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It’s about ethics in journalism, with Ben Smith

17 August 2026 at 16:00
A photo illustration of Semafor editor-in-chief Ben Smith.

Today I’m talking to Ben Smith, the editor-in-chief of Semafor.

Everywhere you go, people say they don’t trust the media — and yet they’ve never consumed more of it. Audiences have moved on from legacy names in favor of Substacks and podcasts and TikTok news influencers that seem to be everywhere in our feeds. 

Why would anyone want to start a new global news organization in the middle of all that, when even once-storied brands like CBS News can’t seem to figure it out? 

Well, that’s what Ben did four years ago. He’s the guy who ran BuzzFeed News at the height of the Facebook traffic boom, and even wrote a book about it, called Traffic, which he discussed with me on Decoder back in 2023

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Around that same time, he cofounded Semafor, which launched in 2022 with a stated goal of reaching 200 million college-educated readers

You’re going to hear Ben say that since then, Semafor has evolved into what he calls an anti-scale company. It still doesn’t have a website paywall, but it makes about half its money in the convening business — that’s what media types have taken to calling events lately.

And Semafor throws some big events. It actually has a new one called Silicon Valley & The World, which will feature some of the biggest names in tech and AI. That’s part of the events business: hosting the subjects you cover on your big event stage. 

So I wanted to know how that all works, and what it feels like to navigate the ethical conflicts that seem to be everywhere in media right now. In particular, I wanted to dig into how Semafor’s newsroom is approaching AI,  the ethics and optics of putting people you cover on your conference advisory boards, and whether independence is still something an audience is willing to pay for.

Ben and I usually hash this stuff out over beers, and I think you can tell we really enjoy getting into all this together.

Okay: Semafor editor-in-chief Ben Smith. Here we go. 

This transcript has been lightly edited for length and clarity. 

Ben Smith, you’re the co-founder and editor in chief of Semafor. Welcome back to Decoder.

It is really nice to be back.

I’m excited to talk to you. You were on the show three years ago, just as Semafor was launching. It was right as Buzzfeed News, which you founded and ran for a long time, was shutting down.

I keep talking to media CEOs about what is going to happen. It feels like you have figured something out at Semafor. How are things going over there?

Things are going incredibly well, and knock on wood as I say that, but I think we figured something out. There are a lot of different things to figure out, and we’re in this unbelievably strange and unstable moment in media. 

But I do think we’ve figured out a model that is quality journalism built around great journalists, paired with really large scale convening that is building both great journalism and a really good business, a profitable business — which is something that is, to me as a former BuzzFeed executive, novel.

A profitable digital media business is in short supply these days. It’s funny, I was looking over our conversation from three years ago. You had just published your book Traffic, which was basically about what I would call the millennial digital media moment and everyone chasing massive scale.

“The platforms are going to deliver tons of traffic to us and then we’ll collect pennies and we’ll all get rich.” This was a pretty common thesis. It feels like you’re saying you’ve turned away from that. You’ve learned the lesson of that time.

Our chief revenue officer, Rachel Oppenheim, likes to joke that my next book will be called No Traffic, but we are really building an anti-scale business. The luxury of starting in that moment, in the rubble of the traffic apocalypse, was obviously not the path to success.

We had to think a lot about targeting and building a very specific audience. The thing that I have kind of come to realize in all these conversations… I listen to your show. We have a show about media that we yap about this on. What’s the future of media? Is it live? We were just talking about it. Who knows?

But in journalism, I have a lot of conviction that great stories aren’t going anywhere. The need for high-quality insight isn’t going anywhere. Great reporters aren’t going anywhere. What surface this all lives on is up for grabs, and you can’t be too ideological about that.

You say surface, I always say distribution.

Yeah.

A theme on Decoder that we come back to over and over again is your distribution shapes what you make. It’s just inevitable. The medium is the message, to borrow that framing. If surfaces — if distribution — are up for grabs, what are you holding onto?

I actually don’t buy that thesis, or at least I’m resisting that thesis because for the audience, the pull of distribution is incredibly powerful. The core thesis of BuzzFeed was we cracked the distribution and built for the distribution. Maybe I’m overreacting a little to that, but we definitely think all the time about how we want to reach political leaders and business leaders. We want to reach nonprofit leaders, and we want to reach people making decisions.

We want to reach them in person. We reach them a lot in email. We reach them on the web, we reach them in video, but we’re thinking about that same audience across media, and in fact, I think video is particularly interesting because of the pull. Videos are placed on the web in terms of the place you can get massive scale.

Then conversely, where there’s a pull of massive scale to create the biggest pull is just to be hyper-polarizing and find ways to create polarizing confrontation. That’s how you go viral, or one of the best ways at least, and we’re trying hard to build the discipline to resist that pull of distribution.

We’re already deep into the weeds. I hope that listeners can tell Ben and I like talking to each other about these things.

Please visit Semafor.com.

[Laughs] I’m excited to play some clips for you. So I’m glad that you said you were reacting to BuzzFeed. A few months ago we had Jonah Peretti on the show, and right after he had sold BuzzFeed to Byron Allen and the Weather Channel. There’s a lot going on there. In full disclosure to the audience, I literally had a beer with you just before I sat down with Jonah.

I remember.

I did not ask the questions you told me to ask, but he said—

Were they about running? That’s another show.

I didn’t do it. I was quickly in the weeds of Jonah as well, and I put to him what I think of as the original sin of digital media, which is that I think Jonah thought he could go so viral so consistently that he could crack distribution and that Mark Zuckerberg and Facebook would pay him money. 

I’m going to play for you what he said to me in response to that, and I just want to get your reaction to it. Can we go ahead and play it?

Jonah Peretti: Yeah. I mean, first, just as a factual matter, we did get paid millions of dollars by Mark Zuckerberg. The prediction that they would pay for content was accurate, but it was just short-lived. So we got paid for that exploding watermelon.

Okay, so he said that to me and I said, “Yeah.”

That was a good day in the office.

It was a great day in the office, I’m guessing, but everyone knew that Mark Zuckerberg wasn’t going to pay forever.

I agree with Jonah on this. Looking back, we all say the social platforms were obviously going to always be dependent on UGC and never pay for anything, and these media companies building on social platforms never made any sense. 

It’s worth remembering these investors’ experience had been shaped by cable, which was a different distribution platform in which companies like Viacom, ESPN, CNN, and MTV had built huge businesses on the back of this new distribution. So they said, “Here’s another new distribution. We’re going to build big businesses on the back of it.”

We now look back and say it was inevitable that Facebook would never pay for content, but it wasn’t. Facebook executives made choices at various times. They experimented with different things. If you are the person in charge of the success of the blue Facebook app, do you think, “It was a great decision to continually rely on low-quality YouTube generated content”? No, that thing is dying, obviously. They should have found a different path. It was a mistake.

Jonah made this argument to me as well, and this is the other—

Obviously I’m brainwashed by Jonah. I worked with him for a long time.

No, I’m just curious. Your paths have diverged and you are building a very different business.  I’m just curious. This is the other clip from Jonah that I want to play for you. It is an argument that Facebook made a mistake. Here’s that clip: 

Jonah Peretti: I actually believe that it was a mistake for Facebook and Mark Zuckerberg to not continue with the news tab, to not continue to pay professional content creators. These platforms have tons of resources and could have spent a couple of billion dollars a year on that, sustained a vibrant media ecosystem, really owned media in a way that would have been incredibly powerful for them and given them charisma, relevance, and authority that they just don’t have today.

The claim there is if Mark Zuckerberg had continued to fund BuzzFeed, he would have more charisma.

That the Facebook blue app would be more successful had they done different things? That’s pretty obvious. You could argue which things. That’s true, and then if you look at whether you would rather be Netflix or the blue Facebook app? You’d rather be Netflix, right?

Netflix famously doesn’t invest in these either.

Netflix pays a lot for content.

They pay a lot for content, but they don’t invest in news.

News, I agree. News is a complicated business. We’re a separate question. But they pay for a lot of professional content. YouTube is the biggest and most interesting story here because YouTube has found a way for individuals to build businesses on top of it in a really impressive way. There are occasional news creators like Johnny Harris, but he’s almost the exception that proves the rule, but we just had Kareem Rahma on our show.

These people are building real businesses, real careers, on top of YouTube, paying producers, increasingly moving up market. I guess the thing that I give Neal Mohan, the YouTube CEO, a hard time about, is I do think YouTube with the idea of the creator and the development of the word creator built a system in which media companies, middlemen, can’t really survive. 

There was a company called Maker Studios which Disney bought for half a billion dollars. It was supposed to be a middleman between YouTube and creators, and that’s one way to give a group of media people leverage against the platform. YouTube has designed a system in which it’s sort of like Uber. It deals with atomized individuals, not with collectives who have any kind of power, and there are all sorts of different collectives.

But a media company is one kind, and YouTube has, probably to its own benefit — and to certainly to the detriment of the media industry — built a system where it’s built for individuals, and no one has any leverage except for YouTube.

This is the big question I’m getting at. You’re building a new kind of business, you’re profitable. You’re saying you’re anti-scale, no more chasing traffic.

I’m still personally looking at the traffic.

Who doesn’t?

It’s just a personality flaw.

If you were raised in the swamp, you will always be a creature of the swamp. But I look at some of the other big success stories of our time. TBPN is a big success story of our time. These are not huge numbers that they’re driving.

They’re driving massive influence and they’re charging high rates to advertisers that are integrated into their content, and now they’re owned by OpenAI, who they cover on their show. 

You look at big YouTubers, and Kareem Rahma is a great example. I saw him speak in and around Cannes and he was very much like, “Yeah, I make advertising for our partners. I make videos. The advertising is the thing that I make, it’s the revenue.”

Somewhere in there is a big tension for the news, for media companies, where we can’t say, “We probably shouldn’t make the advertising for the companies we cover,” but that is actually how you monetize all these platforms at scale. I haven’t found anyone who solved it. I’m curious if you’ve taken runs at it.

In the entertainment business, which Kareem is in, that’s always how it’s been. James Bond is wearing whatever kind of watch he’s wearing. Although the fact that I don’t remember is a real failure of marketing. There’s not that inherent tension in the entertainment business that you’re going to sell out by doing a product placement, or cutting, or appearing in an advertisement. 

But for news there really is, and you need to be careful. The answer to that is actually the audience. The traditional advertising business is that you are reaching an audience who the advertiser values. For the scaled advertising business, Google and Meta — and increasingly TikTok — built the best mousetraps, and it’s impossible for publishers to compete on that scale.

If you’re reaching people in a very focused way in various particular environments — in person, in email, in video — that’s a case you can really credibly make to advertisers. We’ve built a big advertising and related convening business that way, and that’s one answer. It’s not the only answer, but it is one.

When you say convening business, that’s your events business.

Yeah. Max Tani always gives me a hard time about the word “convening.”

Everyone loves the word “convening.” It’s good. You’ve gotten pilled by the revenue people because they love to say it. Everyone else says, “It’s parties.”

We’re going to come to it because there’s a relationship between needing to get everyone in the room and then covering them, which I personally find fascinating.

It’s booking. You had to not insult me for weeks to get me here.

[Laughs] Or did I nag you every single day until you showed up?

Tell me about the revenue split between those things. Are you mostly making money on journalism? Are you mostly making money in events? Which is higher?

It’s just about 50/50.

Is there a pull in either direction or are you trying to grow them both the same way?

We’re a startup. We’re opportunistic. The convening business grew a lot faster. My partner, Justin Smith, has been building businesses like that. He was CEO of The Atlantic and Bloomberg. I’s much more his experience than mine. 

But he came in with this thesis, which I bought into, that basically convening was the business that you could stand up fastest and make profitable fastest, that was a journalism business. We launched hard into that space because it takes longer to build a digital advertising business: you’ve got to build that digital audience. We launched with that and then it’s just taken off in a way we, or at least I, didn’t see. I didn’t imagine that we’d be really competing with Davos this soon.

I want to come back to that, too. When you launched, I remember part of the plan was to go to subscriptions. You were going to build this elite audience. You’re going to charge them lots of money. It was there in the very beginning.

Was that part of the plan?

It was early on, it was part of the plan.

Startups, yeah.

You also said, “We barely need a website. It’s all going to be newsletters.”

Oh, we did talk about that. You were one of those website people.

To this day.

The last.

The last website on earth, that’s TheVerge.com. That all changed for reasons that things change with startups, but the media industry and distribution changed around it. Was there a moment where you said, “We can keep it free,” because you are one of the last free websites?

In my memory, we always thought at some point we’d do subscriptions, but in my experience you just cannot be ideological about revenue. It’s hard enough to build a business in news without getting all hung up on the values of the different revenue streams. 

Advertising-based publishers will tell you that democracy can only survive in a world where there aren’t paywalls. Subscription publishers will tell you that advertising is corrupting. At some point you realize everyone’s just talking about their book and that sometimes they’re already in a tough business and they’re talking themselves out of incremental opportunities and really successful media companies. 

If you look at Disney or The New York Times, what business are they in? They’re actually in a bunch of different businesses. They’re managing them all really carefully. Our view is that if at some point it makes sense to do subscriptions, we’ll totally do them, but we don’t really see it as an ideological choice. When you’re starting a company, you just can’t do that many things at the same time.

Also, I would say more broadly, and I got mocked for this at some point, but we are insanely ambitious about our long-term growth. We really are trying to build, over decades, a huge global company, and subscriptions are a trade-off that caps your growth in some ways. That’s something we think about too. But that said, we’re really trying to build a good business, and if subscriptions are a part of that, at some point we’ll certainly be a part of that.

You launched with a lot of ambition. You’re the first news organization of your kind to say, “We’re going to cover Africa a lot, we’re going to cover the Gulf a lot in various ways.”

That ambition was that those markets are under-covered, and you’re going to provide new information that readers aren’t necessarily getting from other places. You’ll build up that audience and then monetize them in some specific way. Has that thesis proved out?

Yes, and I would say when we launched, this was the thing that was most confusing to people. That Justin and I had worked in global news and had these real ambitions for it, but also were very careful about sequencing.

When we launched, we were in the US, Brooklyn, Washington, on Wall Street, Silicon Valley, and Africa. I remember it would be like me, Justin, and our great Africa editor, Yinka Adegoke doing an interview, and it’d be like, “Oh yeah, we’re American and he’s African,” and people are like, “What are you talking about?” It doesn’t make any sense, but I think we saw there was an opportunity to be very competitive very quickly in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa, with great journalists led by Yinka and his colleague Alexis, to figure out that model. 

We’re now in the Gulf, and we’re going to launch in Europe and Asia. Those are growing businesses and they’re part of a network. We see it less as a colonial hub-and-spoke model. They’re not reporting back to New York for what people in New York care about. We’re trying to build a network of audiences in each of these places.

Is that pulling you in different directions in terms of resourcing? If your audience in Africa grows faster than the audience in the United States, are you going to put more resources there?

Yeah, we’re definitely very attentive to what’s working. I would say it’s just a truth that the US is the biggest media market in the world by far. It depends on how you count, but more than half of all revenue associated with media in the world is in the US.

Yeah, that was the pull.

Actually the pull is mostly always here. We fight against it a bit because we think this is a really good long-term investment.

This is ancient history, but when I worked at AOL of all places, there was a lot of pull that—

Oh, Engadget

We ran Engadget China. We wanted to be in all these other countries. We would resource and run those operations against much cheaper advertising revenue. Pennies to dollars in some cases.

But the audience was there.

But the audience was there.

We had this experience at BuzzFeed. This is part of why I was so excited to do some of it with Justin, because Justin had successfully built businesses in these other markets. At BuzzFeed we’d gone in, built big audiences, and we’d seen in Brazil, in the UK, in Japan this very intense engagement. People wanted independent journalism of this new digital and independent kind.

I remember in the first meeting we were talking about this, Eric Hippeau, this very smart, long-time digital investor was like, “Do not do this. You will never make any money and you’ll have to shut it all down.” We said, “Ah, forget it, old timer.” He was totally correct. We just never figured out how to reliably monetize them.

Even when you could, you’d say, “The Brazilian edition was profitable this year, but bad news, they have currency controls, so the money stays in Brazil.” “Oh, nobody told us that.”

How have you solved for it now?

We’re pretty careful about keeping the costs low and growing the verticals with local revenue. There’s also a lot of value in these huge gatherings that we’re building, that they are fundamentally global, whether it’s in Silicon Valley or in Washington. Building these global networks of CEOs and political leaders feeds that network. That’s been valuable. But I don’t know, we’re careful as part of it. That’s one thing I learned from BuzzFeed.

The high-flying VC era has produced a generation of very conservative media operators.

That’s right.

I think that’s fascinating. The other big innovation I want to talk to you about from the beginning of Semafor, and then I want to start talking about what you’re doing now, the Semaform.

You launched with this way of writing an article. You still use it to this day. I see it all the time. The thesis was that it would just sort of make it simpler to understand what all the different pieces are. I always thought that was funny because you were chasing the most elite audience possible, and presumably they could already understand what was going on.

That’s the problem. They could understand what was going on. And what is going on in a newspaper article is we have a who, what, where, why sentence.

And then you have another sentence that says the same thing. And then you have a paragraph, and then you have a quote that is from an expert, but it just reflects whatever the reporter thinks and they’ve picked the expert with their bias to repeat. And then you have an unsupported paragraph of random theories called the nut graf.

Everything else is just chronological order. Particularly the “an expert in disinformation says this” or “an expert in democracy says this,” any reader sees, “This is what the publication thinks, this what the journalist thinks. Why don’t they just say it rather than do this weird move of filtering your biases through an expert?” And particularly with a sophisticated audience, they’re in on the joke a bit. There are two sides to it because one is that the journalist is required to smuggle their opinion or their analysis in other people’s voices. The other is that really good beat reporters are real experts.

A sophisticated reader actually wants to know what Maggie Haberman thinks to a really high degree. Because the other deal in the newspaper is that you conceal your own analysis and opinion. On both sides of that, the reader is sort of losing out. You’re treating them like an idiot because you’re smuggling bias and opinion in, and then also — and this is particularly true of really senior experienced beat reporters — people read Reed Albergotti or Burgess Everett and want to know what they think. So tell me what you actually think.

The Semaform is an attempt to separate “here are the facts of the story we can all agree on” and “here’s the journalist’s analysis.” For an analysis to be interesting, there’s got to be some chance it can be wrong. Otherwise, it’s totally banal. We go out of our way to try to find somebody who disagrees with us to include that, too. People like that. It’s a bit of humility also.

Back in my day, we just called this blogging.

[Laughs] Blogging, yes.

I would just write down what I thought all the time.

I would say this was influenced by blogging. I know, we’re all old bloggers now. It’s so embarrassing to explain to people that you used to have a blog.

What do I run to this day? It’s still fundamentally the reporters saying what they think.

Someday you’ll be explaining to people you had a podcast.

It’ll just be my VR avatar talking to your VR avatar.

[Laughs] It will be another silly word, yeah.

No legs. It’ll be great. The reason I ask about the format in particular is that my thesis is that distribution and formats shape each other. Semaform was a new format. It was a way to reach an audience and say, “We know you’re not stupid. We’re going to show you the structure of the story out loud.” Has it been successful? Has it actually succeeded in attracting an audience or is it just the trademark of how you do things now?

We hear a lot about it from our audience. People really like it. We also do a lot of shorter form stuff, and so that’s not always broken out that way. But that value of, “We’re going to be really humble, we’re going to be assertive about what we think, but also very, very open to disagreement, very clear about the difference between a fact and analysis,” is core to our DNA and everything we do, including in the events.

Let me ask you Decoder questions. I want to just talk about what’s going on in this industry now. Because you’ve learned a lot and it’s been almost four years that Semafor has been going. Those are all the big early bets and I just want to check in on them. How big is Semafor now?

We’ve got about 60 journalists, and more than 100 employees.

How is all that structured?

I’d say more than 100. It’s probably about half journalists, half a commercial team that includes revenue and a great events production team. We do all that stuff in-house. Part of the luxury of a startup and part of the challenge in news is that — and I think you’re inside at the moment one or two companies that have cracked this — there’s not a lot of talent on the business side of news for obvious reasons. It’s a terrible business.

You go to Harvard Business School and 30 percent of those people go into enterprise sales and .01 percent go into media, for the obvious reason that they like to make money. They look around for where the money is and it’s not in media.

We’ve been incredibly aggressive about trying to recruit really, really great commercial operators and people on our revenue side. It’s fun to be in a place where the wattage on the business side is really, really high. That’s been a real luxury for us. We have bookers, we have producers, we have people thinking about the vibes and the music. We take all that stuff really seriously.

Do you have an in-house DJ?

Would I call Brigitte Anders-Kraus an in-house DJ? I think that would be a reasonable thing to say.

That’s pretty good.

I think she would object. She does a lot of other stuff too. She’s very efficient.

When we did the code conference, I spent a lot of time thinking about the Spotify playlist.

You got to think about that stuff.

Actually, that brings me to the other Decoder question I ask everybody. You have a lot of decisions to make. You’ve grown up a lot over the past four years at Semafor. How do you make decisions? What’s your framework?

I personally make decisions very, very, very fast at very high volume. But I am very attentive to the people around me when they think it’s a mistake, and I’m quick to reverse them

I care a lot about hiring great journalists and having people who I really trust and I rarely jam a decision down anybody’s throat. I want to be surrounded by people who are deep experts in what they’re doing, whether it’s managing or building AI tools or reporting. But I’m very happy to lose fights.

This is a new kind of business you’re describing. You want to make a lot of decisions fast. You’re growing in a lot of different areas. Every time I see you in person, I bring you a new journalism ethics problem. This is a real recurring theme in our relationship. I’m always struggling to be pure of heart.

You come from the most corrupt corner of journalism, which is gadget reviews. You’ve appropriately figured out that in that dark cave, ethics is this incredible way for The Verge to distinguish itself.

It’s literally what we say to our audience: “We are selling you this policy that we can’t be bought.” Maybe that’s the right thing. I look at some of the creators and I look at some of their Lamborghinis and I think maybe that’s the wrong thing. But that’s the way it goes.

I started by playing you that clip of Jonah Peretti saying if Facebook had only paid for news, the tech CEOs would’ve retained relevance and charisma. Maybe the blue app would be better. I’m looking at a media ecosystem where it feels like actually there’s elite capture of traditional media.

David Ellison bought CBS News, to whatever success or failure that’s going to be. He’s, depending on your point of view, either trying to get out of his Warner Bros. deal or he’s dead set on owning CNN and changing it however he wants to change it. Through his family, there’s ownership of TikTok.

Brendan Carr is fulminating at the FCC about what happens on the broadcast stations. He wrote an entire chapter of Project 2025 about regulating content moderation on platforms. I see more influence on the media from that side of the house than ever before. 

That’s the audience that you aggressively try to go out and attract and monetize in different ways. How do you view all of that right now?

These are really different things. We’re in this moment of politicized wealthy individuals buying media companies and using them to curry favor with the White House. That’s just a very specific thing that is incredible.

In some sense, my view of the media has always been that if you actually are delivering something your audience wants, that gives you independence. They want you to be asking tough questions. They want you to be delivering them true facts and insight. That’s the path. There’s a temptation, particularly for places that don’t have strong business models, to start making ethical compromises and you see it all over the place.

In a way, because you’re in the gadget review space, you see it so clearly. I think it’s true in every space. The core thing of journalism and what makes it interesting is the adversarial quality and the independence and the independence of the people you’re asking questions of, the people you’re covering. Businesses like advertising complicate that, but if you don’t hold onto that independence, you’re giving away the whole story. 

We think obsessively about that. For businesses that like innovating, it’s so important that you actually do not want to innovate in the field of ethics. That’s the one space where nobody should be innovating or you should be very, very careful, because if you think about why marketing conferences are so boring, it’s because they aren’t doing tough independent interviews with the people. Our events are interesting because we’re doing tough independent interviews and giving that away would be an enormous mistake.

Can I ask you a really direct question about that?

You’re doing Silicon Valley & The World, which is the big new conference. This is you saying you’re going to compete with Davos. You’re going to put on a bunch of conferences like this that compete on the biggest stage. You’re convening people, as I’ve been told.

I looked at your announcement, and you were kind enough to invite me to it. On the board are Jensen Huang and Satya Nadella, and they’re advisors, but you’re going to do challenging journalism. How does that work?

It’s a reasonable question and it’s a feature of the convening business that is somewhat new business to me, too. But first of all, we’re thrilled that Jensen and Andy Jassy are going to be there and we’re going to be doing newsy on-stage interviews with them. It is a feature of that business.

If you look at the way The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal and our other competitors like Bloomberg do it, part of building a community around these events and getting excitement around them is pulling the newsmakers you’ll be interviewing into the event in some way. The New York Times calls them task forces. The Wall Street Journal calls them a council. Bloomberg actually also calls them an advisory board. But the journalism is totally independent of them.

But how does that work? I did Code Conference and I remember thinking, “I really need to get so-and-so CEO to show up on stage.” If the day before they get on the jet to show up in California, we say, “So-and-so’s CEO is deeply corrupt. Here’s our eight-month investigation…”

They’re probably going to cancel on you.

They’re probably going to cancel. And I thought, “That’s going to be fine. That’d be great actually.”

Yeah, totally.

Because I’ll get on stage and say, “They canceled because they can’t take it.” But at the same time, I knew that the people buying the tickets probably were buying the tickets to see so-and-so appear on stage. This never actually came to a head. This was never actually a problem. It was just always in my mind.

Maybe you weren’t doing enough exposés.

I thought, “Should I be causing this problem more?” How do you think about that? You cover these companies at a really high level.

We do obviously write stories that they don’t like all the time. We try really, really hard to be fair. We try not to sandbag people, but there are two different things. One is, “Did you write a story that upset them and they canceled on you?” You just have to be willing. That’s just the cost of doing business in journalism and that’ll happen and you just can’t think about it. We are trying to be grown up and fair.

One of the things that I’ve noticed is there’s a sense, particularly if you go to these conferences that are not run by journalists, that you don’t want to ask the hard question. You’re a little nervous about there being this core question in the CEO’s business or in this politician’s leadership that is awkward to ask. But of course that’s the question that the CEO spends all his or her time thinking about. Not only are they ready for it, they’ve also thought about it more than anybody else. They’re eager to engage on it. 

It’s like a weird illusion that senior leaders don’t want to be asked hard questions. That’s crazy. The reason they’re in those gigs is because they find it really interesting. They’re much more relaxing jobs.

If you’re interviewing the CEO of Ford and you’re not asking him — and how are you not? — about this crisis of China swallowing their business, what are you doing? There is an impulse, which I think is totally wrong, to tiptoe around the hard questions. I actually think for CEOs, for political leaders, it’s boring for them to go on stage and tell the same canned anecdotes about their personal biographies they’ve told a thousand times. It’s their job to answer hard questions.

I’m always asked by various comms people, “Why do the CEOs come on the show?” In our YouTube comments, people ask, “Why would they show up?” The answer I’ve most commonly gotten is this is the only way their own employees will listen to them.

They want to see the challenge and the stakes and the conflict as you’ve described are present in this format, whereas no one’s listening to the all-hands.

It’s important that you be respectful. There’s a slice of tech journalism that really concluded that the people they cover are monsters. It’s probably hard to get those folks to talk to you then. Conversely, there’s a slice of the tech industry that has concluded all journalists are in a deep conspiracy to destroy them. 

Both of those slices of media culture have run their course and are both toxic and boring at this point. Everybody should stop and just cover these people like important decision makers in the middle of great stories. That’s just the news business.

We care a lot about our independence and other journalists’ independence and build it deeply into the events.

It’s more than a slice on either side. Our own audience says, “All of these people are monsters,” and they’re reading a tech website. I look at most of the politicians in America. They’ve come around to, “Maybe we should stop the data centers, or we should at least talk about it because people will like us if we talk about it.” After a decade of talking about regulating social media—

And not doing it. 

—and clamping down on Big Tech and doing nothing, we’ve never passed a privacy law in this country.

You see there’s a lot of heat around “these guys are monsters, we can just throw sticks and stones at them.” And then on the other side, they own the distribution channels. They’re on X, doing whatever they want to do. There’s a sense that they don’t need the accountability.

Mark Zuckerberg just published a 6,500 word manifesto that in my estimation is freshman year political science thinking. He’s going to get away with it because there’s literally no one around him to say, “Try being smarter than this.”

Do you see that connection at your events, where the thing you need to challenge some of these executives on is people think you have bad values, not your business decisions?

When you are interviewing somebody where there’s a core critique of the thing they’re doing that is the values, you should definitely ask. You always ask them. That’s the question they’ve been thinking about, too.

I actually disagree with you on the AI CEOs though. We’re moving out of an era where you had business leaders. Marc Andreessen is patient zero of this — very, very smart guy, very influential and influenced a lot of people to think this way, but who had this deep paranoia about the media and the sense that it wasn’t relevant.

If you look at the really great business figures of this era, of the new ones — I would say Dario Amodei, Sam Altman, and Jensen Huang — these are classic showmen who love the media. Or I don’t know if they love the media or they hate the media, but they, like Steve Jobs, understand it, like Donald Trump. 

They’re selling something.

They’re salesmen who see the media as a very important sales channel, which is how business leaders have always been. They’re running circles around the guys and the women who are sitting paranoid, saying, “I don’t know if we can talk to this reporter.”

They just pick up the phone and they’re on the cover and they wear the leather jacket and they do whatever the slightly corny but incredibly effective Time magazine cover style thing is. Obviously the legacy media is diminished and there are new outlets, but fundamentally they’re showmen who aren’t operating out of some kind of deep theoretical relationship with media that they plan to change.

