to fund conservation projects via the Cali Fund, a landmark vehicle aimed at mobilizing private finance into nature established in 2024.

Governments know they are running out of time. At COP17, scientific experts reiterated that a million species are at risk of extinction, and the U.N. has identified an annual biodiversity financing gap of $700 billion.  

“We’re not on track to stop and reverse the biodiversity loss by 2030,” said Monique Barbut, France’s environment minister, during a COP17 plenary session on Wednesday. The world needs to “mobilize all international funding sources” to make it happen, she insisted.

The talks also ran long due to disagreements over language related to the involvement of Indigenous peoples in a key decision-making body of the Convention.

The dispute 

The U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity relies on the consensus that rich countries should pay more to protect nature because of the pressure their societies and economies exert on global ecosystems. 

Since its ratification in the 1990s, a group of wealthy countries including Canada, Australia, Japan, the U.K., Switzerland, Norway and some EU members have been funding efforts to implement the Convention.

Now, those countries want other high-income nations to chip in more. “We all know that we need more resources to ensure the effective implementation of the Global Biodiversity Framework,” said Jessika Roswall, the EU’s environment commissioner.

But during the negotiations, non-donor countries — which include China, Saudi Arabia, Russia and Argentina — pushed back against any kind of income-related criteria to determine who should or shouldn’t be paying. 

The deadlock angered some nations set to benefit from a larger donor base. “Are you telling me that rich petro-states who are in many cases wealthier than some of the original list of donors and responsible for a ton of emissions and harmful practices that directly affect biodiversity shouldn’t contribute to the fund?” said Juan Carlos Navarro, Environment Minister for Panama on Wednesday, as negotiations were ongoing. 

The countries “don’t want to have the same obligations as developed countries on this issue [and] bring up the argument of ecological responsibilities,” said Juliette Landry, a senior research fellow at the think tank IDDRI. 

In the end, countries agreed simply to state that “contributions from more Parties
would improve the mobilization of biodiversity finance” and invited others to contribute voluntarily, the draft text shows.

Some successes 

Despite the divisions, many hailed the final agreement as a win for green multilateralism as governments remain committed to the overarching goal of protecting 30% of Earth’s land and sea areas and increase financing for biodiversity to $200 billion annually by 2030. 

“In Yerevan, we saw environmental multilateralism prevail once again. Countries came together, found the spirit of compromise and allowed us to agree important decisions that will support real progress for people and for planet,” said Inger Andersen, Executive Director of UN Environment Programme.

After two weeks of endless meetings, panels and plenary sessions, negotiators agreed to strengthen the role of cities and local governments in implementing biodiversity goals, and improve how biodiversity funding reaches them. They also adopted decisions to support capacity-building and scientific cooperation, and agreed that more needs to be done to protect marine ecosystems.

Countries also recognized the need to reduce subsidies funding economic activities that harm nature and create incentives for activities that protect it. “Incentive reform has moved from the margins to the mainstream of the biodiversity agenda,” said Eva zabey, CEO of the Business for Nature coalition.

Some governments including Germany, Iceland, Uzbekistan and Spain made fresh financial commitments totalling $1.8 billion to the Global Biodiversity Framework Fund and the Global Environment Facility, the funding structures set up to implement the Convention. Under the GBF, countries have pledged to mobilize $200 billion annually by 2030.  

The U.N. Environment Programme also published a report showing that nature restoration is underway at an “unprecedented scale” with over 250 million hectares of land under restoration worldwide.

Still, countries remain off track on meeting their 2030 targets.

In Yerevan, green groups welcomed the agreement but criticized its lack of ambition key issues.

“Political promises made in Yerevan set good intentions, but won’t remove major roadblocks to implementation such as insufficient finance, fiscal and debt constraints, the nearly empty coffers of the Cali Fund and urgent reform of harmful subsidies,” said An Lambrechts, a biodiversity politics expert with Greenpeace International.

Governments have struggled to stay the course since inking the Global Biodiversity Framework in 2022. Though many countries have adopted national biodiversity strategies, financial flows to conservation projects are nowhere near where they ought to be. Geopolitical shifts and economic crises have also made it harder for governments — including the 27 EU member countries — to prioritize environmental protection. 

Countries agreed to renew talks to implement the objectives of the convention in Ecuador.

As Europe’s energy ministers meet in Brussels this week, they are weighing legitimate concerns around energy security, affordability, and the pressures facing businesses and households.

The European Commission’s proposal to delay selected EU Methane Regulation requirements for fossil-fuel importers is now moving quickly through the legislative process. Ministers have an opportunity to keep any adjustment tightly focused, while preserving the policy stability that companies and investors need to plan, invest and manage risk over the long term.

Investors need a stable framework against which companies can plan, manage risk and allocate capital with confidence.

For investors, the question is not whether implementation should be practical. It should. The question is whether a response to current pressures becomes a wider change to a framework that companies have already begun to implement.

Sixty investors, representing over €9.5 trillion in assets under management, have called for the EU Methane Regulation to be maintained and implemented as adopted. That statement pre-dated the Commission’s proposed one-year delay. Its central concern, however, is more relevant now: investors need a stable framework against which companies can plan, manage risk and allocate capital with confidence.

The regulation was designed with phased implementation. It gave companies, importers and national authorities time to prepare for stronger measurement, reporting and verification of methane emissions. It has helped bring methane from the margins into boardroom discussions, where it belongs.

Why methane matters to investors

For investors, methane performance can offer a useful view of how a company is run. It is an indicator of operational discipline, process safety and the quality of management oversight. By setting requirements for measurement, reporting and verification, the regulation can also improve the availability, consistency and reliability of methane data. That gives investors a stronger basis to compare companies and assess whether they are managing risks that could affect long-term value. Maintaining the regulation’s core provisions and avoiding any further delay would protect the progress already under way.

The EU’s position as a major oil and gas importer gives the Methane Regulation particular weight. Clear import requirements can improve the quality and comparability of emissions information across global supply chains. They can help create a more level playing field for companies supplying the European market, rather than allowing weak data or weaker controls to become a commercial advantage.

The choice is not between competitiveness, affordability and effective methane management. Europe can support all three.

This matters for competitiveness as well as climate-related financial risk. Energy affordability is a legitimate concern, particularly for businesses and households facing continued market volatility. But well-designed, practical rules can reward operational excellence, support informed investment decisions and give companies a clearer basis on which to plan, while implementation can be managed in ways that preserve market flexibility and limit unnecessary costs for consumers.

