Data is redefining modern defense operations. The ability to master and manage it is now a decisive factor in military victory or defeat. Few people know that better than Jean Charles Ellermann-Kingombe, assistant secretary general for cyber and digital transformation at NATO.

In a recent interview preceding NATO Edge 26, the Alliance’s annual defense innovation show, Ellermann-Kingombe is very clear on the kind of digital transformation effort it takes to get the right data into the hands of military leaders operating in high-pressure situations, at exactly the time and place they need it.

Data-sharing must be a core design principle, he says: “The bottleneck is often not technology, but permission: classification boundaries, national rules and trust decisions.” Once data is well managed, an even bigger opportunity arises to use AI as “an enabler of military effectiveness,” he says, assisting commanders and operators further.

He adds: “For NATO, the biggest difference AI can make is in decision advantage. Modern operations generate volumes of data that no human organisation can process unaided at the speed required. AI can help fuse information, detect patterns, support planning, prioritise scarce resources and accelerate staff processes, providing commanders with better insight, earlier warnings and more resilient options.”

As powerful as it is, AI can only reliably accelerate defense mission outcomes if it is built on vast, relevant and quality data. Data is the fuel that will power the shift to software-defined defense, an approach that delivers military capability through flexible, modular software rather than rigid, hardware-bound platforms.

THE CHALLENGES OF MASTERING DATA

Software-defined defense, AI and the challenge of mastering the data that powers both, will be hot topics for attendees at NATO Edge 26, due to be held in Izmir, Türkiye, in November and expected to attract over 3,000 participants and more than 270 technology partners, including Elastic.

We will be there because we know that many attendees will be looking to better understand what software-defined defense will demand of them in data management terms.

As powerful as it is, AI can only reliably accelerate defense mission outcomes if it is built on vast, relevant and quality data. Data is the fuel that will power the shift to software-defined defense.

Bringing data together from many intelligent systems and smart devices demands real rigor. After all, in order to make critical operational decisions, military personnel need to be able to see the big picture, quickly searching for information in both structured and unstructured data formats across a vast array of different systems.

Defense data naturally lives wherever operations happen — across land, sea, air, space and cyber domains — and is stored in different formats like images, audio transcripts, documents and geospatial, reaching across thousands of different mission systems.

These can include communications systems that keep troops connected in the field; systems used to manage artillery devices; reconnaissance systems; radar stations; and geographical information systems that support military leaders in tracking assets, planning missions and routes, and analyzing risks and threats, including potential ambush sites and minefields.

In order to make critical operational decisions, military personnel need to be able to see the big picture, quickly searching for information in both structured and unstructured data formats across a vast array of different systems.

On top of all this, organizations like NATO face an additional layer of complexity. Building a common operational picture across the digital environments of 32 member nations requires multi-intelligence fusion of massive volumes of data held in disparate systems, from legacy databases and classified networks to cloud platforms and security tools.

OPERATIONAL ADVANTAGE

Addressing these challenges means turning all this data into operational advantage and mission readiness, accelerating the ability of armed forces to respond to situations by increasing their situational awareness and decision speed.

The answer is a data mesh architecture. Rather than consolidating everything into a traditional data lake, a data mesh approach manages data where it originates and lives, without moving or duplicating it; so it can be searched, queried and analyzed from multiple access points across the entire environment, including allied partners such as NATO member nations. That is what turns scattered data into one unified operational picture with near real-time insights, and context, giving commanders the situational awareness and decision speed that mission-readiness depends on. In my view, it is the most flexible and scalable way to get there.

It also speaks directly to the permission bottleneck Ellermann-Kingombe describes. Because data stays under the control of the nation or system that owns it, access can be governed by policy at the source, with classification boundaries and national rules enforced where the data lives rather than negotiated away in a central repository.

Rather than consolidating everything into a traditional data lake, a data mesh approach manages data where it originates and lives, without moving or duplicating it.

A data mesh approach is sustainable because of its reliance on open standards. They enable defense organizations to connect systems that were never designed to work together, from legacy platforms to dispersed infrastructure, so data stays findable and can be effectively analyzed across the environment. Interoperability stops being a barrier as new partners and data sources join, and new tools can be integrated without rebuilding systems or making major investments. The architecture scales alongside the Alliance’s growth.

Without a unified view, the risk of losing operational advantage to adversaries extends from the battlefield into cyberspace. Zero Trust depends on connecting authentication logs, network traffic and application telemetry where they already sit, so that traditionally separate domains can be visualized and analyzed together. When a user accesses sensitive data, the system must verify not only who they are but also their device status, network path, and the time and location of access. If those checks are slow or impossible, threats can remain undetected and escalate through systems. A data mesh built on open standards connects the pillars of a Zero Trust architecture, allowing organizations to accelerate implementation without replacing the tools they already have.

When the manual efforts of military data analysts struggle to keep pace with the scale and speed of events on the ground, AI can work faster and more accurately.

The same logic is already visible in large government organizations: CISA’s new SIEM-as-a-Service platform uses open standards to give US federal civilian agencies a consistent approach to threat detection and response.

As AI’s value in supporting human decision-making becomes increasingly clear, a data mesh architecture provides the foundation to apply agentic AI capabilities holistically. It enables complex organizations to analyze the vast amounts of data their systems generate, find actionable correlations and separate signals from noise. When the manual efforts of military data analysts struggle to keep pace with the scale and speed of events on the ground, AI can work faster and more accurately. It also lets analysts ask questions across structured and unstructured data and rapidly receive answers grounded in reliable sources.

The numerous tech challenges facing the modern military calls for closer NATO-industry cooperation, and that’s why NATO Edge 26 is such an important event. All 32 sovereign member states that make up the Alliance use different systems, yet they rely on secure, trusted data-sharing with each other as the foundation for cooperating on military operations and sharing intelligence. It’s vital that they can turn to industry innovators to support their operational needs.

At a time of great geopolitical uncertainty, with data increasingly considered a primary defense asset, NATO members face growing pressure to turn it into operational advantage and readiness before adversaries do. We look forward to discussing how at NATO Edge 26.

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LONDON — Vladimir Putin won’t be at the G20 summit in the U.K. next year, Andy Burnham said in an interview published Thursday.

Pushed by the Economist magazine on whether the Russian president will be invited to the gathering of world leaders in Manchester next November, the British PM said: “No.”

He went on to clarify the guest list is “handled by the G20,” but stressed Russia would not be present “because of an outstanding sanction.”

Burnham’s decision to actively exclude Putin comes after U.S. President Donald Trump sparked a diplomatic row by inviting the Russian leader to America’s G20 summit in Miami this December.

British Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband previously told POLITICO Britain will not ditch its ban on directly engaging with Russia, but that it was for the U.S. to make its own decisions.

A photocall at the G20 foreign ministers meeting last week was canceled after politicians, including Miliband, refused to be pictured with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

The U.K. has been one of Ukraine’s staunchest supporters since Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country in 2022 — a policy followed by all the five British prime ministers in post during nearly five years of war.

Burnham also told the Economist he’s keen to host Xi Jinping after the Chinese president visited Manchester in 2015, and said there’s a “real opportunity” for future U.K.-China economic collaboration after his predecessor Keir Starmer’s visit to Beijing earlier this year.

This story has been updated to reflect a full transcript of Burnham’s interview with The Economist.

U.S. President Donald Trump’s midterm election losses haven’t helped the U.K. economy — yet.

The Bank of England’s nine-member Monetary Policy Committee announced on Thursday it has overwhelmingly voted to increase interest rates to 4% from 3.75%, the first time since August 2023 to combat rising prices driven by the war in Iran.

Unlike the U.S. Federal Reserve and European Central Bank, the Bank of England has been reluctant to raise rates for fear of denting the British economy.

Until now, Governor Andrew Bailey and other MPC members have preferred to wait and see whether higher energy prices spilled over more broadly.

But the Bank was forced to increase rates after U.K. inflation came in at 3.5% in September, while the economy posted better-than-expected growth figures — raising the risk prices could take off.

The MPC on Wednesday voted 8-to-1 to raise rates, arguing the energy shock since the war began has built “sufficient” inflation pressures to justify a hike.

The dissenting vote from Catherine Mann was for a larger increase of 0.5 percentage points.

But Bailey made no secret of the fact that the future health of the U.K.’s economy depends on what the U.S. does in Iran.

“Today’s increase shouldn’t be seen as the first in an inevitable long sequence of hikes,” Bailey said.

“But, unless the conflict in the Middle East is resolved, neither does it seem likely to be the last increase.”

The Bank projected inflation would pick up to nearly 5% by the second quarter of 2027, higher than its previous forecast, with greater spillover into wages and other prices.

Under an adverse scenario, in which prices stay higher for longer and the conflict in the Middle East continues to flare, inflation would hit 6.2% in the third quarter of 2027.

Thursday’s decision, which comes a week after Chancellor John Healey delivered his first budget under the specter of Brits paying the highest energy prices in three years, will further squeeze struggling U.K. households and businesses already hit with higher energy bills and mortgage rates.

The tougher financing backdrop could hurt the Burnham government’s promises to tackle the cost of living. Yet rampant inflation would also undercut that pledge.

Still, the Bank’s top brass also pushed back on market expectations that rates could by hiked to 4.75% or 5% in 2027 — which could help bring down decades-high government borrowing costs.

The Trump factor

The decision comes as the rout of Trump’s Republican Party at the U.S. midterm elections on Tuesday raised the prospect of a peace deal in the Middle East.

A thaw in the conflict could bring down fuel prices by easing pressure on oil supplies and improve the cost-of-living picture for U.K. households.

There were reports Trump could respond to his party’s losses by embarking on a bombing campaign in the Middle East, but the U.S. president appeared to accept on Wednesday that higher petrol prices affected his popularity and struck a more conciliatory tone on the prospect of peace negotiations. 

U.S. Vice-President JD Vance blamed the Iran war for the electoral losses. And U.K. Prime Minister Andy Burnham said Wednesday that the elections create an opportunity to focus on the cost of living.

Oil prices fell sharply on Wednesday, amid expectations Democrats could also limit Trump’s funding for the conflict. The possibility of a ceasefire could yet be subject to Trump’s whims.

Regardless, U.K. consumers will feel the pinch through a rise in the energy price cap in January. 

Even if falling oil prices persist over the next few weeks, the price cap is likely to rise substantially because of a lag in the way it is calculated. 

The Bank forecast the cap will hit £2,150 in the first quarter of 2027. Food price increases, which have so far been muted, could hit 4.75% by mid-2027 as companies pass through higher costs.

Healey’s budget will knock 0.25 percentage points off inflation by the second quarter of next year, the Bank said, while tighter fiscal policy to bring down the deficit would likely detract from growth in the medium term.

Europe is feeling more than a little bit of schadenfreude.

In a stunning U.S. midterm election, Democrats regained control of the House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as several governorships, winning big in Republican strongholds like South Carolina, Texas and even Kansas. While some races were yet to be called Wednesday morning, the result is a monumental rebuke of U.S. President Donald Trump.

For Europe, which has weathered Trump’s incessant verbal attacks and tariff threats for the last two years, it was a rare ray of hope in transatlantic politics — if not because Washington would become a more predictable partner, then at least because the U.S. president might be too distracted to focus his usual ire on Europeans.

European Parliament Vice President Sophie Wilmès, a former Belgian prime minister, heralded a “major shift in the balance of power in the U.S. Congress,” adding: “I hope it will lead to a calmer, more constructive relationship with Europe.”

It remains to be seen how Trump will shift his stance on Europe, if at all, with Congress no longer under his control. As president, he still retains many of the executive’s powers on foreign policy.

German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius called the Democratic victory “historic” but cautioned against Europe expecting too much. “We will seek close contact with the Democrats,” he said Wednesday morning at the Berlin Security Conference. “But we do not know what the president will do after the election in the near future.”

Two senior EU figures — both regular Trump antagonists — couldn’t resist celebrating the result, though.