Elon is obviously the big exception to this rule, as of many, but the rest of this new generation of business leaders have a much more normal relationship with the media.

One of the things that I think is really interesting in that context is the rise of the news creator, the news influencer, where they aren’t of the machine the way that you are of the machine. They don’t have a Justin Smith saying, “I’ve built a global news operation. You just do the great reporting, I’ll find new business. By the way, all the big print newspapers have task forces. We will have a global conference and solve independence.”

The influencers and creators I talk to, this is all a first impression for them. The idea that they can be plied with gifts or access or made to seem more important, they feel it.

They struggle with it on a deep level. A lot of our industrialists and politicians now understand that that is a faster route to a bigger audience and that there’s more influence to be had there over the content, over the editorial. How do you compete with that?

You have to have courage in your conviction that people want journalism, that people actually would like true facts rather than lies and independent voices rather than ones that are corrupt. That’s a very optimistic view, but that’s broadly true. You’re seeing that the most interesting and most successful creators are also finding that.

The great Silicon Valley podcaster Dwarkesh Patel’s questions have gotten tougher and tougher because he’s very sophisticated and I think he realizes his audience knows that, if you’re interviewing Jensen Huang about how he thinks about chips in China, you should ask him the hard questions, not the easy ones, and that’s more interesting. It’s so obvious. For journalists who admire or worry about creators, there’s some lacking in the courage of their own convictions that it is more interesting to ask hard questions than easy ones.

Don’t you need the person to show up to be asked the questions of? This is the dynamic that I see in so many places. With the podcasters and the creators, what they’re learning is that their audiences are durable. You don’t need the famous person. You don’t need Apple access to get your big audience. If you have a big audience, you can do whatever you want. My formulation of that is the less access you need, the more you get. But that’s a hard lesson to learn at the beginning.

There’s an old saying that access is a curse, too.

Oh, access is poisonous.

I follow politics very closely, and you see this in Washington. I don’t know if you remember, but in the beginning of the Trump administration, there were all these influencers in the White House press conferences asking Karoline Leavitt how she does her hair. The thing is I think they and their audiences found that that was extremely boring, and they wandered off to talk instead about having paranoid fights with Candace Owens or whatever.

Similarly, the Pentagon in particular brought in all these what they saw as allied, pliable, right-wing influencers to replace the hated mainstream media. And then when the Iran war started, Gateway Pundit is grilling Pete Hegseth about the war and he doesn’t have answers because there are a lot of toxic things about audience capture and you can be pulled all sorts of crazy places by your audience, but also you can be pulled toward journalism by your audience.

What you saw in that Pentagon press room was that their audiences were nervous about the war and did not like it. So suddenly Pete Hegseth is being grilled by these pet outlets that he’d put in there to avoid dealing with real questions. There was some sense that journalism isn’t a trade that you learned at journalism school. It is actually a service to your audience that anybody can figure out if you are paying attention.

One of the really interesting things to me about that dynamic in particular at the Pentagon is so many of the journalists they put in there were video first. They were making clips. I could see them in those press conferences trying to get a clip. They knew the video would play and then the platforms reward conflict, and the comments were, “Why did you ask this question?”

What do you think Sam Donaldson was doing in the White House press room in the 1980s? These are stages for performance.

Sure. Who was it? It was Newt Gingrich who figured out C-SPAN was the stage for him. I understand, but the clip economy in particular. 

They’re going to manufacture a clip, and maybe it’s the audience pulling you towards journalism or maybe it’s just the algorithm pulling you towards conflict.

There are good pulls and there are bad pulls, for sure.

Sometimes it’s hard to tell the difference. You’re doing more video now, and that’s right next to the fact that the Semaform is there to expose the structure of journalism because its audience is really smart and some of them are CEOs. And then you’re going to go make video on video platforms and you’re going to experience that other pull. How do you think about managing that? Are you not chasing scale? 

No, we think about it a lot, about not chasing scale on video, but trying to have really high-level conversations. That there’s a big — but not the biggest — audience for really sophisticated conversations with leaders in media or in Compound Interest, our business show; CEOs on our CEO Signal show; and other stuff we’re going to be launching.

Video reminds me so much of the social web, and the allure of infinite scale if you just follow it toward this fixed point that everyone else is also going toward. It’s this incredibly homogenizing force. Everybody on the left is doing Bari Weiss outrage this week, and it’s very, very hyper partisan. No, we just have really had a lot of internal conversations about resisting that.

How do you make money if you don’t chase scale on video?

You have to reach a really high-quality audience.

And you’re just going to bake the ads in? Are you going to do the ad reads? This is the other big problem of the creator world is the platforms don’t pay you any money, and they’ve certainly learned to pay people less money.

Yes, we do integrated campaigns with direct-sold advertisers. I don’t know. You do host reads. I noticed that Odd Lots, my second favorite show, is doing host reads these days.

This is the biggest concept in all of media.

The principle of journalistic independence is incredibly important. The forms change when you’re in these moments. What I remember is that on Google, the ads used to be in yellow and they had a yellow overlay. At BuzzFeed, we said, “Okay, that’s the convention. We’ll have a yellow overlay on our ads. That’s how you know it’s an ad.”

Then Google removed it, and we said, “I guess that’s not the convention. I guess ads can be the same color as everything else.” These things are signals to the audience and the forms change through time. Again, you don’t want to be innovating the field of ethics, but you have to realize that the forms are changing.

My harshest take about all these platforms is Google made the ads not yellow and then it made them look like the content, and then it changed the economics of the web such that the only profitable thing to publish on the web is marketing content and listicles about what shoes to buy when you go hiking, and now that’s all that shows up in AI Overviews.

And then Meta started charging you to distribute those rather than letting them go viral on their own if they were good.

So everything became advertising. YouTube just made it harder to make money on YouTube. They changed the rules of their partner program. The only way you can make real money as a creator on YouTube and have your big staff is if you do the integrated brand campaign — if you become an advertiser or an ad agency.

That is the pull of all these platforms: “We’re not going to pay you anything, we’re going to take the content for free, maybe we’ll even train our AI on it, and you will integrate advertising it somewhere.” I get what you’re saying about not innovating in ethics, but as someone who has resisted the many, many, many demands that I do the host reads and the checks that come along with it, that’s the innovation is we’re making the reporters read the ads now.

In the old days of TV and radio, the hosts read the ads, and then they stopped. Now they do it again. Maybe there’s some study saying they were more corrupt.  But I haven’t really seen any evidence of that. I just think these are different kinds of forms.

It used to be that front page advertising in newspapers was considered horrifically corrupt and now they do it all the time. Some of this stuff is people get caught up on the forms in a medium that’s just changing really, really fast. No, we want to create amazing advertising that our advertisers are really happy with and works for them. That’s just core to the business. It is another nice thing about starting from scratch. 

There’s a difference between when you’re building a media company, as you have done, thinking about, “This is a product that our audience is going to love and that our advertisers are going to love.” And in that neonatal state, church and state can talk to each other a lot. Once you launch the thing, they’ve got to be really independent.

This is the core challenge of our time, especially if you want to make something that gets wide distribution. If you want to start a newsletter on Substack or Ghost or Beehiiv and charge a lot of money to a small audience, I think you can do pretty well. Your ability to have a massive impact gets immediately limited, as you’ve said. There’s a cap on your audience size. It seems like Semafor wants to have the big impact, but retain the elite audience.

That is a way to build a big business without reaching a huge scale is to reach a very, very valuable audience. Again, that’s not the only way to build a media company, you wouldn’t want to be in a world where that was the only kind of media company, but we are totally, totally focused on that. It is working and it is allowing us to hire great journalists to break stories.

One of the things that I consider with our audience all the time, because we were free until about a year ago, is that we had a huge audience and they were very aware of any of our potential biases. Maybe this is just the tech audience, and we have lots of commenters. But if you love Apple, everything is going to be pro-Apple. That is just the firmament in which a tech publication stands.

But also Comcast was an investor in Vox Media and Vox, and we would have to disclose it. Comcast didn’t like me, but we would disclose it all the time. There’s just some part of, “Well, we think the audience is smart, they’re an elite audience, they understand the structure, they might understand the biases that come with having Jensen on the board of advisors, having a bunch of Saudi royalty on your board of advisors.” How do you feel about that?

No, they understand what we’re doing quite clearly. 

Do they think that that gets some influence? Because that’s what the consumer audience definitely believes.

I don’t know what they think, but our promise to them is that it doesn’t, and that we’re covering these people very independently. In fact, a lot of the people on these advisory boards have diametrically opposed interests to one another. 

There’s no journalistic followthrough, not any more than I think being on the DealBook task force influences what you see in The New York Times. I do think though, in the biggest sense like this, as you said, just to go back to something you said earlier, that everything is marketing.

Everything is corrupt.

In corners of media, including our corner, we’ve managed to really hold the line on this, but if you look at a lot of social video in particular and platforms like TikTok, totally undisclosed advertising is everywhere and it really distorts how people see the world. Just in terms of people’s judgment about what’s working, what’s real, what’s not real. 

I think about this a lot in the AI space actually, because there are so many anecdotes out there or videos of people doing incredibly cool things with this tool or that tool, and you just never really know. It’s just hard to know what’s marketing and what’s not, what’s just literally paid for and what’s not. We are doing a project that I’m very excited about called the Semafor Innovation Atlas. It’s just literally trying to report, “Here are some cool particularly public sector AI projects that are real.” Because there’s so much out there that’s just unreal but that tells a good story, which is in a way the job of marketing.

I had a partner at a very, very large consulting firm tell me they had done hundreds of AI deployments and less than two dozen had yielded positive ROI.  I said, “Can you just tell me that on the record?” And he said, “Absolutely not. We want hundreds more.” 

We’re in that moment where everything feels marketing, everything feels corrupt. The thing I’m just pushing at is the audience, their base assumption, regardless of how elite the audience is, is that everything is corrupt. I find the higher up we go, the assumption that things can be bought and paid for increases.

We live in a very populist moment, in this widespread belief that everything is corrupt. It just diffuses through society and it’s partly justified. It’s partly not. My favorite example of this is the congressional stock trading thing, where there’s been a lot of research. There are, I’m sure, corrupt Congress people front-running stocks. It’s never been a big problem and there’s no study showing that it’s widespread. 

To try to disabuse people of this, they passed a law several years ago saying that members of Congress have to disclose their stock trades. And now there are all these accounts. There’s 400 whatever members of Congress, some of them are winning, some of them are losing. If you only look at the ones who are doing well, you can tell a story about widespread corruption.

Now, everyone believes it’s incredibly corrupt as a result of a transparency measure that actually showed it wasn’t. We’re in a moment where there’s this deeply baked-in sense that every institution is corrupt. We try by being really transparent and really direct and, by not compromising on this stuff, sending a message to counter that. But you’re swimming against a big cultural tide right now.

For us, a big part of the marketing of our events and the way we make them good is that it’s going to be a festival of news, we’re going to ask real questions, it’s going to be exciting. Justin at some point I think called Semafor World Economy “Davos with follow-up questions.”

That’s pretty good.

That to me is like you guys saying, “We don’t take freebies in reviewing gadgets.” That’s a huge selling point for you. You got to really lean into that, not away from it.

The thing that gets me now, the reason I think we can market it, is that if this was 10 years ago saying, “The Verge has an ethics policy,” all of my competitors would say, “So do we.” I think Wired is doing great reporting. 

A lot of the way they market their great reporting is they just say out loud, “Look at all this reporting, we do it. Buy our subscription.” It’s totally effective. They’ve cracked some code there by just saying out loud that they do the reporting, people will pay for it. 

Turns out people like journalism.

I think that’s very smart. What has occurred to me in all of that is particularly our youngest audience does not know. They did not come up the same way. The water they’ve been swimming in their entire lives is social media, integrated brand campaigns by creators, and a feed that is increasingly fake and bought and paid for. I’m not sure about us showing up and saying, “There’s an old way of doing this.”

See, I disagree. People don’t want to be lied to and don’t want to be fed slop. We’re headed for some kind of reckoning like the big payola scandals in the radio industry.

Everybody inside the radio industry knew and it was a totally open secret that the way you got your song on the radio is you pay off the DJ, but it turned out the audience was not in on the joke. So when Congress held hearings into it totally blew up the industry and upended everything. 

Particularly with political influencer marketing, people hate that. You’ve got to think Congress is going to come in and crack down on it. I’m actually optimistic about that. Adam Schiff just recently introduced a bill on it. That probably won’t be the one, but everybody hates this. The idea that your favorite influencer is being bribed by some politician to lie to you, people do not like that. 

That disclosure, which is mostly in effect or somewhat in effect with big brand marketing, if PepsiCo buys an ad, they’re going to disclose it. There’s a lot of shady stuff happening around the margins. And then politics, because there’s this chasm between the Federal Elections Commission, which sort of collapsed, and the FTC, which regulates other advertising. There’s all this undisclosed and undisclosable political advertising. I just do not think people like that. That’s going to wind up having to be regulated. It makes people angry. It makes you angry.

I’m curious about this. There was a recent story, I think it was Politico, saying all of the young staffers on the right have no idea how to do anything, because they’re all comms people. They’re all influencers and there’s a talent shortage. 

I think Madison Cawthorn was the bellwether. He came into office and he said, “I’ve got more comms people than policy people.” And then it very quickly became clear that wasn’t going to be great. But now that’s the norm that we’re all just tweeting policy into existence. We’re going to stop the Iran war with tweets. It’s a real thing that happens once a week in this country.

There’s something there that’s broken. Political influence operations, maybe we hate when they’re paid for, but they are politics now. And they’re part of the feed in a very real way.

Sometimes in really damaging ways, this administration is incredibly responsive to social media. A story goes viral on Twitter and somebody gets their immigration status pulled — I just read a piece from a woman who’s in ICE holding because there was a sort of misleading campaign saying her husband’s mother had been a translator for the Iranians in the ’70s, and so she’s now in an ICE holding cell. The administration acted because this went viral on social media.

There’s always been a very intense relationship between the media and the politicians. The New York Times publishes a story and then Chuck Schumer the next day introduces a piece of legislation, which is the oldest trick in the book. 

Actually, it’s not been my experience that Republican staffers in Washington are incompetent. I live in New York and often go to Washington, and I’m in Washington a lot. People in my liberal Brooklyn neighborhood will say, “God, it must be so horrible to deal with those Trump people.” The reality is actually they’re incredibly polite and responsive. 

It was a nightmare often to deal with the Biden people, because Democrats think that journalists work for them. That writing something independent is an act of betrayal. I suppose Republicans have either appropriate or lower expectations. That’s sort of always been true.

Communication has always been a pretty important part of politics, but there’s a way in which the disorganization of this administration in particular just means that they’re totally reactive to random pieces of media that somebody plays Donald Trump on an iPad. That is really different.

I just see that we’re going to tweet policy into reality as a feature of this administration. There’s not a lot of rigor under that policy often.

Or often somebody else just tweets something and it goes viral. This was the story of DOGE. Musk was just seeing tweets and making policy based on it.

Do you think that has come to an end? We’re saying people hate these political influence operations, that probably they will get regulated in some way because both sides hate the idea that all the influencers are getting paid by politicians.

No, right now we’re in the worst part of it. Although you’ve seen a federal government that had had a lot of momentum and ability to execute things, it lost all of that. At the White House, there’s much less able to do anything right now, so there’s less happening.

This is where I wanted to wrap up. It’s going to break somehow. There’s some kind of reckoning coming where people want the truth. People don’t trust the tech companies. The antipathy towards AI in particular is high, but the tech companies and a bunch of billionaires own all our distribution in very significant and serious ways. Something is going to happen. The audiences are going to change in some way. There will be some reaction somehow. Do you have a view of that?

This stuff keeps changing. There is a temptation to validate the populist impulses of the moment that I actually think journalists should probably resist sometimes. I heard your interview with Gaby Del Valle about data center politics. I loved her anecdote about a rumor going around that the data centers were killing cattle, and she tracked it down to one Texas farmer who had lost one cow. 

I actually think the role of journalism is not always to amplify the populist reaction, even though it’s so easy and social media validates that. It’s a little more complicated. I actually hesitate to predict whether things are getting better or worse.

Your event Silicon Valley & The World is coming up. If I had to make one prediction about the midterms, it would be that surveillance and data centers will cause some sort of left-right realignment. They scramble the lines in very populist ways.

But they also cause alignment. They bring together very disparate groups of people. How do you expect that class of billionaires, which all want things, to react to what I feel like will be a surprising story in the midterms?

There are different strains of this. The data center story is so hot right now, and I’m in the minority here. Most people think this will be a huge political issue for a long time. Companies try to build facilities in people’s neighborhoods and then they go in and they sponsor the Little League team and they pay a bunch of carpenters and they sponsor the parade. That is actually something corporate America is pretty good at. And it’s unbelievable how badly they screwed this up, these data centers.

Yeah, it’s very bad.

But that is because they aren’t actually causing stillborn cattle. Fundamentally, with the exception that they’re going to have to navigate the energy issue, they’re going to have to find a way to not elevate energy prices. But some of that probably does fade as companies figure out how to do this without infuriating neighborhoods and doing it in places people want it. Maybe it will become less of an issue.

The big questions around regulating AI are just fascinating. And you’re right, after, as you said, not regulating social media and then beginning the [second] Trump administration with this incredibly accelerationist point of view, they are now just doing it. They’re just regulating this technology day to day. They’re going to have to figure out a framework for it. Every political candidate will have to have some point of view on it.

It’s pretty unpredictable what this is going to be, but I do think we’re in a new era. Particularly the biggest part of the new era is just that the federal government is now this huge participant in the economy and in the economy of tech. It owns a big chunk of intel and is trying to shape technological policies and picking winners and losers. Executives are in Washington constantly trying to make their case. I think that whoever the next president is, that probably doesn’t change. And that’s a really massive structural shift that we’re all going to be covering.

Do you think that you can run as a populist if you want to take a big stake in our AI companies? Or is that a redistributive move? 

I don’t think populism is necessarily that. I wouldn’t get too far into the details. It just depends how you talk about it.

That does seem like the theme of the day in Washington.

What do they say about simple solutions to complex problems?

Yeah, Trump has compared those stakes in companies to the sovereign wealth funds.

Yeah, that’s reasonable.

A lot of Gulf states have that. I actually wanted to ask you about this. You cover the Gulf deeply, you’ve got events in the Gulf. The United States, I would say, is in some kind of free speech crisis that is modeled a lot after the control that Gulf states have over their media and what people are not allowed to say. The Kushner family is all wrapped up into that.

How do you think about all of the things you talked about independence when you have that money in your organization, when you have those folks on your various boards at events, when you have journalists on the ground in those places?

We cover Saudi and the Emirates in particular a lot and pretty aggressively. We hired the great reporters from Bloomberg and The Wall Street Journal and places like that in the region. We don’t have any investment money from the Gulf and for many sovereigns. I’m not sure that’s what you meant, but just to be clear about that.

They’re on your board for these events.

They’re advisors. There are some executives from that part of the world on advisory boards. But we cover them independently. The same as the Financial Times and The Wall Street Journal and others do in that region, and in The New York Times. If you talk to reporters who work in the region, it’s very, very hard and complicated. And there are local laws that you have to be careful about.

We were the only ones to write about a very interesting story, the way in which the Emirates, I believe, were preventing photojournalists from distributing images. That’s just the law. If your photographer goes and takes a picture of a drone that hit a building, they will arrest them. Every news organization that operates in that region, that operates in China, you just have to be really, really careful and thoughtful about it, but you can’t let it compromise the reporting.

Do you feel like it compromises the reporting here in the United States?

No. I think that global news organizations actually — and if you think about The New York Times, which has reporters in Tehran — have thought really hard about this. There are stories that you have your correspondent in Washington write that you wouldn’t have somebody on the ground in Tehran write. And obviously, we think a lot about the safety of our reporters, but it’s a complicated question.

I asked that question because I see what the Trump administration does to journalists here.

It’s funny, because I think that we obviously are in this, as you said, free speech crisis here in all sorts of ways. I don’t think it’s like a monarchy that doesn’t have the First Amendment. I think we’re a long way from that. 

To me, the closer parallel to the Gulf is personalist rule. People talk a lot about corruption, but when you think about these relationships, often it’s a totally different style of doing business where you’re helping your friends and family. But it’s like a totally different modality that obviously in the American tradition is incredibly corrupt. In other parts of the world, that’s just the nature of business. I think that’s how parts of the Trump administration operate. 

The Trump family in particular sees that as a model. That was the comparison I was making. You can see them enriching themselves, particularly in that part of the world.

I do think that elements of that style of doing business are more like other parts of the world. Obviously a lot of the speech stuff here is terrible, but it’s really not like… I mean, just as somebody who operates there, it’s not like being in a country without the First Amendment.

Fair enough. Lastly, I just want to talk about AI in your newsroom for one second. We’ve talked a lot about AI in the industry. You make a lot of stuff. The pull, especially when you go make a bunch of video, is to fire ever more content into these algorithms. We haven’t really talked about it. Maybe the only journalistic ethics crisis I’ve never brought to you is, how should we use AI?

Because I know that you’re such a purist. It’s funny, I go back and forth on how high impact it will be, but right now I’m like all the way forth on this. A colleague of mine built this great internal tool that is too boring to explain, but it’s going to totally change all of our lives internally. And I’m now a huge believer in the SaaSpocalypse. It’s all going away. 

You cancel your Trello contract and you’re done.

Some of this internal tooling is amazing. We also produced this report out of Semafor World Economy where it was a five-day event with three simultaneous stages and 300 interviews. 

On Saturday morning, I texted the team, “Hey, I know you’re all tired, but could everybody write a little like ‘what I learned at Semafor World Economy’?” And everyone said, “Ugh.” And then Reed Albergotti, our great tech editor, said, “Give me a couple of hours.” He dropped all the transcripts into Codex or Cowork and then produced something that said, “Here are the most commonly made statements. Here are some disagreements.”

We then spent a week hammering through that and actually wound up creating a lot more work for humans. But the notion of, “What’s the takeaway from these 300 conversations?” That’s a job for AI basically. It’s a very hard thing, because no one was in all of them. They were simultaneous.

That was a great product that we then released and will continue to build on. I’m actually very bullish about AI, but fundamentally the best parts of reporting are gathering new information that isn’t on the internet and then communicating it with people. Everything in between is production and is very vulnerable to AI. Those things I think are pretty defensible.

It’s a good argument. I’m going to come around to it, I promise. I’m going to come around to it. This very much was a conversation exactly like the conversation we have over beers all the time.

Okay. I have an AI question for you.

There’s a tool that allows you, on a podcast — if you screwed something up, if you’ve mispronounced somebody’s name — to drop it in with your own voice so you don’t have to go back into the studio and rerecord that sentence. Is that okay or not? This is an argument we’re having internally.

It depends on exactly how misleading you think you’re going to be.

No, just like you mispronounced my name in the intro, and your producer said, “Hey, can you come back into the studio?” It’s Saturday morning.

So if I mispronounced your name to you on air?

No, in your intro.

No, because then that’s just an edit. I would just pick it up.

No, I know, but you have to go into the studio and rerecord that. But you’re on a boat doing whatever it is you do. And your producer can just take your voice and redo it.

That’s fine. I honestly think that’s fine.

I think that’s fine too. Okay, good.

The deception comes if I mispronounce your name to you here, and then you leave, and then I make it better. If I’ve done something misleading. If I’m just picking up audio that you would have never heard and we’re just going to do an edit, we’re editing that anyway.

Okay, good. I feel the same way.

To me, the line always comes down to who is being deceived. And if you’re literally going to deceive the guest and you’re going to create a moment that never happened, probably you’re way over the line.

Although honestly, that’s a standard practice in television. They’ll recut the questions.

I’ve heard this. Although, now they’re all getting in trouble and I have to publish the full transcript, or the Trump administration sues them.

Ben, this has been great. Like I said, this is very much like many of the conversations we’ve had in private. I hope the audience can feel it. Thank you so much.

I really enjoyed it. I love the show, and thank you for having me on.

Questions or comments? Hit us up at decoder@theverge.com. We really do read every email!

Why babies’ experiences matter (even if they can’t remember them)

16 August 2026 at 13:00
A smiling, bearded man wearing a green sweatshirt and a black hat feeds a baby from a bottle while sitting on a leather couch.
A happy father feeding his baby. | Roberto Machado Noa/LightRocket via Getty Images

No matter how hard we try, remembering anything that happened to us before the age of, say, 3 or 4 years old feels impossible. Even memories before 7 years old feel hazy and fragmented.

Our brains just aren’t built to store specific memories from our first few years, something known as “infantile amnesia.”

And chances are, even the earliest memories we think we have might just be amalgamations of stories we’ve been told, images cribbed from old family snapshots and home videos, or scenes we’ve borrowed from movies or TV shows.

So does it really matter if it happened, if we can’t really remember it?

Yes, science says. Even if we don’t have a specific memory of what happened when we were babies, those experiences leave lasting impressions on us of being safe and being loved, which shapes how we form relationships later in life. But whether babies are able to encode and store permanent memories is still an open question.

Columbia University cognitive psychologist Tristan Yates put babies in MRI machines and showed them a series of images, and found that the babies tended to stare longer at an image they’d been shown before, suggesting that they remembered seeing the image the first time.

“We are showing that they’re able to form some memories,” Yates said. “The hippocampus is capable of forming specific memories over a few minutes, but now we need to start doing the research that can get us at longer durations, that can get at more complex memories.”

One theory for infantile amnesia is that an infant’s brain is prioritizing learning general skills, like how to walk or talk or eat, or learning to detect patterns like a bedtime routine, rather than storing specific memories that aren’t necessary for survival.

Noam Hassenfeld spoke with Yates and Dr. Dana Suskind, a professor of surgery and pediatrics at the University of Chicago, on the latest episode of Explain It to Me, Vox’s weekly call-in podcast.

Suskind studies early childhood development and the important role that parents and caregivers play, and she told Noam about how our early childhood experiences can shape us.

Below is an excerpt of their conversation, edited for length and clarity. You can listen to the full episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts. If you’d like to submit a question, send an email to askvox@vox.com or call 1-800-618-8545.

You started out as a cochlear implant surgeon and now you’re working on childhood development. How did that happen? What’s the connection there?

It actually makes a whole lot of sense. When I first started our pediatric cochlear implant program at the University of Chicago, I started implanting cute little kids who all look like they had the same potential to thrive after implant surgery, and found very quickly that I could implant two children who looked very much the same, who had parents who loved them equally, with the same technology, but they would have very different outcomes, with one of them really thriving after surgery in terms of language learning and trajectories, and others barely able to communicate. 

It was that experience and seeing these huge differences in outcomes after the same surgery that led me into this incredible world of childhood development and the importance of the early years and the importance of parents.

Humans come out with brains that are literally only one-third the size of adult brains. That’s very different than any other species. It’s why the puppy can start feeding itself pretty quickly and start walking, whereas the human infant is helpless. In those first three years of life, 85 percent of the physical brain is built during those periods of time. 

A million new neural connections happen every second. The environmental input, the input from parents and caregivers — every serve and return, every touch, every gaze — literally is helping shape and strengthen the neural connections that happen in our brain. 

The brain isn’t being just built for your child’s vocabulary development or their literacy ability. It’s building their social brain, their ability to relate to and connect to the rest of the world. The relationships and the expectations for relationships are built in those early years.

Tell me if this is maybe an oversimplification, but I’m a parent of a young son; he’s a little over 7 months old. And I feel like what I’m doing when I’m raising him is building the structure of his brain, or building the architecture, and all the other stuff, all the specific things, are going to fill in all the rooms of the big building that we’re constructing together. But he’s not going to start filling those in with specific ideas or specific memories until later on in his development. 

The analogy you make is exactly right. I think of building the physical brain — if you were thinking about it through a computer lens — as building the hardware, the firmware, the memory, the RAM. I think of K-12 as really important, but I think of those as software updates. But these early years are building that infrastructure.

“I want you to not strive for perfection, because the one thing that AI has shown us is that humans don’t grow from perfection and frictionless existence.”

At the end of the day, it’s your attachment with him, being the perfectly imperfect parent. I want you to not strive for perfection, because the one thing that AI has shown us is that humans don’t grow from perfection and frictionless existence. So feel okay every time you misstep, misunderstand and repair, because that is, for him, building the understanding of, “I can be loved by another human who missteps but is able to repair.” He is starting to understand how to expect to be treated. 

That’s why it’s almost like you’re building the relationship map for him that’s going to allow him in the future to have expectations of how he’s going to be treated and loved by an imperfect human: building that strong bond, showering him with rich language, that back and forth, looking at him as a conversational partner from day one. 

It’s interesting you brought up AI and friction. What do you think this idea of a more frictionless existence is going to start meaning for kids?

I had a book that just came out on this called Human Raised, and that’s a lot of the argument of the book. Children learn from imperfect parenting through friction, through the productive struggle. And we’re seeing that friction that we’ve always looked at as a bug in the system — like, “Oh my gosh, I wish this was a more frictionless existence with the other humans in our world” — what we’re finding is that it is key for relationships development, learning to have relationships, and actually even learning. 

That’s why, writing an essay with an LLM — you don’t remember it at the end of the day. There’s something about what happens in the brain that we’ve discounted on the friction side of things. So I actually think in some ways friction should be the word of the year, and we need to embrace it a little bit more. We don’t need to friction-max, but we do need to see the power of the friction.

It sounds like even if my son is going to forget all of this, maybe on a deep level it’ll stick with him. But should I still have a nice big 1-year-old birthday party?

Heck yes. Because you’re doing it partially for you — and the grandparents, let’s be clear. Those are wonderful moments that they do remember at some level. My son, who’s now 20-something in medical school, was obsessed with Thomas the choo-choo train. I still have the box of the Thomas the choo-choo train. 