The choice is not between competitiveness, affordability and effective methane management. Europe can support all three. A three-year postponement, however, would not serve institutional investors, companies or Europe’s competitiveness.

Methane is often treated as a narrow technical issue. It is not. Reducing emissions from oil and gas operations is one of the quickest and most cost-effective ways to limit near-term warming. For companies, stronger measurement and reporting can also identify avoidable losses, improve operational performance and strengthen confidence among lenders and investors.

Companies and investors have already begun to respond to the direction set by the impending regulation. Investors are looking more closely at the quality of companies’ emissions data and the systems behind it. A predictable regulatory framework supports that work. Repeated changes to the timetable would do the opposite: they would make it harder to judge preparedness, compare performance and distinguish between companies that are acting now and those that are waiting for the rules to move again.

A longer delay would not remove the work needed to implement the regulation. It would postpone it, weaken incentives for companies and suppliers to prepare, and leave investors with less visibility over how methane-related risk will be managed. It could also disadvantage businesses that have already invested in stronger measurement and reporting, while slowing the development of the market for independent verification services needed to support credible implementation. When the requirements eventually return, the adjustment may be sharper and more costly. That uncertainty carries a cost for companies, investors and the wider market.

Practical implementation, not prolonged delay

The practical challenges facing importers are real and should be addressed through consistent implementation. This includes clear guidance from national authorities, practical ways to link relevant methane data to imported fuels, and clear standards for countries outside the EU whose methane rules are recognized as comparable to EU requirements. This approach would preserve market flexibility and help limit unnecessary costs, without weakening the regulation’s purpose.

If a one-year adjustment is judged necessary, ministers should keep it tightly defined, with a clear end date and no reopening of the regulation’s core provisions. They should use the period to provide the guidance that companies, importers and national authorities need to implement the rules consistently.

The choice facing ministers is not whether Europe should address methane emissions, but whether it does so through a stable framework that rewards preparedness and investment. A limited adjustment may be manageable. A prolonged delay risks creating uncertainty, slowing preparation and leaving Europe less competitive.

Stephanie Pfeifer, CEO, Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change

The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of all IIGCC members.

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Ask European Union leaders what they think of Mark Carney’s climate credentials, and you’ll get a gushing response.

“We see the world with the same eyes: from AI to climate change,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said in her State of the Union speech last month, where the Canadian prime minister was the guest of honor.

“Canada and the EU are very, very like-minded,” the bloc’s climate chief, Wopke Hoekstra, told POLITICO in an interview when asked about his hopes for climate collaboration between the two powers ahead of this week’s EU-Canada summit in Montreal.

But this rosy view sidesteps a less comfortable reality: Canada is a major fossil fuel producer whose climate ambitions fall far short of Europe’s.

And under Carney, those ambitions are weakening.

Last year, Canada produced more crude oil than any other country outside the big three producers, Russia, Saudi Arabia and the United States. Oil and gas are Canada’s biggest exports by far, and the industry lobby is an influential force in Ottawa.

In his previous life as a central banker, Carney was considered a climate champion. POLITICO even dubbed him an “eco warrior” in 2018. But since taking over as prime minister last year, he has weakened Canada’s climate policies at a rate few predicted, scrapping a national carbon tax and electric vehicle mandate and opening new oil and gas projects.

The list of climate laws Carney has watered down, repealed and canceled makes the EU’s own recent backtracking on green laws look minor. Some environmentalists argue it is comparable to U.S. President Donald Trump’s wholesale dismantling of environmental protections.

“The track the Carney government has taken on climate and environmental regulation has been a decisive move in the direction of the U.S.,” said Tim Gray, executive director of environmental non-profit Environment Defence. Carney, he said, “seems to be all in on fossil fuels.”

Keean Nembhard, a spokesperson for Canada’s Environment Minister Julie Dabrusin, told POLITICO the Carney government is “committed to fighting climate change and reaching net-zero by 2050 by taking a pragmatic and durable approach.”

“This includes building major clean energy projects across the country, driving mass electrification, and making significant investment in the low-carbon economy,” he said.

But Gray argued that Carney’s support for fossil fuels and weakening of environmental standards may complicate Canada’s attempts to forge closer ties with Europe, which has some of the world’s most stringent green laws.

Still, in Europe, Carney’s green image persists.

Last week, Belgian member of the European Parliament Saskia Bricmont gave expression to this faith in Carney’s commitment to climate issues when she called on him to lead a global push to put climate back on the agenda ahead of next month’s U.N. climate summit.

“Mr Carney … relaunch the fight against climate deregulation and for the restoration of biodiversity, and re-mobilize the international community around concrete, coordinated measures,” she said.

Carney’s green aura

Carney’s reputation as a climate champion is well earned. As governor of the Bank of England, he led a push among central bankers to take the economic risks of climate change seriously — memorably captured in his 2015 ‘Tragedy of the Horizon’ speech, in which he warned: “The catastrophic impacts of climate change will be felt beyond the traditional horizons of most actors.”

In 2021, after he’d left the Bank of England, he became a United Nations special envoy on climate action and finance and launched a net-zero financial alliance with some of the world’s biggest banks.

But things changed dramatically when Donald Trump took back the White House, and Carney replaced fellow Liberal Justin Trudeau as Canada’s prime minister in 2025. At the time, Trudeau and his Liberals had been way behind in the polls, battered by Conservative leader Pierre Poilievre’s attacks on his climate policies — in particular an unpopular consumer carbon tax.

Carney’s first act as prime minister was to scrap that tax.

Following his surprise victory in the elections that April, Carney set about promoting Canada as an “energy superpower.” To the dismay of environmental groups, he supported the “Pacific Link,” an oil pipeline costing tens of billions of dollars, designed to carry Alberta crude to Canada’s Pacific coast for export to Asia.

He then pushed for thawing relations with Beijing in January, a not-so-subtle pitch to find a new crude oil client that isn’t the U.S. Germany, rushing to replace its dependence on Russian energy, signed a long-term agreement in July to buy Canadian liquefied natural gas from a proposed port in British Columbia, despite backlash from environmental and indigenous groups.

He also scrapped laws on electric vehicle adoption, dropped plans for an emissions cap on oil and gas companies, watered down an existing industrial carbon price and introduced legislation to weaken environmental permitting rules for big infrastructure projects, which critics dubbed the “bulldoze nature bill.”

A landmark moment, according to Gray, came in November 2025, when Carney signed a memorandum of understanding with the government of Alberta, Canada’s biggest oil-producing province. That document, which promised to turn Canada into a “global energy superpower,” contained a string of promises to promote oil and gas and water down federal climate laws.