“American society voted against policies that only impoverish,” Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez said. “Against hate. Against sexism. Against climate change denial and against the privileges of the elites.”

Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski reshared his own tweet from June last year responding to Elon Musk, a key Trump ally. “See, big man, politics is harder than you thought,” he snarked.

Headache for Europe’s far right

For Europe’s ascendant far right, which has long balanced admiration for Trump with the reality that he is deeply unpopular across the continent, the midterms are an uncomfortable reminder of the political risks of being too closely associated with the U.S. president.

Jordan Bardella, leader of France’s National Rally (RN), was keen to chalk up Trump’s “unfavorable” result to his decision to go to war with Iran more than anything else.

“It’s the case that the U.S. intervention in Iran has had a very strong impact on the U.S. economy, but also on the European economy,” he said Wednesday morning.

Bardella added that the RN’s presidential candidate Marine Le Pen was still leading in the French polls ahead of next year’s election and insisted defeats for nationalist politicians in Brazil, Hungary and now the U.S. did not bode ill for his party’s chances.

But the cost-of-living crisis was top of American voters’ minds, according to polls. That’s also the case in European countries, from France to Spain to Greece, which are grappling with soaring rents and widespread anger at apparently impotent governments.

Marine Tondelier, leader of France’s Greens, said Trump had “made the United States the laughingstock of the world” and called the result a “warning for France” ahead of the presidential election in April.

“If our country brings the RN to power next year, it will meet the same tragic fate as the United States,” she said.

U.S. Ambassador to NATO Matthew Whitaker sought to downplay the prospect of a shift in Washington’s foreign policy following the midterm elections, insisting that the issues facing the U.S. and its European allies remained unchanged.

“The foreign policy of the United States has not changed,” Whitaker said, adding that “the issues that we’re facing as a country and as an alliance are the same.”

European markets, meanwhile, greeted the results with cautious optimism. Paris, London and Frankfurt opened slightly higher on Wednesday, following the Democrats’ sweeping victory.

Reality check for Trump

For all the celebrations, European officials were also quick to acknowledge that a Democratic-controlled Congress does not automatically translate into a more accommodating U.S. administration.

Trump retains considerable room to maneuver on foreign policy, including on the issues that have most strained transatlantic ties: European security, trade and Russia’s war in Ukraine.

France’s Economy Minister Roland Lescure noted Wednesday morning that while Trump would be “quite weakened” domestically, the “unpredictable” president remained “in charge of international policy.”

But a hostile Congress could make it harder for him to push through his domestic agenda, while opening the door to greater scrutiny of his administration.

“Voters have a habit of balancing power,” Finnish MEP Mika Aaltola said on X, “and now the president’s hands are more tied in domestic and foreign policy.”

Former Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta was more emphatic.

“Europe is much stronger” thanks to the “blue wave,” he wrote on X.

Kathleen Van Brempt, vice-chair of the European Parliament’s International Trade Committee, shared a White House tweet predicting a Trump victory — and captioned it that it was, actually, America that won.

“And he lost,” she said.

Despite the ballot-box drubbing, Trump himself couldn’t resist a final shot at Europe, during an election night call with Fox News.

“You look at Europe, it’s dying. You look at what’s going on in France, what’s going on in Italy and all these other countries. I mean, they’re going through a terrible time. And they may not even survive, frankly,” he warned. “And we are thriving.”

European capitals are watching these midterms closely — but are under no illusions that a Democrat-led Congress could reverse the new world order shaped by President Donald Trump.

The MAGA movement has few friends among European governments, given Trump’s backpedaling on support for Ukraine and NATO. The president’s war in Iran has caused economic chaos across the continent and his frequent browbeating of European leaders is a headache they could do without.

So Europe will be watching for two things tonight — firstly, an election that leaves Trump so weakened at home that he’s somehow more stymied abroad. This feels optimistic: Foreign affairs remain the White House’s prerogative whichever party controls Congress, and history shows that presidents tend to have an even greater overseas focus in their final years in office.

Second, European leaders will be watching for any hint of the direction the U.S. might be headed in 2028. Any prospect of a 48th president with a more traditional American view of the world — embracing NATO, Europe and free trade — would be warmly welcomed.

But more important still would be any sign that the MAGA movement itself is on the wane. Europe knows full well from the Joe Biden presidency that any reversion to a more conventional president is only going to be temporary for as long as the Republican Party remains of a MAGA mindset.

BRUSSELS — NATO countries are bracing for a worst-case scenario in the U.S. midterm elections Tuesday.

European allies fear a Republican loss could spur President Donald Trump to dramatically step up his attacks on the alliance, according to five NATO diplomats, all of whom were granted anonymity to speak freely on the sensitive issue.

Their worry is that if he is restrained by Congress on domestic policy, Trump, as commander-in-chief of the U.S. military, may seek to cement his legacy on foreign affairs, where he has a freer hand. That could mean pulling thousands more troops out of Europe, three of the diplomats said.

“Usually what happens to lame duck presidents is a mix of venting frustrations and adventurism in foreign policy,” said one senior European defense official. And attacking NATO “seems to be a consistent part of [the] Trump worldview.”

White House Assistant Press Secretary Olivia Wales told POLITICO that “President Trump has done more for NATO than anyone else,” citing his successes in securing agreements by allies to raise defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035, bolster U.S. military presence in Greenland, and efforts to end Russia’s all-out war in Ukraine.

Yet he “remains firm that our NATO allies should have been there for the United States” over the war in Iran, she said, adding: “The President will never settle for the West’s managed decline and will continue to unapologetically advance our interests at home and abroad.”

Democrats are widely expected to win the House of Representatives and potentially flip the Senate, while Trump’s personal approval ratings have fallen to his lowest on record.

The worries underscore growing transatlantic tensions after a U.S. cutoff of Starlink satellite services for Ukraine and a fresh rapprochement between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin weeks before the midterms. Further attacks would deal a fresh blow to NATO, just as Russia steps up its sabotage campaign and so-called hybrid war across Europe.

“He could be very pissed off,” said one of the NATO diplomats. If so, “he’ll be very harsh.”

Forces, money and Ukraine

At the heart of the concerns is an upcoming review of U.S. forces in Europe, expected by December. If Trump is blocked from legislating domestically, he may seek to significantly increase the scope of that pullback to rally his MAGA base, three of the diplomats said. 

The president could also decide to tie continued American presence on the continent to Europe accepting a U.S.-backed peace deal in Ukraine, said Oana Lungescu, a former NATO official and distinguished fellow at the Royal United Services Institute think tank.

“There is a risk that all these things — the U.S. force posture review, Ukraine, European security order … somehow are treated as part of a much bigger deal with Putin,” she said, “creating a very dangerous situation for security in Europe.”

Trump could also move to cut U.S. contributions to the alliance’s common funding, limit the NATO-backed PURL arms-buying scheme for Ukraine, as well as deepen ties still further with Russia, the diplomats said.

A major electoral defeat for the Republicans could also spell big changes at the Pentagon, which would have knock-on effects for any plans currently being hatched in the building.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has become a deeply unpopular figure in Congress, given his refusal to provide regular briefings about budgets and operations to lawmakers, especially Democrats.

That unpopularity has led to speculation that Hegseth could be out after an electoral blowout for Trump, partially because a Democrat-led Congress would slap Hegseth with probes into his firing of dozens of generals and admirals with no cause, and the faltering war with Iran. Those hearings and investigations would hamstring Hegseth and his team, and could prove embarrassing for the administration.

If Hegseth does move on, there would be a transition period in the Pentagon which could push any decisions about moving U.S. troops out of Europe back by weeks or months.

In theory, a Democrat majority in the House and Senate would restrain Trump’s maneuverability even on foreign and defense issues, even if U.S. law currently imposes a minimum limit of 76,000 on troop presence in Europe. 

But “it is doubtful that at least the troop floors would stand up to legal scrutiny and in any case Trump has been very willing to ignore the courts,” said Jennifer Kavanagh, a senior fellow at the Defense Priorities think tank. “The Trump administration has regularly ignored funding guidance from Congress, spending money on activities the legislative branch has not authorized.”

If Trump decides to impose a more sprawling drawdown, Europe will have “the most trouble” replacing assets including electronic warfare capabilities, air defense systems, intelligence and reconnaissance support, aerial refueling, and some types of logistics, she said.

Other allies are more skeptical Trump would hammer NATO. “We have had speculations all the time about Trump … coming out of the NATO; this has not happened so far,” Montenegrin Defense Minister Dragan Krapović told POLITICO. “Congress is the one making the decision, the final decision about less troops in Europe.”

But “to make assumptions with a high probability of success needs an object of study that makes rational decisions,” said a sixth NATO diplomat. “I don’t think we are there with the current POTUS.”

NATO and the U.S. Department of Defense did not respond to requests for comment by POLITICO.

BERLIN — British Defence Secretary Wes Streeting arrives in Berlin on Monday to discuss closer military cooperation with Germany. But internal German defense ministry briefings seen by POLITICO show the two countries still face tough choices over how to work together.

The documents, prepared for internal talks with various defense companies ahead of Streeting’s visit, reveal how Britain and Germany intend to divide responsibility for developing two new types of missiles, the industrial competition taking shape and the technological challenges that remain.

The stakes extend well beyond their bilateral relationship. Russia’s war against Ukraine has exposed gaps in Europe’s defenses, while uncertainty over America’s long-term military commitment has increased pressure on European governments to develop more of their own weapons.

Streeting will meet his German counterpart, Boris Pistorius, as the countries discuss the development of long-range missiles together, even as Berlin weighs whether to join Britain’s next fighter-jet program or pursue a different European partnership.

“The defining test is not where every single component of a piece of kit or equipment was made,” Streeting said on Oct. 22 at the opening of a British artillery factory by German arms giant Rheinmetall. His message: Allies must prioritize delivering weapons over competing industrial interests.

Building Europe’s next missiles

At the heart of the partnership is a plan to develop weapons capable of hitting targets more than 2,000 kilometers away. Known as Deep Precision Strike, or DPS, the project aims to give European forces the ability to strike far behind enemy lines without relying on American missiles.

The internal briefings reveal how Britain and Germany intend to divide the work.

Britain will lead development of a missile designed to fly low and evade enemy radar, known as the High-End Cruise Missile. The first version is expected to be ready for military use in 2032.

Germany will take charge of a different weapon, designed to travel several times the speed of sound. A rocket would carry this so-called hypersonic glide vehicle high into the sky before releasing it toward its target. Berlin aims to have it ready for military use by 2035.

The two weapons are the centerpiece of the partnership, but Germany and Britain are also considering other ways to strengthen their long-range strike capabilities, the briefing shows.

For the two-part DPS project, the plans involve significant investment. Britain has committed £770 million over four years to the wider missile effort. Separate German budget material seen by POLITICO identifies more than €9 billion in future spending, although without a defined timeframe.

But agreeing which country leads each project is only part of the task. The countries must also decide which companies will develop the weapons.

Competition behind the cooperation

For the German-led hypersonic weapon, the ministry plans to have two companies develop competing experimental versions by 2029.

One is MBDA, Europe’s established missile manufacturer. The other is Hypersonica, a much smaller German-British startup. Their designs would be tested before Berlin decides how to proceed.

The competition could prove sensitive. According to the internal German briefing, the ministry anticipates that MBDA may worry its younger rival could benefit from technical knowledge gained during development and testing. 

Hypersonica, meanwhile, is already gaining experience through Nightfall, a British-funded project to develop missiles for Ukraine. According to the briefing, some of that work could help the startup develop a more advanced German-British weapon.

Another complication will be finding out what role France will play — if at all.

When Chancellor Friedrich Merz and President Emmanuel Macron met in July, they agreed to explore cooperation with Britain on long-range weapons, specifically highlighting that ArianeGroup, the Franco-German rocket manufacturer, could play a role.

However, political agreement between European governments does not automatically settle industrial arrangements.