He may not remember exactly that birthday party and the cake that I worked very hard on, but it’s even fun to talk about it now in his twenties. So yes, do enjoy every moment. Don’t get obsessed, like everything has to be perfect, but those are memories for everyone.

Hasan Piker isn’t retreating

15 August 2026 at 14:00
Rep. Ilhan Omar and Hasan Piker stand and applaud with Wisconsin gubernatorial candidate Francesca Hong.
Rep. Ilhan Omar (D-MN) and Hasan Piker stand with Wisconsin gubernatorial candidate Francesca Hong during a campaign rally for Hong on August 2, 2026, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. | Joshua Lott/Getty Images

Hasan Piker has for years now been both an asset and a liability for Democrats. The Twitch streamer has elevated base-energizing progressives, such as Darializa Avila Chevalier and Zohran Mamdani, in interviews and with endorsements. But he’s also stoked controversy with past anti-Israel commentary and generally caused headaches for establishment Democrats who would rather not see Hasan’s favored candidates get any more oxygen. 

Why? A familiar concept for these kinds of centrist Democrats: electability.

That concept has been on many left-leaning voters’ minds over the past few weeks, as primaries have put progressive candidates to the test — with very mixed results. Last week, Wisconsin gubernatorial candidate and democratic socialist Francesca Hong lost her primary to establishment favorite David Crowley. Not long before that, though, progressive Michigan Senate candidate Abdul El-Sayed won his primary against the more mainstream Democratic candidate, Rep. Haley Stevens — albeit by a much smaller margin than many polls predicted.

America, Actually host Astead Herndon caught up with Piker to talk about whether the recent primary results have refined his understanding of how prepared Americans are to vote for democratic socialists, what support for unabashedly progressive candidates tells us about the changing working class in America, and the “pundit brain” problem in the Democratic Party.

Below is an excerpt of Astead’s conversation with Piker, edited for length and clarity. There’s much more in the full show, so listen to America, Actually wherever you get your podcasts or watch it on Vox’s YouTube channel.

The last two weeks have produced mixed results for left-wing candidates: a big win in Michigan and a win this week in Minnesota for Peggy Flanagan, but a loss for Francesca Hong, which was a surprise in Wisconsin.

What have been your takeaways from the last set of results?

I think the ground game is phenomenal. There’s a lot of excitement on the platform. There’s a lot of excitement for the first time for “Change Candidates.” It’s still a good environment to be in if you are a socialist.

The establishment does have a lot of juice still, for sure. And when they can put together a similar strategy to what happened in 2020 against Bernie Sanders with Joe Biden, especially in a place like Wisconsin where Tony Evers is very clearly still a very popular governor, they were able to elevate David Crowley’s campaign, who actually had dropped out and consolidated support behind Sara Rodriguez initially. And he had to drop out because he was only performing at, like, 6 percent.

Yeah, the consolidation was swift, and it was complete. I mean, you’re comparing it to 2020, in which the establishment lined up behind Joe Biden and kind of nixed that Bernie Sanders campaign in the blink of an eye. I imagine you were surprised at the result.

I never underestimate my opponents, whether they be Republicans or whether they be establishment Democrats. You have to always operate as though you’re down 10 points. I don’t believe in the notion that we are going to win easy victories at the end of the day.

There are a lot of powerful interests at play here. There are a lot of people in positions of power that don’t wanna lose their seats. So they’re gonna fight like hell, so we have to also fight like hell. We have to fight extra hard, as a matter of fact, because we’re almost always outspent, right?

I got an alert right before we started talking from the New York Times that said, “A democratic socialist lost in Wisconsin, which shows the movement’s surging wave might crash before rippling out from big cities.” Is that wrong?

Oh, I love that. Look, people are gonna have their opinions. I’ll just say it like this.

Abdul El-Sayed’s one-point victory margin showed that the Democratic socialist-aligned movement or the progressive movement was in tatters. It was obviously a failure. And now, David Crowley’s less-than-one-point victory proves that the centrist bulwark is still here, and that the Democratic socialist movement is dying.

It kind of feels like it’s wish-casting for the most part, from a lot of people who maybe want to go back to the way things used to be. My assessment on this is definitely a little bit different. I think, at the end of the day, these are insurgencies, right? These are insurgent candidacies.

We’re talking about no name recognition for a state legislator that was entirely propped up by local Wisconsin DSA chapters. These people didn’t have a lot of money necessarily, and they were able to defy the odds, and they continued defying the odds all the way until the end.

The idea that the polls showed that Francesca was a clear frontrunner and was running away with this race is utterly irrelevant. Especially if you were to look at this with a broader perspective, like thinking about where Democratic Socialists of America have gotten to in the last two years.

I mean, I remember how I felt in 2024, in the aftermath of the DNC, about where the American socialist movement was as opposed to where it is now. We are clearly a force to be reckoned with, and that’s precisely the reason why a lot of people are paying close attention to what’s going on.

And I’ll say it like this. The fact that the Hong campaign did not have any major progressive national endorsements, and that I was like their top surrogate.

There was no Bernie Sanders endorsement, there was no AOC endorsement. That did make the Hong campaign unique on that front.

I think there were a couple other races that I was also involved in where my candidates lost, right? 

I mean, Saikat Chakrabarti was another great example of this as well. It wasn’t a statewide race, and obviously, there’s always clear local differences that play a formative role in how these races turn out.

But we’ve looked back at this data. There are a couple different endorsement trackers out there, and they’ll put my endorsement up there, and they’ll put, like, AOC and Bernie Sanders. And it’s very clear that the best likelihood of success usually comes from a consolidation of national progressive forces, whether it be outside expenditures coming from Justice Democrats or things like that. And with the Francesca Hong campaign, I think it’s a testament to their success. It’s a testament to how popular the platform is in general.

And one thing I will have to stress here is the salience of the electability narrative. I think that’s still a real motivator for a lot of people.

Yeah, I hear that. Both El-Sayed’s campaign and Hong’s campaign did better among middle-class voters — I should say, than the data would tell us, among working-class voters. Considering how central working-class and bottom-up issues are to the DSA message, why has it not produced results that actually get it more working-class votes? Because that does seem to be something we’ve learned over the last three, four weeks.

I think that we have to dramatically reconstruct how we understand what it means to be working-class in this country. I think a lot of people will disagree with what I’m about to say here, but we have to do away with this fantastical notion that the working-class is one specific thing.

I think for the longest time, people have thought about this hardhat-wearing coal miner as the true working class, oftentimes White as well. And the working class is unbelievably diverse in this country, and it’s also a lot more college-educated than people actually give it credit for.

I think partially this is because if you look back to the ’90s as opposed to right now, yes, if you had a college education, you were upwardly mobile. You were probably a professional managerial class individual that was going to be able to retire at a reasonable age. You were doing fairly well. It was a guarantee for getting a good job, right? 

That’s not the case in America any longer. There are a lot more people who have a college degree who are downwardly mobile, who are having a very tough time in the current job market, who do not own a home, and it’s seemingly less likely than before that they will ever be able to own a home.

And that is the actual working class. It’s much broader, right? So we’ve seen in Zohran’s race and in Abdul’s race, there’s this massive group of working-class folks that constantly get cast aside as not being a true representation of the American working class, when I think like, No, that is the true representation.

Mark Zuckerberg has an Instagzam

14 August 2026 at 18:54

Instagram's wordmark is iconic. Well, was iconic. Apparently Instagram thought it looked old, so the company rolled out a new one this week. It doesn't look like the old Instagram wordmark. It doesn't even look like it spells Instagram anymore. And we cannot figure out why Instagram decided to do this.

On this episode of The Vergecast, David and Nilay start by discussing the new logo, the executive urge to redesign everything all the time, and whether new is always better. After that, they get into the other big Meta release of the week: Mark Zuckerberg's many-thousand-word missive on the future of AI. There are a lot of ideas and proposals

Read the full story at The Verge.

Does Google even want to win at AI?

13 August 2026 at 16:10
A photo illustration featuring Google CEO Sundar Pichai and Deepmind cofounder Demis Hassabis.

Today on Decoder, I’m talking with Hayden Field, The Verge’s senior AI reporter, about a question that’s been rocketing around the tech industry for the past week: Is Google losing the AI race?

That’s because last week Google announced a bombshell reorganization of its AI division, Google DeepMind. Jeff Dean, the company’s chief scientist, is leaving to form his own startup and DeepMind cofounder and CEO Demis Hassabis is stepping aside to focus on longer-term research.

You can read these moves, and Google’s reaction, in a lot of different ways. So I really wanted to sit down with Hayden to dig into some of the smartest analysis we’ve seen this past week, and what we think is really going on here. 

Also: At its core, this is an org chart story — and what is Decoder about if not org charts?

Okay: Verge senior AI reporter Hayden Field on what’s happening at Google DeepMind and the future of AI research. Here we go.

This interview had been lightly edited for length and clarity. 

Hayden Field, you’re The Verge‘s senior AI reporter. Welcome back to Decoder.

Thanks. It’s great to be here.

It’s always chaos when you’re here, Hayden. 

It really is. There’s no week off. Every week something crazy is happening.

This time is a little bit different. The news happened last week. Google reorganized its AI division, Google DeepMind. Demis Hassabis, who was the head of DeepMind, has ascended into Google heaven where he’s now the chairman of DeepMind. He’s going to focus on bigger research. Jeff Dean, who had started Google Brain, left with a bunch of other people from Google to start a new lab that will run on Google Cloud.

This is a big reshuffle of Google’s AI efforts. It comes as Google is not competitive on the frontier anymore. There’s a lot of reactions to this news. I wanted to just go through some of that reaction with you — you’ve done a lot of reporting on what’s going on with Google, what’s going on in the industry — and try to put this all into context for people.

So let’s just start at the start. Google is by and large the best-positioned company to win AI. If you just look at what it is, how it makes money, its distribution power to put AI in front of people, putting AI in Search, its resources, it feels like it should have always been the winner. 

As you reported from the Elon Musk-Sam Altman trial, everyone was afraid of Demis Hassabis the whole time. You look at all of these ingredients and you think, “Google should be the runaway winner.” Instead, I would say over the last week, a lot of people have said, “Google’s going to lose,” which I find fascinating.

Is that your diagnosis of what’s going on with Google? Is this just a catastrophe for its bleeding-edge efforts?

It’s really bad, but I do think people are forgetting how powerful Google is and how much they own. All of the integration they can do, all of the tools, all of the data they have on us — they have a huge safety net, is what I’m saying. A huge cushion.

Even if they make huge mistakes and are falling behind, I still think you can’t count them out completely because they have so much power. However, it’s crazy to me that they have that much power and all that going for the company, and they’re still not in the lead, let alone being behind as of right now. That’s what I think is crazy.

And Sundar and Demis both made that point in their statements last week. Sundar wrote that the company’s committed to being at the frontier and they’re focused on the areas they need to improve, which is CEO-speak for, “We know we need to get our shit together.” And then Demis wrote that the company’s “entering a next chapter” and that “it has the ingredients to lead from here, and I firmly believe we will,” AKA, “we aren’t yet, but we have the ingredients to do it sometime in the future.” Both of them acknowledging that is pretty crazy.

It’s not looking good for them, but it reminds me of someone with a trust fund. They have a fallback. Don’t count them out yet.

That trust fund is Google Search. They have a product that billions of people use and that they’re putting AI into. As you and I have discussed many, many times, that is a consumer product. Consumer AI has not yet reached a point of making a bunch of money for a bunch of people, but everyone sees that as the prize. All of the action is in enterprise AI right now, and you can see Anthropic is out to a big lead because of their focus on enterprise AI and in particular coding.

One of the things I want to come back to is whether Google made the wrong bet on multimodality and world models, which Demis is really focused on, instead of these core enterprise use cases and whether they even want to be at the frontier. They’re saying they want to be, but maybe they don’t. Maybe they just want to sell cloud services to Anthropic, which is a business that is growing for Google.

But hold that thought. I want to come back to that. Just put that in your brain. This is part of the framework that I’m thinking about. You just said Sundar said, “It’s the next chapter. We’re committed to it.” They’re making changes.

But Hayden, a few months ago I was sitting with Sundar Pichai and I asked him, “Hey, you just restructured this entire company. You got rid of all of your senior executives. You have all new ones. You made DeepMind.” He said, “Yeah, that was hard.” Here’s a clip:

Sundar Pichai: It was tough to convey it outside, but I pivoted the company to be AI-first. We had all the ingredients, so in some ways I felt like the Overton window had changed. People were adopting these technologies faster than we had expected. To me it was a way to go and actually express ourselves through our products, but I realized we had to organize ourselves for it. And going back to my earlier point, I realized we need a core model and a core infrastructure team to power everything we are doing across Google. A lot of my initial energy was to go set that up.

To get one AI team, we had world-class research teams in Brain and DeepMind and brought those together as Google DeepMind, which was harder than it sounds because it’s like saying, “Go put Stanford and MIT together and create a department out of it or a university out of it.” So I think we’re doing that well. 

That’s Sundar saying, “My company wasn’t organized for the AI moment. We were slow to react to ChatGPT. I made this huge change to build a central infrastructure team.” It’s three months later, four months later, and the head of Google Brain is leaving. The head of Google DeepMind is becoming the chief scientist. 

Now, Google DeepMind doesn’t have a CEO anymore. It has an SVP. What do you read into that? Is that yet another reset or is it just more of the same?

It’s another reset, but it’s hard because I really do think it’s both. It’s a result of the fact that Demis has never been interested in the productization stuff. He’s, like you mentioned, really into world models, research, curing disease, and drug discovery. And Jeff Dean is similar. So I’m not surprised.

If you’re being optimistic, you could view this as just the ripple effects of the conversation you had with Sundar, but I also don’t think this bodes very well for the company because, as we’re seeing with OpenAI literally right now, whenever there are a bunch of executive shakeups, people get nervous. People below them leave. People don’t work as hard because they’re thinking too much about things. Plus, a lot of the people that are working on AI at Google are there because of Jeff Dean or Demis. So what’s going to happen now?

They’re thinking about this solely on the page, logistical. “Okay, who is best positioned to speed up our productization?” Maybe that’s the best decision. But when you take into account all the minds that are leaving and all the minds that will leave in the next couple of months, it’s going to be rough.

There’s a lot of controversy, or I guess curiosity, around Gemini 4, which is not yet out. They announced it at Google I/O. They put all their emphasis on the 3.5 class models. The 3.5 class models are not at the top of the leaderboards. They’ve actually fallen quite far behind.

Does this strike you as the actions of a bunch of executives who think Gemini 4 is going to vault them back into the lead? Or do you think people are getting out because Google isn’t as committed or focused on being on the frontier?

As SemiAnalysis wrote in its blog, “These are not the actions of people excited about Gemini 4 Pro.” So definitely not. Google is pretty committed to being a frontier lab. It’s more, is it going to reach its goal? Though my answer to that a few months ago would’ve been that it was a frontier lab, right now it’s more of a wait-and-see. It is right now, but is it going to fall out of favor?

SemiAnalysis put it more heavily. They said in their release, “We believe DeepMind is no longer a frontier lab.” To me, it’s still got that designation, but in a few months that might be very different and I didn’t anticipate that changing so quickly. There’s a chance it could go the way of Meta where they suddenly get pretty behind and they keep promising things and then taking a while to deliver. Same with Apple, actually. We’ll see.

I’m glad you brought up SemiAnalysis. It’s an investment research firm. They do great work across AI and chips and thinking about how the math of all this should work out. That post really struck me as well.

I just want to reuse some other parts of it. There’s a lot of this in which The Verge has covered Google for a long time and there are echoes of this throughout our coverage of Google, and there are some parts of this which feel new to me — they’re new problems for Google.

So I’ll just read you the longer version of the quote you just said. As Hayden said, they wrote, “For all intents and purposes, we believe DeepMind is no longer a frontier lab. Google will continue meandering on and releasing models, but their odds of reaching the state of the art again have dropped to zero.”

This strikes me as an incredible claim. We see the model race twist and turn all the time. And to say, “Google will never once again hit the state of the art” feels like an enormous claim. That’s the part that feels new to me. Week to week in AI, anything could happen. Do you think there’s evidence for that?

That’s really putting the cart before the horse. It’s been a few months since we ourselves wrote about Gemini 3’s hype. It was winning the model race for a few weeks until something else came along. I definitely don’t think the odds have dropped to zero for them reaching state of the art again. In a way, they’re cutting out some of their research focus and just going all in on products. If they’re really going all in on that and they find a way to put all their efforts behind that, they will reach state of the art again.

However, what this will be is them constantly catching up right after another frontier lab. And then the other frontier labs that invest in research more and long-term stuff are going to be pulling ahead. It’s kind of the same thing as if you’re a writer and someone keeps copying you, they’re always going to be right behind you. They’re not going to be thinking of the next thing like you are.

That’s what I foresee ending up happening here. If you’re not really investing quite as much in the longer-term research and all these niche areas that, for example, Jeff Dean’s startup is going to be looking at, I feel like they could reach state of the art again. But it’s not going to be them coming in the lead over and over again. 

That’s the part that felt new to me. I don’t really know how to evaluate that claim, especially as Google’s AI division changes leadership. I can’t read Sundar’s mind. I’ve tried many times. It’s very difficult to see what’s going on in his head. I don’t know if he wants to win that race or if he thinks Gemini is good enough now to make a bunch of money inside of Google’s products. I really don’t know how to evaluate, “They’ll never be at the state of the art again.”

The part I do know how to evaluate is the second part of the SemiAnalysis claim here, which anybody who has paid attention to Google will immediately understand and immediately agree with this, I think. 

They go on to say, “Perhaps there’s some world in which Google reaches the state of the art again, but we think the odds are basically zero… The issue with Google was not Jeff Deam or Noam Shazeer,” who we should talk about, “but rather their extremely bureaucratic, painfully slow, and strategically timid culture.”

That’s Google. I literally sit with Sundar once a year and say, “Tell me about your culture and tell me about this bureaucracy.” There’s something about Sundar saying to me at I/O, “I made DeepMind the center of the company and then everything else is productizing their development,” and then all the people leaving and SemiAnalysis saying they’ll never be at the frontier again because their culture is so bureaucratic, that is uniquely Google to me. It feels very familiar.

I know you’ve talked to people at Google since all these announcements. Is there a sense that Google’s culture needs to change even more to go and compete?

There’s a reason that so many people are flocking to Anthropic right now. Anthropic is not perfect by any means. They have a lot of red flags as well. But I’m seeing a lot of people from OpenAI, from Google, from Meta flock there because, as we’ve reported a bunch, people in this space are a little bit post-money. A lot of times they don’t care just about the salary or what they’re making. They care about working for a place that aligns with their values that they believe in. Google has really rubbed a lot of people the wrong way when it comes to that.

Jeff Dean and Demis had both signed a public letter in 2018, saying that AI shouldn’t be used for lethal autonomous weapons. Jeff Dean had been tweeting in the months before he left Google about the fact that mass surveillance could be a really big problem with AI. Jeff Dean even signed an amicus brief in support of Anthropic with the whole Department of War situation, which Google ended up signing and just kind of letting the Department of War do whatever with their AI.

I could see a lot of people fleeing in the next few months because Jeff Dean seemed to be, according to my sources that I spoke with there, the person keeping a lot of people at Google. I could see a big exodus happening in the next few months.

This is one of the bigger questions. Who was the keeper of the morals and values of this team inside of a Google that seems to be more willing to play ball with the Trump administration? With the Department of War, and with the uses of AI that some people are very, very skeptical or very, very skittish about?

There’s been a lot of reporting about the fact that when Google acquired DeepMind and Demis, they signed a pledge to never use DeepMind technology for military purposes. That has been watered down. In fact, Jeff Dean recently said, “We should not use AI for these purposes.” There are people inside of Google who’ve sent a letter. There seems to be a lot of big-name talents who are saying, “We don’t want to commercialize this stuff in the way it’s being commercialized right away.”

The problem is that it’s the governments and the militaries who are spending all the money right now, and Google is good at making money. It wants to fund AI development with actual revenue instead of raising endless amounts of debt like the startup frontier labs are doing. Is that conflict navigable for Sundar and whoever’s running AI now, or is it just the reality of being a huge corporation that funds its efforts with revenue?

It’s unfortunately not surprising to me, for a huge corporation in the US where you have to maximize shareholder value. They’re subsidizing a lot of their AI efforts right now, it seems like, to me. For example, the other day I vibe coded a new website for myself and Gemini was the only tool that I could use the free version of for nine hours. I was trying to do it as an everyman, so I wasn’t signing into any of them. I just said, “Which one will let me go with the free version and do a ton of stuff?” It was only Gemini.

They’re really trying to get people in their corner here and trying to change developers’ loyalty, change engineers’ loyalty over to them. So they need money. And to be fair, I do think they could do this a lot differently if they wanted. They’re one of the largest corporations in the world and they’re making a lot of money in other areas. They don’t have to be doing this, but that doesn’t mean they won’t. And I think they will continue.

But I also think, like I mentioned, that’s going to lead to a lot of brain drain. One of the current Google employees I spoke with said that a lot of people around him felt like losing Jeff Dean was a big blow for morality at Google, and that it also continues a brain drain they’ve been seeing and that mediocrity is the likely result. So like what you were saying, they may be always catching up from now on and never forging a path ahead like they had been six months ago.

I think this brings me back to that framework I mentioned at the very beginning that I wanted to put a pin in. Does Google want to win at the frontier or can they just sell Google Cloud at enormous high rates to Anthropic and OpenAI while maintaining usable models for its consumer products at high rates?

There’s a world in which Gemini is there for you to search your Gmail and provide AI overviews and be cheap enough to run to let consumers vibe code websites for nine hours at a time. But the real money is in selling TPUs in Google Cloud to Anthropic and Anthropic is going to go collect the government money and Google is just there as a vendor. They’re just selling to Anthropic and OpenAI and whoever else needs data center capacity.

We can see Google Cloud as a business that is exploding. They don’t seem to mind that they’re selling their own capacity to Anthropic instead of Google’s own products, which is one of the challenges of running a company that has frenemies as customers.

How do you see that playing out? Do you see Google ever saying, “Look, we have to win at the frontier. We have to win at AGI. We have to make sure recursive self-improvement of coding occurs so the next model works,” which is a religious belief inside of OpenAI and Anthropic? Or do you see them saying, “Actually, being one or two steps behind the frontier is fine because that’ll make our products work well enough and we’ll just sell capacity to the people chasing the AGI dream”?

The way they are right now, they’re going to keep chasing it because their investors want that. It makes their stock go up to say, “Hey, we’re chasing this. We’re at the frontier. We’re the only large corporation that’s almost or nearly or equally caught up with OpenAI and Anthropic.” They don’t need to go the way of Amazon and, in my opinion, Meta right now.

In a year or two, if they continue the brain drain and they keep falling behind, then yeah, maybe they’re going to do what you said in situation two. But for now, there’s no reason for them not to keep chasing, especially because that’s a great thing to talk about on an earnings call and it makes all your investors happy.

The AGI piece is really interesting to me, especially in the context of Google. Demis Hassabis was the final speaker at Google I/O. After an hour and a half of very practical demonstrations of AI inside of Google products, Demis came out and he talked about protein folding and drug discovery, which are the things that he really cares about. 

And then he ended the entire presentation by saying very confidently, “We are at the foothills of the singularity.” Google doesn’t say, “AGI.” It says, “the foothills of the singularity,” which is an enormous claim.

I thought, “Boy, that’s an incredible way to end Google I/O.” And then later I sat down with Sundar and I said, “Do you agree we’re at the foothills of singularity? What does this mean to you?” Here’s what Sundar said to me.

Sundar Pichai: Demis and I have had long, deep conversations on this topic.

Nilay Patel: I figured. 

In this context, for him, the advent of AGI is what he thinks of as the singularity and I think—

Do you have a definition of AGI? Have you debated? Do you have an agreement?

We debated a lot. Both Demis and I are very close to how we think about AGI … There is a harder definition of AGI, which is that it has to more comprehensively do the wide range of tasks, including cognitive tasks, in a way that’s comparable. We’ll at some point actually put it out as a company, and we are working on that. But that’s what he’s talking about in this context.

I’ve been thinking about that answer since it happened. Do you know what Sundar’s definition of AGI or the singularity is based on that?

It’s the exact same as everyone else’s. In the OpenAI lawsuit, in the materials, we saw the definition of AGI come out of that. It was published and it sounds like he’s talking about the exact same thing.

In Microsoft and OpenAI’s 2019 contract that was made public as part of the Musk v. Altman trial, it’s a 36-page agreement, but luckily, finally, we’re finding out their definition of AGI, which is, “A highly autonomous system that outperforms humans at most economically valuable work.” It seems similar to what Sundar is saying in terms of cognitive tasks. It’s just a highly autonomous system that can do a ton of economically valuable knowledge work at the same level or surpass the level of humans.

That’s the definition I’ve been working with for the past six years on the beat, and it seems like that tracks with what he’s saying.

He said to me that Google would put out a definition of the singularity or AGI and they’re working on it. As far as I know, they have not yet released this definition. I don’t know if it tracks the OpenAI one. I do know that’s basically what the industry says, right? That it’ll be better than you and me at economically viable tasks. They’ve stopped saying that. 

Equal or better.

Either way, we’re losing our jobs, right? They’ve stopped talking about it because that means we’re all losing our jobs. So that’s just faded into the background.

I bring this up because Demis is so focused on science, and in particular health outcomes, and in this announcement about him moving on to be chief scientist, Sundar repeated the phrase, “We’re at the foothills of the singularity.” It feels like Demis wanted to chase AGI, world models, protein folding, and all of the next things. 

The thing that makes AI economically viable today is writing software code or automating business processes inside of Fortune 500 companies or agentic shopping or whatever boring thing Google needs to do to make money, and those things are getting ever farther apart. If you want to chase the foothills of the singularity in AGI, maybe that has nothing to do with how Google needs AI to make money today.

That’s a big part of the Google culture clash, right? That’s, “We’re going to chase money and shareholder value instead of holding fast to our ideals.” That’s a big part of the AI industry’s general chaos. How is OpenAI going to make a dollar? Who knows? It’s a code red. We’re right back at the beginning.

How do you see it? Is it that Demis wanted another Nobel Prize, so he led them astray and now he’s getting kicked upstairs and they’re going to focus on money? Or is there real validity to, “We’re going to let him chase the singularity while we work on Gmail Search”?

There’s a big difference between, “We’re going to let him chase the singularity,” and, “We’re going to let him do a lot of research into biology, drug discovery, and the other stuff he’s into,” and that seems to be what he’s going to be doing. It seems like he and Jeff Dean are going to be doing similar things, but in very different places.

It’s a tale as old as time. I’ve been writing about this for so many years, product versus research. The big clashes, the funding, the resources. Companies want products immediately and they don’t want to invest in the long-term research that sometimes leads to those products. They only want the quick, “What are we going to turn this into? What’s the timeline? Let’s speed it up for products and let’s compete with all of our three competitors and not really do these long side projects that may lead to something or may not.”

The tension’s building and building, especially as OpenAI and Anthropic are about to go public. Google has a lot of investors to answer to. This is a building of the tension we’ve been seeing for so many years. And for what it’s worth, I do think the Demis situation was probably mutual.

I’ve heard rumors that maybe he wanted to leave completely, but it would be too dramatic for him and Jeff Dean to leave at the same time. So he said, “Yeah, I’ll go to this other role and then I’ll leave later.” That’s just a rumor. We’re not sure. But either way, it doesn’t seem like he was totally kicked to the curb or kicked upstairs. It’s more probably a mutual parting where he really is not that interested in products and he wants to do the long-term research, and a lot of these guys are like that.

It feels like a real situation where you have to be careful what you wish for, because when Sundar created Google DeepMind, he had to pick a winner, and he picked Demis over Jeff Dean. We were all waiting to see if and when Jeff Dean would leave because he didn’t win, and now they’re both leaving because Demis realized that actually operating inside of Google is a very different job than just doing the research.

One of the questions I have here in general is about DeepMind itself, which is famously headquartered in London and answers to no one. It’s Google’s big, fancy AI research arm with the big fancy CEO. That’s getting pulled down. It’s being led by an SVP who reports to Sundar now. There are some reports that maybe the center of gravity and the authority is going to move back to Mountain View to Sundar himself. How do you see that playing out inside of Google?

I can definitely see the winds might be changing and the Bay Area might be the headquarters again, at least in terms of power. London’s autonomy has been going on for a long time. I’ve visited that office multiple times. It did have a different feeling to it. It felt like there was a lot less urgency in a good way. It was really collaborative. There were a lot of long-term research questions and it was a very different feeling than the tension and the urgency I feel when I visit other AI labs’ offices.

Maybe Sundar got tired of that and said, “You know what? I need the pressure to rise. I need products quickly. The research can only be done if it’s going to lead to something that’s trackable.” I could definitely see the center of gravity moving to the Bay Area.

The reporting from inside of Google that I’m most curious about is how that culture changes without these leaders. As you were saying before, Jeff Dean and Demis Hassabis were moral leaders in addition to technical leaders and research innovators. They kept Google from doing a lot of things. They’re gone now. In some of your own reporting and your story on our site, there are people saying, “Who will we sell out to next?” 

Sergey Brin, who’s deeply involved in AI efforts, supports the Trump administration. Sundar obviously stood behind Trump at the inauguration. The questions from the staff about, “What will we sell it next? What values are up for sale next without the culture carriers of a Demis or a Jeff Dean?” seem open.

Are there answers? Who’s taking over DeepMind now and what kind of person do we think they are?