So why the dramatic shift?

Carney, who has repeatedly positioned energy sovereignty as a bulwark against Trump’s economic aggression, offered his realpolitik response at an event in the heart of Alberta’s oil patch earlier this month.

“There’s a structural challenge of energy security and the existential challenge of climate change, and these challenges are forcing countries to think differently about where their energy comes from and on who they can rely on to supply it,” Carney said in Fort McMurray, Alberta on Oct. 1.

“Even under any plausible net zero scenario, the IEA [International Energy Agency] forecasts the world will still need tens of millions of barrels of crude a day. So the question is: who will emerge as the world’s trusted suppliers? It should be us. It must be Canada.”

Not black and white

Carney, to be sure, is no Trump. Unlike the U.S. president, he has retained his pro-climate rhetoric and promised to develop the country’s mining of critical minerals essential for the clean energy transition.

In May, he unveiled a national electricity strategy which aims to double Canada’s largely clean electricity grid by 2050 to meet soaring demand. “The path to net zero is electrification,” Carney said then.

In August, he announced C$10 billion in federal support for the Churchill Falls hydroelectric project in Newfoundland and Labrador, saying it will be the largest clean energy project in North America, capable of generating enough electricity to light up the equivalent of Canada’s three largest cities.

Nembhard, Environment Minster Dabrusin’s spokesperson, also pointed to new electricity transmission lines, electric vehicle subsidies and a C$2 billion plan to retrofit homes with heat pumps.

Canadian climate activist Alex Cool-Fergus said she does not think Carney “believes that oil and gas is the future,” but is simply being pragmatic about Canada’s economic reality.

“The electricity strategy that came out in May was incredibly important, and actually gives us a better idea of what his thinking is for the future,” she said.

Trudeau’s approach to climate change was “very much values-based, and it was about doing the right thing,” said Cool-Fergus. “I think that’s hit its limits. Carney’s approach makes more sense for the world of 2025-2026.”

The limits of the partnership

Hoekstra, the EU’s commissioner for climate, said he wants to deepen ties with Canada. “Given all the complications the world is facing, it is imperative to team up more closely with your closest partners,” he said. But he’s realistic about how far that relationship can go.

Hoekstra has ambitions of cementing the EU into a global network of economies with carbon pricing regimes. While he conceded nothing is “off the table,” he acknowledged linking the EU’s Emissions Trading System with Canada’s “quite different” version, which varies from province to province: “You’re talking about a completely different horizon, and that is not something we would attempt in the very short run.”

There are, however, other ways Hoekstra believes the EU and Canada can closely link on environmental issues.

“Doubling down, tripling down on electrification, on solar, on wind, on nuclear, on batteries,” he said, adding “that is one area that I think is potentially very fruitful for my portfolio.”

Another is critical raw materials, a key focus of this week’s summit.

Brussels is exploring ways for the European Investment Bank, the EU’s lending arm, to help finance the mining of Canadian mineral deposits that could supply the bloc with an alternative to Chinese-produced metals, with a framework agreement expected to be signed during the summit. Lithium, copper, nickel, and other key ingredients for electric vehicle batteries and clean energy technologies essential for decarbonizing Europe are abundant but often undeveloped all over Canada.

This week’s summit will also explore investing in infrastructure on Canada’s east coast to liquefy and ship Canadian gas to Europe, a move that could help the EU diversify its supply away from the U.S., which, along with Norway, has become Europe’s dominant supplier since it cut off Russian gas imports following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Many EU member countries will welcome success on these goals. But Gray warns that closer ties with Canada could lead to deeper penetration by the country’s powerful fossil fuel lobby, which he described as a “major, major force.”

“They’ll be spending time trying to make sure the alignment with the EU is in a direction that favors them,” he said.

The EU’s lack of oil and gas resources — and, by extension, the absence of a powerful fossil fuel lobby — has kept climate policy relatively bipartisan in the EU. Could inviting a fossil fuel “superpower” into the fold as an “associate member” change that?

“That would depend very much on what is an ‘associate member,’” Dutch Climate Minister Stientje van Veldhoven-van der Meer said.

BRUSSELS — Hope for the best, prepare for the worst.

The European Commission updated its approach to dealing with climate change along those lines on Tuesday with a package aimed at improving the bloc’s response to mounting disasters such as extreme heat, supercharged storms and worsening wildfires. 

Unveiling its first-ever law to boost the bloc’s resilience to global warming, the EU executive conceded that merely slashing planet-warming emissions is insufficient as climate extremes wreak havoc across the continent. 

“There is no alternative to continue to cut emissions more forcefully and to move full-frontal into clean energy,” Climate Commissioner Wopke Hoekstra told reporters. “But at the same time, we do have to acknowledge that the problems we’re facing have morphed into something that is so large that just doing that alone unfortunately no longer is good enough.” 

The Commission’s proposed Climate Resilience Law asks governments to draft plans to prepare for a world that’s 2 degrees Celsius hotter in 2050 and 3C hotter by the end of the century, aligning with the United Nations’ latest projections that current global climate policies can only limit warming to 2.8C. 

The same U.N. report also warned that the world can no longer limit warming to 1.5C, the lower bound of the Paris Agreement’s dual goals, and that steep emissions cuts are needed to achieve the best-case scenario of halting the rise in global temperatures at 1.8C. 

The Commission insisted that Tuesday’s package did not amount to Brussels resigning itself to catastrophic levels of warming. 

“Let me just be crystal-clear on the 1.5C, that remains our goal,” said Hoekstra. “At the same time, it would be unwise not to prepare for… the current trajectory the world is on.” 

Regulation for the deregulation era

Under the proposed law, governments are “encouraged” to take the 3C scenario into account when designing policies, budgets and investments. 

Countries will have to carry out national climate risk assessments every five years starting in 2029, and subsequently draw up climate-proofing plans by the end of 2030. These strategies should also indicate which public authorities are in charge of managing certain climate risks to avoid inaction and finger-pointing among ministries and agencies.  

The fairly light-touch legislation reflects the prevailing mood in the EU. Brussels itself has committed to a deregulation agenda, and national governments have called for fewer rules, not more, particularly where climate and the environment are concerned. 

Efforts to improve resilience to weather extremes, such as flood prevention or urban greening, are also largely a national and even local responsibility, with the EU holding limited powers. 

Even the limited rules proposed on Tuesday are already raising eyebrows. 

“I strongly support a clearer allocation of responsibilities,” said Peter Liese, the lead climate lawmaker of the center-right European People’s Party. But, he added, “we need to examine whether the plans, in the form proposed by the Commission, are necessary. Plans alone do not protect people and could tie up resources unnecessarily if we do not design them pragmatically.” 

