The United States cannot credibly defend freedom around the world while treating the survival of a democracy under attack as a bargaining chip.
Russia’s war against Ukraine is not simply a territorial dispute. It is a test of whether democratic nations will defend the principles that sustain their freedom — or allow an authoritarian aggressor to destroy these principles through military force, terror and economic coercion.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine was unlawful. Its conduct has included attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, and in March 2023, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova over alleged war crimes involving the unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children. All grave allegations that demand accountability.
As Ukraine continues to fight for its survival, current U.S. policy raises a fundamental question: Does Washington understand what is at stake?
If Moscow succeeds in subjugating Ukraine, other authoritarian leaders will also ask whether military conquest can succeed. Can U.S. commitments be trusted? Will democratic nations stand together when the price becomes politically inconvenient?
Ukraine’s defense is not charity. It is a strategic investment in American and European security, Washington’s credibility and the deterrence of future conflicts.
The U.S. emerged from World War II understanding that an international order based on sovereignty, freedom and rule of law serves its interests. And successive Republican and Democratic administrations recognized that unchecked authoritarian expansion threatens both American security and the independence of its allies.
That understanding must guide U.S. policy toward Russia today.
Diplomacy is essential. Negotiations to end the war should be pursued seriously. But peace cannot mean rewarding aggression, compelling Ukraine to surrender its sovereignty or giving Moscow time to rearm for another invasion.
Appeasement does not necessarily prevent conflict. It can encourage aggression by convincing dictators the free world lacks the will to resist them. And a ceasefire without effective safeguards could become merely a pause before the next assault. A settlement that leaves Ukraine defenseless would postpone the conflict, not resolve it.
Peace should be measured not by the speed with which an agreement is signed, but by whether it protects Ukraine’s independence and makes another war less likely. And economic pressure is among the most important nonmilitary instruments available to the U.S. in this process, as Russia’s ability to wage war depends substantially on energy revenues, access to international markets and networks that facilitate sanctions evasion.
On Sept.18, U.S. President Donald Trump signed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 into law. Then, on Oct. 16, he issued an executive order waiving specified sanctions, restrictions and duties authorized under the legislation, citing the national interest. This order raises a legitimate question about how Washington intends to use the economic leverage Congress provided.
The measurable objectives these waivers are intended to achieve, why they serve American national security and what conditions would trigger their reconsideration need to be explained.
The U.S. needs to enforce restrictions consistently, close avenues for evasion and impose consequences when countries or companies knowingly provide material assistance to Russia’s war effort in violation of applicable law.
This does not require abandoning diplomacy. It requires a coherent policy in which economic relief advances clearly defined security objectives.
If Washington weakens its own pressure without obtaining meaningful concessions, it risks surrendering leverage while leaving Russia’s aggression unresolved. Every source of revenue helping Moscow sustain its military campaign has consequences for Ukrainian civilians, who bear them in destroyed homes, shattered families and lost lives.
U.S. policy should not make it easier for Russia to finance a war Washington says it wants to end.
American history has a bipartisan tradition of leadership that combines the defense of freedom with strategic judgment.
Harry Truman understood U.S. security depended on resisting authoritarian expansion. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, John F. Kennedy demonstrated that strength and diplomacy are not opposites. Ronald Reagan understood freedom must be defended against those who seek to suppress it. And George H. W. Bush knew sovereignty and alliances are essential to an international order where nations cannot redraw borders by force.
Though from different eras, the leadership of these presidents reflected a common principle: American security is strengthened when the U.S. combines military strength, alliances, diplomacy and a commitment to the independence of free nations.
A policy that pressures Ukraine more than Russia, offers Moscow economic relief without substantial concessions or asks Ukrainians to accept an insecure future is not a strategy for lasting peace. It risks rewarding aggression and inviting further conflict.
And above all, Ukraine’s future should not be decided over the heads of Ukrainians.
Democratic institutions can be attacked and dismantled far faster than they can be rebuilt. Ukraine’s struggle is therefore about more than one war. It is about whether the democratic world will remain a community of nations bound by common principles or become a collection of states left to negotiate individually with authoritarian regimes.
History will not judge U.S. policy solely by the immediate cost of weapons, energy or sanctions. It will judge whether America stood by a nation fighting for survival, upheld the principles it asks others to respect and helped prevent future wars by demonstrating that aggression does not pay.
Adrian Zuckerman is a former U.S. ambassador to Romania (2019-2021); Mark Gitenstein is a former U.S. ambassador to Romania (2009-2012) and to the EU (2022-2025); Ron Gidwitz is a former U.S. ambassador to Belgium (2018-2021) and acting U.S. ambassador to the EU (2020-2021); Jim Gilmore is a former U.S. ambassador to the OSCE (2019-2021); Kathleen Kavalec is a former U.S. ambassador to Romania (2023-2025); Jim Rosapepe is a former U.S. ambassador to Romania (1998-2001).
POLITICO occasionally publishes opinion pieces from guest authors to offer our readers a range of perspectives on the intersection of power and politics. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of POLITICO.
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