The ministry briefing says talks about involving ArianeGroup in developing a booster — the rocket component that would propel the hypersonic weapon into flight — proved difficult because of limited rights to use the technology. The document does not specify what those restrictions entail.

For Britain and Germany, the next step is to turn these plans into firm commitments. Officials have discussed initial agreements to advance the missile project before the end of the year, separate documents seen by POLITICO show, although it remains unclear whether any will be signed during Streeting’s visit.

Responding to POLITICO’s request, the German defense ministry declined to comment.

A difficult choice in the skies

While Britain and Germany are moving closer together on a missile partnership, their plans for building the next generation of fighter jets pose the question: Which countries does Berlin want as its long-term defense partners after its flagship fighter-jet project with France collapsed in June?

Britain has moved to fill that gap. During a visit to Berlin earlier this month, British Prime Minister Andy Burnham encouraged Chancellor Friedrich Merz to consider joining the advanced fighter program London is already developing with Italy and Japan, known as GCAP.

For Britain, German participation would help divide the enormous costs of developing a new fighter jet. For Berlin, it offers something beyond the aircraft itself: closer post-Brexit ties with Britain, a major European military power and key NATO ally, as well as a strategic partnership with Japan.

That diplomatic appeal matters as Europe takes on more responsibility for its own security amid uncertainty over America’s future commitment to the continent. 

But Germany’s defense ministry sees problems with the British offer.

“At present, cooperation with Sweden and Spain appears preferable,” one of the internal briefings states, pointing to a better match with Germany’s military needs rather than GCAP.

Officials also worry that Germany would have too little influence over a program in which Britain, Italy and Japan have already divided much of the development work among their companies. 

That leaves Berlin weighing the diplomatic benefits of joining Britain against the military and industrial advantages of starting over with different partners.

For Streeting, the visit to Berlin therefore comes at an important moment with unresolved issues. Britain and Germany are making tangible progress on missiles, but London has yet to convince Berlin that it should also become a partner in Britain’s next fighter jet.

KOREAN DEMILITARIZED ZONE — Friedrich Merz ended his five-day trip to Asia on Friday reflecting on Europe’s past.

After visiting the blue barracks where the armistice that ended the Korean War was signed in 1953, in the Joint Security Area where North and South Korean troops stand face-to-face, the German chancellor addressed the obvious parallels between his country’s history and Korea’s present.

“Thoughts are running through my mind about how grateful we may be that in Germany we haven’t had to experience this for 36 years,” Merz said.

The remarks concluded a tour of Singapore, Japan and South Korea, where the chancellor was challenged by Asian capitals over security and trade cooperation — and often reminded of how the region’s turmoil are intertwined with Europe’s precarious moment.

‘Collective security’

One only has to look across the border. Shortly before Merz arrived in the demilitarized zone, North Korea fired about 10 short-range ballistic missiles toward the Sea of Japan. The chancellor’s greatest security concerns at home — Russia’s war against Ukraine and Moscow’s threat to Europe — are increasingly becoming problems in the Asia-Pacific region as well.

The fact that Pyongyang is able to launch so many ballistic missiles, testing and expanding its long-range strike capabilities, is directly linked to its cooperation with Russia. North Korea has been sending soldiers to the Russian front in Ukraine for two years and in return benefited from combat experience and technology transfers.

North Korean state television on Thursday showed leader Kim Jong Un with new military drones, including a potential stealth drone, underscoring the great strides the country is also making in drone development. These are serious security issues that other countries in the region, including Japan, cannot ignore.

Besides provocations from Pyongyang, there is China, which is not only becoming increasingly dominant in trade but also casting its eye toward Taiwan, making far-reaching territorial claims in the South China Sea and putting strong pressure on critics such as Japan. And there is Russia, which is forging close military ties with Beijing and carrying out joint bomber flights with the Chinese air force near the Japanese border.

“Russia’s war against Ukraine is ever-present here in the region,” Merz told reporters following his visit to the border. “There is no longer such a thing as unilateral security in the world, only collective security,” he added, underscoring his call to “work closely” with Japan, South Korea and Singapore “on security policy issues” and in the defense industry.

Middle power struggle

This German offer has generated considerable interest. Given Berlin’s position as Ukraine’s largest supporter, German defense companies are highly active in the war-torn country and cooperate with local manufacturers, giving them access to rapid technological developments. This makes them attractive to Asian partners who fear falling behind North Korea and China as they benefit from their cooperation with Russia.

The fact that the chancellor traveled with a large business delegation — the kind previously seen only on visits to China — underscores this focus. Among the companies were several defense firms, including aircraft manufacturer Airbus, air defense manufacturer Diehl Defense and drone specialist Quantum-Systems. Japan welcomed the cooperation, with Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi speaking of a “premium partnership” with Germany.

Yet Merz’s trip was about more than defense deals. The chancellor used his visits to warn against violations of international law by Russia but also increasingly by China and the United States. “We are on the threshold of a new era,” he said in Tokyo. “We are witnessing how the major powers are pursuing a new policy and how international rules are eroding.”

His words echoed a similar warning issued by German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier during a parallel trip to Beijing. “An order that was never perfect, but at least served as the foundation for international cooperation, is eroding. Lawlessness looms. I see this as a great danger for all of us,” said Steinmeier.

To counter this trend, Merz built on Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s proposal that “middle powers” should team up to better defend themselves in the face of unreliable major powers and toothless international organizations.

In speeches in Tokyo and Seoul, Merz proposed a “global political alliance for rules-based trade.” Medium-sized powers such as the EU, Asian nations, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the South American Mercosur trade bloc should “coordinate” and “act together” if others challenged international rules “or if economic pressure were to be exerted,” said the chancellor.

It’s a thinly veiled reference to Chinese threats to restrict access to rare earth metals and the tariff threats made by U.S. President Donald Trump. Merz also said the alliance could strengthen the World Trade Organization and seek to unblock the nomination of judges to the organization’s appellate body.

“Considerable concern” over Franco-German car deal

During his trip, however, Merz experienced firsthand just how difficult it is to put such an ambitious proposal into practice when special interests complicate an alliance of small and medium-sized powers.

This became most evident when the Asian countries issued a sharp protest over planned “Made in Europe” rules for the car industry. Under a proposal agreed by Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron, Brussels would restrict subsidies for cars to vehicles produced inside the EU, Switzerland and the U.K., putting foreign manufacturers at a disadvantage.

In polite but direct terms, South Korea’s President Lee Jae Myung told reporters he had “asked Merz for support so that Korea would be treated like the EU member states.” A similar complaint was voiced in Japan.

“That was, in fact, a topic that surprised me a bit, given the intensity with which it was presented,” Merz told reporters before returning to Germany on Friday evening. He admitted that the Franco-German proposal had “sparked considerable concern in the region — in Singapore, Japan, and Korea — that we may be facing a new wave of protectionism in Europe, that we are closing ourselves off from other countries.”

Merz vowed to take those complaints “very seriously” and raise them at the next EU leaders’ summit. Yet they are a sharp reminder of how much industry-specific details can hamper the implementation of his proposed broader alliance.

The chancellor’s trip also revealed challenges when it comes to security cooperation: A request for Japan to supply Patriot anti-aircraft missiles to Ukraine fell flat. And it remains unclear whether Tokyo continues to contribute several billions to a new Ukraine loan next year, as Brussels hopes.

A Japanese diplomat, granted anonymity to discuss sensitive matters, posed a different question to the German delegation: “How exactly will you help us if China attacks Taiwan?”

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Vladimir Putin’s possible return to a G20 summit in Florida in December risks normalizing Russia’s war crimes in Ukraine, the EU’s foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said on Saturday.

“Normalizing Russia coming back to these international fora is just normalizing war crimes being committed every day now” in Ukraine, Kallas said in an interview with Bloomberg TV.

She added that Russia’s war in Ukraine conflicts “with U.N charter principles that all these countries around the table have signed up to.”

Putin hasn’t yet confirmed whether he would attend the December summit hosted in the U.S. His last in-person attendance at a G20 meeting was in 2019 — three years before Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Kallas’ remarks come amid growing frustration among EU countries over Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov’s attendance at a G20 ministerial gathering in Atlanta.

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who was hosting the meeting, called off the traditional family photo after European officials refused to stand beside Lavrov.

Kallas said in the interview that “we don’t want to stand next to him [Lavrov] in this fora,” because he’s been placed under international sanctions.

However, she added that Lavrov’s presence meant “we can also immediately fight back on these lies” from Russia.

Kallas hailed the U.S. decision on Friday to sell 500 Patriot missile interceptors to Ukraine as a “very positive development” and called on allies to toughen sanctions against Russia.

A former Prime Minister of Estonia, Kallas has emerged as one of the EU’s most vocal critics of Russia.

In the interview, she rebuffed reported calls from the Pentagon for NATO countries, including the Baltic states that border Russia, to tone down their criticism of the Kremlin.

“The question is if you don’t talk about the threat, is it going away? I think it’s not going away.”

BRUSSELS — The European Union and Canada have agreed a framework to invest more European money in Canadian critical minerals, as part of a broader agreement to boost raw material and energy trade between the two jurisdictions.

The EU confirmed Friday it had concluded negotiations that would “facilitate European investments in critical Canadian resources, in particular in critical raw materials,” following talks between senior EU officials and the Canadian government in Montreal. The investments would be made through the European Investment Bank, the EU’s lending arm.

The two jurisdictions will also carry out a “long-term feasibility study” on exporting Canadian liquified natural gas to Europe. Canada is rich in gas but currently doesn’t have infrastructure to liquefy and export it from its east coast.

The commitments are part of a much broader effort to deepen the relationship between the EU and Canada, who see themselves as likeminded democracies in a world that is increasingly pulling away from the international rules-based order that has dominated since World War II.

“[W]e will accelerate collaboration to support investment in critical raw materials projects, both in Canada and in the EU, along the value chain, including extraction, processing, refining, manufacturing and recycling activities,” the EU and Canada said in a joint statement.

They also said they would “explore cooperation opportunities on raw materials projects in third countries identified as projects of common interest.”

The joint statement, which aims to build “an even closer association between Canada and the EU,” also covered security, trade, tech and artificial intelligence, competition policy, financial services and cultural exchange.

MONTREAL — Prime Minister Mark Carney wanted the landmark EU-Canada summit to be about much more than “nomenclature.” He got what he craved. 

Over a whirlwind 48 hours in Montreal, top officials from Brussels and Ottawa huddled to pursue agreements on critical minerals, super computers and defense cooperation.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, European Council President António Costa and Carney gathered as U.S. President Donald Trump continues to upend the global order and Chinese dominance of critical markets squeezes middle powers. 

Those challenges have pushed the EU and Canada into a rapidly developing partnership that eclipses anything attempted by Brussels with a non-member country since the bloc was formed. 

Here are all the key things POLITICO learned during the EU-Canada meetings. 

Carney finally embraced ‘associate membership’

Initially reluctant, the Canadian prime minister came around by the end of the summit to endorse von der Leyen’s controversial label for the global alliance the EU and Canada are building. 

Carney set a six-month deadline to firm up the ground rules of what “associate membership” is, trialing an induction process that could be a model for other non-European countries.

“With Canada becoming the European Union’s first associate member, in the coming months we will determine the full substance, scale and scope of this new form of membership,” he said Friday. 

Carney added he will meet periodically with von der Leyen to track progress, including a return trip for the College of European Commissioners to meet with their Canadian counterparts in March.

Got minerals

Both Canadian and EU officials are walking away from the summit with at least one major win: the framework agreement signed between the European Investment Bank and Canada that will open up the bloc’s lending arm to Canadian critical minerals crucial for future tech. 

That means batteries, circuit boards and semiconductors, which all require lithium, nickel, cobalt and other critical raw materials that, as of now, the EU is largely dependent on China to score.

The deal helps wean the Europeans off a politically volatile critical minerals dealer, for a more reliable Canadian supplier. 

The agreement does not immediately unlock funding for specific projects, but it supports pathways for future investments in Canadian mining and helps link the bloc’s supply chains with Canada’s.