Others argued the law was too limited. “The danger is a framework that tells us exactly how exposed we are and then commits us to nothing,” said Greens-affiliated lawmaker Kai Tegethoff. “Europe needs binding resilience targets and clear, measurable goals for the sectors most at risk.”

The Commission, for its part, has sought to appeal to governments’ concerns over the EU’s economic competitiveness by emphasizing the wealth-destroying threat of climate disasters and the business potential of climate-proofing technologies. 

“Some may say resilience is expensive. But the right question is, what is the real cost of being unprepared,” said Teresa Ribera, the Commission’s executive vice president in charge of the green transition. Both she and Hoekstra cited data showing the impact of heat on GDP as an example. “Europe cannot be competitive without being resilient,” she added. 

In the wider package presented Tuesday, the Commission also highlighted the emerging market for climate technologies such as drought-resilient crops and cooling solutions, casting European industry as a front-runner in that sector. 

As the EU is currently negotiating its next long-term budget, the package does not come with any funding attached, despite financing often acting as the biggest barrier to climate-proofing efforts. The bloc needs to invest around €70 billion a year by 2050 to adapt to a warmer world but currently only spends €29 billion. 

More where that came from

While presenting new obligations for governments, the Commission also promised to push ahead with work in Brussels. 

The European Environment Agency will draw up bloc-wide climate risk assessments, with the next one due in June 2028, and the Commission will present an EU “strategic plan on climate resilience” by the end of September 2028. 

Progress will be assessed regularly based on four criteria — climate-related deaths, economic losses attributable to global warming, the share of uninsured losses, and related fiscal costs. The Commission’s Eurostat agency will start compiling EU-wide statistics on climate-related deaths and economic losses by the end of 2030, according to the regulation. 

Beyond the legislative efforts, the EU executive also presented a wider package that includes several digital tools, including a “climate viewer” that converts the new warming scenario into local projections policymakers can use.

The Commission also vowed to take into account the new 3C warming scenario in all its future policy proposals. Further steps, including a heat wave action plan and a climate insurance alliance, are planned for next year, it said. 

“I wouldn’t say that we’re nearly done,” said Hoekstra. “Much of this is going to be work in progress.” And if climate change continues getting worse, he added, “this package might well need to be beefed up.” 

LONDON — Liz Truss claims the U.K. would have managed successful missions to Mars within years — if only her 49-day premiership hadn’t been cut short.

The assertion comes in the former British prime minister’s new book “Bank Job,” which was published Monday and claims to explain “how the Bank of England broke the bond market and brought down the government” when her mini-budget in 2022 precipitated market turmoil.

In its closing chapter, the book paints a vivid picture of what Truss believes life in 2040 would be like if her policies had been given a chance to bed in. “Several missions to Mars have now been launched from Britain’s space port,” Truss’ book imagines.

The ex-PM also opts for some more grounded policy dreams.

She envisages a 2040 in which “there are now no European Union laws in Britain,” a “permissive regime for artificial intelligence” is in place, and tumbling energy costs and faster planning timelines have helped make the U.K. a leader in AI.

“Bitcoin received tax treatment consistent with its status as a form of money for commercial purposes,” she imagines. “No central bank digital currency was introduced.”

Since leaving office after a revolt in her own party, Truss has dismissed claims her economic decisions — which included a huge energy bills bailout and tax cuts funded by fresh borrowing — were responsible for crashing the pound.

She has instead pointed the finger at the central bank, the Treasury and the Office for Budget Responsibility watchdog, accusing them of working against her. Her new book takes direct aim at the Bank of England, which proposed to sell £80 billion of gilts before the mini-budget, although delayed that sale amid market turmoil.

Truss lost her House of Commons seat at the 2024 general election, and has since been involved in launching the Conservative Political Action Conference in Britain.

BRUSSELS — The center-right European People’s Party joined forces with far-right lawmakers Thursday to push through a vote delaying a key EU climate law governing the methane emissions of oil and gas companies.

It was the latest example of the European Parliament’s biggest group ignoring old taboos and working with the far right to pass legislation weakening environmental rules.

The EU Methane Regulation requires fossil fuel companies to monitor and report emissions of methane, a potent greenhouse gas that’s a major cause of global warming.

The requirements were due to come into force in 2027, but the Commission last week proposed delaying implementation by a year following intense lobbying from the oil and gas lobby and the U.S. government.

The EPP proposed going further, calling for a three-year delay. The amendment passed by 326 votes to 244, with the support of far-right groups Patriots for Europe, the group of Marine Le Pen’s National Rally; and Europe of Sovereign Nations, the group of the German far-right party the AfD. Giorgia Meloni’s European Conservatives and Reformists also backed the proposal.

Most lawmakers from other centrist and center-left groups, including Renew Europe, Socialists and Democrats and the Greens, opposed the three-year delay.

The right-wing majority also voted for an amendment that would force the Commission to review the law and propose any necessary changes by mid-2029.

It comes a year after the EPP — the group of Commission President Ursula von der Leyen — set a new precedent when it sided with the far right to vote to weaken environmental reporting rules for companies, breaching the so-called cordon sanitaire. Since 2024, right wing groups have made up a majority in Parliament.

Thursday’s vote, if adopted by other EU institutions, would move the deadline for implementation of rules to 2030 — well beyond the Commission’s proposed delay to 2028.

It comes after a months-long pressure campaign by oil and gas companies, which claimed that key elements of the rules requiring them to monitor and track leaks of the potent greenhouse gas were unclear, risking compliance failures that could deter critical supplies from reaching Europe.

The Parliament’s position aligns it with industry’s own call for a three-year delay, and lawmakers echoed the sector’s concerns about the risk of supply disruptions linked to hasty implementation of the rules.

“The postponement of the requirements for oil and gas importers in the Methane Regulation is a matter of political responsibility … We need legally certain rules in place … to safeguard Europe’s energy supply and competitiveness,” MEPs Andrea Wechlser and Christian Ehler, both in the EPP, said in a statement to POLITICO.

“The crisis in the Middle East is already putting massive pressure on energy markets—about 20 percent of global LNG trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz,” they added.

The Parliament’s position could empower national delegations — which failed to agree on a joint position Wednesday after pushback from Germany, Italy and Poland — pushing for a longer delay. Member countries hope to find a compromise next Wednesday after failing to find agreement earlier this week.

CORRECTION: This article has been updated to reflect that Parliament voted to delay the rules until 2030.