It’s Koray Kavukcuoglu, and these questions are super valid because I don’t think Koray’s going to be speaking up on this stuff. He’s a product guy. He’s focused on speeding up the product. I’m sure he and Sundar have had a bunch of conversations about focusing on the short term.

Over the past few months, early this year, I was chatting with a bunch of AI employees at a ton of different companies, and they all, including employees at Google, felt like the messaging from their companies was, “Shut up and focus on the mission. Keep your head down. Roll stuff out. Don’t worry about what’s going on in the outside world politically.” It seems like that’s going to be even more of a thing now.

One of the sources I was speaking with at Google said, “Speaking out on moral issues like ICE agents and AI surveillance and autonomous lethal weapons, Jeff Dean was one of the last people who was willing to do that.” And it doesn’t seem like Koray’s going to be really eager to take that place. These questions are really valid and I wouldn’t be surprised if a lot more DeepMind people left after all these changes.

Let me ask you the hardest question of all to wrap it up. There’s a lot of noise in the ecosystem right now saying that Google has lost the AI race. But as we said from the beginning, Google has a ton of advantages here.

It’s making money, which most of the other companies aren’t. It’s selling Google Cloud infrastructure to its own best competitors. It has massive distribution advantages in Search, in Gmail, in the fact that Apple appears to have distilled Google’s models for Siri. There’s a lot here where Google just has structural advantages. It’s playing with house money. It’s a trust fund baby, as you’ve said several times here.

Is it possible to lose the AI race from that vantage point? Or is it really just about if Anthropic gets to a point at recursive self-improvement that they can call AGI, everyone else has to lose by default?

It’s not possible for them to fail. It’s possible for them to change up their strategy. Like we were talking about earlier, maybe they become an Apple where they’re running on Google AI and they’re fine with that, but they’re picking a different company. Same with Amazon. They’ve given up a little bit, it seems like. I’m going to get some flack for that. Meta’s still really desperately trying, but they’re behind.

I don’t think Google can fail. It’s more, do they eventually realize it’s not worth their time? Does the brain drain continue? Do they realize, “Look, there’s no amount of money we can offer to get some of the best minds back here. Let’s just cut our losses”? That’s a little ways off. I don’t think that’s going to happen in the next few months or even the next year.

But it’s important for these execs to remember that a lot of the people that are most involved and really pivotal in building this technology and keeping them at the frontier are extremely serious about their morals and what they’re doing. They don’t just do it for the money. It’s going to be tough to resell that dream to some of them if they’re trying to rehire after they lose people. OpenAI is experiencing the same thing. So we’ll see.

It’s worth noting Demis is still there. He’s the chief scientist. Presumably he will still be going to the London office and be charming, and Demis is very charming. You can see all that continuing to happen, but what are we shipping? What are the roadmaps? Who gets the GPU access? That seems like it will change and that will have some downstream effect.

If you had to look for signs, is Google succeeding or failing, is the culture a problem or are they just retrenching to go and be even more aggressive? What kinds of things would you look for right now?

What I typically look for is what they’re really offering every time they have a big release and how pivotal it really is. Are they doing something that their competitors did six months ago? And are they even doing that well? That’s how I think about these things sometimes. There will be a big release from an AI company or a big tech company that’s trying to catch up in the AI race. Sometimes it’s six months behind OpenAI or Anthropic, and sometimes the stuff that they’re really excited about is pretty bad.

That’s what I would be watching from Google. With Gemini 4, what can it really do? Does it have that same effect that Gemini 3 had on the industry, where it’s leading for at least a week or two? Or does it not even have an hour of lead time and it just falls flat and it’s used by the enterprises that they work with and no one’s really excited about it? That’s the type of thing I’d be looking for.

I’d also be looking for the exodus. If a ton of the DeepMind engineers leave, if they’re desperately trying to hire and offering more and more desperate pay packages, that’s another sign. Whenever Demis leaves — and that will eventually happen — that’s a huge sign.

We’ll be looking out for all that. I’m confident that the chaos in the AI industry will continue, and Hayden, you’ll be back on Decoder. Thank you so much for joining me today.

Thanks so much.

Questions or comments? Hit us up at decoder@theverge.com. We really do read every email!

How an AIPAC endorsement became a liability

12 August 2026 at 22:00
A woman wearing a keffiyeh carries a Palestinian flag that says “Freedom for Palestine” and a sign reading “Dump AIPAC.”
Pro-Palestinian Jewish American demonstrators rally in Manhattan on February 22, 2024. | Selcuk Acar/Anadolu via Getty Images

The American Israel Public Affairs Committee — better known by its short name, AIPAC — bills itself as a bipartisan advocate “for policies that strengthen the US-Israel partnership.” In 2026, it’s become something else: a major — and seemingly, losing — issue in Democratic politics. 

Progressive Democratic candidates in primaries across the country are explicitly calling out their opponents’ relationship with AIPAC, often using the connection as a rallying point to persuade voters about the problem of “dark money” in politics. Most recently, in Michigan, AIPAC spent about $30 million boosting Rep. Haley Stevens in her bid for the state’s Democratic Senate nomination. Her opponent, Abdul El-Sayed, drew attention to it again and again. She lost. 

As one of the biggest spenders in US elections, the group has gone well beyond its origins lobbying members of Congress to support its agenda. According to David Dayen, executive editor of the American Prospect, AIPAC is spending millions of dollars against candidates who speak out against Israel’s actions in Palestine — sometimes using advertisements that have nothing to do with Israel, and may appear unrelated to AIPAC.

Dayen spoke with Today, Explained co-host Noel King about the backlash surrounding AIPAC’s spending, the group’s complicated web of shell PACs,  and what it all means for the Democratic Party’s quickly evolving stance on Israel.

Below is an excerpt of their conversation, edited for length and clarity. There’s much more in the full podcast, so listen to Today, Explained wherever you get podcasts, including Apple Podcasts, Pandora, and Spotify

What is AIPAC?

AIPAC started out as a lobbying organization. It was inaugurated in the 1950s. It has historically been seen as one of the more powerful lobbying organizations in Washington. And its goal is to strengthen and maintain the relationship between the US and Israel.

They have annual conventions where pretty much everybody across the political spectrum attends and gives speeches. But something changed about five years ago. AIPAC was not content to just lobby members of Congress. They wanted to influence who actually got to Washington. And they began to engage in the use of super PACs to run advertising and other forms of political engagement in campaigns, and particularly in primary campaigns that determine who actually gets to a general election.  

Why did they want to influence who got to Washington? Maybe that sounds like an obvious question, but it wasn’t happening before, so why did it start happening?

One thing that happened is in 2018, we saw the rise of what is known as “The Squad,” and that included Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Ilhan Omar, and Rashida Tlaib — people who had very strident views, particularly about the US-Israel relationship. Those progressive Democrats were very successful in winning safe seat races. And I’m not in their head, but it could be that AIPAC wanted to try to provide a counterweight, and stop that from happening, and use their resources — very prodigious resources — to spend money in these campaigns and to make sure that doesn’t happen again.

Once upon a time, an endorsement from AIPAC was a powerful thing. It could be a huge benefit to a candidate. What exactly did it get you when AIPAC said, “This is our guy, this is our gal?

I mean, in practical terms, it probably got you $5,000 because that’s the limit on a corporate PAC. But because AIPAC was powerful and also a bipartisan organization, getting your name on the list of AIPAC endorsees was something that you could tout in your election. It was something that showed that you had a commitment to what has historically been an important bond between the US and Israel. 

It certainly wasn’t as controversial in the years before 2023 as it is today. After October 7, we saw what a lot of people have termed a genocide against the Palestinian people. The changing attitudes around the US-Israel relationship more broadly, where large numbers of Americans now view that relationship negatively, have changed what the meaning of an AIPAC endorsement really is.

I know that you’ve dug into the numbers. What do we know about how much money AIPAC is specifically spending this midterm cycle?

It’s a hard question to answer. If you go by the Federal Election Commission disclosures, AIPAC has raised about a hundred million dollars this election cycle, and has spent in independent expenditures — that’s TV ads and mailers and these kinds of things — about $28 million. 

But that is an undercount for a couple different reasons. When I say those numbers, I am going by the specific super PAC that AIPAC has created. It’s called United Democracy Project. United Democracy Project has sent money to other PACs — about $9 million worth.

Is this a lot of money?

I think the real innovation here is the transfer of money from, in this case, pro-Israel PACs, to these pop-up PACs, these shell PACs that are created specifically for a particular election and then funded through AIPAC and, in some cases, other other pro-Israel PACs. 

They are sort of laundering this money through to other PACs, so those other PACs run the ads and it doesn’t look like it’s coming from AIPAC. A perfect example was the first real major primary state of the cycle, which was Illinois.

There were four open seats in the Chicago area that are pretty strongly blue. A Democrat is going to win the general election. And so these primaries were highly contested. AIPAC set up two PACs, one called Elect Chicago Women and the other called Affordable Chicago Now. And millions of dollars went from AIPAC’s super PAC, which is called United Democracy Project, into these two pop-up PACs. 

And those two PACs then funded ads for four candidates in those four open seat races. Now, if you were watching that on television, you would say, “Hey, elect Chicago women. That sounds like a good idea. I’m gonna watch this ad” or “Affordable Chicago now. I like affordability.” The truth is that this money was coming from AIPAC into these ads and supporting candidates that were generally supportive of the US-Israel relationship. 

Now, those four races — AIPAC won two of them and they lost two of them. And it was really interesting, I think, where they were successful, and where they weren’t. In one race up in the Evanston area, it became a big issue that AIPAC actually was behind these ads from Elect Chicago Women and Affordable Chicago Now. 

The [AIPAC] candidate, a state senator named Laura Fine, actually was harmed, I think, in the election by this fact that this got out, and that this became a major issue in the campaign. And she ended up finishing third in that primary, despite having millions of dollars supporting her. There were other races where this wasn’t sort of as explicit a factor in the election itself, and those candidates were able to win. 

This all sounds quite shady and yet I wonder — how unusual is it for an interest group in politics to be doing something like this?

I think it’s pretty unusual. It’s not something I’ve seen a whole lot of. We saw it to a smaller degree in some other election cycles — two years ago, four years ago — but it has become a concerted strategy this time. 

And so there are these pop-up PACS that are specific to a campaign, but also some established PACs that have been around for a while are receiving money from AIPAC and affiliated groups and using that in campaigns. 

Emily’s List is a very well-known political organization that supports pro-choice women. They took [hundreds of thousands of dollars] from an organization called Democratic Majority for Israel that is not affiliated with AIPAC per se, but aligns on similar candidates. 

There are other examples of this, more obscure examples. Like there’s a PAC called Crush MAGA PAC. And it’s affiliated with a different, I’m gonna sound crazy when I say this, but Crush MAGA PAC is affiliated with a different pack called Save Democracy, and Save Democracy has received $100,000 from United Democracy Project, which is AIPAC Super PAC. So sometimes the layers here are two or three or even four PACs deep. 

And it can be really hard to untangle all this and figure out where the money has come from, because AIPAC certainly isn’t saying, “We’re funding that campaign.” They’re releasing disclosures as required by the Federal Election Commission, but they’re not saying where the money is earmarked for, if it’s for a specific race, if it’s for a specific candidate.

AIPAC at times has responded to criticism of it by appearing to conflate it with criticism of Israel or criticism of Jews. Last year, Sen. Bernie Sanders comes out with a statement. He denounces Benjamin Netanyahu’s government for what he says is the “extermination of Gaza.” He calls for an end to military aid to Israel. He says people are starving to death.

AIPAC attacks Sanders’s statement, calling it a hate-filled rant and blood libel, and pointing out that in his statement, he didn’t mention Hamas’s attack on Israel. So AIPAC is now public in a way that historically it has not been. And it is tying criticism of Israel to antisemitic sentiment. Does this help or hurt AIPAC’s cause, do you think?

It depends on the messenger, but the issue is that there’s a very straight line between how this money is being used, transferred, spent, concealed, and a broader critique that I think a lot of Democrats have about money in politics. And so when AIPAC decides, “Okay, we’re going respond to criticism that is rooted in what AIPAC believes, and the conditions in Israel and Gaza and the West Bank, et cetera,” to saying, you know, “Any criticism of what we’re doing is antisemitic — I think people who see this as a broader problem about money in politics see that as an extremely cynical take.”

I don’t think that really connects to one of the big reasons why people are really objecting to this, which is that they don’t want to see their politicians essentially bought.

But it’s additionally fraught because there are antisemitic tropes where, you know, a cabal of Jews is secretly controlling the government and finance, right? It feels triply complicated.

Look, I’m Jewish, and in having to cover this, I have to try to follow money from Jewish groups from one place to another, and that can certainly be uncomfortable. And it does add some weight to this issue. 

But I feel like we are talking here not about somebody’s religion, but about a policy. And it’s a twofold policy. One is the policy of the US government funding, to the tune of billions of dollars, the destruction of an entire region, and also the policy of allowing super PACs to dictate who ends up making decisions in Washington.

How Ukraine is holding its own against Russia — and changing warfare as we know it

11 August 2026 at 20:30
Two Ukrainian soldiers bend over a heavy bomber drone lit with red light from a helmet; behind them are dark clouds in a twilight sky.
Ukrainian soldiers prepare a “Baba Yaga” heavy bomber drone before a nighttime training flight on March 23, 2026. | Dmytro Smolienko/Ukrinform/Future Publishing via Getty Images

When the Russia-Ukraine conflict erupted into full-scale war in 2022, things looked grim for Ukraine. Its capital, Kyiv, was under threat almost immediately, and there were questions about how long the smaller country could hold out, even with US support. More than four years later, however, the dynamic is changing. US military support has waned, but not only has Ukraine held its own in years of grinding, attritional fighting, it increasingly has Russia on the defensive.

According to Marcus Walker, who covers Ukraine as South Europe Bureau Chief for the Wall Street Journal, “it’s certainly possible for the smaller country to survive and have a chance of winning only because it is more nimble and and better at improvising and for large periods of the war has had the edge in terms of innovation.” 

Walker, who, last month, reported on how the war is beginning to shift against Russian President Vladimir Putin, talked with Today, Explained co-host Noel King to explain how Ukraine has held on this long — and how it’s successfully improvising on the battlefield to press its advantage.

Below is an excerpt of their conversation, edited for length and clarity. There’s much more in the full podcast, including how Ukraine has recently gained a new ally on the American right who has Trump’s ear. You can listen to Today, Explained wherever you get podcasts, including Apple Podcasts, Pandora, and Spotify

You recently wrote that Ukraine has Russia on its back foot. How?

To understand what happened this year, we have to go back to the very beginnings of the war, which were in 2014 when Russia seized Crimea and the Eastern Donbas region in a smaller-scale war. And, at the time, Ukraine was a militarily weak country. Its army was pretty backward and had outdated equipment; although, it fought as hard as it could. The society was politically divided, especially over its relationship with Russia and with the West and with Europe. And Russia seems to have drawn the lesson that Ukraine would be a pushover when it launched its full scale invasion in 2022. And, at the time, now four and a half years ago, even most Western governments and intelligence services thought that Russia would win the war easily.

Instead, the very fact of Russian pressure on Ukraine had somehow welded Ukrainians together and created a stronger, more united society and state that shared — whatever the internal differences — at least the determination to have a country called Ukraine. And, in the meantime, they did a lot of reforms to their country and to their military. 

And so, when Russia launched a full scale invasion — thinking, “this will be easy,” — instead they found themselves in a full-scale war that they’ve been unable to win. On balance, Russia is really struggling to get any military result despite the investment of massive resources and the loss of incredible numbers of soldiers in trying to win this war. It just isn’t able to turn its advantage in numbers into victory. 

Right now, it’s hard to see Ukraine collapsing. However, Ukraine’s a long way from winning outright. And the outcome of this war is ultimately still open.

Ukraine must be doing something right on the battlefield. What is it doing right?

It has found ways to counteract Russia’s advantage in numbers, in manpower, and in equipment. And, above all, the asymmetric war that Ukraine has been fighting has come to rely heavily on drones, on its know-how, and on its skill at improvisation to develop a new form of drone warfare that other countries around the world have been trying to learn from, including the US military, including Middle Eastern countries, including Iran, and including other NATO countries in Europe — and, of course, the Russians, too. 

There is a constant arms race here in terms of drone technology and tactics. And both sides are now using incredible numbers of these often very tiny weapons — often 12 or 15 inches big with four little propellers — that can kill at ranges of 20 to 30 miles.

What is Ukraine using the drones to do, exactly?

They’re the most important tactical weapon at the front for killing Russian infantry. They are also using larger bomber drones with propellers or with wings to try and destroy Russian logistics, to blow up trucks transporting ammunition or other supplies on the supply roads far behind the front. They’re using long-range drones that can fly for a thousand miles or more to destroy Russian oil refineries deep inside Russia in an attempt to cut off the oil revenues that are vital for the Russian state and for Putin’s ability to finance the war. 

On the front line, drones are also doing all sorts of work that humans used to do, such as transporting ammunition, and food, and water to infantry soldiers on the front line. So, if you go to frontline areas now, or anywhere near them, you can see ground drones: little remote-control vehicles with big chunky wheels trundling along on their own with no human in sight. 

They also, for example, evacuate wounded Ukrainian soldiers. They will lie down on these ground drones and be ferried out, because that is better than having six men carry you out on a stretcher where, if you’re hit again, then you might have seven casualties.

How did Ukraine end up using drones in so many areas — and so successfully? Is this just weaponry evolving the way it tends to?

Obviously, in all wars, innovation happens very fast under the pressure of necessity. But there is something very particular about Ukraine. It is a country of people who like to improvise. It’s also a country with a large software sector, a large IT sector. And it’s a place where large parts of the military have a culture of, as we journalists sometimes put it, trying to MacGyver solutions. You take what you have, and you improvise. 

It so happened that the drone revolution started with consumer drones, the same kind of quadcopters that people were using to take pictures on holiday. And they worked out ways to attach a claw to them that can then drop a grenade or strap some explosives to it and crash the whole drone into a Russian vehicle. That was how it began at the start of this war in 2022. But, now, these things have become really a deadly fleet of flying killer robots that saturate the frontline area. 

Of course, the Russians are doing the same. So, on both sides of the front line, it has become extremely difficult and dangerous to move under a sky full of these killer robots.

I was reading this weekend that Ukraine has been using drones to target warehouses for this company called Wildberries. It’s kind of like Amazon for Russia. What’s the strategy there?

There are a couple of aspects to that. One is that Wildberries has also been selling a large amount of military gear, such as body armor or drone components. It’s more like an Amazon from which the soldiers can order a lot of gear to continue the war, so it is a way of disrupting military logistics. 

But, also, it strikes a blow to Russian civilian perceptions of the war, because, for years, Putin tried to tell the Russian population that this war is something happening far away, and it wouldn’t touch them directly. Now, it turns out that their equivalent of Amazon deliveries are not going to be arriving, because the warehouse burned down. 

At the same time, it’s a way of damaging the Russian economy, because Wildberries also owes a lot of money to banks. And so, if the company is in trouble, then it also causes trouble for the Russian banking system. And it hurts the tax revenues of the Russian government that pay for the war.

Is Russia showing evolution on the battlefield, as well?

Yes, they have. They have also come up with their own innovations. For example, in the last couple of years, since about 2024, they’ve been using large numbers of drones on fiber optic cables. That means the pilot that’s flying them is attached via a long thin plastic cable or fiber optic cable to a drone that carries a spool and is unspooling this cable as it flies. Now, what does that do? It means that electronic interference with the radio signal is no longer possible, because there is a physical connection between the pilot and the drone. So, that was an innovation that bypassed electronic warfare or the interception of the radio signal of the video feed that pilots need to fly their drones. 

They’ve had other innovations too. The Russians last year, for example, came up with a whole new class of medium-range drones — cheap, fixed-wing drones. The Ukrainians have now responded and made their own versions, which are better, but it really is a constant race of innovation and adaptation. And every time I come back and talk to military units here, everything’s changed. The tactics that worked last year no longer work. And the drones that work now didn’t exist three months ago.

Is there some possibility that Ukraine can win this war by not losing it?

Yes. Winning in war means achieving political war aims. And Ukraine’s aim is to survive as an independent nation state. It can do that. It can achieve that even if it loses currently about 20 percent of its territory that’s under Russian occupation. 

I think it’s hard to see how Russia can achieve its own central war aim, which was to reimpose political control over Ukraine to turn it into a kind of protectorate — really to take back control of the place that was once Russia’s largest colony. It’s very hard to see how the Russians can achieve that. The Russians seem to be counting on the West, on the US and the Europeans getting tired of supporting Ukraine, of sending financing and loans and weaponry. Putin seems to believe that, without this international support from the West, Kyiv won’t be able to carry this on forever.

What happens to Bose when headphones become AI?

10 August 2026 at 16:00
A photo illustration of Bose CEO Lila Snyder.

Today, I’m talking with Lila Snyder, who is the CEO of Bose.

You certainly know Bose — it’s one of the most famous brands in all of consumer tech. The company started 60 years ago selling speakers to consumers, and its focus on research and development has led it to be a leader in both car audio and noise-canceling headphones.

Lila was last on the show about four years ago, and since then she’s dramatically rearchitected the company. The focus on research is still there, but she’s sold off Bose Professional, acquired the high-end audio brands McIntosh Labs and Sonus faber, and, perhaps most importantly, started licensing all that core Bose technology to other companies.

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That means that while you can still go buy a Bose soundbar or Bose headphones, the company is also turning into a B2B business, and you can get Bose technology in Skullcandy headphones and Epson projectors, among many other products. 

That big change in the business comes with a big change in structure. Becoming a software company in addition to a product company comes with a whole new set of challenges, and Lila and I talked about how it’s all working out.

I also wanted to know if this is all a reaction to the potential rise of AI wearables — products that might end up looking a lot like headphones, and which need all kinds of audio processing to enable voice input.

Is Bose just trying to sell tech to a range of new companies that might disrupt headphones entirely? Or does Lila have a plan for a headphones market that was already disrupted when phone vendors like Apple and Samsung made their own products like AirPods and Galaxy Buds work better than the competition?

We got deep on this, and Lila was pretty open about the challenges and the opportunities here. As Decoder listeners know, I’m a huge audio nerd, so I loved every minute of this conversation. I hope you do too.

Okay: Bose CEO Lila Snyder. Here we go.

This interview has been lightly edited for length and clarity. 

Lila Snyder, you’re CEO of Bose. Welcome back to Decoder.

Thank you so much.

I am really excited to talk to you. It’s been four years since you were last on the show, which seems entirely too long.

A lot of things have happened. Bose has bought some companies. You’ve sold some divisions. The idea of what headphones are is largely the same in one important way, but maybe going to be very different in another important way. How are you thinking about Bose today?

We are having a lot of fun in what I would describe as our second chapter of the transformation of Bose since I joined. In some ways, many things are the same. We’re still making amazing products for our customers. We’re still excited about bringing that new technology forward in both our consumer business and our automotive business. But I would say two things fundamentally have changed as we’ve thought about growth for Bose for the future.

For 60 years, it was all Bose, and we’re now a multi-brand company. So as you said, we’ve made a couple of acquisitions. One of those was the McIntosh brand, a legendary 75-year-old audiophile brand that we absolutely love, and also Sonus faber, which is an Italian craftsmanship heritage brand that’s also been around for over 40 years. And so that brought us two things: from one brand to multiple brands, but also into the luxury audio space. 

The second change for us is that we’ve always been an amazing products company where we developed technology through research and a lot of development cycles, and all of that technology went into Bose products. And today what’s different is we’re still doing that, and we’ve added a technology business we call Audio Tech, where we’re taking that technology and starting to put it into other places. 

The big insight for us was that sound is really important. It’s getting more important, we think, given everything that’s going on in the world around us. There are so many products and devices out there that are using sound — whether that’s audio, voice, or even noise-canceling, where those things are incredibly relevant — but they’re not products that Bose would make. They’re not targeted at our customer set. But we really have a strong belief in bringing great audio to as many places as we can.

The last time we talked, you were in the middle of becoming a more functional company. In particular, you had said the last step was the engineering organization, which is really the heart of Bose. It had been very divisional, very organized into products. You were centralizing that.

Having an audio tech division that sells core technology feels like a very natural offshoot of that. “We’re going to have a big central engineering team. It’s going to feed into our products and other products,” and then you can abstract that a little bit and sell it to other people. Who are the customers for the audio tech division?

So it’s a B2B2C business, if you will. So our customers are large companies that are putting products into the market. So I’ll give you a couple of examples. We’ve partnered with Motorola on a series of products from earbuds to making the phone itself sound better.

So Motorola is a good example. We’re partnered with Xreal. They’re making pretty awesome XR glasses, right? So that’s an experience where sound really matters a lot. We’ve had a lot of fun partnering with them. You’re starting to see Bose technology show up in a lot of different verticals, from mobile to compute, to other people’s headphones and audio products for sure.

We just released, with a partner called Sena, a motorcycle helmet communications device. And we’re excited about all the places we’re bringing our technology. It’s actually creating a broader aperture for how we think about invention and research at Bose as well, which is really exciting.

I want to come to that because that seems like a big change. And the reason I asked about customers is that having a new set of customers really changes the focus of the company. A lot of us are familiar with audio brands in particular partnering with device makers, partnering with automakers.

Yeah.

Maybe it’s just a logo. I think you have been very proud that Bose has not been just a logo in many places, but for a lot of people it’s just a logo. What’s the difference between, okay, there’s Xreal glasses powered by Bose with a Bose logo on the side, and selling the technology without the Bose logo? Or does a Bose logo always come with it?

When you said this is new for Bose, in a way, yes, but in a way it’s exactly what we’ve been doing in automotive for over 40 years. And so we do have a model for doing this inside the company, and it’s just broadening that thinking into new spaces. First and foremost, we’re selling technology, and the technology is the key. And then in some cases, we’re also selling the brand. So you might get technology in a product without a Sound by Bose or Powered by Bose logo on it, or you might get the logo as well, but you’ll never get the logo without the tech, if that makes sense.

Some of our partners are interested in the brand, some are not. Sometimes we’re interested in having our brand connected to their brand, and sometimes we’re not. And so that’s part of the discussion we have with each of our customers, about whether it makes sense for them and for us. And so when you see it, know that it’s been really thoughtful, but it’s also attached to a lot of great technology that’s inside that product.

Tell me about those conversations. Is it cheaper to take the brand? Is it more expensive to take the brand? This is one of those places where Bose has maybe a bigger, more famous brand than maybe some of the customers. How are you thinking about that, and how does the cost change?

As you would expect, the technology has a licensing fee to it, and so does the brand. We’ve invested over 60 years in our brand. We’re incredibly proud of it. It is, I think, one of the most iconic brands in the world, full stop, and certainly within the audio space. And so we are incredibly careful about where we put the brand, and it certainly isn’t free when you put it on a product.

Right next to that is McIntosh. As you know, I grew up a total stereo nerd, just reading the magazines, dreaming about having the blue meters in my house someday. Still working on it. I’m going to get there. I did have a Jeep with a McIntosh sound system several years ago. The blue meters were… It was a very fake Android app that ran on a very slow Android infotainment system, but I still loved it.

That’s a brand that has a real halo. You can’t make cheaper McIntosh products. That’s not good for that brand.

No way.

You need to stay way up there. How are you thinking about that relationship to Bose, which is much more of a premium mass market brand?

We think of them as two completely separate brands. And then think about Sonus faber as yet another third brand, all of which are targeting really passionate fans of those brands for what they stand for. So when we thought about getting into the luxury space and acquiring those two brands, we spent a lot of time saying, “What is it that we’re going to do internally to protect the brands?” 

We do not want to Bose-ify anything that is happening in those brands. And so we’ve set it up as a separate business unit. We have a luxury audio business unit that houses those two brands. We are very careful. As you said, we have no intention of bringing products down-market. We believe both markets are exciting. We’ve been in that premium audio space for a long time. 

When we looked at what we’re calling luxury audio, we had two really important insights, I think. One is that as we’re doing our own technology work, there’s a lot of really exciting technology we develop that just isn’t right for a premium audio product. It’s right for something that sits at a higher level. We just didn’t have anywhere to put it. And that was true on the consumer product side, and it’s certainly true on the automotive side where we felt like we were bumping up against what you could put in a premium product, and the ceiling of what we wanted to do was much higher.

So the first reason we’re excited about it is that it sort of unleashes the creativity of our engineers to think about what you could do at those higher price points with just a different type of customer, a different type of experience. So we were excited on the technology side.

We were equally excited, I think, about this idea of luxury. If you look at the luxury market writ large across all categories, what you find is that audio is really underrepresented compared to the role luxury plays in automotive, hospitality and travel, fashion, or leather goods. And when we really sat back and thought about it, given how much music is a passion point for people, it didn’t make sense to us.

We think there’s a huge opportunity to attract new customers to the category if the experience feels more like a luxury experience. And so when you think about those products, it’s certainly about how they sound, but you went right to it. It’s the iconic design, it’s the artistry, it’s the craftsmanship. All of our luxury products, whether it’s McIntosh or Sonus faber, are handmade. They are crafted one by one for you as the customer. And there’s something incredibly special about that.

These weren’t your decisions, so I feel like I can be a little bit rude about them. When I saw McIntosh was licensing to Stellantis to be in Jeeps, I thought, “This company has to be desperate for money. That’s not actually a match.” It was fun that I had a Jeep with blue meters in it. It was great.

But I thought to myself, “This is a total mismatch, and they should be in Maybachs,” or whatever it is, whatever luxury sector that you want to be in, because that’s the brand. Was this just opportunistic for you that this was a company that needed the help, that was in trouble, that you could go and you could push your products upmarket without having to take the Bose brand there? Or was there some other opportunity that presented itself to you?