Canada’s energy ambitions still point east

Critical minerals aren’t the only Canadian natural resource on the menu for Europeans. 

Carney has said he wants to make Canada an “energy superpower” and leverage huge stores of oil and liquefied natural gas in his country for export. The only problem: Most of it is in the western province of Alberta, far from Europe.

But the summit concluded with a commitment by both sides to a “long-term feasibility study” on exporting LNG to Europe via the east coast or Arctic ports closer to the bloc. 

“There’s also a huge opportunity in terms of bringing some of the fossils and gas from Canada to the EU,” said a Commission official, who was granted anonymity to talk about sensitive diplomatic negotiations. “The old infrastructure in Canada was built north-south for historical reasons, but now there is talk of starting to build east-west.”

Making nice with Washington? Don’t hold your breath.

As Europeans and Canadians preached deeper ties, Sen. Peter Welch (D-Vt.) was there doing damage control.

Welch, whose state is a little over an hour’s drive south of Montreal, spent Thursday reassuring business leaders that U.S. relations with Canada and beyond can, some day, get back to normal. When exactly, he couldn’t say for sure.

During his trip, Welch met with Quebec Chief Trade Negotiator Pascal Paradis, tourism industry leaders, businesses and manufacturers nailed by tariffs, and hit up a Eurasia Group lunch.

Tuesday’s U.S. midterm elections could offer a waypoint to warmer relations. But Welch loaded his optimism about Democratic Party fortunes with caveats.

“I think we’ll be successful, but you’ll still have a president who abuses his authority and acts in arbitrary ways,” he said. “It’s not like I can give any assurance that things are going to change.” 

Unspoken in the communiqué: China

Canada and the EU pledged deeper cooperation on pumping more European money into the mining, production and refining of critical minerals, a response to China’s dominance of the global market for those minerals. But the final summit communiqué steers clear of naming specific countries. 

Canadian Defense Minister David McGuinty was more candid.

“China has been vacuuming up as many critical minerals as they can throughout the world, particularly in the African continent, cutting deals, usually infrastructure for critical mineral deals. That could be a soccer stadium, for example. It could be a light rail system,” McGuinty told POLITICO at the summit Friday.

“It turns out that Canada’s got a huge amount of critical minerals, and basically all 10 of the 10 critical minerals on the short list for NATO, which the United States is also aware of. We’re going to not only exploit, but we intend to move to transform,” he said.

The common language: Sovereignty

Outside the summit, many Montrealers were oblivious to the landmark meeting taking place in the city. Inside, the vibe was existential.

The trio of leaders — Carney, von der Leyen and Costa — invoked individual and collective sovereignty as reasons to pursue a closer alliance to weather “new storms” stoked by climate change, challenges to democratic norms and the weaponization of trade. Carney has notably claimed concerns about encroachment on Canada’s sovereignty as a reason to walk away from trade talks with the Trump administration. 

“Today is about sovereignty,” Carney said. “We’re building the industries and infrastructure that underwrite our collective security.”

Quebec wanted a seat at the table

The summit came to Montreal weeks after Quebec — the French-speaking province in Canada that hosted the summit — elected a separatist government. Quebec shares powers with Ottawa and had its own seat in the CETA trade talks with the EU over a decade ago; and it had sought a similar role at this summit. 

But Ottawa refused to let new Premier Paul St-Pierre Plamondon address the summit, so he boycotted it, complaining he was being asked to “serve shrimp cocktail.” 

Carney accused him of leaving “an empty chair.” It stayed empty, even though six former Quebec premiers came to dinner.

The Europeans did not escape unscathed. The Quebec press panned von der Leyen’s English-only speech on the opening day as a faux pas in Canada’s largest francophone metropolis. Commission Executive Vice-President Teresa Ribera did little better, telling Radio-Canada in French that, for Brussels, summits like this are between national governments.

Bagel diplomacy

In a town where the original heated rivalry persists between two bagel shops, von der Leyen couldn’t resist picking a side with a photo-op at St-Viateur. 

Sorry Fairmount. 

The United States cannot credibly defend freedom around the world while treating the survival of a democracy under attack as a bargaining chip.

Russia’s war against Ukraine is not simply a territorial dispute. It is a test of whether democratic nations will defend the principles that sustain their freedom — or allow an authoritarian aggressor to destroy these principles through military force, terror and economic coercion.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine was unlawful. Its conduct has included attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, and in March 2023, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova over alleged war crimes involving the unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children. All grave allegations that demand accountability.

As Ukraine continues to fight for its survival, current U.S. policy raises a fundamental question: Does Washington understand what is at stake?

If Moscow succeeds in subjugating Ukraine, other authoritarian leaders will also ask whether military conquest can succeed. Can U.S. commitments be trusted? Will democratic nations stand together when the price becomes politically inconvenient?

Ukraine’s defense is not charity. It is a strategic investment in American and European security, Washington’s credibility and the deterrence of future conflicts.

The U.S. emerged from World War II understanding that an international order based on sovereignty, freedom and rule of law serves its interests. And successive Republican and Democratic administrations recognized that unchecked authoritarian expansion threatens both American security and the independence of its allies.

That understanding must guide U.S. policy toward Russia today.

Diplomacy is essential. Negotiations to end the war should be pursued seriously. But peace cannot mean rewarding aggression, compelling Ukraine to surrender its sovereignty or giving Moscow time to rearm for another invasion.

Appeasement does not necessarily prevent conflict. It can encourage aggression by convincing dictators the free world lacks the will to resist them. And a ceasefire without effective safeguards could become merely a pause before the next assault. A settlement that leaves Ukraine defenseless would postpone the conflict, not resolve it.

Peace should be measured not by the speed with which an agreement is signed, but by whether it protects Ukraine’s independence and makes another war less likely. And economic pressure is among the most important nonmilitary instruments available to the U.S. in this process, as Russia’s ability to wage war depends substantially on energy revenues, access to international markets and networks that facilitate sanctions evasion.

On Sept.18, U.S. President Donald Trump signed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 into law. Then, on Oct. 16, he issued an executive order waiving specified sanctions, restrictions and duties authorized under the legislation, citing the national interest. This order raises a legitimate question about how Washington intends to use the economic leverage Congress provided.

The measurable objectives these waivers are intended to achieve, why they serve American national security and what conditions would trigger their reconsideration need to be explained.

The U.S. needs to enforce restrictions consistently, close avenues for evasion and impose consequences when countries or companies knowingly provide material assistance to Russia’s war effort in violation of applicable law.

This does not require abandoning diplomacy. It requires a coherent policy in which economic relief advances clearly defined security objectives.

If Washington weakens its own pressure without obtaining meaningful concessions, it risks surrendering leverage while leaving Russia’s aggression unresolved. Every source of revenue helping Moscow sustain its military campaign has consequences for Ukrainian civilians, who bear them in destroyed homes, shattered families and lost lives.

U.S. policy should not make it easier for Russia to finance a war Washington says it wants to end.

American history has a bipartisan tradition of leadership that combines the defense of freedom with strategic judgment.

Harry Truman understood U.S. security depended on resisting authoritarian expansion. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, John F. Kennedy demonstrated that strength and diplomacy are not opposites. Ronald Reagan understood freedom must be defended against those who seek to suppress it. And George H. W. Bush knew sovereignty and alliances are essential to an international order where nations cannot redraw borders by force.

Though from different eras, the leadership of these presidents reflected a common principle: American security is strengthened when the U.S. combines military strength, alliances, diplomacy and a commitment to the independence of free nations.

A policy that pressures Ukraine more than Russia, offers Moscow economic relief without substantial concessions or asks Ukrainians to accept an insecure future is not a strategy for lasting peace. It risks rewarding aggression and inviting further conflict.

And above all, Ukraine’s future should not be decided over the heads of Ukrainians.

Democratic institutions can be attacked and dismantled far faster than they can be rebuilt. Ukraine’s struggle is therefore about more than one war. It is about whether the democratic world will remain a community of nations bound by common principles or become a collection of states left to negotiate individually with authoritarian regimes.

History will not judge U.S. policy solely by the immediate cost of weapons, energy or sanctions. It will judge whether America stood by a nation fighting for survival, upheld the principles it asks others to respect and helped prevent future wars by demonstrating that aggression does not pay.

Adrian Zuckerman is a former U.S. ambassador to Romania (2019-2021); Mark Gitenstein is a former U.S. ambassador to Romania (2009-2012) and to the EU (2022-2025); Ron Gidwitz is a former U.S. ambassador to Belgium (2018-2021) and acting U.S. ambassador to the EU (2020-2021); Jim Gilmore is a former U.S. ambassador to the OSCE (2019-2021); Kathleen Kavalec is a former U.S. ambassador to Romania (2023-2025); Jim Rosapepe is a former U.S. ambassador to Romania (1998-2001).

POLITICO occasionally publishes opinion pieces from guest authors to offer our readers a range of perspectives on the intersection of power and politics. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of POLITICO.

Prime Minister Andy Burnham will have an unofficial goal when he meets members of Britain’s former empire next week: Avoid a fight about slavery reparations.

Good luck, as they say, with that.

His predecessor Keir Starmer’s trip to the last Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, at a beach resort on the Pacific island of Samoa in 2024, is still the stuff of rueful mutters in parts of Whitehall.

Lined up in a semi-circle of armchairs — “like an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting,” as one person briefed on the gathering put it — leaders from many of the 56 Commonwealth nations negotiated live over a 16-page communique on laptops and tablets. Starmer, a barrister, found himself personally redrafting a key paragraph about reparations on a screen surrounded by other leaders, said two further people briefed on the meeting.

The unusually intimate format of the leaders’ retreat meant they had no officials with them on the veranda, and Starmer had just one civil servant — No. 10’s private secretary for foreign affairs — stationed in a tent close by. His chief of staff Morgan McSweeney was woken at 4 a.m. London time by a phone call to talk about the strategy for reparations.

That, however, was never clearly resolved. The retreat dragged on hours late; some leaders left before it was even over. Starmer was frustrated and felt he had been “ambushed,” said one U.K. official involved in the 2024 trip. A second said they had blocked the incident from their memory. A third said Starmer was left “furious,” adding: “He went in blind and it was terrible for him.” A fourth said simply: “It was a disaster.” All were granted anonymity to speak frankly.

The eventual communique agreed on a “conversation towards forging a common future based on equity.” This fudge kicked the issue of reparations down the road — where it now lands in Burnham’s lap.

Britain’s new prime minister will touch down at the biennial summit in Antigua and Barbuda next week to find the issue still firmly on some Caribbean and African leaders’ minds.

At the United Nations in May, 123 countries passed a motion calling for “inclusive, good-faith dialogue on reparatory justice.” The U.K. abstained. Barbados PM Mia Mottley announced a manifesto from Caribbean leaders on the “moral, ethical and legal case” for reparations in June. Commonwealth Secretary-General Shirley Botchwey said last week that an apology for Britain’s role in the slave trade “wouldn’t hurt.”

The visit will be a test of how Burnham — who has a reputation for speaking off the cuff, especially on issues of moral justice — maintains a delicate U.K. government line that reparations are not “the answer,” as Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband told POLITICO last month. And Burnham will face that challenge in a unique spotlight: It will be his first overseas visit with King Charles III, who is the head of the Commonwealth.

POLITICO spoke to a dozen U.K. officials or politicians who were involved in the 2024 summit or the planning for Burnham’s upcoming visit. They painted a picture of acute anxiety in the British state over how to deal with calls for reparations from its former colonies; tensions between Downing Street and the Foreign Office over the handling of 2024; and serious questions in Whitehall about whether the summit is even useful for No. 10 — despite the king’s role leaving U.K. prime ministers little choice but to attend.

Burnham will not have to deal with the extreme jetlag and communications hurdles that dogged Starmer’s trip, which involved a 28-hour flight in each direction. But like Starmer, he will fly out at a time when his in-tray is crowded by other issues — not least the U.S. midterms happening at the same time and the domestic aftermath of his first budget, just unveiled this past Wednesday.