LONDON — Brussels is proposing to extend negotiations on its core demand for cut-price tuition fees for EU students studying in the U.K. beyond next month’s leaders’ summit, as a package of deals nears completion, three EU diplomats with knowledge of the talks told POLITICO.

The European Commission on Wednesday presented the option to member countries of decoupling the tuition fee demand from the long-delayed U.K.-EU summit on Nov. 20.

A postponement would clear the way for a deal to be struck on other key elements of Britain’s “reset” with the bloc, including new agreements on agri-food trade, emissions trading, and a youth experience scheme.

The diplomats — all of whom were granted anonymity to speak freely about ongoing talks — said the proposal would involve asking the U.K. to commit to finalizing an agreement on tuition fees within six months. The proposal was first reported by the Financial Times.

The EU is pushing for European students to pay the domestic rate for tuition fees when studying at British universities, as they did before Brexit.

But one of the diplomats highlighted that the tuition fee demand was still part of a wider “package” linked to the other three agreements slated for the summit, and that the agreements would not enter into force until there was agreement on all areas. 

In addition, the diplomats confirmed that both sides were considering a joint summit statement on economic security, amid mounting U.K. concerns about the EU’s Made in Europe proposals.

Meanwhile, negotiations on a sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) deal — which would see the U.K. and EU align on agri-food standards — are close to completion, two of the diplomats said. The deal would include temporary arrangements for gene-edited plants and novel foods, such as lab-grown meat.

For gene-edited plants, the U.K. wants to keep its own rules until equivalent EU rules come into force, and has pledged not to change them in the meantime.

For novel foods, the U.K. would follow EU decisions to approve or reject products, but could set its own rules for products the EU has not yet assessed. In both cases, the products would be sold only in Great Britain and would not have access to the EU single market.

Dan Bloom contributed to this report

BRUSSELS — The EU is preparing to try and persuade Canada and the U.K. to increase their support for Ukraine as part of efforts to plug the €70 billion funding gap Kyiv faces next year.

The EU-Canada summit on Oct. 29-30 and the EU-U.K. summit on Nov. 20 will give Brussels a chance to make the case at the highest level. With Kyiv’s financing needs rising and U.S. backing uncertain, Brussels is increasingly looking to non-EU allies to contribute more, five EU officials, including two from the European Commission, and two EU diplomats told POLITICO.

The EU and its member countries provide 80 percent of Ukraine’s external aid, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said Friday. “We urgently need other partners to step up.”

European Council President António Costa told the European Parliament on Wednesday morning that “international partners have to intensify and step up financial support to Ukraine.”

The EU has committed to a €90 billion loan for 2026 and 2027, intended to cover about two-thirds of Ukraine’s needs. Brussels had expected other partners — including Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia and Norway — to provide another €45 billion, but much of that money has been slow to arrive as other governments have yet to firm up or disburse the support Brussels expected.

While calls to help Ukraine defend itself are not new, the projected 2027 bill has grown as Russia intensifies its assault, the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran drives up costs and Washington shifts toward positions more favorable to Moscow — leaving Europe and other allies to shoulder more of the cost of keeping Kyiv afloat.

Brussels is heading into negotiations about closer economic and defense ties with London and Ottawa. Diplomats and EU officials said they do not expect a formal bargain, but that support for Kyiv from the EU’s partners is likely to shape the political climate around the talks. Like others in this article, they were granted anonymity to speak about the sensitive diplomacy.

The EU has also raised Ukraine’s 2027 financing needs at meetings of the International Monetary Fund, the G7 and the G20, as well as with Gulf Cooperation Council countries.

“During my meetings in Bangkok, the need to secure financial support for Ukraine in 2027 was a prominent topic,” European Economy Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis told POLITICO, referencing last week’s IMF and World Bank Group meetings. He said he called for “broad burden sharing and stressed the importance of international partners each doing their part as Ukraine continues fighting Russian aggression.”

All the EU officials and diplomats stressed that the push was not a criticism of the U.K. or Canada, both of which are strong supporters of Ukraine. The point, they said, is that Kyiv’s needs have grown.

The U.K. says it has committed a total of £25 billion for Ukraine and Canada has promised the equivalent of €5.4 billion in military assistance and €8.2 billion in direct financial support.

The EU and its member countries say they have contributed over €231 billion since Russia’s full-scale invasion, including military aid, budget support and guarantees, support for Ukrainians hosted in the bloc, and proceeds from immobilized Russian assets — an amount one senior EU diplomat described as already “over and above.”

How to meet Ukraine’s financial needs has become “a central discussion in every single meeting” with partners supporting Kyiv, a Commission official said.

The push to secure Ukraine’s financial needs comes as support for Kyiv will be tested in a series of elections across Europe next year. In France, far-right front-runner Marine Le Pen has vowed to end aid if elected president in 2027, while in Italy, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni faces a challenge from Russia-friendly Roberto Vannacci ahead of next year’s election.

The looming votes, combined with the unpredictability of Washington’s backing for Kyiv, mean European countries need to look beyond their own budgets, the senior diplomat said. “We need to think wider and broader.”

The EU is also urging the Ukrainian government to secure more support from non-EU backers. “This is the first next step that they need to secure from their partners,” the Commission official said.

Not ‘pulling a Trump’

EU ambassadors are set to talk about the upcoming Canada and U.K. summits tomorrow, with Ukraine funding expected to form part of the discussions, the two diplomats said.

Brussels, “without pointing the finger,” wants to use the run-up to the meetings to press for broader support, the senior diplomat said. But the EU “won’t be pulling a Trump” and explicitly linking favorable treatment to contributions to Ukraine, they added.

The Commission has not set out what it will ask partners for or how any request might connect to trade and defense talks. The diplomat said the EU still needed to work out “how much will translate in joining those dots.”

Von der Leyen proposed making Canada the EU’s first “associate member” in her State of the Union speech last month. The October summit in Montreal is an opportunity to develop the idea.

Ottawa will participate in the EU’s SAFE program, which finances joint defense procurement, giving Canadian companies preferential access to SAFE-funded contracts. Closer defense cooperation and industrial access could form part of the wider conversation about support for Kyiv, one of the diplomats said.

In a statement to POLITICO, Kathryn Serieux, a spokesperson for Canada’s Privy Council Office, said Ottawa “is and has been a steadfast supporter of Ukraine,” with Canada committing nearly C$26 billion in military, financial development and humanitarian assistance.

“Canada continues to stand by Ukraine and remains engaged with international partners on Ukraine’s needs,” Serieux said.