We weren’t actually shopping for brands first. The first thing was, strategically, we saw the opportunity in the luxury space. We saw an opportunity to create something new around luxury audio, and we were really excited about that.

So once we had made the strategic decision to go there, we had a lot of conversations about buying a brand or creating a brand. But the reality is, in luxury, at those price points, history and heritage are part of what you’re buying. And so we sort of intuitively knew we wanted to find a brand or brands that really had that strong history that we felt like we could build on top of.

We thought those were both brands that had incredibly passionate fans, and we saw an opportunity for us to take them to a new level. So that was how we ended up acquiring the McIntosh group.

Bringing in their engineering organization, they have a lot of technology. How integrated has that become over time, or are you leaving them alone?

We’ve brought it into our engineering organization, but we’ve also kept a lot of the aspects a little bit separate. So probably the best example of that is Bose has a Bose sound. Everybody knows that. You buy a Bose product… You buy one, the headphones I’m wearing, the speaker in your house, your car. There is a sound signature to brands that consumers expect. That comes from the engineers. 

The engineers are tuning products to sound like they should. And so we’re very careful on the engineering side to protect the sound signature of McIntosh. What we don’t want is for you to hear a McIntosh product or a Sonus faber product and imagine that it sounds different. So that’s one.

Initially — as you do with, I think, any acquisition — you want to be careful to protect what you bought. We’ve integrated it, yes, but we have a separate team that is doing the engineering for luxury, and we’re slowly adding Bose technology to it where it makes sense. So there are things, for example, on the Bose side where we can be incredibly helpful in terms of the software aspects, the connectivity, those sorts of things. Those are things that we do really well, and they’re not the most important part of those products, but they have to work. There are aspects that we’ve started to add into the products, and you’ll see more of that over time.

I’m really curious about that luxury aspect. The knock on high-end audio for years, and I’m not saying this is McIntosh, but the knock on high-end audio for years is that it’s the same stuff, all dressed up fancy. There are headphones that are famous for having weights in them to feel heavier even though there are commodity parts inside.

This is one of those places where you could just say, “We’re just going to make more expensive versions of the same thing.” And some buyers are totally price-insensitive, in that they will always just buy the most expensive thing. Then there’s, “We’re going to make it worth it. We’re going to make it worth 10X the price of whatever Bluetooth speakers are at Best Buy.” 

Where are you falling on that? Because it’s very tempting, especially in luxury, to just make it expensive.

The value comes from the sound. You should come visit us at Bose in Framingham and listen to a McIntosh system, a Sonus faber system. They’re incredible. They’re not anything like what you would get at a Best Buy in a premium product from Bose or anyone else. And that’s incredibly special.

Part of that is the technology itself. Part of that is that it’s more analog, so it has a different sound signature to it. It’s got a lot more power behind it because that’s what McIntosh is known for, and that’s what you need to power a Sonus faber set of speakers. You’re also paying for design. In a way, it’s a little bit of art.

We just launched a new integrated amplifier, the MA2375, for McIntosh. I’m so excited about it. It’s sort of got that retro look with the vacuum tubes. It is a design piece. I want to sit it on my desk. I want it to be a part of the decor. You would say the same thing on the Sonus faber side. It’s like buying an incredible piece of Italian furniture that has been handmade with natural materials and just feels like art that also sounds beautiful.

So there’s more to the value proposition in the luxury space. It’s true in the premium space too. Design really matters, color matters, feel, touch, comfort, all those things matter in addition to the sound. I think it’s just even that much more elevated in the luxury space.

I’m really curious about all the different sets of new customers you’re describing. There’s the B2B business, which is growing in audio tech. Then there are luxury customers who have a lot of money, but they’re fickle. And particularly in high-end AV — and I’m a high-end AV nerd through and through — convincing people it’s worth it because they can hear it has always been the hardest problem.

Maybe the most fun problem, because you can convince a lot of people they’re hearing a lot of things that aren’t there. You can sell expensive cables at a hundred times the price of the regular cables, even if they don’t do anything different. This is a lot of new customers for Bose. Do you think the B2B business is going to distract your core technology roadmap? How are you holding that all together?

It is more complex for sure. It is a broader mission, and I think we’re ready for it. When I was here last time, we were in the middle of the transformation that I would say was solidifying the foundation of Bose, and now we’re building on top of that. We’ve built an amazing marketing and brand infrastructure that we’re now using to power three brands instead of one, but a lot of that capability can be put in the direction of all three.

So the key is real clarity about who the customer is, which we’ve done a lot of work on the Bose brand for sure. We talk about the music lover for Bose, but we’ve done the same work for McIntosh and the same work for Sonus faber so that we are one thousand percent clear about who the customer is and how we want to talk to that customer.

On the kind of products side of our company, I think we’re really clear about what the mission is for each one of those brands. On the technology side, interestingly, as we become more of a B2B technology company, it’s actually creating advantages back to the Bose brand and our luxury business as well. And what I mean by that is that it’s caused us to completely rethink the way that we do research and we develop our tech.

In the past, if you think about Bose developing products, we were developing purpose-built technology for a pair of headphones or a car audio system. And I think last time we talked about the tech franchises. We care a lot about noise cancellation. We care about immersive, lifelike audio, and we care about this idea of hearing what you want. And those are all experiences that are built on some basic building blocks of technology that we’ve been developing for a long time.

But because we were developing them for our own products, we’ve had to do a complete shift in the way that we think about it so that we’re now developing, from the ground up, those building blocks. Now we’re able to say, with common platforms, common algorithms, AI — think of them as sort of AI units — we can create different experiences for our own products, and we can port that same technology through the same platform tech into other people’s products.

What that’s creating is a lot of efficiency at the research and development level. It’s creating more breadth because now that we’re thinking about things like noise cancellation for different spaces, spatial audio, or hearing what you want, it is actually creating more innovation and more invention at the core. It’s making us faster because we’ve made these building blocks a lot more consumable for our B2B customers; it makes us faster at bringing our own products to market, too.

I think this is a great place to ask the Decoder questions because you’re describing the endpoint of a pretty big culture and structure shift at Bose that you’ve been architecting for several years. So how is Bose structured today?

There’s a business unit structure, there’s a functional structure, and we are living in what I would describe as a hybrid. So for the core functions that matter deeply to what we deliver, like engineering, marketing, and supply chain, those are global functions that support all of our businesses. But because we’ve added new customer sets and really two new businesses with luxury and audio tech, we’re also running four business units. So those four business units have business unit presidents, and they draw on the global functions for the work that they need.

How many people is Bose today?

About 2,500.

And you’re mostly in Framingham, or are you all over the place?

We’re global. All over. Yep.

You said you’re a hybrid. How’s that split between engineering, sales, all that sort of thing?

I don’t actually think about it that way, but the one thing that I do know — sort of the most important statistic to me — is that half of our employees are engineers.

You’re describing AWS, you’re describing Amazon. You’ve modularized a bunch of components inside the company; now you can build new products faster. This is really great. Every company that goes through this transition ends up hiring more and more engineers over time because you just need to build more and more components. Has that been growing? Are you investing more in that kind of engineering?

We are for sure. I think it’s probably not unique to us. We’ve been in this transition of hardware long, long ago. It was just hardware, and then hardware and software, and then more and more software. And now as we’re building the technology pieces, those are truly just software products that are an algorithm- or AI-based product that we’re selling with. 

You see that mixed shift continuing. We’re certainly seeing growth in our engineering ranks. And we’re getting a lot more productivity out of engineering as we start to have more sophisticated tools, as we use AI and other things to help with some of that development. So yes, growing. And I think more productivity per engineer, if you will, as we start to use more sophisticated tools to do the development.

You said it’s pure software products, right? When you sell out to B2B, you’re just selling the algorithms. Do those feel protectable? This is one of the things that I think about all the time. What is the actual thing you’re selling, and how easily can it be copied by a Chinese firm that does not respect our intellectual property laws or something like that?

Yeah. I’m probably oversimplifying. We’re really selling three things. We’re definitely selling software, algorithms, et cetera. I’ll come back to your “how do you protect it?” question. One of the very special things about Bose is actually systems engineering, which is an underappreciated discipline in my view. So software’s great, but software has to run on hardware in our world. Ultimately, that software has to get delivered through something.

The magic at Bose, the secret sauce, has always been systems engineering and how you’re marrying together hardware and software elements for an experience that feels unified across the device and that’s optimized to provide the best experiences. So we’re certainly doing that on our own products, but you see that kind of a service as we start to sell more and more technology into our B2B customers.

There’s also a lot of desire for help on that system side because our expertise there is real. That’s always been true in our automotive business, and it is increasingly true in our partnerships and our customers on the audio tech side as well. So I think that the second piece, which is really important to call out, is that it’s not just software for software’s sake. It’s software that has to be integrated into a system where everything comes together to work. And then you’ve got kind of the idea of systems engineering and then services on top of that.

So, how you tune a product. Some of our partners and customers need help with that, want help with that; some don’t. There are a lot of services that get married along. Sometimes it’s systems engineering. Sometimes it’s things like tuning, et cetera. So three pieces.

Can I play devil’s advocate here for one second? What you’re describing here, if you wanted to poke at it as hard as you could, is a process of a little bit of commodification. There are a lot of common components here, and then it’s the layers on top that differentiate in the market. 

If you’re an audio nerd, the magazines are all saying one engineer in their garage innovated on speaker technology, and they made the speaker cones out of waffle paper, and now they’re more transparent than ever. Whatever that myth was that sold a lot of speakers back in the day.

If we’re not starting from the products back, but you’re starting from the components up, there’s a risk that everything kind of becomes the same, and it’s branding and marketing, and maybe the sound signature that’s tuned into it is artificial now — it’s not from the components themselves. How do you balance that? Or is that just not a worry with modern consumers?

I think what you’re describing is that if we’re putting Bose technology in other headphones, doesn’t that just revert to the mean? I think there’s a second, bigger market for us that is not audio products. Things that we call audio second. So for example, the XR glasses, the main function is not audio, but audio is really important. You don’t usually buy a car because it has a Bose sound system, but when you buy the car, the sound system is actually one of the most important features of the car.

A projector that you buy for your house, you’re buying because it’s a great projector. We’re partnering with Epson, and the sound is also really important there. So it’s a little bit different, I think, when you get into audio second. In the audio market, I think that the key is that there are so many different customers who want different things.

When you think about products that have ingredient technology that’s the same, it’s really enabling you to do things for your customer and the experience that you’re trying to create. I’ll just use Skullcandy as an example. Skullcandy just launched a pair of headphones with Sound by Bose, and you couldn’t have two more diverse customer sets between who they’re targeting and who we’re targeting. We helped them with the technology. So there’s Bose technology inside to help make that sound better, but the design choices of what they want for their customer are incredibly different from what you would find [with Bose]. 

So I don’t think you would ever put those two products, a Bose headphone and a Skullcandy headphone, side by side and say, “Wow, this is really commoditized. It sounds the same. It is the same.” They’re very, very, very different.

I think I’m asking slightly more about the audio-second product. If all of your audio-first products come from the same technology base, the same modular components that can be remixed into all the products you want, do you lose the ability to innovate at the product level? If everything is made out of the same Legos, at some point you can’t be like, “Actually what I need is all new Legos.”

I think the answer is no, because the product is so much bigger than just those ingredients. So if you think about headphone design, the comfort and all of the other features, right? There may be a lot of ingredient technology, but the ones that you choose may be different.

One of the things that we talk a lot about now is being at the intelligent edge. Everything Bose does is what we would describe as at the intelligent edge. And as you know, it’s a pretty hostile environment. You have limited compute, you have limited power. You’re always making trade-offs between what I am putting in this product and how does that impact my ability to do that? Because there’s just not enough room to put everything in it. 

So I think the reason why you still see so much differentiation among products, even if some of the ingredients are the same, is because all of those product choices that you’re making are really critical, and you have to make a lot of them to fit inside that constrained environment that you’re working with.

This brings me to the other Decoder question about decisions. You’ve obviously made a lot of them, and you’ve got a few big ones to make that I want to come to concerning AI. How do you make decisions? What’s your framework?

I am a believer that you get the right people in the room, you have an intense debate that isn’t always comfortable, that sometimes makes people a little bit queasy, and you move as fast as you can to decide, knowing that if it’s wrong, you can pivot. That is, in my simplest terms, the way I think about it.

We get a lot of type one and type two decisions, move fast, in that we had an ex-Amazon employee write to us and say, “Every decision is reversible if you have enough money.”

[Laughs] That might be true for Amazon.

That’s a very Amazon perspective. The reason I bring this up in the context of AI is that I’m looking at the sweep of things you’re doing, and I’m looking at where, in particular, the big tech companies think their headphones are going to go.

I was reviewing our conversation from four years ago. Boy, did we talk about Bluetooth a lot. We did. This is a core limiting technology. It’s an enabling technology in an important way, but they hold onto what Bluetooth can and can’t do on their platforms very tightly. And then their products, their first-party products, get to extend that standard in different ways — and they all do it. 

This broadly means if you have an iPhone, the best working headphones that will do all the things the platform wants you to do are probably AirPods. If you have a Pixel, it’s probably Pixel Buds. If you have a Samsung phone, it’s probably their buds.

And this is because they have reduced the capability of the interconnect. One of the reasons they’re doing that is because they want your earbuds in your ears 24/7 so you can talk to their AI systems on the back end. And this is their future. Maybe the answer is that we’re all going to wear Meta Glasses, or we’re all going to wear Xreal glasses. It seems up for grabs in big particular ways. What’s your view of that? What’s your view of AI wearables? And do you think there’s room for third-party players here?

We absolutely think wearables are critical to the AI future. I think that we’re clear on that. The form factor, if you work backwards from that, we’re going to use our wearable devices to communicate with our AI agents. And that is going to become more and more important and more and more natural. We strongly believe that.

The second thing we believe is that it is more likely to be conversational and sound-based than anything else. At least we think that is probably the primary mode. And so the types of technologies we’re focused on are around voice pickup, clarity, speech enablement, and we think all are incredibly important. What form factor you want to use as your wearable, I think the jury is still out. I think the answer is going to be a whole proliferation of them. Some people will like glasses because they like the glasses.

Some people will like open earbuds, which we hadn’t launched when you and I talked last time. We talked a lot about open ear audio, but not yet about that form factor, that clip-on form factor that Bose invented and launched into the world. We think that is a really powerful form factor that will be for some. Others might want a watch, a pin, a ring, or 18 variations of how those work together.

Part of the reason we think being in the audio tech business is important is that it gives us the ability to participate in a lot of those different places that we might not naturally be able to go on our own. So we think form factor is going to matter, but I don’t think there’s a single winner there. At least that’s my current view. I think that there will be multiple types of devices that consumers will choose based on their own personal preferences.

We know there are going to be a limited number of LLMs, right? We know that those are going to converge to the large ecosystems that already exist. New ones may emerge, as we’re seeing, but there won’t be hundreds of those. There will be few of those. And yes, there may be some advantages if you stay within that ecosystem for your earbuds. But fundamentally, I think even though a lot of people choose earbuds, headphones, and other devices in their ecosystem, a lot of people don’t. 

I think consumers still want choice. And I think it is important for those ecosystems. In our conversations with them, they need third-party players to interface with their AI as well. They need third-party players to produce devices that work with what they’re doing because they recognize that they’re not going to have a full share of the market and that choice matters.

So we believe we’ve got a couple of ways to compete now. Our own devices, for sure, need to be compatible across the different LLMs and the ability to interface with them. And we need our technology starting to crop up in other places where that interface will happen.

Is this a way to just hedge the bet that no one actually knows what’s going to happen with AI? If you’re selling Bose beamforming technology to a handful of Silicon Valley startups making pendants, that means you’re not making the big bet on pendants being a form factor yourself. You can wait and see. Is this just a way to make sure the technology is available and being monetized while you wait for the answers to emerge?

There’s certainly a diversification play, absolutely. And I wouldn’t shy away from betting on a few, and if one becomes a winner, awesome. I also think that it’s important not to lose sight of what your brand is. The Bose brand is: we are for music lovers. And if we start to branch out and create some of those other devices that are not core to who we are, I just don’t think it works. So it is a way to participate because we don’t think those are areas that it makes sense for the Bose brand to go.

One of the things I worry about, again, as a music fan, as an audio nerd, is every single time the tech companies come to music, convenience wins, and quality suffers. This is the pattern that has been repeating since MP3s first came out. We’re going to go from CD quality audio, which in 2026 is still what people refer to as the best audio you can get. CD quality — that’s the bar.

But we went from that to, I don’t know, 128 kilobit MP3s on iPods. We stayed there for a long time. We got a little bit better. The headphones got worse. The interconnect went from wired to a compressed Bluetooth interconnect. At every point, the market picks convenience. There’s some point here, even in luxury, where you just walk in, and the music is playing because the AI has determined the music should be playing, and the endpoint of the music is the least important thing. It’s just that it’s happening to you. 

There’s not this focus on listening intently because you’re probably also watching TikTok at the same time. Or maybe you’re only listening to music on TikTok, and that’s where all your discovery happens, and all of your music money is spent at concerts and live experiences. Somewhere in there is the audio industry. It’s been going through this convulsion.

There’s another turn coming here where Apple, OpenAI, Samsung, and whoever else are going to launch AI-first devices that are conversational, that have audio input and output capabilities. And they will say, “And you can also listen to music.” They will commodify it even further, and the idea of a music lover gets even more squeezed. How do you view that? Because as a music lover myself, I’m like, “This is only getting worse. It’s only becoming. It’s not audio second. It’s like audio 15th.”

Okay. So it’s a complicated web there that you just spun.

Yeah. I’m having an existential crisis here. 

I’m going to try to help you. In some ways, what we find with our luxury customers is that what they’re looking for are moments of clarity, quiet moments where you put down the phone, you put on a record, right? You listen to it the way that it was supposed to be heard on an amazing sound system. And the quiet nature of that, the ability to step away from what is a chaotic digital world — that trend is picking up. It’s picking up. We see it in the luxury space. We actually see more of it in the premium space a little bit now too.

I do think that the appreciation of music, just appreciating it for the emotional state that it puts you in and what it does for your mental health. I actually think that is a trend we’re seeing. And I actually think that’s going to continue to grow. 

Our belief and part of the reason that we started this audio tech business is that we want you to have the best sound experience no matter what. Even if you’re listening in a hostile environment, you’re listening on a lower-cost pair of headphones, or you’re listening to a crappier format, let’s at least make sure you have the best experience possible and that you can tell the difference between what good and better sounds like, or what better and best sounds like. So I think that’s the second thing. 

The other thing that I think is positive about what you said is there’s just so much music discovery because it’s everywhere. And not everyone is going to turn into a music lover, and that’s okay. But I think for young people who are discovering, I’m always amazed at the songs my kids are excited about because I’m like, “You know that’s not a new song, right? That’s from when I was a teenager.” I think that’s great.

The way that the younger generation is doing music discovery is creating a love of music that is not bound by time or genre. I think that’s really cool. And our belief is that if you help people listen to that as best you can, they will get an appreciation for what better sound sounds like, and over time they will graduate into the formats and the products that actually bring that to life in an amazing way.

But that’s music. I appreciate that this is happening in music. I think the question I’m asking is about AI and the almost religious belief in Silicon Valley that AI, in particular natural language input, will usher in a platform shift. Mark Zuckerberg has a religious belief that you’re going to talk to Muse Spark through Meta Glasses. 

Whether or not you believe him, he is laser-focused on that because he wants to stop being constrained by Apple’s platform policies. That is the story that plays out in the pages of Verge every single day.

Apple probably believes this, right? Apple believes natural language input is some kind of enormous threat to the iPhone. They’re reacting to it. Somewhere in there is, are you wearing headphones to talk to this? And can Bose headphones meaningfully participate in those ecosystems? Or will all of these companies create more first-party opportunities for themselves?

I think both can be true. So I think we’ll see if Mark is right, but that doesn’t mean you want to have a crappy listening experience when you’re listening to music. Do you take the glasses off and put on headphones? Do you make the glasses sound better? I don’t think that just because we have a utility, which is AI on the… I’ll just use phone calls. It’s an old school example. Just because you can take phone calls on your headphones, if they didn’t sound good to play your music, most people who love music would not wear those to listen to music. It’s just the reality. And I think the same is true. It’s a utility.

If you’re someone who doesn’t care so much about music and it’s not part of your personal brand or your identity, you may say, “That’s good enough for me. I can’t tell the difference.” But I think for most people, they will choose multiple devices or they will choose one device that can do all of it really, really well. And I still think there’s room for high-quality listening experiences, even in a world where we’re all chained to our AI.

So I’ll just paint a picture for you. If Xreal wins the AI race and all of us interact with Claude all day long through our Xreal glasses, and the sound is powered by Bose through an audio tech partnership, is that victory? Is that success? Or is there more to be done?

I think there’s always more to be done. When you think about how fast technology is moving, I think we’re imagining experiences today that can be had at the edge, that live within the compute constraints and the battery constraints that we have. Two years from now, those constraints are going to still be there, but the amount of capability you have will be larger. I think we’re going to continue to see innovation and invention in the space that’s going to create experiences we haven’t imagined yet.

One of the things that I’m really curious about is just the amount of audio input all of these companies want to do. We had the CEO of Zoom on Decoder, and he was like, “Everyone will talk to AI avatars in Zoom and all of us will be mediated by Zoom. And that means we’ve got to record the in-person meeting. Everyone has to wear the rings or the pendants, and we’re going to record everything all day long so the AI can fully know us.” 

I have a lot of thoughts about that, but that’s one vision in the world. We’re going to record everything, which sort of puts a lot of pressure on noise cancellation, on rehabilitating the audio once you have it. There’s not just a lot of noise, but damage that happens in the compression process and transmitting over the internet. That all seems like an opportunity for a company like Bose.

Is that where the investment is to help the AI hardware companies deal with lossy streaming and TikTok audio? What do you think about that opportunity?

One of the things that we’re learning as we further venture into this space is that the core problems are the same. If you take something like speech clarity, voice pickup, that is a world we’ve done a lot of research on, a lot of work on. It’s an incredibly important part of a Bose headphone, for example, but it’s also important in a dozen other places where the same type of technology, at its core, can be expanded and extended. 

So think about driving 70 miles an hour down the highway in my car. That same speech clarity technology is really relevant in the car in the same way it is in a headphone, in the same way that it is in a motorcycle helmet, where you can imagine that’s maybe the most hostile sound environment you could get.

I think the same is true. Noise-canceling has all sorts of varieties that, I think, are incredibly important in the AI examples that you talked about and in a lot of other everyday life examples where noise cancellation hasn’t gone yet. A great example of that is hearing aids. As you know, we’ve been working on hearing aid technology at Bose for over a decade. Just this year, we launched the world’s first hearing aid with a customer and partner called ORKA in China that has noise cancellation. 

It actually now solves what I think is the biggest problem that hearing aids have had for decades, which is that my most challenging environment, if I have some hearing loss, is a noisy restaurant, for example. And traditional hearing aids amplify all of that sound. Noise canceling has always been the dream of hearing aids because if you could take the noise of the environment down and amplify the speaker, the person you’re trying to have a conversation with, that’s sort of the holy grail now because you’re doing exactly what the customer really wants and needs.

That, up until now, has been impossible to do because in a hearing aid, you need 15 to 18 hours of battery life. You have very limited compute. It’s been a really tricky problem. For us, solving that problem was both about hardware — a new driver that actually fits in the ear canal, but can power noise canceling — and the platform that we built to enable that at a low enough compute level that you could do it inside of a hearing aid over a period of 15 to 18 hours in a day. That’s the kind of innovation for noise canceling, for example, where it’s an obvious use case, but to get there required a considerable number of building blocks.

I’m glad you brought up hearing aids. The last time you were on the show, you had a partnership, I believe, with Lexie. And after our conversation, I ran out and bought my dad those hearing aids. After four years, he won’t wear them because he says everything is too loud. Exactly the problem you’re describing.

But you exited that partnership with Lexie, and the parent company — just asked a couple of weeks ago — is leaving the US market. They’re out. You’re describing hearing aids that you’re making in China. Is there something particular about the US market that just makes it too hard, or are you going to reenter?

No, we’ve been here with Lexie, and they’re going through some challenges, and so we’ll find the right partner for us in the US. I think the over-the-counter hearing aid market has struggled more than any of us thought. If you go back four years, it hasn’t taken off at the rate we had hoped that it would. But I still see a ton of opportunity in the hearing aid space. And this hearing aid happens to be in China, but there’s no reason that you won’t see it in other places around the world.

Why do you think it hasn’t taken off? 

I think it hasn’t worked yet. There are a couple of factors. And again, we’ve been partnering into it, so we’re not as close to the day-to-day. But I think there are really two things. It’s definitely cheaper and more accessible than it was in a prescription environment, but these are still very expensive products. So, rounding about a thousand dollars, which is a lot of money. 

I think in an over-the-counter space, most customers are expecting something that looks and feels more like what they would be willing to pay for a consumer electronics product, which is more like two, three, or maybe $400. While it’s more affordable, it is not as affordable as I think the consumer wants, needs, or expects. I still think there’s some work to do there from a technology standpoint to figure out how you bring it down.

It’s also not really in the insurance space yet. If I get a prescription hearing aid that’s covered by Medicare or that’s covered by my insurance company, but that’s not the case for over-the-counter. And so I think there’s just some affordability challenges we haven’t quite fully solved yet — ones that the industry has not solved. That’s one piece of it. I also think there’s still a stigma part of it. There’s just still a, I don’t want to look old. I don’t want to feel old. I don’t want to wear a hearing aid. And until we figure out the right industrial design and make it more palatable, I think you still have resistance no matter the price point.

The hearing aids my dad was most resistant to were when I tried to get him to wear AirPods, after Apple had released that feature. He looked at me and said, “Absolutely not.” 

So this is a particular area of convergence. What is an augmented reality hearing device except a hearing aid? Except a hearing aid with intense noise cancellation that can focus on the speaker in front of you and maybe translate them in real time if you don’t speak the same language? You’re talking to an AI, and you just want to whisper so no one can hear you, and it’s talking to you, but you’re still hearing everything that goes on. 

This is the convergence, right? The idea of headphones, the idea of augmented reality, and the idea of hearing aids, they’re in a Venn diagram. And the center of that Venn diagram, I think, is getting bigger and bigger over time.

I just keep coming back to the same question: Is the culture of Bose designed to provide technology to all of the players in that ecosystem? Or are you still trying to win with the best product that hits the middle of that Venn diagram?

We are always focused on who the Bose customer is and what the features they want are. As I’ve said a couple of times, you can’t fit everything in. That Venn diagram is getting bigger as compute is getting more powerful at the edge, but it’s still limited. 

When it comes to adding AI, we talk about it at Bose as tiny AI. A lot of companies are good at really big AI. What we’re good at is taking really complex algorithms and then figuring out how to shrink them down and take as little power and compute as they possibly can so that they can fit in our devices. But you’re always constrained. So we’re looking at what our customers are asking us for, what they need, what they want in that Venn diagram. Where do they want the emphasis to be? And that’s where we’re pushing our products. You’ll continue to see us do that.

Other companies will choose a slightly different variation of that Venn diagram, and they’ll look for a different feature set. And I think that’s what makes the industry go. It is competitive by nature, and it is important to have a deep understanding of what the customer needs are.

Do you think that there’s any pressure on Bose just from the product manufacturing side? There are tariffs, there’s a lot of focus on what gets made in China. We talked briefly about protectability and whether or not you even want to sell into Chinese companies or Chinese OEMs who might turn around and take your technology, which we have seen at scale with Apple, Tesla, and others. Is it worth it to be chasing hardware at this time?

I think, since COVID, the supply chain has become a more exciting environment. 

[Laughs] Sure. 

So it’s been a series of things. I think our perspective back then was that we said, “Look, it’s clear we’re going to need to be more flexible and more agile in our supply chain.” That, I think, became clear. We’ve done a lot of work to get ourselves into a position where we expect curveballs now; we just don’t know what they’re going to be. And when they come, we’ve designed ourselves in a way that we can adjust quickly, and we think we’re flexible enough to handle it.

The world needs hardware. As much as everyone is enamored with software and AI, and those are the things creating the magic, perhaps, on the hardware these days, you still need physical things. We are a physical world. You need physical things, and we are going to continue to make physical things and roll with the curveballs that come our way.

Have you moved manufacturing, meaningfully, out of China?

We have, yeah. So we’re diversified across Asia. We also have manufacturing in North America for some of our products as well.

Have you moved anything, meaningfully, back into the United States?

The only thing we have in the US is McIntosh. So all of our McIntosh products are built in Binghamton, New York.

It’s funny, because those are the only products you have that also wouldn’t benefit from the price cut of not having tariffs. You need to keep those prices really high. Have you thought about moving anything back to the United States to avoid whatever tariffs and bring prices down?

We’ll always look at it. It’s a fulsome economic equation of not just economics, but also expertise. Consumer electronics expertise from a manufacturing perspective moved to Asia a long time ago. And so it’s both a cost and an expertise question. We look at it, we talk about it. If it ever makes sense, we’ll do it. Right now, those things don’t play out for us.

I feel like I have to ask you about Bluetooth one more time here at the end of our conversation. I’ve waited.

It is the limiting factor of so many things you are doing. It’s the limiting factor of how you can connect to phones. It will almost certainly be the limiting factor of how all these AI devices work.

The manufacturers have really put Bluetooth in a box. There is a wall around what it can do and what they will ever allow it to do on their platforms. And then there are their extensions. And this is across the board. I’m not even singling out one manufacturer. I used to always single out Apple, but now they’re all doing it. So it’s like, great, there’s a wall around Bluetooth.