The first U.K. official quoted earlier in this story said: “There’s a sense that there can’t be a repeat of [2024] this time around.” The third U.K. official quoted above said: “I don’t understand why they’re making the same mistake. Does the prime minister really have to go?”

A No. 10 official, however, said Burnham made clear soon after taking power on July 20 that he was “very keen” to attend the summit. Miliband has “laid the groundwork so that things hopefully won’t be as tricky as they were in 2024,” this person added.

“Andy’s style is that he is an honest broker with people, and he will give an instinctive response to things,” the official said. “But the government’s position is clear that reparations are not seen as the right route. It’s a careful balancing act, but one that we’re well prepared for.”

Climate resilience fund in the works

One tactic for the current No. 10 will be to try to avoid talking about it public.

Downing Street has broken with recent precedent by deciding not to bring the usual “pack” of political journalists, taking a smaller media “pool” instead. This will limit the scope of questions that Burnham faces. (Political editors from news outlets, including POLITICO, have written to No. 10 to object to the arrangement.)

Timing could also allow the visit to slip under the radar. Burnham and Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband will be there alongside counterparts including Anthony Albanese of Australia and Mark Carney of Canada, creating a rare opportunity for them to discuss the implications of the U.S. midterm results in private. The symbolism, as “middle power” nations deal with a drift in U.S. relations under Donald Trump, would be obvious.

Officially, the agenda is to build an alliance that can boost these middle powers, along with the developing states that global summits usually overlook. 

The Commonwealth Secretariat — the London-based body that co-ordinates the summit — said the aim of next week’s gathering is “partnerships and investment,” including in climate and youth employment, and removing trade barriers.

Likewise, the U.K. Foreign Office has been working on a climate resilience fund for developing nations, two people with knowledge of the talks said. A third said conversations in the U.K. government had focused on mobilizing public and private finance, and improving access to finance for climate-vulnerable countries.

Three people with knowledge of the planning emphasized that this summit would be an opportunity to build on relations with countries that could discuss bilateral trade, though they did not name specific nations and no U.K. trade ministers are due at the event.

“There will obviously be trade and investment discussions with a range of partners,” said one of the three people, a U.K. government official, who also noted that the U.K. will raise the impacts of El Niño. “The bigger picture is that we want to use the Commonwealth network to deepen trade and investment links across its 56 members — that Commonwealth advantage is one of the reasons the grouping matters to the UK.”

‘Playing Scrabble with words’

But leaders at these events, known by the awkward acronym CHOGM, can raise whatever topics they wish — reparations included.

Denis O’Brien, the Irish telecoms billionaire who founded the Repair Campaign calling for financial reparations to the Caribbean in 2022, said: “The conversation has moved radically forward.” He urged Britain and other European nations to “start off with an apology and then have an engagement,” adding: “The Foreign Office and the prime minister’s office are playing Scrabble with words — and unfortunately they’re leaving King Charles, who is so highly respected in the Caribbean, in a very difficult position.”

Paul Boateng, the Labour peer who was Britain’s first Black Cabinet minister and now campaigns on the issue, said Caribbean nations “are going to be pressing it. This issue is not going to go away.” The recent UN resolution reinforced Caribbean and African nations’ argument, argued Boateng: “We can’t be seen to simply ignore it … We cannot hold the Foreign Office line that it changes nothing.”

That position cast a long shadow two years ago.

No. 10 flew to Samoa in 2024 insisting reparations were “not on the agenda,” even though the summit’s free-wheeling format meant the choice was effectively out of Downing Street’s hands. 

This message “went down like a bag of sick” with Caribbean nations who saw it as “colonial” and “arrogant,” recalled one person involved in conversations at the time.

The handling created tension between Downing Street and the Foreign Office, then led by David Lammy, who also attended, according to six other people with knowledge of the 2024 trip. 

One of the six people said No. 10 figures had expected the Foreign Office to better manage expectations among Commonwealth nations ahead of Starmer’s arrival. The person said: “No. 10 did not feel like they were well enough informed, and felt some of this could and should have been handled in advance. There was the feeling that both Lammy and the Foreign Office were institutionally pre-disposed to this sort of stuff and not shutting it down. The PM didn’t know what he was going into.”

A second person said: “​​The FCDO world does forget, sometimes, the politics of what’s going on in the U.K. It’s very institutionalized.”

A third person stressed that senior aides in No. 10 had blamed Foreign Office officials, not Lammy personally. Before Starmer left office this year, No. 10 had been drawing up plans for Starmer to skip this year’s CHOGM — and send Lammy as his representative. By then Lammy had been moved from the foreign office and was Starmer’s deputy prime minister.

Another of the six people countered that it was No. 10 that persisted, ahead of the 2024 summit, with a line that was too binary — reparatory justice, as campaigners prefer to call it, has a wide definition that includes support for climate adaptation and education — and failed to listen to Foreign Office warnings ahead of time about the strength of feeling among Commonwealth nations.

“The audit trail would completely exonerate David and the Foreign Office,” this person said. They argued No. 10 officials — who were keen to hold on to the mantle of fiscal responsibility ahead of Starmer’s first budget — had viewed the row too much through how it would be perceived by the right-wing Daily Mail newspaper.

Two other people with knowledge of the 2024 trip insisted they did not remember any significant friction between No. 10 and the Foreign Office. Lammy’s office did not immediately respond to an invitation to comment.

UK review mooted a scaled-back summit

More significantly, the 2024 summit also led to discussions in Whitehall about the set-up of CHOGM itself.

Lammy commissioned an internal review by Foreign Office officials on the Commonwealth in the wake of the 2024 summit, his former Special Adviser Ben Judah told POLITICO.

Judah said the review suggested reducing the frequency of CHOGMs to “every four or five years,” potentially aligned with the hosting of the Commonwealth Games, and seeking to remove the final communique and leaders’ retreat.

It suggested an investment conference in alternate years modeled on the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, which could keep the Commonwealth branding but with no organizational role for the Secretariat, said Judah.

Judah suggested this would improve attendance at CHOGM, which is often patchy; India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi does not plan to attend next week’s summit, for example, though there will be a delegation led by External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar.  “The Indians think this thing is ridiculous and self-harming and just totally bizarre,” said Judah. “They’d be interested in a real investment conference, not this farce.”

A second former U.K. government official said they knew about the report, which has not been made public, adding that No. 10 figures under Starmer discussed similar concerns about the format of the Commonwealth summit after the Samoa visit.

The Foreign Office declined to respond to questions about the report when contacted by POLITICO, including when it was finalized or whether any of its recommendations were pursued. One Foreign Office official, however, stressed that it was not the U.K. government’s position and that any decisions about future CHOGM arrangements would be for Commonwealth members collectively.

The U.K. government official quoted on trade and investment earlier in this piece said: “The Commonwealth is more important to our geostrategic position now than at any time throughout its 80-year history. In today’s more divided, unpredictable world, the Commonwealth has the potential to be a powerful, values-based force for good in the world.

“This gives us a huge opportunity to drive U.K. interests and priorities — Commonwealth relationships have helped to drive global support for Ukraine, and it is hugely important for our work on climate.”

Funding pulled from reserves

Judah, however, argued that the Commonwealth Secretariat is a “broken institution” and Britain should wind down its involvement to focus on an investment summit instead.

CHOGM has ended up as a “platform for the reparations campaign,” argued Judah: “There’s nothing else on the agenda because it’s not a real international organization, and it’s not a real summit with deliverables.” The Commonwealth and Secretariat, he said, has “essentially been taken over by the only countries that are still really invested in them, which are the Caribbean countries supported by a few African countries, to push the reparations agenda.”

For some, that extends to questions about the way the Secretariat spends its money.

Two people with knowledge of the situation said part of this year’s CHOGM summit is being paid for out of the Secretariat’s reserves. “There is a real sense of concern about the malaise and drift of the organization,” argued one of the two people. “Financially it’s in a dire, dire state.”

A Commonwealth spokesperson responded: “The Commonwealth Secretariat accesses reserve funds for the biennial Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting and always with member country approval.”

Back in 2024, Starmer’s most senior aides privately raised the question about whether he should attend the Samoa summit at all. “We were overruled,” said another person who worked under him.

Whitehall officials initially assumed that Burnham would not go either, until he said otherwise. “To a lot of the Caribbean countries, the word [from officials] was that he wasn’t going to show,” said O’Brien. “I think people were taken aback by that.”

But despite Starmer’s experience in 2024, Burnham will attend. 

Among all other reasons, there is one very obvious one. “It’s very difficult for a prime minister not to go because the king goes,” said one person who worked under Starmer. “It’s important to him.”

Burnham’s ‘surer touch’

Once Burnham is in the room, campaigners hope he will at least be a listening ear.

Outside the prime minister’s Manchester office No. 10 North is a statue of Abraham Lincoln, commemorating the mill workers who refused to touch raw cotton picked by slaves.

Burnham referred to it in his first speech to the United Nations last month. “In 1862, people with little power used it to help those with none on the other side of the world,” he said. “The best change is change like that, bottom-up change led by people.”

The new prime minister “understands the importance of Manchester as the second great city of empire, and he has a surer touch than his predecessors,” argued Boateng. “We’ve got an opportunity to reset the relationship.”

What reparatory justice would look like is another matter. 

Previous estimates have suggested Britain should owe as much as £18 trillion, but the conversation is far more nuanced than talking about a single big number.

While Boateng argues that no measures should be taken off the table, he would begin with reforming the International Monetary Fund and World Bank to give more Commonwealth countries a meaningful seat at the table, and returning historic artefacts such as the Benin bronzes that are displayed in London’s British Museum. “The British Museum holds loot, literally loot. These are stolen goods,” he said.

Britain is working on debt relief too. Chancellor John Healey plans to make international finance for developing countries a key theme when Britain hosts G20 finance ministers next year. 

NGOs have urged Healey to make debt relief more generous by changing the G20’s common framework and UK domestic law, which sets the terms for 90% of debt that low-income countries owe to private lenders.

Maria Finnerty of Bond, the membership body for NGOs, said Britain “continues to play a role in enabling illicit financial flows through loopholes linked to the City of London and its overseas territories, amounting to the loss of billions from some Commonwealth countries.”

Miliband reflected all this in his POLITICO interview last month at the Labour Party Conference. While condemning the slave trade as “terrible,” he said his focus was on addressing current issues in countries “on the front line of the climate crisis, of the debt burden, of trying to reduce poverty in those countries.”

O’Brien is calling for monetary payments, however. Through the Repair Campaign, he wants to see the EU and U.K. make money available to the 15 Caribbean Community (CARICOM) countries — with a special case for Haiti — “each year for the next 75 years” for issues such as education, green energy and storm defenses to deal with climate change. 

O’Brien would not be drawn on a single figure, but suggested payments should supplement the national budget of each affected country by around 10% a year.

Asked if he had had conversations with the Foreign Office, O’Brien replied: “What do you think?

“I mean, we would like to. We’re approaching this in a very friendly way, taking a very, very sensitive period of history and trying to get results. We have the highest respect for the British government, and particularly the King. But it can’t go on forever.”

Night falls in the European capital. Everything’s quiet, but the nightmares are about to begin.

Viktor Orbán’s ghost haunts the Schuman roundabout; ash from the bonfire of red tape covers the Justus Lipsius building; Ursula von der Leyen’s chief of staff, Björn Seibert, chases after staffers demanding to know what “associate membership” for Canada actually means; and MEPs tremble at the prospect of construction workers uncovering the skeletons of political intrigues past during renovations.

Scared? You should be.

Here’s our guide to who is terrified of whom in the Brussels bubble. 

Everyone is scared of Marine Le Pen

The person haunting EU diplomats, officials and lawmakers is French presidential front-runner Marine Le Pen. Will she really halve Paris’ contribution to the EU budget, as promised? Will she pull Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni away from the Brussels mainstream? And will she demand von der Leyen’s head?