The U.K. summit is expected to advance Prime Minister Andy Burnham’s promised reset with the bloc, including agreements on youth mobility, food and emissions trading. Burnham has said the status quo is “not good enough” and wants Britain to move closer to the EU.

London wants U.K. companies to count as European under the proposed Industrial Accelerator Act, which would give preference to goods made in Europe in public contracts and industrial support. British officials worry U.K. firms could lose out despite close links between British and European supply chains.

Three U.K. officials said Tuesday they had not heard of a request for Britain to provide more support for Ukraine in exchange for letting its companies qualify under the act. A fourth EU official said Ukraine was expected to feature in the summit declaration with the U.K., but that it would reflect both sides’ efforts to help Kyiv, rather than a Brussels demand for more support.

The EU is also pressing Japan to increase its contributions, with one senior EU official saying it was lagging in 2026. A person familiar with the thinking in Tokyo pushed back on the idea that Japan was not pulling its weight, saying Tokyo had already given around $20 billion in support to Kyiv — but there could be room for more if Ukraine requested it.

Tokyo is also seeking assurances that Japanese companies will retain access to the EU market, following concerns the Industrial Accelerator Act’s “Made in Europe” preferences could put its firms at a disadvantage.

The Mission of Japan to the EU didn’t respond to a request for comment.

Australia says it has not yet received a request for more funding for Ukraine for 2027. Canberra is likely lower on the list, if it is on it at all, because its prime minister and foreign minister met Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the U.N. General Assembly last month and announced additional funding and a security agreement, an Australian official said.

Dan Bloom contributed reporting from London. Amanda Copp contributed reporting from Canberra. Mike Blanchfield contributed reporting from Ottawa. Gregorio Sorgi contributed reporting from Brussels.

BRUSSELS — Center-right lawmakers in the European Parliament are intensifying efforts to weaken two EU climate laws, a campaign that could undermine the bloc’s push to cut planet-warming emissions.

The European People’s Party, the largest group in Parliament, will this week push for a three-year delay to rules on emissions of the climate pollutant methane, a change the fossil fuel sector and the U.S. government have lobbied hard for.

A growing number of EPP lawmakers now also want to delay — or scrap altogether — a new carbon price on transport and heating, known as ETS2, according to a document obtained by POLITICO. That puts them in line with several EU member countries, including Italy and Poland, which pushed for a delay to the new carbon price at a meeting of EU leaders in Brussels last week.

Both policies are central pillars in the EU’s effort to reduce its planet-warming emissions. A successful repeal of ETS2 in particular would be a blow to EU climate goals, as it covers around 40% of the bloc’s greenhouse gas emissions.

But it would also be a major victory for conservative and pro-business lawmakers and national governments that have been campaigning for less stringent EU climate laws in the name of industrial competitiveness.

Ax the tax

The EU Emissions Trading System, launched in 2005, requires power plants and factories in sectors like steel, chemicals and cement to acquire carbon allowances for every ton of carbon they emit. The total number of allowances is reduced each year, eventually reaching zero.

ETS2 applies the same idea to suppliers of fuel for transport and heating from 2028.

The cap-and-trade scheme will be a powerful tool for reducing emissions from these highly polluting activities. But many policymakers worry it will raise the cost of gasoline, diesel and natural gas and add to voters’ cost-of-living pressures.

Nine national delegations of the EPP — the Polish, Spanish, Italian, French, Romanian, Croatian, Slovenian, Slovak and Estonian — are now calling for ETS2 to be repealed, according to draft amendments obtained by POLITICO. “ETS2 should be deleted,” the amendment, sponsored by Polish EPP lawmaker Adam Jarubas, argues.

Another amendment in the same draft, backed by 10 national delegations, takes a softer approach and asks for ETS2 to be “postponed until 2031.”

EU legislators are already reviewing a proposed reform of the EU’s original Emissions Trading System, which makes amending ETS2 — which is contained in the same legislation as the first ETS — much simpler.

No majority in Parliament or among member countries currently supports delaying or repealing ETS2, but a string of elections next year raises the likelihood that more right-wing governments will be in power before ETS2 comes into force, adding momentum to the push to scrap or delay it.

Methane delay

Last week, the European Commission, the EU’s executive arm, proposed a year-long delay to rules that will require oil and gas importers to monitor, report, and eventually reduce emissions of the potent greenhouse gas.

The delay — which affects monitoring requirements and later obligations on methane intensity — followed months of lobbying from industry and member countries, which claimed the Commission provided insufficient clarity on how to comply. The U.S. government also pushed to delay the rules, which are currently due to come into force on Jan. 1, 2027.

But the proposed delay requires support from both governments and lawmakers, some of whom want to go well beyond the Commission’s revised timeline.

On Tuesday, European lawmakers voted to fast-track parliamentary discussions around the Commission’s proposed delay, laying the groundwork for a fresh vote Thursday. At that vote, the EPP is expected to campaign for a three-year delay of the rules, as well as possible further adjustments, according to one lawmaker familiar with the matter.

Dimitris Tsiodras, a European lawmaker, echoed industry concerns that compliance risks could deter cargoes from Europe if left unaddressed. “We cannot afford to put our energy supplies at further risk,” he told lawmakers.

Right-wingers against the rules will still face opposition from left-leaning lawmakers. Jutta Paulus, a German Greens lawmaker who steered the parliament’s position on the legislation in 2024, announced on Tuesday that her party would table an amendment to reject the delay altogether.

However, the EPP could reach an outright majority if it joined with right-wing and far-right groups.

The party is already exploring a deal with those groups if the Socialists and Democrats — the Parliament’s second-largest group — don’t cooperate with its push for a longer postponement, according to two people familiar with the matter. S&D lawmakers opposed extending the delay earlier this month, but a group spokesperson said the party has yet to adopt a formal position in negotiations.

A parliamentary push for a three-year delay could also invigorate member countries’ efforts to delay the rules further.

Member countries are currently divided, though many, including heavyweight France, support the one-year delay proposed by Brussels, according to two diplomats briefed on the matter.

Poland, Slovakia and Czechia, meanwhile, would prefer a three-year delay, but their luck in campaigning for an extension may depend on where Germany lands, the people said. Berlin is currently split between its socialist-controlled environment ministry and its center-right-controlled energy ministry, leaving countries uncertain whether they can formulate a joint position tomorrow, they added.

Italy is also trying to decide whether to opt for one year or more, two diplomats familiar with the matter said.

In a throwaway comment this week, Donald Trump made clear that he does not regard the war in Ukraine as a conflict with fault on both sides. “Russia frankly has been fine on Ukraine,” the U.S. president said. “They have not been doing that much.”