For a company like Bose, which has to connect to phones, that is the limit. Have you tried to push hard to overcome that limit? Have the antics of the European Union helped you open up and overcome the limit? How has this played out over the last four years?

Probably not terribly different from what we talked about last time. We partner, we push, we ask for what we want, and we work with what we have. So I think we are always trying to test and push the limits as much as we can, and we’re incredibly good at not using that as an excuse. So how do we create amazing experiences with the advantages that we have? And we think we’re pretty great at doing that.

On the other side of this, you’ve got McIntosh products, your premium home products, and people are disconnected. A lot of people still want to play Spotify off their phone onto their home stereo system. There’s a joke we tell in our other show, the Vergecast, where we just try to locate the computer. Where is the computer supposed to be here?

If you’re playing music off your phone, is the computer your phone, and you’re just Bluetooth streaming to your speakers? In the context of McIntosh, that is just like a heartbreaking crime. Don’t stream Bluetooth to your McIntosh system. So that means the McIntosh system needs a computer. It needs to run some variant of a Spotify app that has Wi-Fi that pulls lossless down. That means it needs a ramp. The whole thing immediately becomes a computer. Maybe a somewhat low-powered computer that’s only focused on a handful of apps, but a computer.

You also have all the carrying costs of a computer. Software updates, application updates, Spotify changes its file formats. Whatever is going to happen, you’ve got some problem there. How do you think about that?

Across all of your products, the amount of compute going into them is going up, as you’ve described. Maybe in tiny ways, but it’s going up. And then you’re not charging service fees. How does that all work as more and more of your products fundamentally become network computers?

I think consumers are subscription’d out. I think that the idea that you’re going to create a subscription service over an over-the-air update that they’re going to pay for on a monthly basis, I think that’s not coming in our space. So we have to kind of think long term as we’re selling products today: what is the software, compute, cloud storage, all of the security, all of the costs that live across the life cycle of that product that we’re going to have to support. We have to build that into the cost of maintaining that product, right? Which is different from what you would have done in the past. 

We’ve made some design choices, I think, that are important as well. We don’t need to duplicate what Spotify is doing either. So as we think about the lifestyle collection products that we just launched, what we heard overwhelmingly from our customers was, “I just want to go to my music. I don’t understand why I have to deal with you. I love how this sounds, but please just get me to my music faster.” We thought for a long time about how best to do that in the home. And we think about it in our wearables too. We want you to be able to control your home speakers through Spotify, AirPlay, or however you want to do that. And that offloads some of that from Bose, which is good.

We also just made an acquisition of a company called Stream Unlimited. Their business is to connect to all of the streaming apps, devices, et cetera, that allow a smart home device to have those easy connections. That gives us some scalability and some participation in that orchestration layer, which is also helpful for us. So we come at the problem in a couple of different ways.

There are rumors, in a few months or weeks here, that Apple will put out a whole bunch of new smart home devices. OpenAI might put out a smart home device. Obviously, I have Google ones, and there are Amazon ones. You ask any of those companies, what are the number one and two things people ask for from their assistants in their house? And it’s setting timers and playing music. Then everything else is a long tail of almost nothing. The drop-off is enormous.

If you want to play music and you’ve got a great stereo in your house, you’ve got to go connect to their smart home system. Now you’re on their network, and now you’re just another endpoint for whatever forthcoming successful consumer AI agent will exist. Big question mark there, but let’s say it happens.

That further commodifies you, right? That’s yet another time when they’re not going to use your interface or your streaming; they’re just going to say [a command] out loud in their home, and the OpenAI device will be like, “I found some speakers on your network. I’m playing the music for you.” Do you need to participate there? Do you need the OpenAI agent to say, “I’m playing it on your Bose speakers,” and then you collect a tiny little licensing check back, or how should that work?

I don’t think so. I think we understand there are a lot of components in this chain, and customers think about Bose for amazing sound. And when they’re playing the speaker, and they’re asking whatever agent they’re asking to play it, there is an appreciation. There is going to be a logo on that speaker. If you have a new Bose Lifestyle speaker, there’s going to be a logo right on the front of it. You’re going to look at it every day in your kitchen, living room, or wherever it’s placed.

I get the feeling those logos are about to get bigger and start lighting up. You can see it coming.

[Laughs] We’re not going to make them that big.

So that chain is long. And in fact, you launched another piece of the chain of music, which is that you launched Studios, which feels like a record label, a marketing venture for new artists. How does that play into it?

So bigger than a record label, not just a record label, but that’s a piece of it. Think about Bose Studios as a way to connect with our customers and give them new avenues to participate with us. The announcement may feel like a sudden thing, but if you sort of look at what we’ve been doing at Bose over the last four or five years, we’ve been moving in this direction. 

Getting the attention of consumers is hard. You don’t do that with traditional advertising anymore. Consumers are engaging with content, and that’s it. And so we’ve been building more and more content. We’ve been partnering with more and more creators. We’ve been dipping our toe in this water for the last several years.

So I’ll give you a couple of examples. We’ve been partnering with NME to do their mixtape, where we’re helping them bring undiscovered, up-and-coming artists to the forefront and helping bring and celebrate those artists. We’ve learned a lot from doing that. The connection and the participation of our customers with that content and with those artists has been incredible.

We’ve been sponsoring an event, the Chris Brickley Invitational, which is this amazing basketball event for high school basketball players. It is becoming the place to go if you’re an All-American type high school basketball player, both on the men’s and the women’s side. And that event has turned into something so special. We’re not putting on a new Super Bowl over here, but we are participating in content creation in a way that connects with our customers. We think that’s really important.

We also like this idea of up-and-coming creators who need support to launch their careers. At Bose, we say fiercely independent. There’s something so unique about our structure and the independence that we have. We kind of like the idea of supporting this up-and-coming group. It supports our connection with our customers, and we think we’re helping them along the way as well.

I feel like I could spend another full hour just talking about the economics of the music business and brands supporting creators in this way. But sadly, you’ve already given us too much time. Lila, thank you so much for being on Decoder.

Thank you for having me back.

Questions or comments? Hit us up at decoder@theverge.com. We really do read every email!

How to staycation better

9 August 2026 at 13:30
The painting “Interior with an Etruscan Vase,” by Henri Matisse, 1940.

I have to be honest about something that is a great source of personal shame: I am really, really bad at taking time off of work.

Despite working at a company with unlimited PTO, the last time I took a weeklong vacation was about a year ago, making me a walking cliche of the American who never goes on holiday. You could argue that the reason is cultural, that the Protestant work ethic has me in a chokehold. But I think the root cause is much simpler: For something allegedly relaxing and fun, vacations require a lot of planning and even more money. The price of flights is up, hotel rooms aren’t cheap, you need to factor in the cost of meals, and even that corny souvenir shot glass isn’t going to pay for itself. 

Hannah Sampson, who writes about travel for the Washington Post, says one answer is to take a staycation. “It’s taking the time to do things you normally wouldn’t do in your regular life and put on hold all of the burdensome things that you would do in your daily life,” she told Vox. “You’re enabling yourself to discover something that you might have taken for granted.” 

Plus, she says, a staycation can be “really fun and rewarding while also being budget-friendly and hopefully allowing you to put money aside for the bigger trip that you want to take sometime.”

So how do you make the most of a staycation? And how do you keep your typical day-to-day life from creeping in? We discuss that and more on the latest episode of Explain It to Me, Vox’s weekly call-in podcast.

Below is an excerpt of my conversation with Sampson, edited for length and clarity. You can listen to the full episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts. If you’d like to submit a question, send an email to askvox@vox.com or call 1-800-618-8545.

It sounds like the key to a successful staycation is all about mindset. How do you achieve that mindset shift?

The way to really get into the staycation zone is planning and preparing and getting yourself hyped for what you’re going to do. This is something that I love about going on vacation and it applies to staying home too. 

Read reviews for places that you might want to go. If you’ve picked a restaurant, look at the menu and start to drool over what you’re going to eat. Think about your favorite bookstores or paths or discover a new corner of your neighborhood that you want to explore in advance. The anticipation of that experience will give you that vacation high. 

It’s so hard though, because you’re around the house. How do you make your home feel a little more special?

I think we all got too much practice on this during the pandemic, but there are a lot of things you can do to change the vibes of your house. I have a candle that’s national park-scented, so it’s piney. In my house, we do a lot of things like use audio to set the mood. I have small kids, so we’ll play audio of a ride at Disney World or just ambient sound from a park that we like. 

During the pandemic, my husband and I meant to spend our anniversary at the beach where we got married, but I was pregnant. We couldn’t travel. So we found a webcam that showed the sunset on that beach and we got takeout. It was really sad, but we watched the sunset.

It’s sad, but it’s also quite sweet. It’s like, “We’ll bring the beach to us.”

Exactly. And it was a beautiful sunset.

For me, one of the challenges of a staycation — and for all vacations, if I’m honest — is not letting real life creep in. And that’s beyond taking time to do administrative tasks around the house. That Slack goes off. I get that email. A news alert goes out and I’m just like, “Well, what if I just take a little gander?” How do you keep from letting that happen?

Unplugging is so hard. You could have a couple of small kids and teach them to tell you to get off your phone, which mine have learned to do. My husband actually has a Brick device, which locks your phone for you. The discipline is real there. 

It takes work to force yourself out of that constant need of scrolling through TikTok or just seeing what’s up at work. You don’t need to be on there. If there’s an emergency, they know how to reach you at work. So trust that process. Be super in the moment with whatever you’re doing because you need that mental break, even if you haven’t gone somewhere. 

You need to make the most of the time that you have, especially if you’re taking vacation time and spending it at home. Vacation time is a precious resource that you should be using to the best of your ability. 

The doomsday threat we’re ignoring

9 August 2026 at 13:00
Troops in gas mask

Of all the extinction-level threats vying for our attention, AI, climate change, and nuclear war tend to get most of the airplay. But Annie Jacobsen thinks biological war should be near the top of our mental list of doomsday scenarios, too.

She should know — Jacobsen has carved out a unique niche as America’s foremost reporter on the ways we could end the world. Her bestselling 2024 book Nuclear War: A Scenario terrified readers and experts alike, and has been optioned by Hollywood. 

It was while conducting dozens of interviews with high-level government sources for Nuclear War that Jacobsen was told repeatedly that biowarfare should be her next focus.

She took their advice. Her gripping new book Biological War: A Scenario follows a similar ticking-clock format that shows, step by step, just how a humanity-threatening man-made biological catastrophe could play out. (Spoiler alert: not great.)

The result feels like dystopian science fiction, albeit the kind that comes heavily footnoted with government studies that come to similarly grim conclusions. The fact that tech CEOs are also sounding the alarm that advanced AI could make creating killer germs even easier only adds to the growing sense of anxiety. And this book has also been optioned by Hollywood for a TV adaptation. 

Jacobsen sat down with Today, Explained host Noel King to talk through the plot of her nightmare scenario, why we’re still developing biological weapons despite the clear risks, and what needs to happen to avoid disaster. Below is an excerpt of their conversation, edited for length and clarity. There’s much more in the full podcast, so listen to Today, Explained wherever you get podcasts, including Apple PodcastsPandora, and Spotify.

How does your book start?

The inciting incident in the book is an accident at a Biosafety Level 4 lab, shorthand BSL-4, in Siberia called Vector. And it’s an actual BSL-4 lab, the highest classification. … And there was an actual accident, an explosion there in 2019

In that real-life incident, a deadly pathogen was not released that we know of. But of course, in Biological War: A Scenario, a deadly pathogen is released. And it’s a form of pneumonic plague, which is a nightmare pathogen and sits at the top of the Tier 1 select agent list of the CDC. And so in the first act of the book, I show the scrambling of the intelligence community and the Defense Department, trying desperately to determine if something got out and what it is. … The release of the pathogen widens, and so once you have escape. You do not have mitigation, which has to happen in the first 24, 48 hours. Now you have a situation which is unstoppable.

You say this is now an unstoppable scenario. What is it?

A plague itself, of course, conjures up images and ideas of the bubonic plague of the 14th century, the Black Death. That killed between one half and one third of Europe. The bacteria is called Yersinia pestis. And pneumonic plague is the airborne version of plague. The problem with an airborne pathogen is that because the delivery system is the human lungs, it can move very quickly from a scientist in that lab who now has Yersinia pestis in his lungs out to the general public. And that is precisely what happens in the scenario.

How does it spread from there? The city where this BSL-4 lab sits isn’t Moscow. What happens once the pathogen is in the lungs of the people who work in that lab, or the janitor who was cleaning it that night?

That’s right. Well, suddenly it’s in everyone’s lungs, and those people go out into their community. And even though Koltsovo, the science town where Vector is located, is a small town, it is just 12 miles from Novosibirsk, which is the third-largest city in Russia. And, also, there happens to be in this scenario a group of international hunters on a hunting trip in that area who come across a dying scientist in the snow. One of them gives him CPR, being the Good Samaritan that he is. And lo and behold, those travelers suddenly are now getting on an airplane in Novosibirsk, flying home to where they reside in five or six of the continents.

What makes this form of plague so novel, so dangerous?

I pull this information from actual facts of the Soviet Cold War-era biological weapons program that we know about from Soviet defectors. And I want you to keep in mind: This is 40 years ago when gene editing was in its infancy. But there are two things specifically that the Soviet bioweapons engineers did to plague. 

Their idea was to create a super plague weapon. And one of them has never been revealed before. They were working to insert the gene for euphoria into the plague pathogen. … When you get a disease, a pneumonic-type disease, pneumonia, tubercular, you want to go home and get under the covers because you feel terrible. And when you do that, you’re infecting a lot less people than you would if a gene for euphoria had been inserted into the pathogen, which would make you feel terrific, which would make you want to go out and socialize with people, perhaps even go to a crowded disco. 

And the other thing that the Soviet scientists were working on was a way to defeat medical countermeasures, but with an added component of psychological distress. They inserted a gene into the pathogen that would be triggered by the taking of antibiotics. And that second pathogen would give you encephalitis, which is a swelling of the brain. The psychological part of it, according to the Soviet scientists, was that they wanted the last thought of the person dying of what they thought was pneumonic plague, but would in fact be encephalitist to be, “My government and Western medicine has failed me.”

Those of us who try to remain optimistic think there’s a way to stop it. In the movies, there’s an outbreak, then the government gets it under control, and okay, maybe a lot of people die, but we’re all right. That is not where your book is headed. How does your scenario end?

So in the book, I take readers from outbreak to anarchy in six days. Anarchy is what will happen according to Pentagon war gaming and pandemic planning. And this is because fear of infection becomes a secondary weapon, if you will. People begin to behave like they are about to die, which is most certainly underpinning everyone’s mind. And so after those first six days, the Principals Committee, the President’s Biodefense Committee, must make a decision. The president has to declare the Insurrection Act, which allows the military to step in as a law enforcement agency. 

“Imagine the president — with a few Secret Service outside the door, the military aide with the nuclear football — sitting alone in a room wearing a gas mask.”

What happens to the president really blew my mind as a reporter. He goes somewhere in the United States very far away from everyone. Because the idea, the goal, is to make sure that the president doesn’t get the airborne pathogen in his lungs. So maybe I’ll leave you with an image. Imagine the president — with a few Secret Service outside the door, the military aide with the nuclear football — sitting alone in a room wearing a gas mask.

In the book, the people who survive are the ones who have gas masks. Everyone else is gone.

And look, we hope we never get to that, by all means. But yes, the Pentagon has issued 1.7 million gas masks to its military personnel. And that is a spooky thought in and of itself, coupled with the idea that the military is predominantly male. There’s something like 17 percent women in the military. And so, unlike the Nuclear War scenario in which I had science-based nuclear winter theory to work from, in Biological War, nothing has been written on the science record about what it might be after. And so the one imaginative part of the book is the very end where I write about biological twilight. … And it is a very, very ugly world.

Let’s back up. We did outlaw biological weapons at some point, right?

That’s right. Very mysteriously in 1969, President Nixon just unilaterally declared that the arsenal was going to be destroyed. At the same time that all of the nations of the world were working to sign this treaty called the Biological Weapons Convention Treaty, which would outlaw bioweapons. Soviet Russia at the time signed it but immediately began work on an illegal biological weapons program that was colossal. And this went without notice, without any idea really by the CIA and the Pentagon all the way until 1989, when one of the Soviet scientists named Vladimir Pasechnik had a crisis of conscience and he defected and he told British intelligence all about the program.

Where have we seen biological weapons used?

Maybe the most important example of a biological attack in the past, certainly here in the United States, are the anthrax attacks, which occurred right after 9/11. Weaponized anthrax was sent through the mail to US senators and a number of media outlets. So five people ended up dying; 22 got sick in four states. But that really kicked off what can be considered the biological military-industrial complex, if you will, which led to this buildup in BSL-4 labs around the world today. There are 110 BSL-4 labs around the world. There are more than 3,500 BSL-3 labs.

Your book has a map of where those labs are, which I found weirdly comforting, mainly because I don’t live too near any of them. If one of these things is going to be released, either accidentally or deliberately, where is the threat coming from? A rogue nation? Terrorists?

Certainly, bad actors getting a hold of a biological weapon was the great concern of the post-anthrax situation. And that is why so much emphasis was put on bioterrorism. Now I avoided that specifically in the book. … And I didn’t even have an attack. Rather, I had an incident. I had a lab leak because I have learned in the decades since that really is the greatest concern. So many of these BSL-3 and 4 labs are in places without a lot of security, including in countries where there are wars going on.

Could somebody be making a biological weapon in a basement somewhere, off books?

Absolutely. And another disturbing document I came across, unclassified in the Pentagon, was a threat spectrum that showed weapons of mass destruction in terms of destructiveness. And of course, nuclear weapons sit at the far end of the spectrum. They are the most destructive. But very close behind were biological weapons. And even more startling was the notion that biological weapons present the greatest overall threat. 

Nuclear weapons have an extremely high barrier for entry. You have to have fissile material. … You have to have a weapons delivery system like an ICBM or a submarine. … That creates a situation where most nuclear weapons, all nuclear weapons, if you will, are in the hands of a command-and-control system within a nation. 

Biological weapons have no such barriers. In fact, the barriers for entry are getting lower literally by the day. You now can have a situation where someone with very limited knowledge of biology can create a biological weapon in their basement with the use of computational systems like an AI system, for example.

Your book reads like a thriller. How much have you exaggerated? How much have you novelized in order to hold our attention?

Everything in the book is based in science fact, meaning all of the facts, all of the figures. I write a hundred or so pages of notes in the back of the book for readers to be able to answer the question that you are asking me. … In the notes, you can find that answer.

Did any of those people give you good recommendations for how to avoid a disaster scenario, or at least how to avoid these things proliferating?

Well, you know, the ticking clock scenario that I write has an even more urgent ticking clock, which is the public’s pressure on lawmakers to absolutely do something about this nightmare scenario before it happens. Look, we have a world right now where you have the CEOs of the largest AI companies in the world admitting publicly that the lane of bio mixed with AI is of their top concern. You don’t hear that about nuclear. You hear that about bio.

How do you sleep through the night?

Anyone who knows me personally can vouch for the fact that I am an optimist at heart. I really believe that information is king. Once you know things, it gives you a lot of power. Perhaps that’s whistling by the graveyard, but that’s what works for me.

Do you have a biohazard suit?

I do not. I do not. But I do have a few gas masks. I must tell the truth.

Donald Trump has a gas problem

8 August 2026 at 13:00
A sign for the gas station Wawa standing near a road displays the price per gallon for regular gasoline and diesel.
Gas prices in Chadds Ford, Pennsylvania, on May 21, 2026. | Matthew Hatcher/Bloomberg via Getty Images

With the 2026 midterm elections quickly approaching, President Donald Trump’s war with Iran is ongoing and gas prices remain high. 

Americans are taking note: On this week’s episode of America, Actually, host Astead Herndon visits Allentown, Pennsylvania in the state’s bellwether Seventh District, to hear how persistently high gas prices — almost $4.20 per gallon in Pennsylvania — are showing up in residents’ lives. Many said the economy and prices were at the top of their list of issues, and laid the blame at Trump’s feet.

Still, gas is just one expense of many, for voters who are likely also feeling the pinch with the cost of groceries, housing, electricity, and more. So how much power do gas prices really have to shape the outcome of an election — and, potentially, a presidency? And after decades of renewable energy growth, technological disruption, and new existential worries, why are gas prices still so core to the American political conversation?

To learn more, Herndon spoke with Julian Zelizer, a professor of history and public affairs at Princeton University. They discussed the history of gas prices as a salient political issue, why Americans feel high prices so acutely, even compared to other commodities, and whether voters are ever willing to overlook gas prices when they go to the polls.

Below is an excerpt of the conversation, edited for length and clarity. There’s much more in the full show, so listen to America, Actually wherever you get your podcasts or watch it on Vox’s YouTube channel.

When did the price of gas become such a political weapon in America? Does this date all the way back to the Model T?

It really dates to the 1970s. That’s when the United States will have two energy crises, in 1973 and 1979, and the price of gas becomes a huge political issue for Americans. It affects presidents, it affects Congress, and it becomes a manifestation in that decade of the problems facing the country.

I think that’s when we start to realize we don’t have unlimited resources and it’s gonna be a political problem.

Can you go in more detail about that? What happened in the ’70s to make it so clear to Americans that this party might not last forever?

Production of oil here peaks in the late 1960s, early 1970s, and then in 1973, OPEC, which is the cartel of oil-producing countries in the Middle East, imposes an embargo on the US because the United States had supported Israel during the Yom Kippur War. And as a result of the embargo, prices go up and supplies go down, and that’s when Americans start to face gas lines.

Then, in 1979, we have another round of this after the Iranian Revolution, and that leads to even bigger gas lines and more stringent rations and government mandates in ’79, and many people think it really helped bring down Jimmy Carter’s presidency.

Carter in 1979 is really reeling from what Americans experience. And it’s not simply gas prices, it’s waiting in line for gas. It’s hearing that you could only buy gas on certain days. It’s reading stories about people stealing gas and violent clashes occurring over getting this commodity. 

There’s a lot of things that go into the mix with Carter — the hostages in Iran — but certainly his difficulty dealing with this fundamental is a big part of what happens in 1980 when Reagan wins the presidency.

Of course, presidents have little control over the global price of oil, yet they are blamed for it seemingly every time. How have politicians and particularly presidents dealt with that reality, considering the price at the pump is so important to their political futures while not always in their control?

In the ’70s they tried with legislation. Carter pushes legislation that deals with energy, but it’s limited in its success. Americans want a lot of oil and it was hard to get them to conserve.

He put solar panels on the White House. There’s really not much that presidents can do. We have the strategic reserves. And other than that, I think presidents just wait it out and hope the timing works in their favor and the gas prices go down again.

Is there an example of a president who beat the gas prices trap? Do we have any example of someone successfully convincing the country, “Hey, look away from the price of the pump”?

I think we have presidents who say, “Just look away for a little while,” and when reelection comes around again, they’re doing better. Even President George W. Bush struggled with some of this after 9/11 and after the war started. But in the end, he doesn’t make an announcement about it so much as focus on other issues such as national security.

And now we see how prices fluctuate, so you just wait for those moments.

Why is it always gasoline rather than other commodities when we think about the priorities for the electorate?

There’s a few things. One is that, historically, the automobile really symbolizes American freedom and American consumption. And so when something impinges on our ability to drive a lot…

Second, it’s a price you just see. It’s just very visible when it goes up or down, more than groceries even.

I think that kind of recurring image for people becomes very politically potent if that number gets too high. So it’s a real struggle, but it’s also symbolically right in front of us. And these days, I think even more so now than in the ’70s or ’80s, it’s become something that the reporters and the media track.

I want to talk specifically about this summer. We’ve crossed $4/gallon again this summer, the highest since 2022, and this time it’s pretty clearly tied with the ongoing war in Iran.

Donald Trump has tried to make the argument that some short-term pain at the pump is worth a long-term national security focus. But his energy secretary said pretty clearly that gas won’t be back to $3 until 2027. Obviously, that puts us after the midterm elections. It sounds like he’s running the exact playbook you just told me has never worked, which is to get people to just pretend this is not happening.

What have you thought about how the president has handled the spike in gas prices?

In part it strikes me as a president who doesn’t really care about the fate of his party. I think it’s a big issue. I think most Republicans understand that. And it’s tied to a war that really doesn’t have public support.

It’s a war without the kind of clarity that many people felt after 9/11 with Afghanistan, and Iraq for a while. It’s the worst of all worlds. And so I think he’s really fumbled on this issue, and there was part of him that hoped people either wouldn’t care even if they noticed, or somehow the prices would diminish. It’s certainly not looking that way.

What’s behind the Google AI shake-up

7 August 2026 at 18:45

Some of the biggest names on Google's AI team got new jobs this week. In some cases, including for legendary Googler Jeff Dean, those jobs are no longer at Google. Given that Google's models seem to be behind the best of what's coming out of anthropic and OpenAI, is this a sign of Google in turmoil? Is it about Demis Hassabis wanting something more interesting to work on than virtual assistants? Or is there something else entirely happening here?

On this episode of The Vergecast, Nilay and David start by discussing the leadership shake-up at Google, the state of the AI race, and whether Google is actually set up to succeed here. They also t …

Read the full story at The Verge.

Trump’s imaginary Red Scare

7 August 2026 at 12:30
A sticker reading “socialism is good, actually” in red text on a white ground, along with a drawing of a red rose, is seen on a table.
A sticker reading “socialism is good, actually” is seen on a table during an election night party held by the Los Angeles chapter of the Democratic Socialists of America on November 4, 2025, in Los Angeles, California. | Eric Thayer/Los Angeles Times via Getty Images

Democratic socialists keep winning primary elections, and Democratic voters are trending in the same direction: Recent polling suggests that a third of Democrats and Democratic-leaning adults now identify as democratic socialists. Most recently, Abdul El-Sayed, who does not identify as a democratic socialist but was endorsed by Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT) and Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) and supports policies like Medicare-for-all, won a fiercely fought Democratic Senate primary in Michigan. 

As democratic socialists gain ground in Democratic politics, President Donald Trump and Republicans have attempted to conflate democratic socialism with communism (though allegations of “communism” are hardly new territory for Trump). At the same time, recent reporting has pointed out that, in fact, there are some members within the Democratic Socialists of America who openly identify as communists.

To help us understand what communism actually is and its history in the United States, Today Explained co-host Noel King spoke with Maurice Isserman, a history professor at Hamilton College. Isserman has written extensively about the history of communism in the United States, including in his latest book is Reds: The Tragedy of American Communism.

Below is an excerpt of the conversation, edited for length and clarity. There’s much more in the full podcast, so listen to Today, Explained wherever you get podcasts, including Apple Podcasts, Pandora, and Spotify

Define communism for me. 

Communism began as a split off from the socialist movement. It was inspired by the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917. And it is in favor of a total transformation of capitalist society with the government — the state — owning and operating what communists would call the means of production: factories, transportation, and so forth. It also believes in one-party rule. So for 75 years or so, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union allowed no competing parties to exist within that country.

There have been communists in the United States of America before. What is their history in this country? 

The American Communist Party was founded in 1919, right after the First World War.

And it was, again, inspired by the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. It seemed to point to a way out. The Bolsheviks came to power, remained in power. And so communists or would-be communists in the United States, in Europe, elsewhere said, “Well, if they can do it, we can do it too.” So an American Communist Party was founded in 1919 — small, isolated, mostly immigrants, but it gained strength in the course of the 1930s during the Great Depression.

Why did they gain strength during the Great Depression? 

Because capitalism seemed to be failing and communism seemed to be the wave of the future. The other factor leading to the increase in communist influence was that fascism was rising in Italy, in the 1920s, in Germany, in the early 1930s. And it seemed as if there was a stark choice facing the world: either fascism or communism. And many people in the 1930s said, “Well, let’s support the communists to beat back the threat of fascism.”

Did elected communists get anything done in the United States?

Well, there were very few elected communists. In the 1940s, there were two communist members of the New York City Council, but that was about it in terms of open communists being elected to office. Their influence was seen more behind the scenes in the labor movement, in organizing the big new industrial unions of the 1930s, and organizing so-called front groups, anti-fascist groups, anti-racist groups, and so forth. And the party was never huge. At its height at the end of the 30s, it had perhaps 75,000 members in a country then with a population of 130 million. Its influence extended beyond its own membership, but it was still very much a minor party — growing, but minor.

Why did communism fail in the United States of America? 

One reason was that it was repressed by the government pretty much throughout its existence — in the first Red Scare immediately after the First World War, and then again in the second Red Scare, which we commonly refer to as the McCarthy era in the late ’40s and through the 1950s. Communists were sent to jail for advocacy, for simply saying that they favored communism.  

But it also failed because of its rather slavish obedience to the dictates of Soviet leaders. When the Soviet foreign policy changed from anti-fascism and anti-Hitlerism in the mid- to late ’30s to a kind of de facto alliance with Hitler from 1939 to 1941, the American Communist Party obediently followed that line. Then Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, and the Soviet Union swung back to anti-fascism. Well, [the American Communist Party] made that turn too. But all of those turns gave the communists a reputation as an organization that did not really exist to serve American interests, but rather to serve Soviet interests.

We know from reporting that’s been done that there are people within the DSA who identify as communists. Can you help us understand who these folks are within the organization and what they actually believe?

There are a number of left-wing factions. There’s a group called Red Star. There’s another one called the Marxist Unity Group. There are three or four of them that work in coalition. They’re rivals, but they also work in coalition to control, by a narrow margin, the national leadership. One of the members of Red Star is a co-chair of the organization. 