The bubble had warmed (slightly) to the idea of Jordan Bardella in the Élysée Palace, after his years leading the National Rally’s European operation revealed a certain pragmatism toward Brussels — only for those hopes to be shattered when a Paris appeals court cleared Le Pen to be a candidate for the presidency.

The next ECB chief is scared of Jean-Luc Mélenchon

The European Central Bank president is the euro’s last line of defense against unorthodox national economic decisions — but that could be tested by French presidential candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon, who is on course to reach the runoff after vowing to set billions of euros of French debt “on fire.” His incendiary plan calls on the Frankfurt-based ECB to waive interest payments on a vast tranche of French bonds — an unorthodox, perhaps impossible, maneuver that critics warn could even see France kicked out of the euro.

Now that we know Christine Lagarde will step down as ECB president in February, what France’s presidential candidates want to do about its monumental debt pile will haunt the race for her successor, with Dutchman Klaas Knot and Spaniard Pablo Hernández de Cos as the two frontrunners.

Lobbyists are scared of ChatGPT

The number of amendments lawmakers have filed has exploded since generative AI arrived, with key EU laws now facing thousands of proposed text changes. Parliament officials don’t think it’s a coincidence, with some pointing to amendments written in suspiciously bot-like language, and others saying sometimes amendments cite legislation that does not even exist.

The growing pile of amendments is haunting lobbyists, parliamentary assistants and officials forced to track and sort through it all — along with the fear that AI could eventually replace them. Spare a thought, too, for the MEPs who may have to vote through the amendments one by one, with hands raised in plenary. 

Commission officials are scared of Austria’s Europe minister

Well-heeled Commission officials (and their families) are spooked by Austria’s Europe Minister Claudia Bauer, who has been leading a push to slash the Commission’s administration expenditure — which pays eurocrats’ salaries and offices — in the next seven-year budget. The campaign, backed by most EU capitals, resulted in an 8% cut to the admin budget in the latest budget proposal.

Bauer is so feared that EU officials joke they reduce their delegations’ size whenever they travel to Austria.

Jessika Roswall is scared of Stéphane Séjourné and Valdis Dombrovskis

Environment Commissioner Jessika Roswall and her department have reason to fear industry boss Stéphane Séjourné, who is taking the lead on the upcoming Circular Economy Act, despite Roswall’s official title of Commissioner “for a Competitive Circular Economy.” Making matters spookier, Roswall’s environment department now shares the Breydel building with Séjourné’s internal market and industry department, setting the stage for some chilling corridor encounters as Roswall pushes for greater environmental protection while Séjourné prioritizes industrial growth.

Roswall is also under pressure from EU simplification chief Valdis Dombrovskis to cut red tape on several environmental laws. The Latvian commissioner, who oversees the omnibus packages, wants a deal before year-end. Meanwhile, the center-right European People’s Party continues to press the Commission to reopen laws on birds, habitats, and water — the EU’s oldest nature protection laws — so they can be simplified too.

Alexander Stubb is afraid of Kaja Kallas and António Costa

Kaja Kallas has not publicly addressed the call that Finnish President Alexander Stubb made to Russia’s Vladimir Putin, but the EU’s top diplomat has made clear she dislikes such outreach. Still, if Putin offered serious talks and concessions, Kallas would be the obvious person to answer: as coordinating EU foreign and security policy is her job. “Of course I will talk if such an opportunity presents itself,” she told Estonian media in September when asked about speaking with Putin or his Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.

Also reaching for the phone: António Costa. EU diplomats note that the European Council president represents the bloc at the leaders’ level abroad. That institutional turf war may explain why Stubb stressed that he and Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Støre spoke only for their own countries — not for Europe.

Manfred Weber is scared of his own group …

What keeps the leader of the European People’s Party — Europe’s largest political family — up at night? Divisions within his own ranks. So far, Weber has kept a tight ship and wants to reunite his troops ahead of the 2029 EU election, which he is casting as a battle against the far right. But that may prove tricky as the EPP’s national delegations increasingly clash over whether to work with the far right or isolate them.

… and the group is scared of Ouarda Bensouag

Central to Weber’s strategy is Ouarda Bensouag, the group’s secretary-general and his chief of staff. One of his most trusted lieutenants, she has a reputation as a smart but ruthless operator who EPP staffers fear when crossing paths in the Parliament’s labyrinthine hallways.

No one is scared of the Parliament … but they should be

Parliament’s attempts to spook capitals over the next long-term budget have been borderline tragic so far: It keeps threatening to kill the budget, but nobody seems to care or believe it will.

They should care. When it comes time to pass the budget, 361 of 720 votes will be needed, and the margin could be razor-thin in a fragmented chamber that’s hostile to plans to pool farm and regional funds. The louder MEPs protest — and the longer the Council ignores them — the more determined they become to prove the threat is real.

By Max Griera, Gregorio Sorgi, Kathryn Carlson, Nick Vinocur, Jakob Weizman, Fiona McNally and Eliza Gkritsi

LUXEMBOURG — Europe’s energy ministers are running out of ideas to protect citizens from surging energy prices as winter approaches.

But at a summit in Luxembourg on Thursday, they were clear on one thing: Demanding voters cut back on power use is not an option.  

European gas prices soared above €100 per megawatt-hour on Wednesday for the first time since 2022, as last-minute panic-buying to fill European gas reserves added to supply pressures linked to the war in the Middle East.  

But at the Thursday summit, EU energy ministers broadly acknowledged that both Brussels and national capitals had run out of ideas to contain price pressures.

“We’ve exhausted most of our short-term options,” said one senior European energy official, granted anonymity to offer a candid perspective. “What’s left is really crisis management.”

For the past year, government attempts to cushion price rises with renewables schemes, windfall taxes and costly fuel subsidies have ultimately failed to contain anxieties that have since boiled over into widespread protests across the continent.

“The EU and member states don’t have a magic wand to make the price increases go away,” Irish Energy Minister Darragh O’Brien, whose government holds the EU’s six-month rotating presidency, told reporters. “There’s a lot of measures that have been taken already in the short term. What today is about is actually seeing how we can move to more sustainable measures.”

But even crisis management is proving politically difficult. Despite calls by EU energy chief Dan Jørgensen earlier this year to encourage consumers and businesses to cut energy use, European ministers are reluctant to make such a move official policy.

“I don’t want to see that we will limit people,” said Mika Nykänen, the state secretary to Finland’s energy ministry. Instead, he called for policy designed to “change behavior” and reduce energy consumption less painfully. “Industry does it naturally. Normal households, normal families — they sometimes need encouragement,” he said. “For instance, subsidies to invest in the energy efficiency of houses, windows.”

Demand reduction “has an impact on industry, it has an impact on business, and in a difficult situation, it could be the way to do that. But it does not … solve the long-term,” Polish Secretary of State for Energy Wojciech Wrochna told reporters.

High prices “will regulate demand by itself,” Swedish Energy Minister Ebba Busch told reporters.

Fossil fuel subsidies

Such was the opposition to demand reduction measures on Thursday, Jørgensen — who was at the summit warning of a “difficult” winter of soaring fuel prices ahead — gave up even proposing it, focusing instead on subsidies. He reluctantly accepted that such subsidies could include fossil fuels as well as clean alternatives, but urged that they be “targeted and temporary.”

Since the war started, governments have paid €18 billion for tax relief on fossil fuel products, including a controversial move by Rome earlier this month to reduce the impact of gas prices on electricity costs.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen warned national leaders against this tendency, urging them at a summit this month to keep policies temporary and targeted to avoid inadvertently increasing fossil fuel demand and distorting the EU single market, according to two EU diplomats familiar with her comments.

That remains a point of contention among EU leaders, with some, including Greece, calling for greater fiscal space to increase energy subsidies while others warn of the dangers of subsidizing fossil fuels.

“Our concern is to make sure that we don’t create conditions where different member states go very far in different national decision-making,” said Lithuanian Energy Minister Lukas Savickas in a separate interview.

Jørgensen did not respond to POLITICO’s question at a subsequent press conference when asked whether new fiscal flexibilities were being considered.

Other ideas have gone by the wayside. Von der Leyen rejected calls by countries to establish an EU-wide tax on windfall profits of oil and gas companies at this month’s summit, the diplomats cited above said even as European oil companies like Shell, TotalEnergies and Repsol rake in their biggest profits since 2022.

Member countries also questioned the value of a Commission proposal to coordinate the purchase of energy supplies. Such a scheme would work in theory but be hard to implement for “big players” with established supply chains, Wrochna said.

Neither has the EU’s commitment to hastening the release of strategic crude oil and diesel reserves earlier this month — in response to what EU officials described as U.S. “blackmail” — done much to ease fuel costs.

Even so, the EU’s commitment will now include over 40 million barrels on top of the 10 million pledged by Paris, France’s economy minister Roland Lescure told reporters on Thursday.

A parallel push to delay methane monitoring requirements — a plank of the EU’s 2024 Green Deal that industry argued was poorly designed and would disrupt supplies — also had no impact on prices.

Slow pay-off

To be sure, measures designed to lower electricity prices and encourage consumers to switch away from imported fossil fuels are starting to work, with soaring sales of heat pumps and electric vehicles in Europe this year. “There’s no silver bullet, but when you add all of these things up, it can actually matter,” said Jørgensen.

But even longer-term efforts to encourage the switch to cleaner energy are facing backlash as countries resist ceding power to Brussels.

One example is a Commission proposal to make electricity bills more affordable and speed up electrification, including by ensuring electricity is not taxed more heavily than natural gas. Member countries pushed back against the proposal’s taxation provisions on Thursday, arguing that Brussels is overstepping EU treaties requiring that tax changes be approved unanimously, risking higher costs for households and industry.

Busch, the Swedish energy minister, said the proposal’s taxation provisions went too far, warning it would face “a lot of pushback” from countries concerned about EU interference in national tax policy.

Germany and Poland also raised concerns about the proposal’s potential impact on industry and national tax systems, while Italy warned that changing tax rates could make energy more expensive rather than encourage electrification.

KYIV – Russia struck a railway platform in the central Ukrainian city of Dnipro on Thursday, killing at least 14 people in what Mayor Borys Filatov described as an act “of genocidal war.”

“In Dnipro, the Russian forces directed a drone straight at the railway station platform, where many people were waiting for a train. As of this moment, 14 people have been killed, and at least 14 others have been wounded,” State Emergency Service of Ukraine said in a statement.

Russia also killed civilians in residential districts of Kremenchuk in сentral Ukraine and in the center of Chernihiv in the north of the country, emergency services said. Three people were killed in Kremenchuk and another 15 were injured, while two children died in the strikes on Chernihiv, where 23 people were injured, including a 10-month-old baby girl. Houses, shops, and cars were also damaged, the statement says.

“Just how many terrorist strikes has Russia carried out against our people since sanctions were lifted on certain Russian oligarchs and the Russian energy sector, rather than de-escalating?” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in a Facebook post after the strikes.

“This is precisely why Ukraine has always said that just and decisive action by America and Europe is needed in response to Russian escalation … It is time for new, stronger sanctions steps by the EU, the United States, and the G7,” Zelenskyy added.

Czech President Petr Pavel condemned the attack as “inexcusable,” while French President Emmanuel Macron said the incident underlined the need to “redouble our efforts for a just and lasting peace and bring Russia to the negotiating table.”

Russia’s defense ministry said Moscow carried out strikes in places where Ukraine was producing drones and on logistical routes used to transport weapons.

Russia downed most of the 613 Ukrainian drones heading towards Moscow overnight on Thursday, the capital city’s mayor Sergey Sobyanin said. He did not give details on the extent of the damage.

We live in an era where wars are fought not just on battlefields, but also on our screens, in our minds and through the narratives we are led to believe. Narratives are influencing perception while missiles destroy infrastructure. What happens when the war for truth becomes more dangerous than the actual battle itself? Who’s controlling the narrative?