To residents of Kyiv — who have endured weeks of intensifying bombardment — and Ukraine’s allies across Europe, the remark confirmed a growing impression that the U.S. is taking Russia leader Vladimir Putin’s side in the war.

“American negotiators have been trying to push Ukraine into surrender for already almost two years,” the EU’s top diplomat Kaja Kallas told the European Parliament on Tuesday. The reason Ukraine hasn’t “surrendered on Putin’s terms” so far is because Europe has been providing so much support, she added. 

As they scratch their heads for explanations for Trump’s latest turn against Ukraine, some European officials and diplomats think it comes down to the president’s personal preferences, as much as his country’s political aims.

“I do think it’s a personal thing,” said former British Cabinet minister David Lidington, now distinguished fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, a leading security think tank in London. “Trump is self-centered — his personal predilections for dictators and autocrats, his desire to give opportunities to U.S. businesses … are very important parts of his motivation.”

In private, EU officials agree. “Trump doesn’t like [Ukrainian President Volodymyr] Zelenskyy. He just doesn’t like him,” said one government official who has observed both men closely. “That makes it harder to get the U.S. to help on peace. Everything is a rational business deal with Trump, until it’s not.” 

A diplomat from an EU country — granted anonymity, like others in this report, to discuss sensitive matters — said the inconsistent Trump could change his mind again and reverse recent moves against Ukraine. The U.S. president has chopped and changed on many issues, “except one thing,” the diplomat said. “He seems to be supportive of the Russians.”

“He’s been critical of Ukraine, the EU, NATO, but hardly ever said anything critical about Putin. It is striking. We have to deal with an administration that seems to be more pro-Russian than anything else,” the diplomat said.

The White House didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment.

Mounting losses

For Ukraine and its European allies, the idea that nothing can or will change Trump’s feelings about Zelenskyy is a bleak one. After four-and-a-half years of war, Kyiv is running low on funding, air defenses and — amid swelling support for Europe’s populist right — facing a potential loss of political support in the months ahead. 

Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff met the Ukrainian president and the leaders of Norway and Finland for talks in Oslo on Tuesday, and will head to St. Petersburg to discuss peace proposals with the Russian leadership on Wednesday as the White House pushes hard for a ceasefire. One option Putin will be offered is a three-way leaders’ summit with Trump and Zelenskyy.

Previous efforts to get the Russian president to attend such a meeting have failed, however, and EU diplomats do not believe Putin is showing any genuine desire for a ceasefire. That is partly what makes Trump’s hostility toward Zelenskyy so problematic.

“There is a clear consensus across Europe that Putin does not want peace,” a second EU diplomat said. “He will need to be forced into peace.”

But instead of making demands of Putin, Trump has ratcheted up his pressure on Zelenskyy, even amid escalating Russian attacks on Ukrainian cities this month. Ukraine’s leader is feeling the strain, as he told his EU counterparts in private meetings in Brussels last week, according to the first diplomat.

In a succession of highly critical comments in recent days, Trump has said Zelenskyy “doesn’t care” and “doesn’t want to end this war;” and should be replaced as leader or as Ukraine’s negotiator. “President Putin would like to see a settlement,” Trump said. “President Zelenskyy could have solved this war, or he could have made a deal, many times.” 

The Oval Office beating

Trump’s animosity may date back to an incident during his first term in 2019, when he urged the Ukrainian leader to help with an investigation into Joe Biden, who eventually defeated Trump in the following presidential election, Lidington said. A succession of hostile encounters in the years since — including in the Oval Office in February 2025 — have reinforced the impression, he said. 

“It was clear that in the infamous meeting in the White House that Trump and [Vice President JD] Vance had planned that public beating-up of Zelenskyy and it struck me then that there was a strong personal element to this,” said Lidington.

“I think there’s another element, which is that if you look at the people Trump tries to court, it tends to be autocratic strongman — and it is ‘man’ — leaders,” Lidington said.

He recalled attending a dinner with world leaders in 2018 to mark the centenary of the end of World War I in Paris. French President Emmanuel Macron and the German chancellor at the time, Angela Merkel, were playing joint hosts “at the top table,” but Trump was not interested in making small talk with either of them, Lidington said.

“It was pretty obvious from the body language that Trump was impatient with them and one of the people he really wanted to talk to was [Turkish leader Recep Tayyip] Erdoğan and other people who were a bit more in that strongman image that he likes to portray himself,” he observed.

‘Strange stories’

A senior official from a European country familiar with the Ukraine talks said Trump’s motives were partly political, partly about calculating what would be profitable and partly about personalities.

“They are currently in an election cycle and need someone to blame for rising prices,” the official said. “In general, Trump tends to like various types of people and leaders. He actually has a fondness for successful and cheerful people.”

In recent days, Zelenskyy has warned his country is suffering more civilian casualties because the U.S. has cut back on support, including Starlink and Starshield services that help Ukraine defend itself against Russian attacks and plan operations. “We still have no explanation for this, just different strange stories,” Zelenskyy told U.S. congressmen on Monday.  

This month, the advanced warnings of incoming Russian missile attacks from U.S. partners have failed to come through as normal. Ukraine is also running low on Patriot missile interceptors, he said. 

The Pentagon has not issued an official comment on the Ukrainian complaints. The U.N. Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine said 328 civilians were killed and more than 2,000 wounded across Ukraine last month, an 85% increase compared to September 2025. The U.N. said that the first two weeks of October were among the deadliest for civilians in Ukraine in years, driven by increased missile and drone strikes.

The first EU diplomat quoted above said many European governments were irritated that Trump had cut them out of his conversations with Putin so far. “There is probably much more dialogue between the Americans and the Russians than we might know,” the diplomat said. 

Tuesday’s meeting with Witkoff in Norway raised the possibility that direct engagement with Putin might be back on the cards, for Zelenskyy at least. 

“Today was a good day for peace,” Finland’s President Alexander Stubb said after attending the talks in Oslo. “On a substantive and technical level we have actually made a lot of progress under the radar in the past week or so,” Stubb said.

The process is now going in the right direction again, he added. “Hopefully, we don’t do any backtracking.”

BRUSSELS — The European Union is beefing up its presence in the Arctic to catch up with neighboring powers carving new trade lanes and drilling for resources under the melting ice.

On Tuesday, the EU unveiled a new plan called Northern Neighborhood. It’s meant to prepare for rising military and commercial activity in the north driven by climate change, and calls for new transport, research and security infrastructure in the region.