These people make no bones about their belief. They’re not secret communists infiltrating. They describe themselves as being inspired by the Bolshevik Revolution or being inspired by Maoist China, or they call themselves Marxist-Leninist. So they’re quite open about it, and that comes out of a different political tradition, an antithetical tradition to democratic socialism. 

They have a different ultimate strategy in mind, which is not to work within the Democratic Party as AOC is committed to do, as Zohran Mandami is committed to do, but rather they want to split and start an independent revolutionary socialist party, which will run against both Democrats and Republicans, which is a strategy that has been tried an infinite number of times in the past by various groups of leftists.

Is this a Red Scare, or is there something to be scared about here?

It’s definitely a Red Scare. Trump and his allies don’t have a lot going for them in this election cycle. They’ve got an unwinnable war going on. They’ve got gasoline prices skyrocketing. Trump is even underwater on immigration, his signature issue. So what do you do in that situation? You create a boogeyman, or try to. And the difference is that most Americans under the age of 45 have no memory whatsoever of the existence of the Soviet Union as a threat to the United States. 

When you launch a Red Scare in 1919, well, there’s communist Russia. When you launch a Red Scare in the 1940s and ’’50s, well, there’s the Soviet Union. There’s a real threat. I mean, they have missiles and so forth. 

Who’s supposed to be the foreign threat today controlling the actions of these American communists? Cuba? Cuba can’t even keep the lights on for its own people. It doesn’t have missiles. It’s not going to invade the United States or its allies. So I think this is an attempt to launch a Red Scare using DSA as kind of a boogeyman. But DSA, again, is not one thing. It has the ‘left wing of the possible’ Democratic socialists, who I would say include such figures as Zohran Mamdani and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. And then it has, unfortunately, some would-be Bolsheviks, so it’s really a question of which DSA is going to prevail in the long run. 

Which one do you think will prevail in the long run?

I’m a historian. I’m very good at predicting the past, and I’m terrible at predicting the future.

The left and right agree on one thing: no data centers

6 August 2026 at 16:00
A photo illustration featuring data center protesters.

Today, I’m talking with Gaby Del Valle, a policy reporter here at The Verge, about the growing backlash against AI data centers. 

Gaby recently reported a fantastic piece about Hernando County, Florida, where last month the county commission unanimously approved a yearlong moratorium on data center construction. She attended a protest there organized by a group called Humans First, a conservative grassroots movement focused on combating AI data center build-outs. 

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You’ll hear Gaby explain that it was part of a bigger, broader, and bipartisan opposition to data centers. Not only as physical buildings, but as infrastructure that powers an AI boom that takes local jobs and fills feeds with slop.

Data center construction has become a proxy for the public’s feelings about AI: something physical they can aim their fear and frustration at — and even create enough pressure to stop through community organizing and protests.

So I wanted Gaby to talk me through what these protests look like on the ground, from voters whose party affiliations have typically aligned them with big business. You’ll hear Gaby say data centers are scrambling party lines, turning diehard Trump voters into protesters who care about left-coded issues like groundwater contamination and forever chemicals. 

It’s a confusing time, and data centers are going to play a major role in electoral politics going forward. So I suspect this won’t be the last we hear from Gaby on movements like Humans First.

Okay: Verge policy reporter Gaby Del Valle on the bipartisan data center backlash. Here we go.

This interview has been lightly edited for length and clarity. 

Gaby Del Valle, you’re a policy reporter here at The Verge. Welcome back to Decoder.

Thank you. Happy to be here.

I’m excited to talk to you. You were on previously with our friend Alex Heath, but this is the first time I’ve gotten to talk to you in Decoder. I think the story you just wrote about data centers and conservative backlash in Florida is just a real preview of what tech policy going into the midterm elections is going to be like.

You were just there. You talked to a bunch of people who are protesting data centers. It is a real alignment scramble in terms of our politics. Tell us what you found.

What I found was people are really, really, really, really mad. And the reasons why they’re mad are different depending on the community, but they’re also all the same, if that makes sense. They have localized concerns. They were telling me Florida’s really humid. It doesn’t make sense to build a data center that needs to be kept very cool and dry in such a humid place. A lot of them were concerned about their groundwater. They were concerned about PFAS getting dumped into the water.

But I’ve also talked to people in Arizona who have the opposite concern. Arizona is not very humid. Arizona’s very dry. And they’re also like, “It doesn’t make sense to build a data center in the desert.” So whatever your community is, you’re like, “It doesn’t make sense to build a data center here because of X reason,” basically.

The thing that really strikes me in reading your piece and hearing about the other reporting you’re doing for pieces to come is that data center build-outs and data center protests do not neatly map to the usual right-left culture war alignment that we have seen play out for so long. And I’m curious about your view on that. Why can’t Elon Musk just command his army of followers to be pro-data centers?

This is so interesting to me. So this is a little bit of backstory that’s going to answer your question. The woman who organized Humans First, which was bipartisan and now is focusing only on organizing conservatives, was an early founder or organizer with the Tea Party way back when. And this has a similar vibe to me. It’s not a left-right thing. It’s a populous technocrat divide.

You’re seeing that on the right and the left. So for example, at the Abundance Conference last year, it was center-right to center-left-ish. And everybody was pro-nuclear, pro-AI. And we were hearing that, “These things are here to stay. We have to figure out how to do it smartly.” At the same time, the populist left and the populist right are both skeptical of tech development, to put it lightly.

That skepticism plays out across a number of dimensions. I couldn’t help but be struck as I read your story by how many strains of conspiracy thinking there are about data centers.

I’m curious if they’re just visible. They’re so big, and they require so much development and so much build-out that you can just glue any concerns you have onto them. “This big thing is happening, and I don’t feel any control. And I’m also worried about 5G, Chinese government interference, and X, Y, Z. And I can just point it all at this very big thing by which there’s a process to say no. I can go to my local town board meeting and literally say no.”

I mean, I think that’s part of it. It’s interesting because I think there’s a spectrum of conspiratorial thinking to, I guess, misinformed thinking on the water use question. We now know that they don’t use as much water as we previously thought, et cetera, et cetera. But on the far end of the spectrum, one of the people I talked to told me that cattle born near data centers are all stillborn. I tried to track that down. I was like, “Where did this come from?” And it was one farmer in Texas who claims he had one stillborn calf on his cattle farm.

So that got spun out via the internet rumor, social media mill. I think that’s part of it. There’s this issue of social collapse that comes out once you talk to people a little bit. One of the women I talked to said, “I had this friend. ChatGPT told her she couldn’t be friends with me anymore.” You have all of these stories of people harming themselves, going off their medication, or whatever because they’ve been talking to a chatbot and it goes awry.

I think this gives people a feeling of control. Where I can go to my community board meeting or my council members’ meeting, and I can say, “I don’t want this big building that houses the scary thing that is fracturing my community here.” So it’s not just the actual building. I think it’s a broader backlash to generative AI and to LLMs specifically.

One of my ideas that I’ve been pushing on lately is that the AI products are not winning over hearts and minds in the market. So if the data centers just said Netflix on them, maybe people would like them more.

But instead, that’s where the slop is coming from, and it’s why the jobs are going to go away. It’s also where Mark Zuckerberg is just going to get even wealthier. Is there a dynamic of that — that people just don’t like the thing that the data centers make?

Yes, absolutely. They don’t like a lot of the things that the data centers make. It’s not just AI. I think AI is a big part of it, but this is a little preview of a different story I’m working on… In Tucson, there’s a data center project that’s getting built out. The people I talked to there said, “Yeah, this might be an Amazon Web Services facility, and Amazon works with ICE.” So this technology is fueling mass deportations through, not directly, but creating the non-sexy infrastructure that surveillance is built on.

There are two things to it. Part of it is a NIMBY, “I don’t want this thing in my backyard, literally. I don’t want my town to get polluted. I don’t want this. I don’t want that. I don’t want to see it. I don’t want the noise pollution.” And then the other part is, “I do not like what this big building represents and what it has wrought on society.”

Does that cut across bipartisan lines? Or is that more culture war coded?

It’s both. It cuts across culture war lines in that people have different concerns about what LLMs do. So one woman I spoke to was talking about the fracturing of social bonds. On the construction front, she was like, “We’re a rural-ish community. We don’t want this big blight on our nice rolling hills.” So that’s a right-coded thing. And there was a lot of anti-development stuff that is neither right nor left. 

On the left, I would say there’s similar culture war concerns, but it’s… I don’t know if this is necessarily a culture war concern, but fueling deportations. Both sides, I think, are concerned about the job losses because of AI. And both sides have caught on to the fact that these facilities don’t really have a lot of long-term job prospects. There’s the big construction boom. There’s an HVAC situation. But to actually maintain these facilities, it doesn’t require that many people.

I think people have caught onto that. The promises of the AI data job, or that the AI boom will lead to jobs related to data centers, are not actually true.

Yeah. At most, it’s a few hundred jobs for each of these facilities, at least in the data centers we have now. Why do you think some of the protests make national news? The Kevin O’Leary data center in Utah is a national story. Maybe it’s just because he’s a cartoon character.

And then there’s a new project in Georgia where there might be a huge OpenAI facility that seems to go under the radar. There are all of the projects in Florida that you are reporting on, but don’t seem to be explosive in the way that some of the other ones are.

Yeah, I think that’s a good question. There was one in Florida that was explosive, and it was just because it was near Mar-a-Lago. I think that one pretty obviously made the national news because it’s related to the president. I honestly think a cartoon character at the center of it is the deciding factor a lot of the time on whether it’ll become a national story or not. And then also the numbers. The Utah one, I don’t remember off the top of my head how big it’s supposed to be, but it’s supposed to be huge. So then that becomes a proxy for all data center development. 

They’re being planned everywhere. And I think what’s so interesting is that the backlash exists everywhere too. I relied a lot on, for example, the Tampa Bay Times to figure out the background for this story. They’re on top of it. They’re going to these meetings and watching people get yelled at and asked, “Did you sign an NDA? Yes or no?”

Do you think the local governments are being responsive? You’ve now gone to some of these protests; you’ve talked to people on the ground in various counties across the country. The basic unit of democracy is supposed to be your local government because you know those people and you can yell at them in the grocery store and the town board meeting. 

We’re seeing there’s a wall going up in some of these cases where the local governments are saying, “No, we have to do this development. This is the only economic development available.” And the people are saying, “No, we’re going to throw you out.” Do you think local governments on the whole are being responsive or not responsive at all?

I think it really depends. In Hernando County, they did pass a moratorium. There are a lot of counties in Florida where moratoriums have passed. But in Tucson, again, the city government is responsive to what the people want and the county government isn’t, and they’re at odds with each other. There are all these videos of people yelling at their representatives about NDAs again. And then them being like, “We cannot say whether we signed an NDA,” which is an answer, but whatever.

I think it really depends on a lot of things. How small the communities are, for one. How vulnerable the people in office feel to getting voted out, I think, is another big one. In Florida, the Republican primary for governor, I think, might be affected by this issue. The primary is in a few weeks and the front-runner, Byron Donalds, has taken a lot of money from the AI industry and data center development groups. And people are mad. People are really mad. 

He was endorsed by Trump, and everyone I spoke to, as proud Trump voters, said things like, “I don’t understand why Trump would endorse him. I’m not going to vote for him.” One woman I talked to who told me she was opposed to everything Democrat said she would vote for a Democrat or an independent if Donalds won the primary. And Donalds has also changed… not his stance on data center development, but the way that he talks about it in response to a lot of this backlash.

How has he changed the stance? How is he talking about it now?

He says his vision is to make Florida the financial capital of the world. And to a lot of people, that would sound great, but these people are really upset by this, both because they… I mean, there are a lot of other things at play here. Housing costs in Florida have gone up exponentially. Not only in big cities like Miami, but in the suburbs of Tampa, for example. Housing prices have shot up to levels that I, as somebody who grew up there, just don’t understand. I literally can’t wrap my head around it.

So I think a lot of the backlash to development and to data centers is also related to people’s cost of living going up and to these, in their words, outside developers coming in and changing a community that’s already changing. He has since said that we need data center development, but we need to do it responsibly. 

Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis is another great example of this. He supported a bill that would require data centers to pay their own utilities and also let counties require them to use reclaimed water, which would address the water issue. But the Tampa Bay Times reported that he also supported legislation that gives massive tax breaks to data centers. And that he pushed to amend that law, which I think was signed in 2017, to only apply to hyperscale data centers, which are the ones that people have problems with.

The people I talk to, they know that there are currently data centers in Florida, and they’re smaller. There are no hyperscale data centers, but there are around one hundred smaller ones for Netflix or whatever. And they’re okay with that. One woman I talked to works in IT. She said, “I understand that data centers are a boogeyman, and we need them for stuff. But I don’t want this massive facility using all of our power, emitting these frequencies, et cetera, et cetera.” Another thing that I think is really interesting-

Wait, can you just explain what “emitting these frequencies” means?

[Laughs] Just the noise. I talked to these guys at the Border Security Expo who work for a data center company, and they all live in Virginia. Even they were like, “Yeah, it sucks.” They said, “I hate walking around my neighborhood because I just hear it all the time.” And they work in data centers. I don’t think she meant 5G. 

It’s a real element of this, right next to China being a villain of whatever persuasion you need China to be a villain for. Again, there’s just a piece of all this where it’s a big thing that you can stop. The power of NIMBYism can stop this. Maybe we can’t stop everything else. We can’t stop Facebook from doing targeted advertising that feels like it’s listening to you. No one knows how to stop this. It’s bad. We don’t like it, but no one knows how to stop it.

“I can stop this building from being built” seems like it not only scrambles our culture war lines, but it’s scrambling politics, too. Byron Donalds saying he wants Florida to be the financial capital of the world. One, it’s very funny in that he has to contend with the existence of New York, London, Beijing, and Amsterdam. Go down the line. 

There are a lot of places that can compete for that title where Miami might not be in the running. But doing it via building data centers is not the path to that result. It’s just a bunch of economic development that might result in some short-term gains.

It feels like people have clocked it, and they’ve clocked that it’s a thing you can stop. I’m curious if there’s anything else. You’ve spent a lot of time covering the right, and I wonder if there’s anything else that scrambles the lines like that. Because in almost every other case, “let’s build stuff, let’s tear down the White House and build a ballroom” is fine. Building things is better, and it is coded in one side of the culture war.

Yeah. I mean, this is, again, so Florida specific, but it really surprised me how much of the politics around this were scrambled. One of the women was talking about this ballot initiative that’s going to pass. It’s going to give more tax exemptions to homeowners, which I feel is a standard Republican thing — lower taxes for homeowners. People would like that.

She said, “This is terrible. It’s going to deprive county governments of funds that they would otherwise get from homeowners, which will then entice the counties even further to have data centers come into our communities.” So she was thinking of the second- and third-order effects of this, even though that’s a pretty populist initiative. But yeah, it’s all so scrambled. 

How do you see the scramble inside of the right and then carrying over to the populist left? The idea that a bunch of billionaires threw all of their weight behind Donald Trump in 2024, and that led to, I don’t know, a bunch of podcast bros throwing their weight behind Donald Trump in 2024. There was a cultural wave of Peter Thiel, Marc Andreessen, Elon Musk, and the All-In podcast about building and tech and the future. It feels like that has come to one kind of end.

I don’t think that that wave is driving the culture anymore because of the backlash to AI. We can all see the college students booing at graduation. If the backlash is there against the data centers, against AI taking the jobs, against billionaires in general, what does that turn into on the right? Because that was the animating force of the right for so long.

I think that is still an open question. I think the question is whether this backlash is strong enough to shake people’s other partisan concerns.

If you’ve got a Democrat candidate who is anti-data center development, but also not super gung-ho about deputizing all Florida police officers to do ICE arrests, where does that leave someone who supports Trump’s immigration policies but doesn’t want a data center in their neighborhood? I don’t know. I think that’s what the party is struggling with right now.

I mean, I think Trump is this perfect avatar for people because he somehow stands for anti-elite sentiment, but also for hard work and capitalism. He’s just this perfect blend of, I don’t even know how to describe it. He contains multitudes, I guess. And nobody else can contain multitudes like him. They don’t have the juice. They just don’t have it.

Can I make the argument?

Yeah.

I think I can make the argument. I grew up in Wisconsin, which has many similar dynamics to maybe Florida, in that people in Wisconsin remember a time when there were big factories. In the town I grew up in, Racine, there used to be a Case factory that made tractors. There was a Chrysler factory in Kenosha that made Jeep Wranglers. This is a real thing that occurred, and all those things are gone. 

So Trump would promise all of this huge economic development that basically looked like manufacturing. I think what his version of this, even with tariffs, was, “We will bring manufacturing back to all of these places. And that manufacturing will require a lot of hard work, but there will be dignity in that hard work.”

At the end of it, you’re going to get to point to a Modine air conditioner and be like, “I made that thing. My community made that thing.” I think that is very seductive. I mean, Trump spent years promising that we would build iPhones in America, and that’s Wisconsin and Foxconn and all this stuff.

Maybe none of those things were ever going to come true because that’s not how anything gets made anymore. And that’s not even the kind of work people actually want to do in America anymore. But you take all of that energy, and you’re like, “Actually, what we’re going to make is data centers.” And no one can see at the end of that, “I made a Jeep Wrangler.” They get to see that Elon Musk got richer; they just lost their jobs, their children feel like they have no future, and their feeds are full of slop.

And I feel like something gets disconnected in the multitudes where you can tell everyone, “Yeah, the best I can do for you is make you the world’s richest factory foreman.” So people are like, “That sounds awesome. That’s better than whatever nonsense I’m doing online.” But you can’t be like, “I’m going to make Sam Altman richer,” because that doesn’t mean anything to anyone. All of this construction doesn’t do anything for anyone.

I look at the backlash, and all I see is that a lot of people across the political spectrum have come to that realization. You can tear down our communities to build bridges and factories, and you can pollute the skies with smokestacks as long as we all get jobs. But if you’re going to do all that and all I get is more AI-generated movie posters on Amazon Prime whose price keeps going up every month, screw you. And I’m wondering if that connection is… That’s my guess. I’m wondering if you see any hints of that connection in your reporting as you talk to all these people.

I think so. I think the Florida version of making a Jeep Wrangler is like, there were orange groves and cattle ranches, and now there are not. I used to drive past an orange grove when I was a kid. That orange grove is gone. It’s a Publix now. There was an old cow field. Now that’s a mall.

On the one hand, that’s what people want. People want consumption, but they also, at least in Florida, liked thinking that they lived near an orange grove. Like, “Oh, maybe the guy’s using tons of pesticides. Maybe the orange grove is worse for your health than the data center.” I don’t know. I don’t have the stats on this. But you could see the tangible effects of what your economy was producing.

Now it’s just like, “There’s a building that none of us can go in. It makes a horrible noise. And I think it’s drinking all my water?” And then it’s also making your kids dumb and alienated, and making everybody lose their jobs. People don’t like that.

Again, these aren’t Luddites. The woman I talked to said, “I found out about the Humans First organizing [efforts] via Facebook. I know there’s an irony in that. I know there’s an irony in me working in IT and opposing this data center.” They’re not dumb. They understand that all of these things that we’ve built our lives around require something to power them. They just don’t want that something to be within driving distance of their house. They want it somewhere else.

And it’s unclear where that somewhere else should be apart from space.

Apart from space.

That is a very different episode of Decoder. But that’s one answer the industry has: “These people, their stupid concerns are too annoying. We’ll just put the data centers in space,” and maybe they’ll solve that problem. Who knows?

The other answer is, “We’ll just horsepower over their concerns. This is too important. We’re going to do it anyway. And maybe we’ll just subsidize a bunch of education in some community. Maybe we’ll just pay a bunch of extra money. Maybe we’ll pay for everyone’s electricity.”

I don’t know if those have gotten any traction. Is there anything that the tech companies or the neoclouds could do in these communities to overcome the objections? Could they just pay for healthcare? Or is that just a non-starter?

I don’t know about paying for healthcare, but something that I didn’t include in the piece,  because it was extremely dry and very technical, was that the small protest ended with about an hour and a half long presentation from a land use expert on how to write local zoning ordinances to prevent hyperscale data centers from being built. It was really specific stuff, like “You could have them on multiple small parcels of land.” It was really dry. “You could require them to use this amount of reclaimed water, et cetera, et cetera.”

I think what people want more than the data centers not being there is a degree of community input on how they’re built — if they’re going to be built. I think if they got that, they would maybe not be pacified, but they would at least not feel like there’s a big external force coming in and steamrolling their community, especially when they already feel like that in every other aspect of their life.

This is the thing that I’m most curious about. So much of our politics and our culture has been nationalized. Everything happens at the national level. The fact that the mayor of New York is a national political figure is at once very silly and also just the funniest thing that has happened in a long time.

Data centers are very local. They’re happening to people in their backyards, and a data center being built in Florida, Georgia, or Tucson has nothing to do with me in New York. It’s far away enough.

Maybe what you’re hearing from everybody is just, “Somewhere else, and as we get to somewhere else, I won’t care.” But it is very local. And then it is very in person. People are going to the meetings; they’re encountering one another. There have been stories of bridges across party lines from people who would never like each other normally because they both hate the data centers.

Is there an element of a return to actual local politics and actual community building here that could be catalyzed by opposition to data centers?

I really think so. Again, I’m talking to organizers in multiple states who are going to these community, town council, or county council meetings and yelling at their representatives. And sometimes it’s hundreds of people. I think this is maybe a weird analogy, but it reminds me of the local backlash to right-wing organizing and local education policy, which is where a lot of the anti-trans backlash started. You’d go into the school board, and you’d be like, “I don’t want this gender stuff being taught to my child. I don’t want my kids to know that slavery was bad.”

I’m not comparing them in terms of value judgment. I just think it’s at a level of local engagement that is at the same time a national issue. It’s these really, really, really localized policies that may end up driving, if not national policy change and national policy discussions, but at least national political vibes. Whoever wins the Democratic and Republican primaries and runs for president in 2028, what are they going to be saying about data centers? I don’t know, but I know it’s going to be informed by what happens this year and next year.

I’m actually very curious how Trump handles it. As you said, he contains multitudes. He’s very good at reading his own base. It feels like the Trump base is very much polarized around data centers. There are a lot of people who love Donald Trump but hate data centers. And then there’s his money, which loves the AI build-out and loves data centers. That is a fracture as deep as anything.

A lot of those folks will say, “AI just has a marketing problem. If only we could convince people of the benefits of this build-out and the super intelligence to come, they would be on board.”

The best marketer they could have for that would be Donald Trump. But he doesn’t seem to be willing to make those claims at the level that they might need. And certainly he is very attuned to his base hating AI. How do you think he’s going to play it? And how do you think the MAGA coalition will respond to it?

Okay, so do you remember when Trump was talking about H-1B visas? Or not even when he was talking about it, but just the whole swirl around what we’re going to do about these?

Yeah.

Trump said, “I think we should stamp an H-1B visa to every foreign student’s college graduation diploma.” And I thought, “What are you talking about? Your administration is charging $100,000 for these visas.” He kept saying things like, “These kids are really smart. We need them in America building chips.”

I think he’s just going to do it like that. The thing about Trump is that he can say literally whatever, and he can do literally whatever, and the people who like him will continue to like him. Sometimes they’ll be like, “Oh, well, I don’t like this particular policy of his. I don’t know why he endorsed this candidate,” but they’re still going to back the guy.

But enough to split the difference on this issue? In every other issue, he could polarize the electorate, and he would get there, but, “I’m going to put a data center in the backyard, and it’s going to make that noise.” Maybe not enough.

But the thing is that they don’t see it as coming from Trump. They’re thinking, “These companies are coming into our community.” And if you connect the dots, it’s like, “Who supports those companies? The president. Who is giving the president a lot of money? All these different companies.”

That’s not how people see it. They see it as these tech oligarchs who are just disconnected from politics and disconnected from anything because of all their money. They don’t see that as having a connection to the president. Instead, they see that as having a connection to the governor, to the board of commissioners, or whatever. But Trump is floating above it all. I don’t know why.

Well, I’m curious, and maybe we should end it here. The Florida gubernatorial primaries are coming up. If Donalds loses, even with that Trump endorsement over the data center issue, do you think that will be a signal or a predictor of what will happen in the midterms?

I think it would be a massive signal, if only because Donalds is polling so much further ahead than everybody else. He’s the clear frontrunner, and the lieutenant governor who’s polling second is also pro-data centers. If any of the anti-data center candidates win the Republican primary, that is going to be huge and completely unexpected by everybody in the state. But it could happen. Crazier things have happened.

We’re going to be doing a lot of coverage of this in the months to come, especially ahead of the midterms, because this scrambling of party lines, this scrambling of the culture war, seems very important. The politics we’ve had for so long, they don’t seem like they can hold up to everyone hating the same thing.

Maybe that’s all America needs. It does seem like every American hating these big buildings that make loud noises might be the thing that unifies us, which is good or bad. You can make your own decisions, but I can’t think of anything else. There’s nothing else that’s cutting across party lines this way. Can you?

Literally nothing. Nothing at all. And it’s cutting across party lines, I think, not just in that people hate it, but I had these deeply conservative women talking to me about local environmental and ecological issues. They were talking about pesticides and forever chemicals in their water, which you wouldn’t expect looking at Republican politics five to 10 years ago, that this is where we have ended up.

We’re still doing climate change hoaxes at the national level, and on the ground we’re talking about pesticides. There’s something there.

Gaby, we’re going to have to have you back as the story develops and certainly as we go into all these elections. Thank you so much for being at Decoder.

Yeah, thanks for having me. This was fun.

Questions or comments? Hit us up at decoder@theverge.com. We really do read every email!

Maybe your stingy boomer parents should give you their money now

2 August 2026 at 12:00
A senior couple sits in a sports car parked in front of a house with a lawn.
A senior couple sold their house in Minnesota and moved to central Florida, where they will have more time for their convertible sports car. | Bruce Bisping/Star Tribune via Getty Images

Over the next 20 years the United States will see a massive transfer of wealth as boomers leave trillions of dollars to their children as they pass away. A contingent of those children are asking, “What if we got that money, now?” Millennials and Gen Z want to be able to take advantage of the money they stand to inherit before their parents pass away. While a majority of parents actually do help their kids, many with the means are surprisingly reluctant. 

Bill Perkins argues that these parents should let it all go. Perkins is an entrepreneur and the author of the book Die with Zero. He argues that the money would be better spent while your children are young adults rather than in their 60s when they may already be set up financially. Perkins joined Today, Explained co-host Noel King to explain the philosophy behind his book and why the best time to give is now. 

Below is an excerpt of their conversation, edited for length and clarity. There’s much more in the full podcast, so listen to Today, Explained wherever you get your podcasts, including Apple Podcasts, Pandora, and Spotify.

What you’re essentially saying is before you pass on from this earth and leave your kids a big inheritance, maybe instead give that inheritance away sooner.

If you’re going to leave money to your kids, you should be thinking about what’s the right amount. That’s probably the first thing that people think about. But one of the things that people don’t think about is when is the right time? And I argue ferociously that it is not when you die. It is actually well before you die. So that gift makes the maximum impact on their lives.

So you would be agreeing with the millennials who are feeling some kind of way about their parents sitting on the inheritance for now and waiting until they pass on. You think that the youths have a point?

Oh yeah. I’m their best friend. I am definitely their best friend. When you leave an inheritance to someone, you’re trying to have maximum impact on their lives so that they may be able to enjoy it. And that time is not at 86 or 60. The time that they can convert that capital into meaningful experiences at the greatest rate without that much decay is between 28 and 33. 

Why is that? What’s happening between 28 and 33?

The sharpest and the biggest calculator you will ever be is at 28. And you reach physical maturity at 33 and then it plateaus and declines. And so what that means is that your mental acuity is declining and your physical abilities are declining at various rates, which means that your ability to convert that money into experiences that you enjoy or can do decline as you age. Most of your life is still ahead of you. At 60, most of your life is behind you.

Are you literally advocating “die with nothing”? Or are you saying, “Hey boomer, maybe have a responsible cushion and give your kids the rest.” What are the mechanics of this?

I am arguing to get as close to zero as possible. Knowing that there are uncertainties in life, that’s going to be probably an impossible goal — especially the biggest uncertainty, when you’re going to die. The uncertainty around what things will you be doing later in life besides hanging out and maintaining yourself. But this is an iterative formula, and if you are not on autopilot and you deeply think about it, you can be more efficient with the allocation of your resources and how you split those things up.

There’s a mathematical reality to some of this. If you’re a boomer and you’re sitting on money, you invest it. Having that money compound over 15 or 20 years, you could be giving your kid, when they are 60 or 65, just an enormous sum of money versus a much smaller sum based on how investment works when they are 33. What do you think about the argument that it’s better math to wait?

I would say that they’re not truly understanding the purpose of the money. Would you give your kid who’s 30 a rattle or a binky? So the understanding of the purpose of the money is for them to have a fulfilling life, not to have a bunch of zeros. And so what matters is how do they convert those zeros into a fulfilling life? And so because you decay — that’s the unfortunate part of having a human body — and then you eventually die, the ability of you to convert that money into the adventurous life or fulfillment that you choose declines with age. And you could just have a thought experiment. How much would you pay of your net worth to be 30 again? 

Jesus. One hundred percent, and I’m not 65.

Exactly. And so you can easily see that I’m not going to make enough capital to make up for the difference in age, right? Because that money helps make the life.

We know that this is a very hard conversation to have. It’s hard for parents to talk about not being here. It’s hard for kids to approach this without seeming greedy. How do you suggest families broach this conversation?