When wars end, the fighting over what they meant begins: who won, who was to blame and who can be trusted to keep the peace. These questions are settled less on the battlefield than on screens, in feeds and in group chats. For a Middle East emerging from the war that began on February 28, that contest may decide whether any new security order holds.

The region is now asking what comes after deterrence. That question brought policymakers, military leaders and researchers from the United States, Europe, Asia and the Gulf to the TRENDS 6^th Annual Conference, held in Abu Dhabi and organized by TRENDS Global, in collaboration with its global offices. The answer cannot be measured only in missiles and alliances. Information resilience should be treated as security infrastructure, planned and funded like air defense, not managed as public relations.

What happens when the war for truth becomes more dangerous than the actual battle itself?

The struggle over perception can now matter as much as events on the ground. That is no longer hyperbole. In any crisis today, governments, media outlets, political movements and non-state groups compete in real time to define what is happening. Disinformation, coordinated propaganda and now content generated by artificial intelligence (AI) mean a false account can reach millions before an official one is drafted.

As former BBC correspondent Karen Allen put it at the conference, “Now in an instant, I’m able to influence millions of people,” and algorithm manipulation is what we are increasingly seeing.

This year’s war showed how real that is. Within days of the first U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran, an AI-generated video of Dubai’s Burj Khalifa on fire, with crowds fleeing, was viewed tens of millions of times, according to BBC Verify. Fabricated images of damaged U.S. facilities in the Gulf spread just as fast, some posted by Iranian state-linked outlets. UAE Minister of State Noura Al Kaabi later described the attacks on the country as coming “from the sky and behind our screens.” Her government’s answer was to treat “fake news and misinformation as a security threat.”

A more damaging false story was not a single video. It was the idea that the Gulf was a party to the war. The UAE did not want this war and said so. On March 3, Minister of State Reem Al Hashimy said the UAE did not “seek to expand the circle of confrontation,” that it had “repeatedly confirmed” its territory could not be used for any military operation against Iran, and that “returning to the negotiating table is the only rational way forward.” The attacks continued anyway. Reuters reported, citing UAE defense figures, that 186 ballistic missiles and 812 drones were fired at the country in the first days of the conflict.

Information resilience should be treated as security infrastructure, planned and funded like air defense, not managed as public relations.

Tehran sought to blur that record, framing strikes on Gulf cities as retaliation against American aggression. Its foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, told NBC News that Iran had “not attacked our neighbors,” only “American bases,” and called the hotels hit in Dubai “collateral damage.” Countering that narrative does not require propaganda of our own. It requires putting the record in front of the world quickly and repeatedly: the UAE’s public calls for restraint before the war, its refusal to let its territory be used against Iran, and the hundreds of missiles and drones fired at it, most of which it shot down. Facts published fast, through verified channels, in Arabic, English and Farsi, are harder to bury than corrections issued too late.

Even after a war ends, the threats do not disappear; they simply take different forms. Ceasefires and reconstruction depend on public trust. If populations come to believe that the peace is a betrayal, or that a neighbor cannot be trusted, no deterrence framework or security pact will survive contact with domestic politics. Spoilers understand this. Their cheapest weapon is a story.

Seen from the Gulf, the lesson of recent years is that speed and credibility beat silence. Crisis communication is not a side function of security. When official channels inform the public quickly, consistently and honestly, rumors have less room to grow. When they hesitate, someone else fills the gap.

None of this is simple. Governments everywhere are still working out where countering disinformation ends and controlling speech begins, and that debate should stay open. But the common ground is wider than it looks: a society cannot be secure if it cannot tell what is true.

The harder test comes now. After a war, influence campaigns shift from shock to slow erosion: relitigating who was to blame, questioning whether Gulf governments can protect their people, and setting neighbors and communities against each other. Young connected audiences are the main target. They are also the best defense.

Protecting our societies from that influence does not mean closing them. It means official channels fast and credible enough that people turn to them first. It means platforms held to clear rules on labeling AI-generated conflict content, as X began to do in March. And it means a generation of young Emiratis and Gulf citizens equipped to verify what they see and able to tell the region’s story themselves rather than leaving it to others.

The harder test comes now. After a war, influence campaigns shift from shock to slow erosion.

This is not only a Gulf problem. The campaigns aimed at audiences in the Gulf also shape how Washington and Brussels understand the region. The UAE and its partners already work closely on defense and intelligence. Detecting and exposing cross-border influence operations belongs on that shared agenda as a joint effort between governments, platforms and researchers.

Diplomacy, investment, and deterrence will rebuild the region’s security. Whether that security holds will depend on something harder to measure: what people across the region believe about each other, and about who protects them. For the UAE, winning that argument with facts is not public relations. It is part of keeping the country safe.

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Najla Al Midfa is an Emirati researcher at TRENDS Research & Advisory, a company under TRENDS Group. Her research focuses on geopolitics, international relations, economic diplomacy and regional security, with a particular interest in the UAE’s foreign policy and strategic partnerships. She holds a master’s degree in Global Affairs and Diplomatic Leadership from the Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy, where her thesis examined the UAE’s economic diplomacy through its Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement strategy.

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Sources

• Sixth Annual TRENDS Conference 2026 kicks off on October 12 — WAM (Emirates News Agency), September 2026
• TRENDS 6th Annual Conference 2026 — Sustainable Security: programme and speakers — TRENDS Research & Advisory
• AI-generated Iran war videos surge as creators use new tech to cash in — BBC Verify, March 7, 2026
• Factbox: Iranian missiles and drones fired at Gulf countries — Reuters (republished by Al-Monitor), March 3, 2026
• X suspends revenue sharing for undisclosed AI war videos — AFP, March 3, 2026
• UAE urges the US, Israel and Iran to return to the negotiating table — Euronews, March 4, 2026
• Fake news treated as security threat during Iran war, says UAE minister — The National, September 15, 2026
• NBC News, “Iran’s foreign minister denies seeking war with neighbors,” March 2026. https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/irans-foreign-minister-denies-seeking-war-neighbors-rcna261954

KYIV — With another bitter winter of fighting in the Russia-Ukraine war ahead, diplomatic activity is ramping back up in a fresh attempt to close in on a ceasefire and eventually a final peace accord.

Under renewed pressure from U.S. President Donald Trump, Kyiv and Moscow are preparing to send negotiating teams to Abu Dhabi for a three-way meeting with American officials to explore the potential for agreement. The meeting is penciled in for Nov. 10. 

But many questions about the process remain, including whether Europe will have a seat at the table when key decisions are taken — and who should fill it. Based on remarks from key leaders, and conversations with European officials granted anonymity because the talks are sensitive, POLITICO breaks down what’s under discussion for an agreement and what could get in the way.

What will they discuss? 

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy says the agenda for Abu Dhabi should first include initial steps toward de-escalation, such as prisoner swaps and ceasefires on energy infrastructure and for the Black Sea. There should also be a discussion among the technical negotiating teams of what format a future three-way meeting between leaders — Trump, Zelenskyy and Russia’s Vladimir Putin — should take, he told reporters this week.

When it comes to a final deal, one overriding question for Ukraine is what form of security guarantees it will get from Europe and the U.S., or potentially NATO. Zelenskyy won’t want to accept anything he believes could leave Ukraine vulnerable to a future attack from Russia. 

Putin is also likely to raise the need for security guarantees — for Russia — including limiting or potentially reversing NATO’s presence in the neighborhood. 

Then there’s the question of territory. Zelenskyy’s view is that marking out any boundaries, temporarily or permanently, is something that can only be discussed at leader level. “No one else has the authority to do so,” he said Tuesday. 

Zelenskyy said during previous sets of negotiations over the past year, “as a compromise,” that Ukraine had been prepared to discuss the idea of a demilitarized “buffer zone” on both sides of the contact line in the Donbas region.

Similar ideas were proposed for other parts of Ukraine. Zelenskyy said his negotiators discussed these questions again with the Americans in recent weeks. “We are ready to discuss the issue of territories because the Russians keep wanting to discuss it and make it part of the agenda,” he said. But this would need to be at a leader-level meeting. 

Europe has a role 

European leaders are adamant that they must be included in final negotiations, not least because it is they who are are now providing the vast bulk of financial and military support to Ukraine. Trump ended American aid in 2025.

Zelenskyy and U.S. officials accept that European governments will likely need to be involved in discussions about security guarantees — mainly because any peacekeeping forces deployed to Ukraine would be dominated by European troops.

The Coalition of the Willing, a loose alliance of more than 30 countries led by France, the U.K. and Germany, put together detailed proposals in coordination with the U.S. almost a year ago. Ukraine is also interested in exploring bilateral security guarantees with the U.S., a discussion that would not need to involve European officials.

Plans for rebuilding Ukraine and nurturing its economic revival would also have to involve Europe, Zelenskyy said. “We cannot envision such a, so to speak, ‘Marshall Plan’ without Europe.”

But Europe doesn’t know who should speak for it 

Trump’s renewed interest in Ukraine also resurfaced some sore questions for European governments: Who should represent them when it comes to decision time? And should they even be talking to Putin at all? 

With no clarity emerging from Brussels, some leaders have taken matters into their own hands. On Tuesday, Finland’s President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre held a 90-minute call with Putin, urging him to end the war. It went down badly with several European governments, including Denmark, Italy, Sweden and Lithuania. One frustrated diplomat said: “There are too many middle-aged men who want to end up in the history books having solved this war.”

Russia has said the Stubb-Støre call achieved nothing of substance and the war will likely “escalate.” By some accounts, Putin used much of the time on the phone lecturing the Nordic leaders on regional history. 

One problem in identifying a lead negotiator is that the European countries with a stake in the talks are not only in the EU — the U.K. and Norway, for example, are both outside the bloc. Without clarity of leadership, European interests risk being sidelined when the talking gets serious. 

It all comes down to Trump 

One critical unknown factor in the mix is how long Trump’s attention will stay on Ukraine.

After the U.S. and Israel launched a war with Iran in the spring, progress on Ukraine stalled for months, only to return this fall as Trump sought to mitigate the impact of the Middle East conflict. A new escalation in the Iran war risks sidelining the negotiations all over again. 

The U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff held talks with Zelenskyy, Stubb and Støre in Oslo on Oct. 20. Witkoff then went to St. Petersburg to meet Putin the next day. There was supposed to be a follow-up meeting in Brussels this week in preparation for negotiations in Abu Dhabi — but the Americans postponed the talks, apparently due to developments in the Middle East. 

“The meeting in Abu Dhabi now depends on the American side,” Zelenskyy said Tuesday. At a press conference Wednesday, he added: “We very much hope that the escalatory processes in the Middle East — which are currently the subject of so much discussion — will not interfere.”

Putin can wait 

After their Kremlin call, Stubb and Støre apparently told Zelenskyy they felt Putin was serious about the Abu Dhabi opportunity. But in public and private, diplomats and political leaders in Europe are deeply skeptical that Putin is at all serious about an imminent path to peace.

Despite the Kremlin insisting he is on board, European diplomats believe the Russian leader is just playing for time in the hope that Ukraine weakens over a winter of attacks on its energy system, and Europe — perhaps with the far-right Marine Le Pen in charge of France — gets tired of paying for the war and gives up next year. 

That’s why EU officials know they cannot pin their hopes on peace and need to redouble their financial support and military aid for Ukraine, while tightening sanctions on Russia. EU leaders will discuss the issue of securing funds for Ukraine’s war effort at their summit in Brussels scheduled for November 26.

Nicholas Vinocur in Brussels contributed to this report.

LONDON — Andy Burnham became Britain’s prime minister 100 days ago on a pledge to end 40 years of neoliberalism. His first budget announced he wouldn’t do that on the front page.

Wednesday’s 150-page red book was titled “breathing space for today, fresh hope for the future”, a confession, with true British modesty, that it was a stepping stone to bigger pledges downstream.

Burnham’s top finance minister, Chancellor John Healey, unveiled 98 changes, including help for most households’ energy bills, which are due to spike this winter because of Donald Trump’s war with Iran, and a £10 billion defense package to support Ukraine.