“The Arctic is one place where the tectonic plates of geopolitics are colliding. And it’s not someone else’s frontier. It’s part of the European Union,” Commission President Ursula von der Leyen declared as she unveiled the strategy.

She pointed to Russia’s expanding military footprint and the race for emerging shipping routes and critical resources as forces reshaping Europe’s security and economic future.

Climate change is dramatically affecting the Arctic. Planet-warming emissions are making the ice melt faster, disrupting the region’s fragile ecosystems. But where the ice is disappearing, countries like China, Russia and even Canada see an opportunity.

The EU is now scrambling to update its existing policies on the Arctic — once largely focused on environmental protection — to give more importance to security, shipping and extracting resources.

The strategy calls for a rebranding of the EU’s existing partnerships with Norway, Iceland, Canada and the U.K., backed by regular summits to set joint priorities and launch projects.

Here are five things Brussels wants to change about its Arctic policy.

1. Defense and security 

The strategy warns that Russia is rebuilding its military presence in the Arctic and that China has growing strategic ambitions in the region.

The EU plans to set up a pilot research project using satellite and maritime observation in 2027 and share ship-tracking data to help identify Russian shadow fleet vessels.

In the longer term, it wants EU countries to lead on a maritime security hub to pool intelligence on threats ranging from undersea cable sabotage to illegal fishing. It also calls for setting up an Arctic Cable Hub alongside NATO to monitor and protect subsea cables in the North Atlantic and the Arctic. The strategy lacks any information on funding for these projects, however.

Finnish MEP Mika Aaltola of the European People’s Party said the new focus on the Arctic is long overdue.

“Europe hasn’t been thinking about [the Arctic] enough,” Aaltola said. “Because of the ice melting and climate change, it’s becoming kind of the next great game. And if that happens, then what are the European positions when it comes to Russia, China and also the United States?”

2. Access to energy resources

The new policy sticks with EU promises not to drill for fossil fuels in the Arctic.

“The EU remains committed to ensuring that oil, coal and gas stay in the ground, including in Arctic regions,” it reads. Instead, Brussels promises to develop renewable energy projects in the region but drops an old commitment to convince the rest of the world to follow its lead. 

“It is good that the Commission maintains its opposition to oil and gas drilling in the Arctic,” said Delara Burkhardt, a Socialist MEP, but not pressing for a global ban “weakens the EU’s ability to push for stronger international protection and leaves the door open for other countries to exploit one of the world’s most fragile ecosystems.”

The EU’s former Arctic policy — drafted in 2021 — committed the bloc to pursuing an international moratorium on Arctic oil and gas extraction. 

Norway — which supplies a lot of energy to the EU — has made it clear it would still drill in the Arctic regardless of the bloc’s position.

3. Critical raw materials 

The EU is under pressure to secure new supplies of critical raw materials to reduce its dependency on China.

The new strategy says it will continue working with Canada, Greenland, Norway and the United States to develop critical raw materials projects in the region, but insists it will do so while following the “highest social, environmental and governance standards,” and work to the “benefit of local communities in respect of Indigenous Peoples’ rights.” 

Brussels has already labeled several critical raw materials projects, including the Sokli project in Finland and the Per Geijer rare earth deposit in northern Sweden, as “strategic” under EU law, which means they could benefit from faster permitting procedures.  

But some of these projects face serious local resistance from local and indigenous communities, who say the mining plans threaten reindeer herding and protected ecological sites. 

4. New trade routes

Melting ice is opening up new shipping routes in the far north, and the EU is worried that it could be sidelined from the region. But the strategy offers little on that front; its only action is a study on new shipping lanes.

The number of vessels operating in the area covered by the Polar Code — international regulations covering shipping in the Arctic and Antarctic — rose by 40% between 2013 and 2025, while the total distance sailed nearly doubled, said Michael Kingston, a special adviser on polar issues to the Arctic Council on marine protection.

Recent transits by Chinese and South Korean container ships using the Northern Sea Route running along Russia’s Arctic coast show the appeal of a route that is about 20 days faster than conventional routes, he added. 

“Russia builds the infrastructure, China facilitates and funds some of it,” Aaltola said, calling it part of a “grand bargain” between the two.

He complained that the EU is left on the sidelines. “When it comes to the Arctic, there is a vacuum of interest, and there’s also a vacuum of resources and institutions participating.” 

The route is still mostly seasonal for Russian oil and gas tankers, said Ksenia Vakhrusheva, project manager and Arctic project adviser at the environmental group Bellona. Ice, unpredictable weather, increased insurance costs and Moscow’s control over the route make it unlikely to become a mainstream commercial corridor anytime soon, she added.  

Europe also has leverage as the final customer for Chinese shipments, Vakhrusheva said.

“If the EU sends a strong message to China that they do not want goods shipped via NSR, China won’t use this route for transit,” she said. “For NSR to become a valid transit route you need two sides,” she said, “a seller on one side and a buyer on the other.” 

5. Environmental protection 

The strategy is light on measures to shield the Arctic from the impact of global warming. However, it does warn that increased shipping in an “inherently harsh and poorly charted environment” raises the risk of “catastrophic accidents, severe marine pollution” and hybrid interference.  

“Increased shipping in the Arctic both exploits this vulnerability and exacerbates it,” said Dave Walsh, an adviser at the Clean Arctic Alliance NGO, citing carbon emissions, wastewater discharge and noise as some of the impacts of more traffic.

Safety and the environment have not been a priority for Moscow, said Vakhrusheva, and a shortage of high ice-class ships combined with the need to sell oil and gas “to whoever is ready to buy it” raises the risks. 

Protections such as a ban on heavy fuel oil are still negotiated at the International Maritime Organization, where the EU is a key player, she said, adding that such measures will push up the cost of Arctic shipping. 

The strategy says Brussels will push at the IMO to turn measures to limit black carbon — soot emitted by ships that falls on snow and ice and accelerates melting — from voluntary guidelines into binding rules.

It also calls for expanding the definition of Arctic waters to everything north of 60 degrees latitude, replacing the current boundary, which excludes much of the waters around Iceland and Norway from special Arctic shipping rules.

It also promises to keep pressing for compliance with the Polar Code through tools such as an IMO regulation that involves national maritime authorities inspecting foreign-flagged ships in Arctic ports to verify compliance with international safety, environmental and crew-qualification standards. 

The document includes non-binding commitments on biodiversity loss and plans to boost ocean and Arctic research programs. It also promises to launch an “initiative to promote local public and private investment in the Arctic around blue economy sectors.” 

Jakob Weizman contributed reporting.