The one thing I don’t tell people is whether you should be leaving an inheritance or not. That’s up to you. There are some people who are just like, “All my money is for me. The kids, I gave them an education or gave them whatever they need, a shot in life, and they have to go make their own way.” That’s one. But those who intend to leave a gift, once they’ve thought deeply about it, I think they will come to the logical conclusion that it’s not a bequest. It’s an inheritance and that there’s a better time. And so in my mind, it’s a gift of love. It’s a gift of opportunity. It’s like, “Here you go. I’ve been fortunate in my life to be able to pass on the gift of choice. And here’s this capital and here’s some wisdom that comes with that.” But again, that’s me, not you.

Why Trump is at war with the International Criminal Court

1 August 2026 at 13:00
Marco Rubio, wearing a navy suit and a red tie, sits at a desk holding his glasses in one hand; on the desk are a microphone, a water glass, and a small American flag.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio at an ASEAN meeting in the Philippines on July 23, 2026. | Ezra Acayan/Getty Images

The International Criminal Court is in the trenches right now.

Last week, its chief prosecutor, Karim Khan, was voted out of his position. In a first-of-its-kind vote, 82 member states decided that he engaged in misconduct and a serious breach of duty. The vote comes after he was accused of sexual misconduct by a female colleague at the ICC, which Khan has denied.

It’s a mess, and it’s hitting the ICC at an inopportune time. On top of this internal turmoil, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently launched an all-out attack on the court.

In a Wall Street Journal op-ed earlier this month, Rubio wrote that the Trump administration’s goal is to “dismantle the ICC—brick by brick, if necessary,” citing the possibility that the court could “target” American citizens, such as Border Patrol agents or US soldiers.

The US is not a member of the ICC, and has a history of wariness about the organization.

Beth Van Schaack previously served as the US ambassador-at-large for global criminal justice, a role that led her to work directly with the International Criminal Court. She spoke with Today, Explained co-host Noel King about the decades-long tumultuous relationship between the US and the ICC. And they discuss whether, if the ICC is now weaker than ever, the Trump administration can actually break it for good.

Below is an excerpt of their conversation, edited for length and clarity. There’s much more in the full podcast, so listen to Today, Explained wherever you get podcasts, including Apple Podcasts, Pandora, and Spotify.

If the International Criminal Court is charged with dealing with people who have allegedly done very bad things and then trying them, why is the United States not a member?

The United States signed the treaty in the waning days of the Clinton administration, but never submitted it for ratification to the Senate. And one of the concerns is that the final treaty allows for jurisdiction over individuals who may commit crimes on the territory of state parties. And the United States has always been concerned about that principle because we have troop commitments.

Supporters of the court have always said the United States and its personnel are vulnerable regardless of whether you join. If US personnel are committing crimes on the territory of state parties, which we saw in Afghanistan, the response is to do those cases domestically and there’ll be no occasion for the International Criminal Court to consider those matters.

There’ve been peaks and valleys in the relationship between the ICC and the United States. So we’re in a frankly pretty deep valley right now with this new campaign that Secretary Rubio announced.

But back in the Bush administration, there was also very acute concern and it stemmed from this Afghanistan investigation. The Bush administration and Congress both put in place measures that they thought would be protective of US servicemembers. So that was one valley.

Now what’s interesting is in the second term of the Bush administration, many of these measures were dismantled because the Bush administration realized that the court was doing important work in some areas where it also cared about justice — in particular, Darfur.

Then, the Obama administration announced a reset in its relationship with the court, and that’s where I entered the picture. The Obama administration directed various executive agencies to look for ways to support the court where the work that it was doing was consistent with US policy.

Then, we had the first Trump administration, which reversed course almost immediately and eventually imposed sanctions on senior figures, including the prosecutor herself and one of her key aides.

Then, we get to the Biden-Harris administration. They pulled down those sanctions and again launched a reset of the relationship. At that point, there were a number of situations where the court was working, including following the brutal war of aggression by Russia against Ukraine.

Here we saw a remarkable rise of bipartisan support for the work of the court. You had senior Republican figures in Congress supporting the court. The late Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) led a resolution that was supporting justice in Ukraine. Secretary Rubio, then Sen. Rubio, joined that resolution. There was new legislation passed that made it easier for the United States to support the work of the court.

Of course, with the second Trump administration, we have reversed course again, and in particular with Rubio’s announcement.

Well, let’s talk about the reversal. Secretary of State Marco Rubio is at one point on board with the ICC, and then recently he vows to dismantle it. What happened here?

It’s not clear what the precipitating event is, to be honest. There is no existential threat at present. Obviously, there’s always the concern that this is some kind of a distraction because matters are not going well in Iran and with respect to the economy — that this is something to pull eyeballs away from those matters onto something that he can look tough in. Is this just kind of red meat for anti-multilateralism or is there something that is not made public that is happening?

Is there anything actually that Marco Rubio or anyone else in the United States at the highest level could do to the International Criminal Court to put an end to it?

The International Criminal Court is part of a larger system of the rules-based order that we’ve been trying to build since World War II. Almost all of our friends and allies are members of this court and they care deeply about its success. They are committed to seeing a system of international criminal justice. So, no is the answer. The United States alone cannot dismantle this court.

Now, it can injure the court and it has already done so. There are already eight ICC judges, including judges who hail from some of our closest allies — France, for example — who have been subjected to brutal sanctions. They can’t use credit cards that pass through New York. They can’t make reservations online because of financial sanctions. They can’t travel to the United States because of travel bans, et cetera. The chief prosecutor and two of his two deputies have been sanctioned. Non-governmental organizations that are involved in human rights in Palestine have been sanctioned and a UN figure has been sanctioned. Those measures are already in place.

What his most recent campaign seems to announce is some diplomatic move to try and convince states to leave the court or to cease their cooperation with the court. And we have seen in recent days a couple of states announcing that they were withdrawing. These are mostly states within Africa, but also Venezuela, subject to investigation by the prosecutor’s office. The United States can certainly injure the court, but there’s no way that we could dismantle the court.

Most Americans don’t spend a lot of time thinking about the International Criminal Court, but they may know it because lately, it has gotten a lot of attention that the court has issued an arrest warrant for [Israeli Prime Minister] Benjamin Netanyahu. New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani has said he would like to see Netanyahu arrested if he comes to New York.

Mamdani has said he does not have that power. He cannot order the NYPD to do it, but he would like for it to happen. What are the chances that Benjamin Netanyahu comes to the United States and is arrested?

Pretty close to zero, if not actually zero. This is a matter of federal law and international law. And the Headquarters Agreement between the United States and the United Nations, which placed the headquarters of the UN in New York, basically gives certain privileges and immunities to individuals who are coming to New York to attend official functions.

New Yorkers are a feisty bunch. So when word is out that Benjamin Netanyahu is in New York, can you imagine the protests that would happen? Can you imagine the embarrassment that he might experience when he’s supposed to be giving his remarks at the General Assembly High-level Week where all the heads of states convene to deal with transnational issues and his motorcade is ensnarled in protests protected by the First Amendment, calling for his arrest for various international crimes? If I were his lawyer, I would say, “There’s no chance you’re going to get arrested.” But honestly, it could be a miserable visit, given all of the strong support for accountability in this matter in the United States.

This is a lot of drama for a body that for a long time seems to have avoided a ton of very public drama. So who gets hurt in all of this? Is it the court? Is it the US and its reputation? Where do you think this leads?

Unfortunately, I think everyone comes out not looking great here. The court needs to put in place measures to be able to receive those complaints by witnesses, whistleblowers, victims themselves, process them quickly, but also fairly to all parties involved. The United States looks terrible as well, launching a campaign like this against an international organization whose mandate it is to deliver justice for the worst crimes known to humankind.

Can the internet survive rogue AI?

31 July 2026 at 13:00
A photo illustration shows the logo of AI platform Hugging Face logo on a mobile phone screen.

The internet may no longer be solely the domain of humans. Last week, OpenAI disclosed an “unprecedented cyberincident”: An experimental AI agent successfully hacked its way into the open internet.

Specifically, the agent was assigned a task; in order to complete it, the agent broke out of an isolated research environment and hacked into a third-party platform called Hugging Face. It’s a move that many experts deemed inevitable, given the speed and scale of advances in AI technology — and it raises serious questions about AI safety.

But for Konstantinos Komaitis, a senior fellow with the Democracy and Tech Initiative at the Atlantic Council, it wasn’t the unexpected behavior of the AI that was significant. It was what that behavior could mean for the internet’s fundamental, decentralized infrastructure and whether it would spur calls to build new barriers against autonomous AI agents. 

Komaitis argues that such barriers are not the solution, however. He spoke with Today, Explained co-host Sean Rameswaram about why an open internet is actually key to combating AI cybersecurity threats.

Below is an excerpt of the conversation, edited for length and clarity. There’s much more in the full podcast, so listen to Today, Explained wherever you get podcasts, including Apple Podcasts, Pandora, and Spotify.

So most people see that this happens and they think, “Oh no, AI went rogue. How long before it kills me?” You see that this happens and you start thinking about infrastructure. Tell us more about why you were thinking about infrastructure in light of this AI agent breaking containment.

The internet was never designed with full security in mind, right? 

When you’re creating a decentralized system, you cannot possibly foresee every security or vulnerability that might come up. But because you have a system that is based on building blocks, you have the extraordinary capability of actually addressing security issues as they come up through those building blocks without breaking the whole system down. 

And of course, the other thing that this does is that it pushes you towards collaboration, because when you have so many building blocks, you cannot possibly possess all the knowledge for each building block. So you’re bringing literally everyone to try to address these problems. 

Take the internet, for instance: We have spent decades addressing those vulnerabilities and developing mechanisms to authenticate users and devices, encrypt communications, mitigate distributed attacks, coordinate incident response, and of course share threat intelligence. 

Now, what is new with agentic AI is not that simply the malware is better or the phishing attacks are more sophisticated. It’s the emergence of systems that can actually discover vulnerabilities across thousands of systems. They can reason about alternative paths to an objective. They can adapt when they’re blocked. They can chain together legitimate internet services in unexpected ways. Then they do that while they’re operating continuously at machine speed. And this is really at a scale that the internet is not ready to necessarily cope with. 

Effectively, the internet’s openness becomes both a strength and a vulnerability. So the internet was optimized for interoperability, and AI now is optimized for exploiting that interoperability.

And what scares you the most about that? What do you think is most vulnerable to threats?

The fact that we do not have the appropriate mechanisms and institutions to be able to deal with that. I come from the internet world. I’ve spent 20 years of my career defending the open internet and discussing it in international fora. And one of the things that a lot of people underestimate about the internet is how valuable trust is as a property within the system. 

We are talking about networks that exchange data literally based on trust. So what really concerns me right now is that in many ways, we are asking 21st-century AI systems to operate on 20th-century assumptions about trust. And unless we figure that out and we realize it, we will continue having these problems. And of course, the knee-jerk reactions that are coming with this, which are, “Let’s fragment the internet, let’s restrict it, let’s restrict access, let’s take control over it.” That is never the solution.

What do you see as the solution?

Effectively, we need to build institutions that are trusted and are able to cope with those incidents as they happen. Because right now you have OpenAI and you have Hugging Face telling everyone, “Don’t worry, we’ve got this.” And we don’t know; they might have this. But at the same time, I cannot help but wonder. And many, many other people have wondered whether, actually, this is very good PR for these companies and especially for OpenAI.

OpenAI just went to the world saying, “We have developed one of the most powerful LLMs, and we realized that it behaved the way it behaved, but don’t worry, we are going to fix this.” And in this current climate and in this current timing, I am not sure that this is enough. You need institutions that are much more transparent, much more accountable, and much more collaborative across the board.

You want institutions to step up and essentially serve as a watchdog. Help us understand which institutions, because in the United States, famously, our government has done very little to regulate tech.

First of all, we need to stop thinking of institutions as necessarily government-affiliated, right? Or that they are the outcomes of government initiatives. There can be in collaboration with governments, but one of the things that the internet has taught us is that institutions that are built through a bottom-up coordinated process have the tendency of actually being more agile and able to deliver some of those things that we’re talking about. 

So take, for instance, again, open standards. The internet’s open standards are not created by any agency, government or private. It’s created by institutions where engineers from all across the board and all over the world gather together and create those standards.

That’s reminding me of the original design of OpenAI to be this not-for-profit company that had everyone’s best intentions in mind, that could do something idealistic and moral and ethical because all of the profit-minded companies weren’t going to. And now look at OpenAI. Their not-for-profit arm is an afterthought, and they’re chasing profits. 

Do you think it’s practical to leave this to institutions? Because what we’ve seen so far is that institutions bend toward capitalism.

It really depends on how you build the institution, right? It really depends on what sort of guardrails and checks and balances you have around it. In order to build an institution, you need to really know what you want to achieve. You need to have a north star. 

One of the reasons the internet worked was because everybody disagreed, but they agreed on the common shared goal, which was to connect people across the world. For AI, we still do not have that northern star. And once we get it, that’s when you start the building of those institutions in order to facilitate this and bring everyone together.

For me, it is very important for everyone to understand that keeping an open internet is really more important than ever, especially as AI agents become increasingly capable. Because it is tempting to think that the answer to new AI risk is literally ‘build more barriers.’ But the internet’s greatest strength has always been its openness. So the challenge today is not that the internet is too open; it’s that its trust architecture was designed for a world in which humans or software directly controlled by humans were the primary actors. 

Now, it’s being challenged by this agentic AI that introduces a new type of participant — systems that can reason and plan and act with limited human oversight. So we need to evolve our understanding of trust and what it means online. And that will require a lot of work because, as you know very well, Sean, it’s very difficult to build trust, but you can break it within seconds.

Trump’s Saudi nuclear deal is making Israel uneasy

28 July 2026 at 17:00
Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu give thumbs-up standing outside of the White House.
President Donald Trump greets Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House on September 29, 2025. | Win McNamee/Getty Images

Last week, the Trump administration announced a landmark civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia. The deal would allow the kingdom to develop nuclear power using American technology and could eventually pave the way for uranium enrichment on Saudi soil. But the agreement must first undergo congressional review — and survive President Donald Trump’s social media feed.

When the Trump administration announced its agreement, it made no mention of the possibility of normalizing diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. But that omission and the possibility that Saudi Arabia could eventually enrich uranium alarmed Israelis — and Trump quickly threw in both conditions in a Truth Social post.

The chaos around the agreement comes as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu heads to Washington, DC, this week to meet with Trump. The Saudi deal — as well as growing friction over differences on the goals and trajectory of the renewed US war with Iran and frustration in Washington over Israeli military operations in southern Lebanon — will undoubtedly be topics.

Today, Explained co-host Sean Rameswame spoke with Michael Koplow, chief policy officer at the Israel Policy Forum, about the relationship between the two countries and its leaders ahead of Netanyahu’s visit. 

Below is an excerpt of the conversation, edited for length and clarity. There’s much more in the full podcast, so listen to Today, Explained wherever you get podcasts, including Apple Podcasts, Pandora, and Spotify.

What are we expecting from the meeting between Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Trump?

I suspect this will be among the most tense meetings that they have had because there are a number of issues on the table where President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu are on different pages. The issue that they used to be on the same page about was Iran, and I don’t think that is the case anymore. 

As we’ve seen the Iran war unfold, the Israeli view is still the view that they had at the outset of the war, which is that this is necessary to deal with Iran’s nuclear program, with its ballistic missiles, with its proxies. And ultimately what the Israelis wanted to see, and what they still want to see, is a different regime in Iran. President Trump may still share those goals, but it’s pretty clear that, as the war has not gone the way he anticipated, he’s looking for an exit strategy and his main focus is the Strait of Hormuz, which is not something that the Israelis care about at all. 

I think at this point, when Prime Minister Netanyahu arrives at the White House, he’s probably going to try to convince the president that the original goal should be on the table, that the US and Israel should keep going, and President Trump seems to have a different view of things.

And now we have this new deal with Saudi Arabia. Was Israel taken by surprise by the deal? 

It absolutely took Israel by surprise. When the deal was announced on Wednesday, it was a deal to provide Saudi Arabia with nuclear power and nuclear infrastructure. There was no mention of Israel. There was no mention of normalization. There was no mention of anything outside of the bounds of a nuclear agreement. 

President Trump on Thursday put out his Truth Social where he said that the deal is absolutely contingent on Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords. And what’s curious about that is that when the deal was announced, there was no mention of it, and the deal was actually signed. So either the president is intending to change the terms of the deal after it’s been signed, or he’s willing to back out of it if this new condition is not met. 

Or, and I suspect that this is the actual answer, he will secure some sort of commitment from the Saudis to examine joining the Abraham Accords at some point down the road when Israel has met a number of conditions and there’s been progress toward a Palestinian state. And if that is how it unfolds, it will leave the Israelis behind. And I think this comes as a pretty big shock to [Israel] given that President Trump’s previous policy was that a deal between the US and Saudi Arabia would involve normalization.

Was Netanyahu himself surprised by this deal? 

I think he must have been surprised by this deal. It is true that Trump and Netanyahu have seemed to have had a very cushy relationship, not only during this term, but during President Trump’s first term as well. But it’s not a relationship of equals.

We’ve seen President Trump — particularly over the past few months, I think in response to criticism here in the United States over the role that Israel and the role that the prime minister may have had in convincing President Trump to go to war — repeatedly talk about the fact that he is in charge, that Prime Minister Netanyahu is going to do what he says, that he is the decider and Prime Minister Netanyahu is not. 

I do think they have a good relationship, but President Trump, at least publicly, seems to be signaling that he is in charge and he wants everybody to know that. I think that Prime Minister Netanyahu undoubtedly is feeling some stress in this relationship. And when he shows up here tomorrow, he’s going to do whatever he can to try and repair any rifts that there are.

Israel wanted this war, but hates this deal that the president may very likely complete with Saudi Arabia. Did they miscalculate somewhere in here? 

I think the Israelis have miscalculated in a number of ways. And the biggest is that consistently since 2017 or 2018, you hear Israeli officials, political officials, security officials, even ordinary Israelis, talk routinely about President Trump being the best friend that Israel has ever had and exhibiting a faith in President Trump that he will never do anything that will hang Israel out to dry. 

And a lot of what they’ve done has proceeded on that assumption. And even though everybody is aware of President Trump’s transactional nature, even though everybody is aware that he is relatively volatile, that he slips on policy issues all the time, the Israelis had this faith that they would always be an exception to that rule. And I think what we’re seeing is that they’re not necessarily an exception to that rule. 

And it’s important to stress that when it comes to this Saudi nuclear deal, the problem for the Israelis is not just that it was signed without any hint of normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia being part of the deal itself. It may open the door for countries that have signed more restrictive agreements in the region, like the UAE, to do the same. And ultimately, all of this is a bet that the trajectory of Saudi Arabia is going to continue, that it’s going to continue modernizing, continue becoming more moderate and pragmatic, and continue improving relations with Israel. 

If that’s not the case, once you’ve handed the Saudis a nuclear program, that’s irreversible. People shouldn’t forget that Iran’s nuclear program started off as a civilian nuclear program that the United States provided for it under the days of the Shah. So for Israelis, the normalization part of this is absolutely worrisome, but the deal itself is problematic too. And I think that’s where the Israelis are feeling panicked.

Why it took so long to talk about perimenopause

26 July 2026 at 13:00
A photograph shows hormone therapy replacements in their packagaing.
Medicine has come a long way. | BSIP/UIG Via Getty Images

Medicine has come a long way. We are living longer than ever, we have eradicated diseases that once seemed like a certain death sentence, and new improvements  are constantly being made to our quality of life. But despite all the advances, there’s a huge gap in women’s health. “I think there’s such an interconnectedness between society, culture, medicine, and science,” Dr. Elizabeth Comen told Vox. She’s a medical oncologist who specializes in breast cancer and an associate professor at NYU Langone. She says medicine often mirrors what’s happening in society at large. “For many societies across the globe, women did not have equal agency or power over their bodies, and that’s really reflected in the history of medicine.”

It’s reflected in medicine’s present, too. The share of women with heart disease in the United States is rising, there’s a cultural backlash and skepticism surrounding birth control, and almost half Americans are turning to social media influencers (many of whom aren’t credentialed) for medical information. 

Why is there such a disconnect when it comes to health care for women? And what will it take for it to end? We find out on this week’s episode of Vox’s weekly call-in podcast, Explain It to Me.

Below is an excerpt of my conversation with Evans, edited for length and clarity. You can listen to the full episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts. If you’d like to submit a question, send an email to askvox@vox.com or call 1-800-618-8545.

We are at this point where we know more about our bodies than we ever have before. Sometimes you go to the doctor, and it feels like they’re still catching up on some pretty basic aspects of women’s health. Why does it feel that way?

Because it’s true. It takes a long time for medical science to catch up with the glaring gaps in our healthcare system. The gaps are not just about the obvious women’s health issues. We focus a lot on breast cancer. We focus a lot on reproductive function or our gynecological needs. But the gaps exist head to toe from our neurologic care, our gastroenterology care, how our hearts function, how our immune system functions, how our joints function. The gaps are real, and the experiences are real.

Can you walk me through some of the history? What did it look like to study women’s health before the 20th century? What were we dealing with?

When we think about modern medicine today and these specialties of urology, gastroenterology, they really didn’t exist before the 1900s at all; those are relatively new concepts. For much of the history of medicine, at least in the Western world, the idea was that, at best, we were small men and, at worst, there were many ridiculous diagnoses like hysteria and a long legacy of dismissing women’s medical needs because we were largely not taken care of by women. Those women that were caregivers in the history of medicine, whether it was the midwives or other types of healers, were largely pushed out of medicine as it became codified, and the idea of medical science really came to rise in the late 19th century.

So, I’m guessing that they weren’t really talking about menopause at the time, let alone perimenopause.

Perimenopause wasn’t even discussed. That’s a relatively new term and new part of our lexicon when it comes to lay discussion and the public at large. With respect to menopause, one of the famous physicians, Roger Wilson, wrote a book [called] Feminine Forever and referred to women going through menopause as vapid cows. He was the one that advocated in the 1960s and 1970s for women to be on hormone replacement therapy. But understand that, in the 1850s, it’s not like people really were wildly aware of what estrogen, and testosterone, and progesterone did. These are all relatively new ideas — the concept of hormones and how they can travel in our body. And again, we have a long way to go.

I read that women were rarely included in clinical trials until the National Institutes of Health mandated it in 1993. I find that so surprising. Why were women missing there? 

Well, these studies were not designed with women in mind. Some of the massive cardiology studies for drugs that we use day in and day out were done on thousands of men and not women. There is so much to that history, including the animal models on which many of these drugs were developed. In order to develop a drug, often, they are developed on mouse models first. It wasn’t until 2016 that you were even required to state the sex of the mice that you were studying. In many of these instances, female mice were not even included in drug development.

Oh my gosh — even the mice? How were these hormones marketed to people when hormone replacement therapy first became a thing?

It depends on which advertisements that you look at. If you look at advertisements of women in the 1950s, ’60s and ’70s, a lot of women were being prescribed anti-anxiety medicine. “Can’t manage your household at home? Don’t want to take care of your kids? Here’s what will sedate you and at least make you able to prepare breakfast for your husband.” It’s really shocking, and yet, not that surprising. If you look at Instagram today, are we really that far off from what gets marketed to women? Women sink billions of dollars probably into sham supplements and sham treatments, because they don’t feel cared for when they go to the doctor. And what fills that space? A lot of people trying to market things that have no proven evidence.

I think it’s really interesting that, at one point, hormone replacement therapy was this big thing, because I feel like growing up in the ’90s and 2000s, hearing women who are older than me speak, they were kind of anti-hormones. How did the pendulum swing that way?

Well, the pendulum has swung in wildly different directions. At first, it was: Every woman needs to be on it. And there were wildly successful sales. Then, there was the women’s health study that exaggerated the risk of breast cancer. Understandably, women were terrified. They were told by the media and by reputable scientists that these risks were significantly high and that they could not be on it, and we didn’t leave them with any alternatives. Now, we’ve become much more granular about what we know and what we don’t know, but I still think we’re far behind on the science. There’s still a lot that we need to learn, but, fortunately, an understanding of the prior studies and what their limitations are has come to light.

There are all these gaps in trust and treatment. There’s going to be a fair amount of snake oil out there, but are there ways that this moment is actually driving better treatment for women?

I’m so grateful that we’re talking about it, but I am terrified of what I see from influencers on Instagram. People can fake their knowledge. There’s so much fake imagery and information that is out there. I wish that we could invest this in quality science, which is long and laborious and painful at times but gives us the quality answers that we need. Every day, I see the consequences of fake information online, whether it’s an incredible loss of financial resources or just wasting money so that you could buy a nice pair of shoes. That would make you feel better than the ridiculous thing online that’s over promising and under delivering. The fear mongering is out of control.

What do you think it will take to trust their doctors again, rather than turning to the treatments they’re being sold online that might be dangerous? What will it take for them to feel good about the interactions they’re having at the doctor’s office? 

I think it’s going to be really challenging. We can’t blame patients, because we’ve done them a disservice. Medicine has fragmented the care of many patients — not just women, but men as well. We have to build a health care system that allows for time to be with patients and really hold space for them. I think that’s where the trust is really going to be built, because, at the end of the day, despite all the technology that’s available, medicine is about human to human care. That is what everybody wants to be treated as: a human to be seen and heard in the ways that you can’t just reduce a body to biology.

An 86-year-old Congress member explains why he won’t retire

25 July 2026 at 14:00
Rep. James Clyburn
Rep. James Clyburn announces he is running for a 18th term on March 12, 2026, during a press conference at the South Carolina Democratic Party. | Tracy Glantz/The State/Tribune News Service via Getty Images

The gerontocracy is real: The median senator is 64 years old, and 20 members of Congress are over 80. One legal scholar called it the “old-igarchy.” It seems the combination of President Donald Trump’s recent 80th birthday, the sudden death of Sen. Lindsey Graham, and the currently unknown health status of Sen. Mitch McConnell has called collective attention to the advanced age of our elected officials — and with good reason. 

So this week, I talked with Rep. Jim Clyburn of South Carolina on his 86th birthday. And I wanted to (delicately) ask a question that’s been brewing in my head since the whole fiasco with then-President Joe Biden: Why don’t the oldheads want to retire? 

Over a long interview, I asked the House Democratic leader about generational change, shifts in the electorate on corporate PAC money and artificial intelligence, and whether he thinks there are any lessons to learn from the 2024 election.

On the question of age, Clyburn told me, “I know people who are 66 years old with much less energy than I have, and none of the experience that I have.” Clyburn said he would also be open to a recently proposed law calling for members of Congress to take cognitive tests, though he dismissed the idea of term limits or an age cap. 

Here’s what else I learned: 

1. They arent giving up power because they don’t want to

That’s the whole thing. The reason the boomers (and Clyburn’s Silent Generation) won’t step aside isn’t that no one has asked. It’s that they don’t want to. And for Clyburn, I think the armor doubles as the blind spot. When I asked about younger generations being distrustful that older politicians can deliver, he invoked his grandparents, saying, “Don’t worry about what people call you. It’s what you answer to that’s the issue.”

And while that is wisdom, hardened over the decades, I don’t know if it works as well as a leadership philosophy. Stay the course and ignore the criticism can also be read as ignoring electoral feedback. “I don’t react to that stuff,” Clyburn said, when asked about calls for generational change.

2. Clyburn says what the establishment thinks: It’s the voters’ fault

Clyburn articulates the core view of establishment politics as cleanly as anyone: There is nothing much to change. He doesn’t believe the party made significant errors in 2024, and he doesn’t take the primary results in New York City, Colorado, and elsewhere to be anything other than a flash in the pan. Pushed on what political lesson he took from an administration built to stop Trump that ended with Trump back in office, he went to turnout: “When the white vote turned out 71 percent two years ago, and the Black vote turned out 59 percent, you tell me whose fault that is.” Asked directly whether the argument was that Black people let Kamala Harris down, he didn’t hesitate: “In many instances, absolutely.” 

At its heart, this is a philosophy that blames the voters and insulates the party establishment from reflection. 

But this is also why the next round of primaries is so important. It’s easy to file New York, Colorado, or Graham Platner’s rise in Maine as one-offs — local flukes, not an overwhelming trend. But the Michigan and Wisconsin primaries are coming, and those are the ones that decide whether this gets treated as a pattern. The temperature of the freakout is still yet to be set.

3. He defends the establishment’s alliance with the Congressional Black Caucus

The moderate wing of the Democratic Party is held up, at the grassroots, by Black voters — particularly in the South. Clyburn knows that, and he defended both the alliance and the corporate policies that tie them together. 

Clyburn holds that taking corporate dollars is necessary for minority candidates who don’t come from family wealth — “I would challenge you to find me one single vote I have ever cast that pharma supported and my constituents didn’t.” He deferred to a pro-Israel colleague, Rep. Gregory Meeks, on questions of Israel: “I’m guided by Gregory Meeks.” He made no apology for backing Andrew Cuomo over Zohran Mamdani in this year’s New York mayor’s race — the same Cuomo he’d said should resign in 2021.

I asked him what Black communities have gotten in exchange for that loyalty. His answer was an agenda: “What did we get out of our support for Obama? What did we get out of our support for Biden?” And that’s a real answer. But I think there’s also another one underneath it.

I see Clyburn’s actions through the context of changing power within the Democratic Party, just as much as what’s going on outside of it. The Black political class, specifically, is invested in holding its own position against the party’s rising coalitions, immigrant communities in particular. That’s part of what’s at the heart of Clyburn’s endorsements of Cuomo and Haley Stevens in Michigan, and even the recent fight over which states should vote first in the Democratic presidential primary. 

Find the full episode — including a bonus segment where Clyburn defends the party’s approach to Israel — wherever you get your podcasts.

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