Many of the tax tweaks were limited and technical, including an 8% cut to tariffs on soy milk. Healey’s ambition was reined in by surging global oil prices and a political choice by his boss not to blow the doors off yet.

Burnham has reviews on the creaking welfare system, devolving power to the regions and a “10-year plan” all coming before Christmas. Only then can he grind out the numbers for next year’s spending review.

The Labour MP Darren Jones, who served in the Treasury until Burnham arrived in July, called it a “steady-as-she-goes budget” that was to be expected. Many Labour MPs were happy, cheering measures for their area and pointing toward a bigger bang later on. Industry lobby groups could grasp onto something in their area of expertise.

But with U.K. growth struggling, others were less generous. Joe Shalam of the center-right Centre for Social Justice think tank called it the “fudge-it budget.” Tory leader Kemi Badenoch asked: “Is that it?”

Perhaps the trickiest response for Burnham was from Mainstream, the left-wing campaign group that helped propel him to the Labour leadership this year. “Ending 40 years of neoliberalism can only be delivered by radical action,” read a statement by the group’s interim council.

POLITICO looks at five other takeaways from Wednesday’s budget.

1) We’re in the holding pen

The chancellor’s big bazooka was to slap a much-anticipated tax rise on banks — but he surprised many by saying it will last only 15 months. It will raise less than £1 billion in its peak year.

It wasn’t the only temporary measure Healey unveiled on Wednesday. He extended existing cuts to fuel duty, a tax cut on household energy bills and a £2 cap on bus fares, but only until 2027. They will all need to be reviewed again before his next annual budget.

Likewise, some of Healey’s spending plans thin out after a few years, which suggests they may need topping up later. This applies even to the areas closest to Burnham’s heart. Budget documents suggest support to end rough sleeping will total £1.1 billion in the two years from April 2027 but only £270 million in the three years after that.

There were plenty of changes, of course, such as to writing-down allowances, property income taxes and tax on savings. Whitehall will have to find more administration cuts while tax inspectors hunt down another £3.2 billion a year. But the Institute for Fiscal Studies, a non-partisan economic think tank, called it all a “hodgepodge” of “fiddly measures” that would do little to affect growth.

Many of the more fundamental decisions were kicked down the road. Healey has committed to spending 3.5% of GDP on defense by 2035, but will only spell out how to fund it in a spending review at some point in 2027. Major reforms to the welfare system — spending on which is still rocketing — will only be decided after two reports by the Labour grandees Stephen Timms and Alan Milburn are published in November.

Healey published a “fiscal devolution roadmap” that spelled out a path to handing regional mayors full control of the business rates raised in their areas by the end of the decade, but this has an element of wait-and-see too.

Healey had a narrative for his cautious approach. “I decided on an early budget to give the country a bit of breathing space and to provide stability and direction in the face of speculation,” he told MPs Wednesday. “We’ll continue to map out that direction for Britain through the prime minister’s 10-year plan and the spending review.”

This is not the Burnham who complained Britain was “in hock to the bond markets” last year.

2) Everything is terrible, so blame the White House.

Burnham and Healey can blame Trump — up to a point.

The chancellor said the headwinds that once faced Britain are now “global economic storms,” fueled above all by the U.S. conflict with Iran. “We did not want this war,” Healey told MPs.

Journalists spent Wednesday trawling through the usual gloomy parade of numbers about the U.K. economy produced by the independent Office for Budget Responsibility. Britain’s projected growth in 2027 was cut from 1.6% to 1% (though Treasury officials insisted GDP per person will rise overall by the end of the decade).

Healey chose to leave himself with a smaller fiscal buffer than his predecessor Rachel Reeves, telling MPs he had used it to “absorb the impact of the Iran war.” He also raised net taxes by £7 billion a year, though this was far less than the £26 billion in Reeves’ last budget.

But the situation is so volatile that these numbers, based on market energy prices in mid-August, are probably already out of date. The OBR’s “severe shock scenario” had oil prices peaking at around $115 a barrel in the first half of 2027. They already hit that level this week.

Healey insisted that Britain is doing well in the circumstances; his ministers all point to an International Monetary Fund prediction that the U.K.’s deficit will be the lowest in the G7 by 2029.

Opposition parties, however, paint a picture of a nation where everything is just getting gloomier. The tax take was already on course to rise to a record high; Healey broke that record again on Wednesday. (It is now due to reach 38.6% of GDP.) Britain’s spending on debt interest has almost tripled since 2020.

3) Defense spending is still a big, big headache

Healey resigned as defense secretary under former Prime Minister Keir Starmer in June to protest the lack of military spending — but now faces mounting unanswered questions about his own plans.

Healey did two big new things on defense spending on Wednesday. First, he confirmed an open secret in Westminster: he plans to reach 3% of GDP by 2030 — on a path to NATO’s 3.5% by 2035 — but repeated that the details of how he’ll pay for it will only be spelled out in next year’s spending review.

Secondly and more significantly, he outlined his plan to plug a ​​£1.8 billion-a-year gap in Starmer’s defense investment plan — but provided only scant details. 

The Treasury said it will be paid for by shaving 1% off each Whitehall department’s capital budget in the coming years. However, those departments have not yet worked out what they will cut; that is a problem for another day. These questions will dog Healey for the next year.

At least one person was delighted: Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The Ukrainian president said the chancellor “made my day” with a £10 billion package of economic and military support to Kyiv. Part of the package needed special sign-off by ministers because civil servants warned they could not guarantee it would provide value for money.

4) There was something to make Labour MPs happy

Much of what Healey did unveil appeared to be aimed at preserving the “Burnham bounce” in the polls and with his own MPs. 

The chancellor called it a “budget for the working people of Britain” and Treasury analysis says it was redistributive, handing the biggest boost to the poorest households (albeit only raising their incomes by 0.6%).

Central to this was Healey’s closest thing to a “rabbit out of the hat” — a £100-per-household cash payment to people living in homes below a certain value this winter. One Labour MP enthused that the criteria for the payment (which Treasury officials say will capture 88% of the poorest households) was “absolutely brilliant” because it will capture working households and those on benefits at the same time.

There was another £1.5 billion for social and affordable housing, a “covenant” to govern new AI data centers and changes to mileage rates for self-employed workers. Burnham has prided himself on being a grassroots politician; it was a grassroots package.

How much voters will notice is another question. The IFS warned the package of “breathing space” measures was still “relatively small.” It could be swallowed by a rise in annual energy bills in January — predictions of which have recently ranged from £276 to £469.

The OBR warned there has been “virtually no growth” in real household disposable income per person over the last decade or so, and predicted “no real earnings growth in 2027” despite Burnham and Healey’s efforts to help.

5) MPs won’t stop chattering about an election

Burnham only has to call an election by mid-2029 and keeps trying to snuff out talk of going earlier — but every prime minister does this until they don’t.

His MPs were studying the budget Wednesday to work out if it makes an early general election more or less likely. It’s fair to say they couldn’t agree.

On the one hand, this cautious budget of temporary measures might suggest Burnham — who needs his own mandate for more radical changes to the electoral system or Britain’s relationship with the EU — is holding out for the country’s backing.

Others would say a cautious stepping-stone budget is hardly the eye-catching approach you would take if you were about to sell yourself to voters. Growth is set to be slow next year; Burnham needs time to turn the economy round and show he can change things.

Burnham told journalists on Wednesday: “I don’t know how many times I’ve done this now, but yes, I can rule out calling a general election in the next 12 months.” The speculation will continue anyway.

Esther Webber, Emilio Casalicchio, Sam Blewett and Charlie Cooper contributed reporting.

CORRECTION: This article was updated on Oct. 29 to better reflect the Centre for Social Justice’s ideological stance.

At some point, maybe around the time Joe Biden declared on the debate stage that he “finally beat Medicare,” Washington got the idea that defeating an old man in an election was easy.

Not always.

Just days before an American election viewed by many voters as an opportunity to neuter an unpopular 80-year-old president, voters in Brazil and Israel delivered a vivid reminder that an old man in his country’s highest office usually didn’t get there by accident.

In Brazil, a decisive majority of voters on Sunday returned left-wing President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva for a fourth term, defying expectations that Brazilians were ready to discard the fiery trade unionist as yesterday’s man. In Israel’s Tuesday election, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — the longest-serving premier in his country’s history — lost his parliamentary majority but may have thwarted his opponents from electing a viable governing coalition.

Lula, 81, and Netanyahu, 77, have almost nothing in common except their age and political resilience. They have towered over their countries for more than a generation, outfoxed prosecutors and humiliated electoral rivals, enraged and entranced Washington. They have done it with the loyal support of voters on the left and right who view each man in heroic terms, as a tireless champion of their interests and a shield against the most fearsome enemies.

President Donald Trump has, at times, shared those political traits. If he has one more escape act left in him, it would look more like what we’ve just seen in Israel and Brazil than anything in Trump’s second term so far.

Since returning to office in 2025, Trump has failed to deliver policy victories that most voters can feel in their own lives, while shedding some of the most important parts of the political identity that forged his populist base. He ran for president in 2024 pledging to whip inflation and railing against needless foreign wars. Trump’s signature acts this term — passing the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, waging a global trade war, attempting regime change in Iran — have made health care, consumer goods and energy more expensive.

What is his closing message in the midterm election? Trump makes one argument consistently: that Democrats are crazy. But you’d be hard-pressed to find a convincing through line in a series of campaign-trail monologues boasting about the economy, trashing individual Democratic candidates as weirdos and subversives, musing about renaming oceans, defending the Cheesecake Factory and admiring Jon Husted’s rock-hard bod.

Compare this to what voters heard in Brazil and Israel: relentless, ruthless, shameless appeals to the political coalitions that Lula and Netanyahu forged over decades.

In Brazil, Lula tapped into the regional and class-based divisions that have defined his electoral career, while offering a buffet of new economic promises to voters in his base. He hiked welfare payments, promised voters free public transit on weekends and endorsed a shorter workweek. His 45-year-old opponent, Flavio Bolsonaro, stumbled in the final days with a dismissive comment alluding to an accident Lula suffered as a young metalworker — a remark apparently taken by many voters as a gratuitous sneer at the working class.

In Netanyahu’s fight for political survival, the Israeli leader delivered an apocalyptic message aimed at polarizing the electorate to his advantage. He posted an AI-generated image of a nuclear strike on Tel Aviv, branded his challengers as soft on Iran and derided Arab political parties as an enemy within. Israeli and American news outlets have reported that Netanyahu pushed the military for a new wave of attacks on Iran before the election, an escalation that might have reshaped the campaign’s final days.

If Trump had approached the midterms with Lula- or Netanyahu-like focus and vigor, he would probably still be a very unpopular president. But he might be a very unpopular president with a firm grip on the red states that control the Senate, instead of scrambling in October to defend Kansas and Mississippi.

Trump’s populist campaign tactics have been comparatively slapdash and unresponsive to voters’ real needs. He floated giving away $5,000 checks to Americans if Republicans keep control of Congress, only to see lawmakers from his own party pan the idea as a budget buster. He has handed out locally tailored goodies — new funding pledges for a pipeline in Alaska, tariff exemptions as a gift to Maine — that might make a difference on the margins but can’t substitute for a national message on the cost of living.

And Trump has not made a concerted effort to heal the breach within the MAGA base over the war in Iran. He has toggled between Bibi-like warnings about nuclear attacks on Southern California and assurances that the war will end after the November election, all while fuel prices stay painfully high for the people who put him in office.

It may add up to the least effective campaign ever for the man who has overwhelmed American politics for 11 and a half years.

And yet, the midterms are not the end of the story.

Even a broad defeat for Republicans next week would leave Trump with half a term to work with. Two more years to recover his footing, return to political basics, reconnect with his base and fight, fight, fight for relevance and recovery. There is a bag of tricks available to him, if he were to get serious about salvaging his presidency.

For Trump’s opponents, the warning from abroad remains: Beware the old man in a hurry.